The battle
The decision of Alexander to attack that very afternoon, almost immediately after his arrival at the Granicus, gave the Persians no time to rearrange their two battle-lines. However, the prominence of Alexander in his white-plumed helmet on the right wing with his Companions persuaded the Persians to reinforce their left wing in order to oppose him (A.A. 1.14.4). Alexander began the battle by ordering an assault force, consisting of the Royal battalion of hypaspists, the Prodromoi, the Paeonians and Socrates’ squadron of
Map 11 The battle of the River Granicus
the Companion Cavalry, to make a frontal attack on the enemy line opposite them (A.A. 1.14.6). He also ordered his right wing to enter the river but, to the surprise of the Persians, he did not make straight for the enemy line, but led his forces across the river at an oblique angle. It is the direction of this manoeuvre that has caused disagreement in modern scholarship.
The standard translation of Arrian’s description of the movement of Alexander and the Macedonian right wing has been as follows:
He himself, leading the right wing to the sound of trumpets and shouts to the God of War, enters the stream, continually extending his line of battle at an angle in the direction, where the current was pulling them [i.e. downstream], so that the Persians would not attack him as he emerged in column, but so that he himself might attack them, being as far as possible in deep formation.
(Arrian, Anabasis 1.14.7)
Thus, it is argued, Arrian believed that Alexander and his right wing moved in the direction of the current, i.e. to the left, in order to attack the Persian left-centre. It is difficult to make military sense of such a move, since it would involve two groups of Alexander’s forces attempting to cut across each other in the midst of a fast-flowing river, and yet expecting to keep in formation. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to stay in formation when advancing in the same direction as a river current, as it would tend to sweep the troops along in a disorderly fashion.
A different interpretation (by Hammond) of Alexander’s manoeuvre is based on an alternative translation of the key passage in Arrian:
continually extending his line of battle at an angle at this/that point, where the current was pulling them, so that the Persians …
It is argued that an unstated but implicit antecedent ‘at this point’ (‘tautei’) or ‘at that point’ (‘ekeinei’) should be placed before ‘where the current was pulling them’. If this translation is accepted, then Arrian was stating that Alexander and his right wing entered the river and were advancing against the current, i.e. to the right. This interpretation is supported by the only other source that recorded Alexander’s sideways movement across the river:
While crossing the Granicus, Alexander outflanked the wing of the Persians, as they were about to attack from a higher position, by means of himself leading the Macedonians upstream (or ‘towards the water/flow’).
(Polyaenus 4.3.16)
Polyaenus emphasizes that the movement of Alexander and the right wing was upstream, i.e. to the right, in order to outflank the Persian left wing. Furthermore, it is easier for an armed force to keep its balance and therefore its battle-formation by advancing against a current. Arrian himself, in the speech given to Parmenion (see above), stresses this specific point: the vital importance of keeping in formation as the Macedonians mounted the opposite riverbank. This could only be achieved by crossing at an oblique angle to the right against the current. Consequently, Polyaenus’ evidence strengthens Hammond’s translation of Arrian, and his view on this issue should be preferred.
While Alexander and the right wing were carrying out this manoeuvre, the initial assault force had engaged the enemy. There were heavy casualties on the Macedonian side, because the steepness of the riverbank made it difficult to mount and the Persians, towering above them, had an easy target for their javelins (A.A. 1.15.1–2). As this first assault began to falter, Alexander stopped the move to the right and ordered his right wing to launch a frontal attack. Alexander, at the head of the Royal Squadron of Companion Cavalry, forced his way onto the bank, where a violent and furious cavalry battle took place (A.A. 1.15.3–8). The superior quality of Alexander’s Royal Squadron and their longer spears, even against greater numbers, enabled him to establish a bridgehead on the east bank, thus allowing the other squadrons of Companion Cavalry to join him. Just as deadly to the Persian cavalry was the presence of the Agrianian javelin-men and archers, who had outflanked them. Interspersed with the Macedonian cavalry, they wreaked havoc by attacking the Persian horses. Gradually the Persian cavalry began to be pushed back, but the turning point in the battle came further down the Persian line of battle:
But when the Persian centre had given way, then both of the cavalry wings also broke, and the rout was complete.
