This problem was further compounded by the failure to create a formal league, which would give new aims to the alliance after the Spartan menace had been curtailed, resolve disputes among the members, and firmly establish Thebes as the legal hegemon of the alliance. However, criticism of Epaminondas should be tempered by the fact that, although the evidence for the internal politics of Thebes in this period is scanty, he and his political ally Pelopidas do seem to have been constantly opposed by the Theban Menecleidas and his political supporters. Thus Epaminondas found it difficult to implement a coherent long-term policy for the Peloponnese due to internal disagreement over the direction of Theban foreign policy.
There was continual strife throughout Greece in the years that followed the battle of Mantinea, because no one state was strong enough to bring peace and stability: far from there being a balance of power, it was rather a balance of weakness. But in the meantime Philip II was laying down the foundations for the emergence of Macedon as the greatest super-power of all time in Greece. In 369, he had been sent as a hostage to Thebes as a token of good faith for the alliance between Macedon and Thebes (see above). Thus for three years he was able to observe at close quarters and learn from Epaminondas’ exceptional ability as a military commander and as a skilful diplomat during the ascendancy of Thebes. These two qualities enabled Philip to become the master of Greece and thus the true heir to the ‘hegemony’ of Thebes.
Map 9 The Peloponnese and central Greece
Bibliography
Buckler, J. The Theban Hegemony, 371–362.
Bury, J. B. and Meiggs, R. A History of Greece, 4th edn, ch. 14.
Cartledge, P. Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta, chs 14, 19 and 20.
——Sparta and Lakonia, ch. 13.
Cawkwell, G. L. ‘Epaminondas and Thebes’, CQ 22.
Davies, J. K. Democracy and Classical Greece, 2nd edn, ch. 11.
Hornblower, S. The Greek World, 479–323 BC, chs 15 and 16.
Sealey, R. A History of Greek City States 700–338 BC, chs 16 and 17.
26
THE RISE OF MACEDON (359– 336): DIPLOMACY AND WARFARE UNDER PHILIP II
The geography of Macedonia can be divided into two parts: Lower and Upper Macedonia. Lower Macedonia, which was the heart of the kingdom, consisted of a fertile coastal plain, situated on the shores of the Thermaic Gulf in the north-west Aegean; this region was ruled by the dynasty of the Argeadae, but internal dissension within the ruling family had in the past kept it weak. Upper Macedonia to the west consisted of a number of large inland plateaux, surrounded by high mountains, which were divided politically into cantons, each governed by their own dynasties. Thus this geographically and politically divided country was exposed to attack from Thessaly and the other major Greek powers in the south, from the non-Greek Illyrians on the Adriatic coast in the west, from the Paeonians in the north, and from the Greek Chalcidians and the Thracians in the east. It is hardly surprising that the kingdom of Macedon had always been viewed throughout the previous century and a half as a pawn in the super-power rivalry of Sparta, Athens and Thebes, and before that had attracted the Persians. Consequently, the Macedonian kings needed to become adept at diplomacy, choosing and changing the alliances that were vital to ensure the safety of their kingdom. However, the accession of Philip II in 359, whether as regent for the young son of Perdiccas or as king, heralded a dramatic change in the history of Macedon and Greece, although the urgent political and military problems confronting him in 359 appeared to be the same insuperable ones that had defeated his many predecessors. But Philip was no ordinary Macedonian king.
The consolidation of Macedon in the north, 359–354
Philip came to power in the midst of yet another Macedonian crisis. King Perdiccas and 4,000 Macedonians had been killed in battle by the Illyrians under their King Bardylis (Diodorus 16.2.4–5 – all references in this chapter are to Diodorus, unless otherwise stated). But this was only one problem among many:
About the same time, the Paeonians, who lived near Macedon, were contemptuously plundering the territory of the Macedonians; and the Illyrians were assembling great armies and were preparing to invade Macedon. In addition, a certain Pausanias, who was related to the Macedonian royal family, was planning with the aid of the Thracian king to make an attempt upon the kingship of Macedon. In the same way, the Athenians, being hostile to Philip, were attempting to restore Argaeus to the kingship, and had sent Mantias as general with 3,000 hoplites and a sizeable naval force.
