This grudging acceptance of ‘radical’ democracy by the upper class began to disintegrate due to the mistakes that were made in foreign policy after 415. The Sicilian campaign, a dramatic departure from the Periclean defensive strategy, was an expensive and risky campaign. After the initial expedition ran into trouble under Nicias, the demos chose to increase their stake by sending out a second lavish relief force under Demosthenes rather than cut their losses and get out of Sicily. Then the demos committed the most foolish of errors: while they were so greatly over-extended and vulnerable, they gave the Spartans the legitimate excuse to renew the war by a provocative attacks on the Peloponnese (Thuc. 7.18–26). The result was the permanent occupation of Decelea in Attica by King Agis. The loss of Attica greatly exacerbated the financial problems of the state: 20,000 slaves, including a high proportion of those employed in industry, had escaped, severely affecting economic output; the revenue from the silver mines was now cut off; all imports from Euboea had to come on the longer and more expensive sea-route; landed estates were now being constantly ravaged; military costs were being pushed up by the need to maintain guards, day and night throughout the year, to protect the Long Walls from assault by Agis’ troops (Thuc. 7.27–28); and finally, the increased demand for imports to feed the vast population, now permanently domiciled behind the Long Walls, led to an inevitable rise in prices, putting more financial pressure on the state treasury which had to support the war widows and orphans:
Expenses were not the same as earlier, but had become much greater as the war had become bigger, and their revenues were draining away.
(Thucydides 7.28.4)
The loss of their estates had depleted the private wealth of the upper class, but the destruction of the fleet in Sicily was the last straw. Now there were virtually no fleet and no crews (Thuc. 8.1), and the very real danger of a mass revolt of the subject-allies (Thuc. 8.2). The potential loss of allied phoros, the cost of building a new fleet (apart from 1,000 talents emergency fund), the extra expense of subduing the subject-allies in revolt, and the need to maintain a fleet continuously throughout the year against the Peloponnesian navy in the eastern Aegean were bound to impose greater financial hardships upon the wealthy. The wealthy would have strong reasons for wanting a much more efficient conduct of war and foreign policy, and a tighter grip on state finances, but this could only be accomplished by a change in the democratic constitution. It was this disaffection with their increasing financial burden that persuaded Alcibiades to target the members of this class first, while on campaign in Samos, in order to bring about the removal of democracy and his own recall:
The most powerful citizens, who had endured the greatest hardship, had high hopes for themselves of getting political power into their own hands and winning the war.
(Thucydides 8.48.1)
This desire for constitutional change, however, was insufficient in itself to bring about the overthrow of democracy – it would need other factors to come into play to achieve this.
The second key factor was the bringing together of the aristocratic clubs (hetaireiai) into partnership by Peisander, at the very beginning of 411 (see below), and his direction of their coordinated efforts towards the overthrow of democracy. These hetaireiai had traditionally been social organizations, usually nothing more than upper-class dining clubs, although they did help their members at the time of elections or when a lawsuit was in progress. However, they seemed to have become more politically inclined and consequently more secretive from the 420s onwards, and it is within these clubs that the true supporters of oligarchy and the bitterest opponents of democracy were to be found. Apart from isolated acts, which were designed to frighten the demos, such as the mutilation of the Hermae (Thuc. 6.27), they had previously been too disorganized to mount a serious threat against the democracy. The arrival at Athens, either at the end of December 412 or the beginning of January in 411, of Peisander who had been instructed by his fellow conspirators to prepare the ground for the establishment of an oligarchy at Athens, changed all that:
Peisander, having approached all the clubs … urged them to unite and to organise a common policy for the overthrow of democracy.
(Thucydides 8.54.4)
At some time between Peisander’s departure for the court of Tissaphernes and his second return to Athens, i.e. from March or early April to the beginning of June 411, these clubs publicly advertised a programme of modifying the democracy, but secretly organized a series of assassinations which included Androcles, one of the leading politicians of the democracy (Thuc. 8.65). Far more effective was their creation of a climate of fear and distrust among the Boule of 500 and the Assembly, out of all proportion to their small numbers, so that these club members gradually intimidated these institutions into passing their preferred decisions:
Nevertheless the Assembly and the Boule of 500 still continued to hold meetings. However, they discussed nothing that did not meet with the approval of the conspirators; and not only did the speakers come from this group, but they even decided beforehand what they were going to say. None of the rest of the citizens, being afraid and seeing how widespread the conspiracy appeared to be, any longer spoke in opposition to them. If anyone did speak against them, he was immediately killed in some convenient manner.
(Thucydides 8.66.1–2)
This groundwork by the clubs was invaluable for Peisander and his oligarchic conspirators. Within a very short time of the second return of Peisander to Athens, the conspirators were able to seize power in early June 411 and establish the rule of the Four Hundred (see below).
