The rule of The Four Hundred
There are two accounts of the oligarchic revolution of 411: Thucydides in Book 8 and Aristotle in the Ath. Pol. (29–33). Although there are certain similarities in their narrative of the events, there is a major split in the description of the constitutional reforms that were passed and the timing of their introduction. Thucydides, who was writing in exile and was a contemporary of and familiar with many of the oligarchic leaders, describes the constitutional change as a swift oligarchic coup by a group of conspirators, all of whom wanted an ‘extreme’ oligarchy and had no intention of introducing a ‘moderate’ rule of The Five Thousand, as mentioned above in 8.67.3; in fact, he makes no mention of the appointment of The Five Thousand, as he regarded their existence as totally irrelevant to The Four Hundred in their planned government of Athens. The account of Aristotle’s Ath. Pol. was written about a hundred years later and uses a variety of sources, including Thucydides, but also, in all probability, the work of Androtion whose father was one of The Four Hundred, which may explain why this version takes a more lenient view of the oligarchs. In this account, the reform of the constitution takes a much longer time, with the appointment of The Five Thousand and their ratification of two constitutions – one for the future and one for the present, which included the appointment of The Four Hundred.
Modern scholarship has made many attempts to reconcile these two traditions, but the commonly held view is that Aristotle’s account contains much that is fictitious and reflects the contemporary propaganda of the ‘extreme’ oligarchs, for whom it was politically useful to pretend that The Five Thousand had a constitutional existence. Therefore, Thucydides’ account is to be preferred, although it must be used with caution, as it includes his opinions about the motives of the conspirators which are open to serious challenge; in particular, his belief that there was no ‘moderate’ group among The Four Hundred and that such people as Theramenes were cynical, ambitious ‘extreme’ oligarchs who only championed the cause of The Five Thousand when The Four Hundred’s rule was doomed to fall (Thuc. 8.66.1; 68.3; 89.2–4; 92).
The rule of the Four Hundred lasted just under four months, from June to September 411 (Ath. Pol. 31). There were three major reasons for its fall. In the first place, the Athenians had been persuaded to give up their democracy asthepricethathadtobepaidinordertowinthesupportandthefinancial backing of Tissaphernes and the King of Persia, otherwise they would be defeated by the Spartans (Thuc. 8.53.2). However, the negotiations through Alcibiades had failed to bring about a Persian alliance (Thuc. 8.56). In fact, Tissaphernes had healed his breach with the Spartans concerning a dispute over the two earlier treaties, and had signed a third treaty which greatly strengthened the Spartans’ military position (Thuc. 8.58 – see Chapter 22). Therefore the main incentive for a change in the constitution had failed to materialize.
The second reason for the collapse of The Four Hundred was their treasonable intrigues with the Spartans. After Peisander’s negotiations with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes had failed to win Persian support, the conspirators made it a major feature of their programme to continue the war more vigorously than the democracy against the Spartans (Thuc. 8.63). But, as soon as they seized power, they pursued a completely different policy:
They made approaches to Agis, the King of the Spartans who was at Decelea, saying that they wished to make peace and that it was more reasonable for him to come to an agreement with them rather than the untrustworthy democracy that no longer existed.
(Thucydides 8.70.2)
Agis rebuffed them at first, thinking that he could exploit the internal strife among the Athenians and bring about their surrender or that Athens would fall to a single attack. However, he had made a serious error of judgement which resulted in Peloponnesian casualties and his retirement back to Decelea. The Four Hundred were not deterred by his original rejection of their overtures, and kept sending envoys to him; upon his advice, they then sent envoys to Sparta with the same request (Thuc. 8.71).
As The Four Hundred’s tenure of power became more precarious through dissatisfaction with their rule both in Athens and in the fleet at Samos, they became even more desperate to make peace with the Spartans:
They sent Antiphon and Phrynichus and ten others as quickly as possible, fearing the situation at home and in Samos, and ordered them to make peace with the Spartans on whatever terms that were bearable.
