Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC)
Page 55
While these preparations were going on, the mutilation of the Hermae (square-cut stone figures topped by a head representing Hermes, found in great numbers in porches and temples) took place one night in Athens. This sacrilege greatly shocked the majority of the people, who viewed the incident both as a bad omen for the expedition and as proof of a planned coup to destroy the democracy (6.27). The investigation was widened to cover any other sacrilegious acts, and evidence was supplied of other statues being defaced, and of the Eleusinian mysteries being performed with unauthorized celebrations in private houses (6.28). Alcibiades was implicated in the wider investigation, and his political enemies exploited the situation to bring about his downfall: they deliberately linked the mutilation of the Hermae and the unauthorized celebrations of the mysteries with an oligarchic plot to destroy the democracy, and accused Alcibiades of being involved in the plot. Alcibiades fervently denied the accusation and urged the Athenians to try him at once, as it would be very unwise to send him out on campaign with the worry of such a serious charge against him. However, his enemies were effective in persuading the Athenians of the need to launch the expedition as soon as possible – thus they could engineer a more serious charge in his absence and stir up ill will against him (6.29). The expedition set sail with much pomp in mid-summer.
The campaign of 415
The first disappointment upon their arrival in Italy was the refusal of their ally, Rhegium, to join the Athenian side (6.44). This was quickly followed by the news that Segesta had only 30 talents to contribute to the war effort (6.46). With these considerations in mind it was time for the Athenian generals to hold a council of war to decide their plan of campaign. Nicias was determined to stick literally to the official objectives: they should sail to Selinus, which was the main objective of the expedition, and by force or by persuasion make an agreement between Selinus and Segesta; then sail around the island in a display of Athenian power and return home, unless they found some quick way to help Leontini or gaining some new allies (6.47). This plan was totally unsuited to the situation because it deliberately ignored the real wishes of the Athenians who wanted nothing less than conquest of Sicily. If the Athenian expedition were to return to Athens without having achieved this, it would have been sent out again with less chance of success. More than anything else this plan gives a clear insight into Nicias’ cautious nature and his dislike of the whole Sicilian campaign:
they should not put Athens at risk by wasting its resources.
(Thucydides 6.47)
Alcibiades was appalled at the timidity and lack of enterprise of Nicias’ plan, and believed that such a great task force should achieve something worthy of note. He recommended the use of diplomacy to win over Sicilian allies and supplies, and then proceed against Syracuse and Selinus, confident in their knowledge of whose support they could depend upon. However, they must first of all win over Messina because it was the gateway to Sicily and would make an excellent base for their army and navy (6.48). Alcibiades’ plan had merit in its aim to strengthen the task force by acquiring more allies and in its recognition of the real aim of the expedition, but the element of surprise – so vital in warfare – would be lost. Clearly Alcibiades’ plan was influenced by political considerations: the use of diplomacy would put his particular skills to the fore and avoided any potential military defeat that would result, with the charge still hanging over his head, in the ruin of his political career.
Lamachus had been chosen as general purely and simply on the basis of his military skills, and his plan was shaped by the immediate military situation and not influenced by politics. He advised that they should sail at once to Syracuse and fight a battle as soon as possible under the city walls as the enemy was totally unprepared:
If they made a sudden attack while the enemy were still frightened of their coming, it would be their best chance of victory and would in every respect fill them with fear, both by the sight of the force (for it would appear at its greatest) and by the expectation of their future suffering, but most of all by the immediate danger of battle.
(Thucydides 6.49.2)
Victory in battle against Syracuse would be far more successful than diplomacy in winning over allies to the Athenian cause. He also suggested as their base Megara, which was uninhabited and close to Syracuse by land and by sea. This was the plan that could have achieved success, if it had been implemented: the Syracusans had not set about the mobilization of their forces until the Athenians had reached Rhegium; they had fought no major naval battle since 453 and were facing the best navy in Greece; and their city defences were in a terrible state of disrepair. Lamachus’ judgement was further justified by the early Athenian victories in 415 and the first part of the 414 campaigning season. However, to break the deadlock, he backed Alcibiades’ plan.
Alcibiades’ powers of persuasion failed to win over Messina, which he said was crucial for the Athenians’ success, but the Athenians were well received at Naxos, and gained Catana as a base more by luck than judgement (6.50–51). At this moment came the summons for the recall of Alcibiades to face trial in Athens. His political enemies and rivals had conducted a very effective smear campaign against him, and the Athenians at home were determined to execute him. Alcibiades appeared to acquiesce in the Athenian demands but, when he reached Thurii on the journey home, he escaped and made his way eventually to Sparta (6.60–61). He was condemned to death in his absence, which gave him an even greater incentive to damage Athens.