The third key factor was the doubt of the Athenian demos itself in its capacity to conduct the war effectively. When the news of the Sicilian disaster reached Athens, the people refused to believe it, and when it could no longer be doubted, they turned on the politicians who had advocated the invasion of Sicily, conveniently forgetting that they themselves had voted for this policy. The decision that they took in the late summer of 413, although it should not be pressed too hard, marked the beginning of the anti-democratic movement:
They decided that they should put the affairs of the city on a more economic basis and that they should appoint a board of older men, who would give advice on current matters as they arose. In the immediate panic they were ready, as a democracy usually does, to put their affairs in good order.
(Thucydides 8.1.3–4)
In a time of crisis, especially in war, democracies are often prepared to put limitations on their exercise of power. Ten men were chosen to be the ‘probouloi’, probably one from each tribe, and it is known that Sophocles, the tragedian, and Hagnon, one of Pericles’ political supporters, were members of this board. The mention of these probouloi as being ‘already existing’ in 411 (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 29.2) suggests that there was no time limit on their tenure of office, and 40 was probably the minimum age. Thucydides does not make clear the full extent of their powers and responsibilities, but, from his words above, they may have had the power to present motions directly to the Assembly, thus replacing the probouleutic function of the Boule of 500. Alternatively, and far more likely, they worked in concert with the Boule in the drafting of motions. Aristotle argued that the existence of probouloi and a Boule in the same state was an oligarchic element in the constitution, as the probouloi would have authority over the Boule (Politics 1299b). Although scholarly opinion is divided on the question of whether the appointment of the probouloi was the first move in the establishment of the oligarchy in 411, it is clear that the Athenians were so troubled by the glaring deficiencies of their democracy in the conduct of the war that they were prepared to give unprecedented power and influence to a small body of elder citizens. The revolts of major allies, such as Chios, Miletus and Rhodes, the operations of the Peloponnesian fleet in the eastern Aegean and Persia’s intervention on the side of the Spartans had further undermined Athenian confidence in their ability to survive. Thus, by the end of 412, the Athenians were in the right frame of mind, with effe
ctive prompting, to think the unthinkable: a change in their democratic constitution.
The catalyst for bringing the other three elements together was Alcibiades’ seductive offer of bringing the Persians and their vast wealth onto the side of the Athenians. Alcibiades had already run foul of the Spartans who had issued his death warrant (Thuc. 8.45), and had fled to the court of Tissaphernes, the Persian governor (‘satrap’) of south-west Asia Minor, where his advice about Persia’s relations with the warring Greek states was well received (Thuc. 8.46). However, Alcibiades was also planning his own recall to Athens, but presumed that there was no way that the ‘radical’ democracy would agree to this. Therefore, in November 412, he set about winning over the most influential men of the Athenian fleet at Samos by claiming that he had great influence with Tissaphernes and that:
he wanted to return home and be a fellow-citizen, provided that there was an oligarchy and not the dreadful democracy that had exiled him, and he would make Tissaphernes their friend.
(Thucydides 8.47.2)
A delegation of these influential Athenians crossed over from Samos to Alcibiades on the Asiatic mainland, where his legendary powers of persuasion convinced them that there was every chance of winning over Tissaphernes and the King to the Athenian side (Thuc. 8.48).
These influential Athenians, upon their return to Samos, formed themselves and other members of the officer class into a group of conspirators, and declared openly that the friendship and the money of the King were dependent upon the recall of Alcibiades and that they should not be governed by a democracy. The majority of the armed forces at Samos were angry at these conditions but grudgingly accepted them, according to Thucydides, because of the prospect of pay (Thuc. 8.48). This incident is worthy of comment for two reasons. First, this is one of the rare times that Thucydides’ bias against the ‘radical’ democracy comes to the fore – it is just as feasible, perhaps more so, that the Athenian sailors agreed to these conditions through fear for the safety of the city and their families, rather than their desire for pay; and his use of ‘ochlos’ (the mob) strengthens the case of personal prejudice. Second, Alcibiades never uses the word ‘oligarchy’ after his first communication but, from now on, he and the conspirators talk in terms of modifying the democracy. It will be seen later in the chapter that the conspirators consisted of two groups: the ‘extreme’ oligarchs who adopted this language simply to deceive the demos, and the ‘moderates’ who believed in a more limited form of democracy.
Near the end of December 412, Peisander and other representatives were sent to Athens to carry out the agreed programme of recalling Alcibiades, overthrowing the democracy and gaining the friendship of Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.49). According to Thucydides (8.53), Peisander immediately approached the Assembly with the conspirators’ proposals, but there is other evidence (e.g. the Lysistrata and the Thesmophoriazusae of Aristophanes) which strongly suggests that Peisander did not approach the Assembly until March or early April 411. It would seem that Thucydides has telescoped the events of 411. In fact, many scholars believe that Book 8, apart from being unfinished, was also unrevised by Thucydides. There are clearly different versions of the same events in different parts of this book, which Thucydides would usually rationalize into one sequence of events; there are also virtually no direct speeches and an unusually high incidence of Thucydidean interpretation of motives, which should be treated with more caution than his statement of facts – the mention of the Athenian sailors’ acceptance of Alcibiades’ proposals solely through their desire for pay is a good case in point. It is reasonable to assume that Peisander used the early months of 411 explaining the conspirators’ plans to oligarchic sympathizers in Athens and thereby winning their support for the planned coup (Thuc. 8.54).