(Thucydides 8.90.2)
In addition, they were building a fortification at Eetioneia, which was part of the Piraeus. It was suspected by their opponents that, far from keeping out the democrats at Samos, its real purpose was to let in the Spartan fleet and army which was coming in the direction of the Piraeus. It was believed that The Four Hundred held the view that, if the oligarchy could not stay in power and their own lives were to be at risk from a restored democracy:
they preferred to lead in the enemy and, having given up the walls and the fleet, to make any agreement whatsoever about the fate of the city, provided that their lives were guaranteed.
(Thucydides 8.91.3)
It was this suspicion of possible treachery and a betrayal of Athens to the enemy that led the hoplites to destroy this fortification (Thuc. 8.92). When The Four Hundred were finally overthrown, Peisander and most of the remaining ‘extreme’ oligarchs immediately fled to Agis at Decelea (Thuc. 8.98).
The third reason for the overthrow of The Four Hundred was the internal split between the conspirators about the nature of the constitution that should replace the democracy. One faction was the ‘extreme’ oligarchs, which included Peisander who had proposed the establishment of The Four Hundred at the meeting at Colonus and ‘was openly the most eager for the overthrow of the democracy’ (Thuc. 8.68.1); Phrynichus who was a bitter enemy of Alcibiades and ‘showed himself more than all the rest to be the greatest supporter of oligarchy’ (Thuc. 8.68.3); and Antiphon who had masterminded the coup (Thuc. 8.68.1). They held the view that sovereign power should be vested in The Council of Four Hundred, which should be unaccountable for its decisions and actions, and whose membership should be permanent. Ideally, they wanted the Five Thousand to exist only in name but, if they had to exist, to be consulted as little as possible. Any check upon their power, even by so small a number as 5,000, was totally unacceptable:
because they thought that sharing power with so many men [i.e. 5,000] was outright democracy.
(Thucydides 8.92.11)
The other faction can be referred to as ‘moderates’, although their preferred constitution would cover a broad spectrum of views; they were opposed to ‘extreme’ oligarchy and ‘radical’ democracy, but some would be more inclined towards moderate oligarchy, others to moderate democracy. Therefore, to the ‘moderates’, the Five Thousand were the crucial element in the reformed constitution, either being the sovereign body of state or supplying all the public officials (see below for the modern controversy). The leader of this faction was Theramenes, although he is lumped among the ‘extreme’ oligarchs by Thucydides (8.68.4); Thucydides’ hostile portrayal of Theramenes may be based on the evidence of an ex-member of The Four Hundred who fled after its fall. However, there is sufficient evidence from his later career that Theramenes was not an ‘extreme’ oligarch, but held a consistent view that sovereign power should be vested in the upper class and the hoplites. He played a leading part in organizing resistance to The Four Hundred and in the establishment of its successor, The Five Thousand. Although Antiphon was executed by the restored democracy, Theramenes continued to serve Athens as a general and a trierarch (captain of a ‘trireme’) throughout the Ionian War (413–404). When he was put on trial in 403 for opposing the brutal excesses of The Thirty Tyrants, an extreme Spartan-backed Athenian oligarchy, he made his political beliefs clear:
‘To run the state along with those, who are able to serve it with their horses or with their shields [i.e. as cavalry or as hoplites], is the constitution that I previously thought the best, and I do not change my opinion now.
’
(Xenophon, Hellenica 2.3.48)
Theramenes’ description of the constitution that he ‘previously thought the best’ is identical to the political manifesto published by the conspirators before the coup (Thuc. 8.65.3 – see above).
The first important reverse for The Four Hundred was the failure of the oligarchic coup in Samos. The conspirators always had their doubts about the acceptance of oligarchy by the thetes in the fleet at Samos and so, through the agency of Peisander and the oligarchic supporters in the fleet, they had encouraged 300 Samians to seize power and establish an oligarchy. In this way the conspirators hoped to cow any rebellious move by the sailors and further strengthen their hold on the government of Athens. However, the assassination of the demagogue Hyperbolus, who was living in Samos after his ostracism, forewarned the Samian democrats who appealed to the main Athenian supporters of democracy – the generals Leon and Diomedon, Thrasybulus the captain of a trireme, and Thrasyllus a hoplite. The coup failed and Samos stayed a democracy (Thuc. 8.73). Far more worrying for The Four Hundred was the declaration of support for the ‘radical’ democracy and of enmity to the oligarchs in Athens by the forces in Samos, now under the leadership of the newly elected generals, Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus (Thuc. 8.75–76). The recall of Alcibiades, brought about by the constant urging of Thrasybulus, his rehabilitation and his election as general by the armed forces at Samos, who believed that he could bring Tissaphernes and the Persians over to the Athenian side, deeply worried the oligarchs in power in Athens (Thuc. 8.81–82).