Meanwhile, Nicias set about implementing his plan by sailing along the north coast of Sicily to Segesta and Selinus in the west of the island; there was also a successful attack on the small town of Hyccara, but an embarrassing failure at Hybla on the south coast near Gela (6.62). It was now October, and very little had been achieved in the three months or so since the arrival of the task force at Rhegium in July. Nothing in fact had been achieved in this period apart from the acquisition of Naxos and Catana as allies, which was to be expected, as they were anti-Syracuse; and the capture of Hyccara. Consequently, as Lamachus had accurately predicted, the Syracusans had put aside their initial panic and were gaining in confidence daily. Nicias’ hesitation to use the forces under his command against the main foe had brought the Athenians into contempt – so much so that the Syracusans urged their generals to take the initiative and attack the Athenian base at Catana (6.63). This shamed Nicias into action and, by a false promise of betrayal by a supposedly anti-Athenian citizen of Catana, he lured the whole Syracusan army to Catana, while the Athenian forces sailed around to the Great Harbour in Syracuse. Nicias might have attempted at this moment to seize Syracuse by assault – which had been done in 461 by 600 mercenaries (Diodorus 11.76.2) – seeing as he had the whole Athenian army outside Syracuse, whose army was now at Catana, but he decided to await its return (6.64–66).
The Syracusans returned as quickly as possible to find the Athenians drawn up in an excellent position. On the next morning, the Athenians advanced to attack, catching the Syracusans unawares, and won a resounding victory by exploiting the Syracusans’ lack of combat experience (6.67–71). The Athenians immediately set sail for Catana:
For it was winter and it seemed impossible to wage war from there [i.e. Syracuse] until cavalry was sent from Athens and collected from the allies in order not to be inferior in this respect, and until money was collected from there and came from Athens.
(Thucydides 6.71.2)
There is much to criticize as the campaign of 415 came to end. Nicias had wasted four months before finally facing the enemy, which he knew that the Athenians had wanted him to attack from the outset. He could not fall back on the excuse that he was unaware of the problems to be faced in Sicily, as he gave a perfect summary of them in his second speech to the Assembly, in particular the quality of their cavalry (6.20–23).Hewasgivenafreehandby the Athenians to prepare whatever armed forces he needed, and yet he used the lack of cavalry as an excuse to postpone any further military action for an
other four months. If Nicias had followed Lamachus’ plan and had attacked at once, the city might have fallen very quickly – compare Brasidas’ sudden and devastating attack on Amphipolis in 424/3 (4.104); if not, then the circumvallation (garrisoned walls or ramparts) could have been built before winter and, with Syracuse cut off from supplies and all outside help, their surrender would have been inevitable. Instead, the Athenians had revealed the areas of their military superiority and by contrast those of Syracusan weakness.
The Syracusans now had four months to rectify these deficiencies, which they did by slimming down their command structure and by introducing a vigorous training programme for their hoplites. In addition, they decided, which ultimately saved Syracuse, to enlarge the line of fortifications so that any future circumvallation would have to be much longer and extend from sea to sea (6.75); this action again reflects on Nicias’ lack of urgency – if he had attacked in the summer of 415, the much shorter distance to be covered would have ensured a quicker construction of the Athenian
Map 8a Sicily
Map 8b The siege of Syracuse
circumvallation (6.72–75). They also requested help from the Peloponnese. The Corinthians were very willing, and the Spartans were won over by the speech of Alcibiades, who was now actively helping the Spartans: he exaggerated the Athenians’ imperial plans to conquer Sicily and Carthage, before they finally turned their increased power on the Peloponnese. He advised them to send out troops, and appoint a first-class commander to organize the defence of Syracuse; and, finally, to renew the war openly against the Athenians, and to do great damage to them by permanently occupying Decelea in Attica (6.88–92). In the event, the Spartans waited another year before seizing Decelea, but sent out Gylippus whose dynamic leadership would be in such contrast to Nicias’ hesitancy.
The campaign of 414
In March 414, with 650 cavalry in all from Athens, Catana and Segesta, Nicias and Lamachus initiated their strategy of circumvallation to capture Syracuse. This involved the seizure of the heights of Epipolae (see Map 8b), which was a triangular plain, stretching from its base at the walls of Syracuse in the east and rising to its apex near Euryelus in the west; the north and south sides of the triangle consisted of steep cliffs, and the easiest ascent to the plain of Epipolae was at Euryelus. The Athenian plan was to build walls between the two seas, thus cutting off supplies by land, and to maintain a sea blockade for the same purpose; if this was achieved, then the Syracusans would be starved into surrender. Nicias and Lamachus landed their hoplites before daybreak, marched at speed to Epipolae and seized control of Euryelus, easily defeating the Syracusan troops sent out to oppose them; this was immediately followed by the construction of a fort at Labdalum on the north cliff in which they stored their equipment and money (6.97). They then commenced work on the circumvallation, beginning with a fort called the Circle which was to be the hub of the two walls – one going north in the direction of Trogilus, and the other going south to the Great Harbour (6.98); the speed with which the walls were being constructed brought great dismay to the Syracusans.