In March or early April 411, Peisander put before the Assembly the conspirators’ proposals about the recall of Alcibiades and an alliance with the Persians, but artfully avoided the mention of oligarchy and talked in terms of ‘adopting a different form of democracy’ (Thuc. 8.53). Although there was a great uproar, Peisander won the argument by concentrating on the demos’ greatest fear:
He asked each and every one of his opponents what hope they had for saving the city, when the Peloponnesian navy, confronting them at sea, was no smaller than their own, when the enemy had more allied cities on their side, when the King and Tissaphernes were supplying the enemy with money and when the Athenians themselves no longer had any, unless someone should persuade the King to change sides.
(Thucydides 8.53.2)
This concentration on the enormity of the danger to Athens, combined with the argument that the Athenians could always later on change the new constitution back to the old one, won the day. Now that he had won over the Assembly, he was determined to consolidate the strength of the oligarchs. He forged the hetaireiai into a unified faction, who began their policy of intimidation and assassination after he and ten other envoys had been sent out from Athens to negotiate with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.54).
Alcibiades, however, could not deliver his side of the bargain, as Tissaphernes preferred the policy of wearing down both sides of the Greeks (see Chapter 22). With the failure of Peisander’s mission to Alcibiades and Tissaphernes, the whole raison d’être for the removal of the democratic constitution at Athens had gone. The conspirators decided to break with Alcibiades and consequently with the Persians but, having gone so far and fearing themselves to be in danger from a democratic backlash at their proposed reforms, the majority decided still to press on with their plan for changing the constitution (Thuc. 8.63). The conspirators evolved a threefold plan: to secure their position at Samos, gain constitutional control of Athens and convert the allied cities’ governments into oligarchies. First, they strengthened their control over the Athenian army at Samos (possibly the hoplites as opposed to the sailors are meant here) and encouraged 300 of the most important Samians to organize an oligarchic coup on Samos; second, Peisander and five of the delegates were sent to Athens to organize the coup, but also to establish oligarchies on their journey to Athens; and third, the other five delegates were also to set up oligarchies in the rest of the Empire (Thuc. 8.63–64). The conspirators clearly believed that oligarchs in allied cities were more likely to stay loyal to Athens, even though Phrynichus had previously poured scorn on this idea (Thuc. 8.48).
Peisander arrived in Athens probably in the second half of May 411 and discovered that the hetaireiai had done an excellent job in preparing the ground for the coup. They had intimidated the Boule of 500 and the Assembly (see above) and had assassinated the conspirators’ main democratic opponents. In addition, they had publicized their programme for ‘adopting a different form of democracy’:
that no one should receive pay except those who were serving in the war; that no more than five thousand should have a share in the government and that these should come from those who were best able to help the state in terms of money and their persons.
(Thucydides 8.65.3)
In other words, it would be the middle and upper classes, the hoplites and the knights, who would gain most from the constitutional reforms, and not the class of ‘thetes’, which supplied the rowers for the Athenian fleet. Peisander and his colleagues then summoned an Assembly and proposed that ten men (30 men in Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 29.2) should be given full powers to prepare proposals for the best government of Athens and present them to the people on a fixed day (Thuc. 8.67).
When this appointed day arrived (according to Thucydides’ version – see next section), probably in early June 411, the commissioners made only one proposal to the Assembly which met at Colonus, outside the city walls, instead of the Pnyx – this location was possibly chosen to discourage the thetes who were unarmed from attending, while encouraging the hoplites who were and who could defend themselves if the Spartan forces under King Agis made a sortie from Decelea. The terms of the proposal were: to suspend the use of the ‘graphe paranomon’ (the right to prosecute someone for putting an
illegal or unconstitutional motion) and to allow anyone the freedom, without fear of prosecution, to propose whatever he wanted. The failure by the commissioners to produce a more detailed set of proposals for the reform of the constitution may reflect an inability to agree among themselves on its desired form. This gave Peisander his desired opening for making a ‘legitimate’ proposal:
that there should be no holding of office and payment by the state as in the present constitution; that they should choose five men as presidents who would choose 100 others, and each of this 100 men would choose three more in addition to himself; and that these, being 400 in number and having gone into the chamber of the Boule of 500, should govern with full powers to the best of their ability and should summon the 5,000 whenever they saw fit.
(Thucydides 8.67.3)
This motion was passed by the Assembly and, on 9 June 411, the conspirators entered the Boule of 500’s chamber, paid them off for the rest of their term of office, and established the oligarchy of The Four Hundred:
It was not surprising that the plot, carried out by so many able men, succeeded although it was a tough undertaking. For it was difficult to deprive the Athenian demos of its liberty, especially since the tyrants had been expelled a hundred years before.
(Thucydides 8.68.4)
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 59