It was now that Alcibiades effectively split the ranks of The Four Hundred, thus fatally weakening them, by a very astute proposal. The Four Hundred had attempted to make a rapprochement with the forces in Samos by sending out a delegation, aimed at allaying their fears about events in Athens. They stressed that the change of government was to strengthen Athens in the war against the Spartans and that The Five Thousand would get their chance to share in the government. Alcibiades’ reply on behalf of the forces at Samos was that he was not against The Five Thousand being the government of Athens, but he insisted on the removal of The Four Hundred and the restoration of the Boule of 500; he also approved of any financial measures that supplied better pay for the troops; and he urged them not to give in to the enemy – so long as the city was safe, there was every chance of a reconciliation between the two groups (Thuc. 8.86). This offer had the desired effect:
Most of those who had a share in the oligarchy, who already had become discontented and would have been glad to get out of the business, if it could be done safely, became far more determined to do so. They now organized themselves into groups and began to criticize how the state was being run … and they proclaimed that it was necessary for the Five Thousand to exist in reality and not just in name, and that a fairer constitution should be established.
(Thucydides 8.89.1–2)
The leaders of this dissident group were Theramenes and Aristocrates, who also feared (rightly) that the ‘extreme’ oligarchs were plotting to betray Athens. Alcibiades’ reply, by holding out the hope of a peaceful and safe compromise between the ‘moderates’ in Athens and the forces at Samos and by playing on their fears about the possible betrayal of Athens to Sparta, had destroyed the fragile unity of The Four Hundred.
The ‘extreme’ oligarchs, seeing the growing opposition to their rule, even among their own former supporters, redoubled their efforts to make peace with Sparta and built the fortification at Eetioneia (see above). However, the hoplites, who were building this fortification, rebelled against Alexicles who was a supporter of the oligarchy and was in charge of the building operation, took him prisoner, and began to destroy the wall, calling for help from all those that wanted The Five Thousand to govern (Thuc. 8.92). The Four Hundred tried to placate the hoplites by promising that they would publish the names of The Five Thousand and that, in future, membership of The Four Hundred would be recruited from this number on a rotational basis. They also agreed to hold an Assembly on a fixed day to settle the problems (Thuc. 8.93). The sighting of 42 Peloponnesian ships sailing along the coast of Salamis prevented the Assembly from being held on the appointed day and provoked great panic, again renewing the fears of the ‘moderates’ that The Four Hundred were about to betray Athens. The Peloponnesian ships, in fact, sailed to Oropus near Euboea and promptly defeated the hastily manned Athenian fleet which had been sent to defend Euboea (Thuc. 8.95). This revolt of Euboea, which caused even more terror and despair than the loss of the Sicilian expedition (8.96), brought about the downfall of the oligarchy; the ‘moderates’ now had their chance to make a better job of governing Athens.
The rule of The Five Thousand
Very little is known about this government due to the lack of literary sources, and what few facts are known are subject to disputed scholarly interpretations. The fullest account comes from Thucydides:
The Athenians held meetings of the Assembly, including an immediate one which was summoned then for the first time to the Pnyx, as had been customary in the past, in which they deposed The Four Hundred and voted to hand over the government to the Five Thousand and as many as were able to provide their own (hoplite) weapons. They also voted that no one, on pain of being cursed, was to receive pay for any office. Other regular meetings also took place in which they voted for lawgivers (nomothetai) and other arrangements for drawing up the constitution.