The Syracusans’ main defence plan was to build a counter-wall from their defences, at a right angle to the Athenian wall; if successful, there would be guaranteed access for supplies and troops from the rest of Sicily and beyond. The first counter-wall (S1 – see Map 8b) was begun from a position roughly opposite the Circle and stretched to the south cliff of Epipolae; however, Syracusan negligence and Athenian daring resulted in the capture of the counter-wall and further progress for the Athenian south wall to the Great Harbour (6.99–100). The Syracusans then constructed a second counter-wall (S2 – see Map 8b) on the lower ground between the southern cliff of Epipolae and the Great Harbour, which stretched as far as the river Anapus. There was a major battle at this second counter-wall, which was won decisively through the superior discipline of the Athenian army (6.101–2). The Athenian south wall to the Great Harbour was now completed, and it was only a matter of time before the only access to Syracuse – the north side of Epipolae – was blocked off. This on-going success brought other Sicilians, previously hesitating, into alliance with the Athenians, and demoralized the Syracusans:
For the Syracusans no longer thought that they could win the war since no help was coming in not even from the Peloponnese, and they were discussing terms of surrender among themselves and with Nicias.
(Thucydides 6.103.3)
A high price, however, was paid for this success with the death of Lamachus in the battle for the Syracusan second counter-wall; this left Nicias in sole command.
From March to June 414 the siege had been conducted with great energy under the joint command of Nicias and Lamachus, but it now suffered under the sole leadership of Nicias; slackness and complacency replaced vigour and perseverance.
It appears that a mood of over-confidence had filled Nicias and the Athenians due to the expectation that Syracuse was destined to surrender – valuable time, possibly as much as two months, was wasted on making the south wall to the Great Harbour a double one, whereas the priority should have been to finish the north wall to Trogilus in order to complete the circumvallation. There followed a catalogue of disastrous errors of judgement on the part of Nicias, which eventually allowed the Spartan commander, Gylippus, to wrest the initiative from him and to turn what should have been an impregnable position for the Athenians into one of desperation.
Gylippus set out from Laconia with four ships as an advance force and sailed to Southern Italy. Unfounded reports that Syracuse had now been completely blockaded encouraged him to attempt to save Italy from Athens. He sought help from the people of Thurii, who rebuffed him and informed Nicias of his arrival:
But Nicias, although learning of his coming, despised the small number of his ships, in the same way as the Thurians, and having considered him to be acting more like a pirate he took no precautions as yet against him.
(Thucydides 6.104.3)
This was Nicias’ best chance to destroy Gylippus, before he had any chance to establish himself and while he was still at his most vulnerable. However, his contempt for Gylippus’ four ships against the might of the Athenian navy gave the Spartan commander a breathing space. Gylippus was then allowed to slip through the straits of Messina, as Nicias had delayed in sending four ships to intercept him, and reached Himera on the north coast of Sicily, where his energy and confidence raised an army of around 3,000 men (7.1). With these he marched towards Syracuse without meeting any Athenian opposition.
Nicias must have realized that Gylippus’ voyage to the north coast of Sicily was to raise an army and that the only access to Syracuse was through Euryelus, which route Nicias himself had used earlier to gain control of Epipolae. Therefore it was essential to defend the road to Euryelus in order to prevent Gylippus and his army from uniting with the Syracusans. Yet Nicias and the Athenians were taken totally by surprise by the arrival of Gylippus, who marched through Epipolae as if it was undefended (7.1–2) – this negligence was a bad blunder on the part of Nicias.
Gylippus’ dynamism was revealed at once by his willingness to face the Athenians immediately in battle at their fortifications. However, the Syracusans’ hoplites were so disorganized that he was forced to lead them away into more open ground. Thucydides is critical of Nicias’ reaction to this retreat:
Nicias did not lead the Athenians forward against them, but remained on the defensive by their own wall.
(Thucydides 7.3.3)
This was an ideal opportunity for Nicias to defeat Gylippus, which would have destroyed his credibility among the Syracusans. The Athenians had already won four victories through their superior hoplites, and victory now would have led almost certainly to the surrender of the Syracusans, who had been on the point of holding an Assembly to discuss means of ending the war just before he arrived (7.2).
This refusal to fight cannot be explained away simply as another example of Nicias’ caution, but rather as a result of fearful
pessimism. For at this moment Nicias decided to fortify Plemmyrium, a promontory forming the southern side of the narrow entrance to the Great Harbour:
He was now turning his attention more towards the war at sea, seeing that the land war, since the arrival of Gylippus, was less hopeful for themselves. Therefore, bringing across an army and ships, he built three forts; and most of the equipment was stored in them and the large boats and warships were now moored there.
(Thucydides 7.4.4–5)
Apart from Nicias’ personal responsibility for failing to prevent the arrival of Gylippus, which would have avoided this situation, his pessimism was unwarranted when the catalogue of Athenian success up to this moment is considered; yet, he had lost the confidence to win the all-important land war upon which the success of the whole campaign depended. Even more disturbing was the deterioration of the fighting quality of the fleet that arose from this move – the need to obtain water and supplies from further afield led to constant casualties inflicted by the Syracusan cavalry (7.4.6).