(Diodorus 16.6.2)
The immediate objective of Philip was survival. He bribed Berisades, one of the Thracian Kings, in order to withdraw his support of Pausanias and the Paeonians in order to stop their ravaging the kingdom of Macedon. At the same time he conducted a massive reorganization and thorough training of the Macedonian army, laying the foundations for that formidable force, which would be one of his two instruments of foreign policy (16.3.1–6).
Philip also set about winning over the Athenians by diplomacy. He knew that the Athenian support of Argaeus was motivated simply by their single-minded desire to regain Amphipolis, and therefore he withdrew the Macedonian garrison from Amphipolis and declared it autonomous (16.3.3). This astute move was designed to give the impression that he had recognized Athens’ claim to Amphipolis, thus making the Athenians lukewarm in their backing of Argaeus. Although accompanying Argaeus with 3,000 mercenary troops to the port of Methone in Lower Macedonia, Mantias, the Athenian commander, took no part in his march to Aegae, the old capital of the Macedonian kingdom, where Argaeus attempted but failed to win over the inhabitants to his cause. He was defeated on his return journey to Methone by Philip who:
having captured some of our [i.e. Athenian] citizens, let them go and restored all their losses to them. He also sent a letter in which he stated that he was ready to make an alliance and renew his father’s friendship with us.
(Demosthenes 23.121)
Philip’s generous treatment of his Athenian prisoners, his defeat of Argaeus and his willingness to make a treaty on favourable terms to the Athenians won the day:
Philip sent ambassadors to Athens and persuaded the Athenian people to make peace with him by giving up all claim to Amphipolis.
(Diodorus 16.4.1)
The Athenians were now removed from the list of Macedon’s immediate enemies.
Philip then exploited the situation in Paeonia where the king had just died; a military expedition in 358 defeated the Paeonians in battle and brought them under Macedonian control (16.4.2). Philip was now ready for the Illyrians who had seized a large part of Macedonia. A decisive victory over the Illyrians and their King Bardylis led to their total withdrawal from Macedonian territory (16.4.3–7). In 358, Philip advanced into Thessaly (Justin 7.6.8). Thessaly in the 370s had risen to its greatest position of Greek power and influence under the dynamic leadership of Jason of Pherae who, before his assassination in 370, had planned to take control of Macedon (Xenophon, Hellenica 6.1.11). Philip’s objective was to secure Perrhaebia in north Thessaly, since his Macedonian kingdom, without control of this buffer state, was always vulnerable to an invasion from the south. It was at this time that Philip married a Larissan woman to strengthen his diplomatic ties with one of the three most important political cities of Thessaly, and the news of the assassination of Alexander of Pherae, the Thessalian ‘tagos’ (ruler), eased the threat from the south.
The security of Macedon, both internal and external, was also strengthened by a series of politically motivated marriages. Between 359 and 357, Philip seems to have married Phila, the daughter of the ruler of Elimiotis, one of the cantons of Upper Macedon; Audata, the daughter of Bardylis, the King of the Illyrians; Philinna of Larissa in Thessaly; and Olympias, the Greek daughter of the Molossian ruler of Epirus, who became Philip’s queen and gave birth to Alexander in 356 (Athenaeus 13.557b–d). Thus, by 357, Philip had consolidated his power over the cantons of Upper Macedon
and, for the first time in its history, was close to creating a unified Macedonian state – only the Greek colonies of Pydna and Methone on the coast lay temporarily outside his control. In addition, his military victories and marriages in the north, west and south had secured these borders of Macedon. It now remained to make safe Macedon’s eastern flank.