(Thucydides 8.97.1–2)
It is not even known if this regime consisted of 5,000 enfranchised citizens. The propaganda of the original conspirators mentioned 5,000 as the maximum number of citizens who should be allowed to participate in government (Thuc. 8.65.3) but this is contradicted by the above quotation and by Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 29.3) who states that 5,000 was to be the minimum number. Many modern historians believe the final number was around 9,000, which was quoted in a speech by Lysias (20.13) in defence of Polystratos, one of the original members of The Four Hundred, but even this information, used in a politically sensitive trial, has to be treated with caution.
The major disagreement between scholars concerns the thetes: whether they were excluded from all political rights, or were allowed to attend the ‘Ecclesia’ (Assembly) and serve in the ‘Heliaea’ (The People’sCourt)asinthe past before the oligarchic revolution, but were forbidden to hold public office. The weight of scholarly opinion comes down in favour of the view that, under this regime, only those of hoplite census and above had the right to vote in the Assembly, hold public office and serve as jurors in the law courts. The majority of Thucydides’ evidence strongly supports this view. It was part of the original propaganda of the conspirators before the oligarchic coup (Thuc. 8.65.3); the Assembly meeting at Colonus established the part that the 5,000 were to play in the new constitution (Thuc. 67); the two ad hoc Assemblies, after the destruction of the fortification of Eetioneia, consisted only of hoplites (Thuc. 93.1; 93.3); these same hoplites were addressed by representatives of The Four Hundred, who promised that the names of The Five Thousand would be published and that The Four Hundred would be chosen from their number, on a rotational basis, in accordance with whatever way the hoplites thought best (Thuc. 8.93.2); and finally, after this offer was made by The Four Hundred:
The whole body of hoplites … agreed to hold an Assembly (ecclesia) on a fixed day in the theatre of Dionysus to resolve their differences.
(Thucydides 8.93.3)
It also seems probable that the reconstituted Boule of 500, with more power than its democratic counterpart, was elected and not chosen by lot. A speech of Andocides (On the Mysteries 96) includes a decree of the newly restored democracy in 410 in which ‘a Boule of 500 chosen by lot’ is said to exist at that time – this unusual description is presumably used to emphasize its difference from the recent one of The Five Thousand.
Both Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 34.2) and Thucydides had high praise for this regime:
During the first period of its rule [alternatively translated: ‘For the first time, at le
ast in my life-time’] the Athenians seem to me to have been better governed than ever before, at least in my lifetime. For there took place a moderate blending of the few and the many, and it was this that first brought about a recovery of the state from its desperate situation.
(Thucydides 8.97.2)
It is tempting to see Thucydides’ description of the above constitution as further support for the belief that it was only those of hoplite census and above who had full political rights. The oligarchic element in the constitution was the establishment of a property qualification as the pre-requisite for political participation; and the democratic element was that sovereignty was vested in the hoplite Assembly, and not the oligarchic Boule.
There was one very good reason why this ‘moderate’ constitution was destined to fail. Athens’ rise to super-power status had been achieved by the strength of its navy and by the class that manned the triremes. The prosperity and ultimate safety of Athens depended upon the thetes, whose demand for full political rights to reflect their importance to the state had been met by the reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles (see Chapter 13). The new regime was committed to waging war against Sparta, but the main hope of military success lay with the thetes in the naval forces based at Samos, who had already restored the democracy in exile (Thuc. 8.75–76). It was never a long-term possibility that the thetes would accept the removal of their political rights. It had been the military defeat in Sicily and the morale-sapping campaigns against the Persian-backed Spartans in the eastern Aegean that had led to the thetes’ temporary loss of confidence in their democracy. The return of Alcibiades with his confident assertion of winning-over the Persians to the Athenian side and the naval victories at Cynossema and Abydus in late 411 did much to re-establish the self-belief of the Athenian thetes. The stunning victory at the battle of Cyzicus in March or April 410, resulting in the Spartans suing for peace, was the final element that restored the full confidence of the thetes, and convinced them that they could win the war with their ‘radical’ democracy. In the early summer of 410 the regime of The Five Thousand was replaced and the rest of the Ionian War was conducted by the democracy until Athens was finally defeated in 404.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 60