Bibliography
Bury, J. B. and Meiggs, R. A History of Greece, 4th edn, ch. 16.
Cawkwell, G. Philip of Macedon, chs 3, 5–9, 11–12.
——‘The peace of Philocrates again’, CQ 28.
Griffith, G. T. ‘The Macedonian background’,in Alexander the Great, Greece and Rome Supplement vol. 12, no. 2.
Griffith, G. T. and Hammond, N. G. L. Macedonia vol. 2.
Hornblower, S. The Greek World 479–323 BC, 2nd edn, ch. 17.
Perlman, S. Philip and Athens.
Ryder, T. T. B. Introduction to Demosthenes and Aeschines.
27
ALEXANDER’ S GENERALSHIP AT THE BATTLES OF THE RIVER GRANICUS (334), ISSUS (333) AND GAUGAMELA (331)
The assassination of Philip in summer 336 postponed the invasion of the Persian Empire for two years. When Alexander ascended to the Macedonian throne, he was immediately threatened by enemies on all sides. His first immediate task was to remove all potential challengers for the kingship which he did with alacrity (Plutarch, Moralia 327). His second was to establish himself in his father’s place as commander-in-chief of the Greeks for the planned military campaign against Persia: his swift march through Greece resulted in his election to this post by the League of Corinth (Diodorus 17.3–4). Alexander’s third task was to ensure that Macedon was safe from an attack by the traditionally hostile Illyrians on its western border, and that there was no danger of a Thracian revolt in his rear, while waging war in Asia: his successful campaigns in 335 against the Triballi, the most rebellious of the Thracian tribes, and against the Illyrians put an end to these problems (Arrian, Anabasis 1.1–6). In the same year the sack of Thebes after its uprising served as a warning to all the Greek states that Alexander would deal ruthlessly with any opposition (Diodorus 17.13–14). Alexander was now ready in the spring of 334 to invade the Persian Empire: he crossed the Hellespont and, before coming to land, cast his spear into the Asian soil, thus asserting his claim to Asia by right of conquest (Diodorus 17.17). His victory in three great battles at the River Granicus (334), at Issus (333) and at Gaugamela (331) turned his claim into fact.
The sources
It is a difficult problem to give an accurate account of these battles due to the fact that the surviving accounts are written by historians, who lived long after the events that they describe. In addition, the contemporary or near-contemporary sources that they used are noted for their bias and their exaggeration. The most reliable account, with reservations, is the Anabasis of Arrian (A.A. for the rest of this chapter), who wrote in the second century AD. His main sources were the near-contemporary accounts of two eyewitnesses of Alexander’s military successes: the Macedonian Ptolemy, Arrian’s principal source (A.A. 6.2.4), one of Alexander’s senior officers and, after Alexander’s death, the ruler and first king of Egypt; and Aristobulus of Cassandreia, a junior officer, possibly an engineer or architect. Ptolemy’s concentration on military matters gives Arrian’s account more credibility, but he does exaggerate his own role in military operations and his services to Alexander, while denigrating those of his personal enemies. Aristobulus must also be handled with caution, as he is so flattering to Alexander and so protective of his reputation. To complicate matters further, both these writers made use of the works of the Greek Callisthenes, a relative of Aristotle, who had been employed by Alexander specifically to give a glowing and heroic account of his achievements. Nevertheless, Ptolemy’s military expertise and Arrian’s military experience as a Roman governor have combined to produce a generally reliable and clear description of these battles.
Modern scholarship uses two terms to denote the two different traditions of Alexander’s reign: the ‘official tradition’ and the ‘vulgate’. The ‘official tradition’ refers to Ptolemy and Aristobulus, who were the main sources for Arrian’s Anabasis. The ‘vulgate tradition’ is contained in the 17th book of Diodorus Siculus (D.S. for the rest of the chapter), writing nearly 300 years after Alexander’s death, and the Roman Quintus Curtius Rufus, writing in the first century AD, both of whom used the Greek Cleitarchus as their main source. Little is known about the personal life of Cleitarchus apart from the fact that he lived in Alexandria under Ptolemy in the late fourth or early third century. His literary work is highly critical of Alexander, possibly due to his dislike of the Macedonians, and was noted in antiquity for its cavalier treatment of the truth and its fondness for sensationalism, such as the information that Alexander set fire to Persepolis, after the suggestion was made at a drunken party by Thais, an Athenian prostitute, to avenge Xerxes’ destruction of Athens in 480 (Curtius 5.7.3–11; D.S. 17.72). Finally there is Plutarch’s Life of Alexander, which made use of a very wide range of sources, including all those mentioned above, and therefore should be treated separately from the two main traditions.