Philip’s first target in 357 was Amphipolis: situated on the banks of the river Strymon, this former Athenian colony controlled the main access to and from Thrace and the Hellespont, and, if brought under control, would afford protection to the eastern side of Macedon. The citizens of Amphipolis appealed for help to the Athenians, who took no action, because a secret deal had apparently been agreed between the Athenians and Philip to exchange Pydna, an Athenian stronghold in Lower Macedonia, for Amphipolis (Demosthenes 2.6; Theopompos FGrH 115 F30). Philip did not hand over Amphipolis to the Athenians after its surrender (16.8.2), but found reasons to delay the transfer. At this point the Olynthian-led Chalcidian League, which had been revived after its dismemberment in 379 by Agesilaos (see Chapter 24), because it feared Philip’s territorial ambitions after his success at Amphipolis, sought an alliance with Athens. But the Athenians rejected this offer, partly because they at this time had too many problems with their naval allies (see below), and partly because they did not wish to alienate Philip and lose their chance to regain Amphipolis.
Philip knew that a combination of Athens and the Chalcidian League alliance would be a grave threat to his newly acquired kingdom, and thus he needed to calm the fears and win the goodwill of the Olynthians and the Chalcidian League concerning his military activities, and to keep them hostile to Athens. Potidaea in Chalcidice was still under the control of the Athenians, who had sent out colonists as recently as 361, and thus was a source of danger in the heart of the Chalcidian League. In addition, there had always been conflict between Macedon and the Olynthians about the possession of Anthemous on their shared borders. Therefore Philip made an alliance with Olynthus which was very favourable to them (16.8.3–5):
‘Do you not think that the Olynthians would have listened in annoyance if someone had spoken ill of Philip at that time when he was handing over Anthemus to them, which all the former kings of Macedon had claimed, when he was giving them Potidaea and throwing out our settlers, when he was stirring up hostility towards us and giving them the opportunity to enjoy the land of Potidaea?’
(Demosthenes 6.17)
The capture of Pydna, one of Athens’ two strongholds in Lower Macedon, around the same time as that of Potidaea ensured war with Athens (16.8.3–5), but his generosity towards the Olynthian-led Chalcidian League had gained a valuable anti-Athenian ally for Macedon, and had given him the opportunity to extend Macedonian influence into Thrace without hindrance. The Chalcidian League would come to regret their being deceived by Philip’s apparent friendship.
The Athenians tried to check Philip’s advance c.356 by making an alliance with the kings of Illyria, Paeonia and western Thrace (GHI 157), but he defeated these three, one by one, and forced them to join him in alliance (16.22.3). A clear understanding and dating of Philip’s relations with the three kings of Thrace are not easy to achieve owing to the scantiness of sources; however, Philip appears to have won a victory at this time over Cetriporis, the King of western Thrace, who was reduced to the status of subject-ally. About the same time Philip set his sights on Crenides, which had been founded by Thasos in 360. He easily gained control of it, increased its population and renamed it Philippi after himself. The attraction of this city was its gold and silver mines which eventually produced 1,000 talents per year, thus greatly increasing Philip’s financial strength, his ability to hire mercenaries and his lavish bribes to politicians in other states (16.8.6). In 355, Philip attacked Methone, the last Athenian outpost in Lower Macedonia, and captured it in the following year after a siege in which he lost an eye (16.31.6).
By 354, Philip had consolidated his position of authority within a unified Macedon; had secured Macedon’s borders by warfare and alliances, especially with Olynthus and the Chalcidian League; had gained safe and unthreatened access to the Aegean Sea; and had a well-trained and battle-hardened army. The success of Macedon in the north during the years 359–354 was due not only to Philip’s exceptional diplomatic and military abilities, but also to the weakness in the 350s of the traditional major powers of Greece: Sparta, Athens and Thebes. Sparta had not recovered from the loss of Messenia at the hands of Epaminondas and the Thebans (see Chapter 25), and in this period was more concerned with restoring a position of influence in Peloponnesian politics. The Athenians had become embroiled in the Social War (357–355), i.e. a war against their allies – a number of their allies in the Second Athenian League, having become disaffected with Athenian imperialistic behaviour, had seceded from the League under the leadership of Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium. Two naval defeats at the hands of the rebels persuaded the Athenians to make peace in 355 and to recognize the independence of those who had seceded, thus considerably weakening Athenian naval power. Finally, Thebes’ long-standing hostility to Phocis came to a head in the Third Sacred War (355–346), which drained Theban resources. It was this war that gave Philip his opportunity to intervene in the mainstream of Greek politics and establish Macedon as the leading power in Greece.