Alexander’s army
The precise numbers of infantry and cavalry that accompanied Alexander, when he marched to the Hellespont in 334 to begin the invasion of the Persian Empire, is a tough problem to resolve. Plutarch (Alexander 15.1) noted that estimates ranged from 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry (Aristobulus’ figures) to 43,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry (the figures of Anaximenes, a fourth-century historian and rhetorician). Arrian, who was most probably using Ptolemy as his source, states that Alexander had not many more than 30,000 infantry and over 5,000 cavalry (A.A. 1.11.3). Only Diodorus gives a detailed breakdown of the size of the different army units (D.S. 17.17):
Infantry:
12,000 Macedonians
7,000 Greek allies
5,000 Greek mercenaries
7,000 Balkan troops (i.e. Odrysians, Triballians, and Illyrians)
1,000 Agrianians and archers
Total
32,000
Cavalry:
1,800 Macedonians (i.e. the ‘Companions’–see below)
1,800 Thessalians
600 Greek allies
600 Thracians, ‘Prodromoi’ (‘Fore-runners’) and Paeonians
Total
5,100
However, there is a further complication with Diodorus: the sum total that he gives for the cavalry is 4,800, even though the correct total, based on his own figures, should read 5,100.
It is possible to have confidence in the figure of 32,000 infantry, since it accords with the totals which were given by Arrian (‘not much more than 30,000’) and Diodorus in his detailed analysis; and which have probably been rounded down by Aristobulus. Anaximenes’ total of 43,000 infantry can probably be explained by his inclusion of the earlier expeditionary force, which was sent by Philip in 336 under the command of Parmenion, and consisted of at least 10,000 men (Polyaenus 5.44.4). As for the size of the cavalry contingent, it has proved to be impossible for modern scholarship to reconcile the conflicting figures with any certainty.
The cavalry
The strongest and most prestigious troops of the Macedonian army were the heavily armed cavalry: the ‘Companions’ (‘hetairoi’). These 1,800 men were divided into eight ‘ilai’ (squadrons), consisting of 225 men (A.A. 3.11.8); one of these squadrons was the ‘Royal Squadron’, the elite group that fought alongside the King. In 331/0, when 500 extra troops were added, each squadron was divided into two ‘lochoi’ (companies). The overall commander of the Companion Cavalry was Philotas, son of Parmenion, who was Alexander’s most experienced general (A.A. 3.11.8). Philotas was executed in 330 for allegedly plotting against Alexander, who divided the command between two ‘hipparchs’ (commanders of the cavalry) because:
he did not want one man, not even his dearest friend, to be in charge of so many cavalry, especially since they were the most renowned and the most formidable of the whole cavalry.
(Arrian, Anabasis 3.27.4)
In 327, the command structure of the Companion Cavalry was again modified so that there were at least six, but in all probability eight hipparchs – this can be inferred from Alexander’s campaigning in 327, since Arr
ian states that he was accompanied by four hipparchs and half of the Companions (A.A. 4.22.7, 24.1).
The Companion Cavalry wore a metal helmet, corselet and a short metal or leather kilt, and were heavily armed with a lance, made of tough cornelwood and possessing a blade at each end, and a curved slashing sword. The lack of saddles and stirrups prevented the cavalryman from using his lance in the traditional, later manner, i.e. putting the whole weight of his body behind the lance, since he would have quickly become unseated; instead he used it as a stabbing spear. The Companion Cavalry rode into battle in a wedge-shaped formation, its apex facing the enemy, so that they had the flexibility to swing quickly to the right or left, and charge into any gap that appeared in the enemy’s line. As the main strength of the Persian forces rested on their cavalry, it was the vital task of the Companion Cavalry to shatter the Persian cavalry by punching a hole in its formation by a full-blooded, concentrated shock-attack. When the Persian cavalry was driven off, the Companion Cavalry could then attack the Persian infantry in the flank and the rear. Finally, they could pursue and finish off the fleeing infantry in the open plain.