The rise of Macedon in Greece, 353–346
The origins of the Sacred War lay with the Theban desire to re-assert their authority in central Greece, after their humiliating expulsion from Euboea in 357, and their hostility towards the Phocians, who had refused to join Epaminondas’ last invasion of the Peloponnese in 362. The chosen weapon was the religious Amphictyonic League, whose function was to care for the temple of Apollo at Delphi (as well as the temple of Demeter near Thermopylae). This League consisted mainly of central and northern Greek states, but the Thebans, after their settlement of Thessaly by force in 364, controlled 16 of the 24 votes in the Council, which carried out the business of the League. Therefore, in 357, the Thebans manipulated the Amphictyonic Council to condemn the Phocians for cultivating Delphic sacred land and to impose a hefty fine on them. When the Phocians failed to pay, the Council ordered the land of the Phocians to be confiscated and dedicated to Apollo. Faced with such punitive action, the Phocians, in 356, under the leadership of Philomelus formed alliances with Thebes’ enemies, Athens and Sparta, and seized Delphi with its treasure (16.23–24; 27.5).
In 355, the Amphictyonic League declared a sacred war against the Phocians, who were now surrounded by enemies: in particular, the Boeotians, the Locrians and the Thessalians. The need to hire a large mercenary army to confront these enemies led the Phocians to ‘borrow’ money from the sacred treasury of Delphi, which outraged Greek opinion, especially when the ‘borrowing’ became very frequent and the huge sums of money became impossible to pay back (16.29). After initial successes against the Locrians and the Thessalians, the Phocians were heavily defeated by the Boeotians at the battle of Neon in 354, and Philomelus was killed (16.30–31.4). However, the Phocians were far from finished: they chose Onomarchus as their new commander-in-chief, who again raided the Delphic treasury to strengthen his army. With this new army he defeated the Locrians and gained control of Thermopylae (16.33). He also capitalized upon the old rivalry between Pherae and the rest of Thessaly, which the Thebans had attempted to end in 364 (see Chapter 25). Onomarchus won over the rulers of Pherae to the Phocian cause (16.35.1), thus kindling their hopes of regaining control of Thessaly as in the days of Jason of Pherae. The Thebans and the rest of the Thessalians turned for help to their former ally in the north – Macedon (16.35.1; Justin, Philippica 8.2.1–2). In this way Philip became a combatant in the Sacred War.
The entry of Philip with an army into Thessaly led the rulers of Pherae to summon help from the Phocians, who sent a force of 7,000 men under Onomarchus’ brother, Phayllus. The defeat of this Phocian force resulted in the despatch of the main Phocian army under Onomarchus who defeated Philip in two battles an
d forced him to withdraw from Thessaly (16.35.1–2). Philip’s defeats in 353 had been caused by being outnumbered in troops, which he remedied in the following year, when he returned to the attack. The Thessalians appointed him ‘archon’, a post which was held for life and gave the post-holder command of the Thessalian armed forces and control of the state’s revenues (Justin 11.3.2) – a great increase in Philip’s power. In 352, Philip and the Thessalians won a decisive victory at the mighty battle of the Crocus Field against the joint forces of Phocis and Pherae: Onomarchus and 6,000 mercenaries were killed, 3,000 were captured, and the rulers of Pherae handed over their city to Philip and retired to Phocis with their mercenaries (16.35.3–6; 37.3).
The whole of Thessaly was now under the power of Philip, but he saw that an opportunity existed to increase his prestige and to extend his influence into central Greece by following up his victory and conquering the Phocians, the ‘sacrilegious temple-robbers’ of Delphi. He marched to Thermopylae, which commanded the entrance into central Greece, but arrived too late. The pass at Thermopylae had already been occupied by the Phocians under Phayllus, the mercenaries of Pherae, and the Athenians who, on this rare occasion, had moved swiftly to oppose Philip (16.38.2; Demosthenes 4). Philip had no alternative but to accept that it was impossible to force the pass:
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