The rest of Alexander’s cavalry consisted of non-Macedonians, of whom the elite were the 1,800 heavily armed Thessalians. These had been traditionally the best horsemen in Greece, and their fighting worth was recognized by Alexander, who placed them on the left wing of his battle-line as a balance to his Companion Cavalry on the right. Their body armour and curved, slashing swords were similar to those of the Companion Cavalry, but they were also armed with two short spears: one was used as a javelin, the other either as a second javelin or as a stabbing spear, according to circumstances. Alexander also employed six other squadrons, each consisting of 150 men: one of Thracians, one of Paeonians and four of ‘Prodromoi’ (‘Fore-Runners’). The non-Greek Thracians and Paeonians were armed with javelins, but the Prodromoi carried much longer lances than the rest, similar to the long ‘sarissa’ (pike) of the Macedonian phalanx (see below), which they had to hold with both hands, while controlling their horses with only their legs. All these cavalry units came from territories which either had been incorporated within the Macedonian state or were under the direct control of Alexander. The rest of the Greeks in the League of Corinth supplied only 600 cavalry.
The infantry
The backbone of the infantry was the Macedonian phalanx, the ‘pezetairoi’ (‘Foot-Companions’). These had been established as a regular body of troops by one of the predecessors of Philip, but it was he who turned them into a formidable fighting force. They were divided into six battalions (‘taxeis’), each one consisting of 1,500 men, making a total of 9,000 men (A.A. 3.11.9). At the battle of Hydaspes in 326, there were seven battalions (A.A. 5.11.3, 12.1ff.), which were possibly formed when reinforcements were sent to Alexander in Susa (A.A. 3.16.11). The Macedonian soldier in the phalanx was not as heavily armed as the Greek ‘hoplite’, since he had no corselet to protect his breast and possessed a smaller shield, which probably was suspended from his neck to cover his left side. The reason for this was that his main weapon was the very long sarissa, probably about 5½ metres in length in Alexander’stime(6½ metres in the second century – Polybius 18.29), which needed both hands to be free in order to hold it. As a result, the ‘sarissae’ of the first three or four ranks projected beyond the front line of battle, creating a wall of spear-points. The sarissae of the remaining ranks (it is not clear if the phalanx consisted of eight or sixteen ranks) were held upright to afford some protection from the enemy’s missiles. The main function of the phalanx was to hold its ground in the centre of the battle-line and keep the enemy’s centre engaged, while Alexander and the Companion Cavalry on the right wing destroyed the enemy’s left wing and then joined in the attack on the enemy’s centre from the side and rear.
The elite of the Macedonian infantry were the ‘hypaspists’ or ‘shield-bearers’, organized into three battalions, each with 1,000 troops (A.A. 4.30.5). There was even an elite within these battalions, one bearing the name of ‘agema’ or ‘the Royal Footguard’. These 3,000 hypaspists were placed immediately on the right of the phalanx in the battle-line to protect its exposed, open right flank. It is not clear from the sources how they were armed, but Arrian strongly implies that they were more lightly armed by including them among the other light-armed troops, the archers and the javelin-men, and contrasting them with the heavily armed troops of the phalanx (A.A. 2.4.3). The fact that Alexander used them frequently for forced marches and other special operations adds support to this view. The final components of the Macedonian infantry were two battalions of archers, one Macedonian, the other Cretan; and the highly valued and much-employed 1,000 non-Greek Agrianians, whose equipment was based upon that of the ‘peltasts’, the 5,000 Greek mercenaries in Alexander’s invasion force – the javelin, the long sword, the small shield and the light body-armour. The remaining 7,000 Greek troops were heavily armed hoplites, who were mainly used for garrison duty and maintaining Alexander’s lines of communication. In contrast, the Persian infantry wore hardly any protective body-armour, were armed with short spears and relied mainly on the bow, thus putting them at a great disadvantage in hand-to-hand fighting.
The battle of the River Granicus (334)
The opening battle of Alexander’s campaign in Persia took place in 334 at the River Granicus, which flows in a northerly direction into the Propontis or Sea of Marmara. Darius III, the King of Persia, sent reinforcements, but left the strategy and the direction of the battle to his local ‘satraps’ in western Asia Minor and to Memnon, a Greek commander in his employment. Memnon’s advice to avoid a pitched battle and to rely upon a ‘scorched earth’ policy, so that Alexander would be forced to abandon his campaign due to a lack of supplies, was rejected by the satraps as too defeatist (A.A. 1.12.9–10). However, his stated concern about the Macedonian superiority in infantry persuaded them to adopt a defensive strategy: they drew up their forces on the east bank of the Granicus, thus ensuring that Alexander would have to cross the river to engage forces – a very difficult and dangerous enterprise.
The sources
It is in the description of this battle that the widest divergence is found between the ‘official tradition’, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, and the ‘vulgate’, Diodorus. There has been some scholarly support for Diodorus’ account (e.g. Bosworth), but it has been in the minority due to the serious problems arising from Diodorus’ version of events. First, he claims that there were 100,000 Persian infantry, which is a gross exaggeration (D.S. 17.19.5); second, he places Alexander’s attack at dawn, which is at variance with all the other sources (D. S. 17.19.3); third, he states that Alexander was allowed to cross the river unopposed and draw up his battle formation – thus negating the key element in the Persian satraps’ defensive tactics (D.S. 17.19.3). Finally, Diodorus’ battle consists of two distinct and separate phases, namely a cavalry battle (D.S. 17.19.6–21.4) followed by an infantry battle (D.S. 17.21.5–6) – thus ignoring the fundamental principle of Alexander’s battle tactics, which coordinated the use of the cavalry and the infantry as a combined striking force. On these grounds, Arrian’s account has found more favour with modern scholarship.
The deployment of the armies
According to Arrian, when the Macedonian forces arrived in the afternoon at the Granicus, Alexander and Parmenion had a discussion about the best course of action. The authenticity of this debate is suspect, but it does lay out clearly the advantages and disadvantages of fighting this battle. Parmenion, a very experienced commander, outlined clearly the tactical problems of going on the offensive and the strategic results of a defeat:
‘It seems to me that we will be taking a very great risk if we attack now, because we cannot lead the army across the river in line-abreast on a broad front. For you can see that many parts of the river are deep, and that the banks are steep, even cliff-like. As a result, when we emerge, we will be in loose order and in column [i.e. not line abreast], which is the weakest forma
tion, and the enemy cavalry, drawn up in massed formation, will strike hard at our phalanx. This disaster at the beginning will cause difficulties for the present and will be very damaging to the outcome of the whole war.’
(Arrian, Anabasis 1.13.4–5)
However, Alexander had decided upon the tactics to overcome the specific doubts and fears of Parmenion.
In Arrian’s account, the Persians had 20,000 (probably exaggerated) cavalry, drawn up along the high edge of the bank, and 20,000 infantry, consisting mainly of Greek mercenaries, drawn up on a ridge behind the level ground that stretched from the river-bank (A.A. 1.14.4 – see Map 11). In recounting the battle formation of Alexander’s forces, Arrian makes no mention of the 7,000 Greek allied infantry, the 5,000 Greek mercenaries nor of the 7,000 Balkan troops. However, the Persian defensive tactics and Memnon’s remark about the Macedonian superiority in infantry (A.A. 1.12.9) strongly imply that these Greek forces were present, most probably held in reserve, ready to be brought into the action if the first attack faltered or failed. Alexander placed the phalanx, the six battalions of his ‘Foot-Companions’, in the centre. On the right of the phalanx stood the three battalions of hypaspists; on their right came a combined force of cavalry – the light-armed Prodromoi and Paeonians, and one squadron of the Companion Cavalry under its squadron commander, Socrates; on their right came the remaining squadrons of Companion Cavalry under Philotas; and finally, on the extreme right wing, the Agrianians (the javelin-men) and the archers. Alexander was in command of the right half of the army, including three battalions of the phalanx to the right. On the left of the phalanx stood the Thracian cavalry; to their left were the Greek allied cavalry; and on the extreme left wing the Thessalian cavalry was positioned. Parmenion was the commander of the left half of the army, including the three battalions of the phalanx to the left.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 69