(Arrian, Anabasis 1.16.1)
Although not mentioned in Arrian’s account, the Macedonian phalanx in the centre and the Thessalian cavalry and the others on the left had presumably crossed the Granicus to confront the Persian centre and right wing, while the other recorded action was taking place. The long sarissae of the phalanx achieved the key break-through in the centre, resulting in the flight of the whole Persian cavalry.
Alexander then led his forces against the 20,000 (mainly) Greek mercenaries, drawn up on a ridge as the Persian second line of defence. They were attacked in the front by the Macedonian phalanx, and on the flanks and in the rear by the Macedonian and allied cavalry. Arrian states unconvincingly that this highly trained, very experienced and numerous army of mercenaries was quickly over-whelmed and massacred, and that there were only 2,000 survivors, who surrendered unconditionally (A.A. 1.16.2). Plutarch’s account is much more realistic: a tough and bloody battle, which resulted in more casualties for Alexander than were sustained in the fighting with the Persian cavalry (Plutarch, Alexander 16). Plutarch, citing Aristobulus as his source, gives the Macedonian losses as 25 cavalry and 9 infantry (Plut. Alex. 16), whereas Arrian gives 25 Companion Cavalry, more than 60 of the rest of the cavalry and about 30 infantry (A.A. 1.16.4) – remarkably and suspiciously low.
Alexander had gained his first success in the Persian campaign and was now free to march through Asia Minor. The victory at the River Granicus had been achieved by the superior fighting qualities of the Macedonian army and by Alexander’s generalship. He had displayed confidence in his own judgement by rejecting Parmenion’s advice to delay the battle until the following morning; and decisiveness by launching an immediate attack upon the Persians. He also showed outstanding organizational ability by coordinating both light and heavy cavalry and light- and heavy-armed infantry into an effective single attacking force. In addition, he revealed flexibility and originality in adapting tactics to meet a particular situation, when he ordered his right wing to move across the river at an angle to outflank the Persian left wing and to mount the opposite bank in line of battle. There was also that vital sense of timing – knowing exactly when to strike to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy – when he attacked the Persian left wing just as the first assault force, whose objective was to pin down the Persian cavalry on the left, had begun to falter and was being pushed back into the river.
Finally, he possessed that outstanding quality that endears every general to his troops and is so vital for army morale: personal courage. He led his army from the front and faced the same danger as the humblest soldier. In fact, Alexander was nearly killed three times in this battle: first, when he was hit on his helmet by the axe of Rhoesaces (A.A. 1.15.7) or of Spithridates (Plut., Alex. 16); second, when he was about to be struck from behind by Spithridates’ sword, but was saved by ‘Black Cleitus’, one of the Royal Squadron of the Companion Cavalry (A.A. 1.15.8; Plut., Alex. 16); and third, when his horse was killed beneath him by a sword thrust from one of the Greek mercenaries (Plut., Alex. 16). It is hardly surprising that the Macedonian army held Alexander in the highest esteem and affection.
The battl
e of Issus (333)
In November 333, Darius led his army over the Amanus mountains and placed his army in the rear of Alexander’s forces on the north side of the River Pinarus, situated close to Issus on the Gulf of Alexandretta, which forms the right-angle between Asia Minor and Phoenicia. The identification of the Pinarus has been a matter of scholarly dispute, but the majority opinion inclines towards the Delai Chai rather than the Payas, which is further south. There are two main grounds for this belief: first, the steep banks of the Payas would have made Alexander’s cavalry charge impossible; and second, the gradual deployment of Alexander’s army from marching line of column into its final battle-formation, as he advanced northwards, could only have taken place in the terrain between the Payas and the Delai Chai.
The sources
The clearest account of the battle comes from Arrian (2.6–11), who made use of the ‘official tradition’, Ptolemy (mentioned by name in A.A. 2.11.8) and Aristobulus. However, there is also the fragmentary narrative of the contemporary historian, Callisthenes himself, which can be recovered from Polybius’ detailed criticism of that writer’s account (12.17–22). Although critical of Callisthenes’ work, Polybius concedes that Callisthenes’ account was generally accepted, and even ranks him among the most learned of the old historians (6.45.1). In addition, Polybius’ summary of Callisthenes’ account strongly suggests that Arrian’s main sources, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, agreed with and, in all probability, made use of Callisthenes’ work. Although Callisthenes has his failings – exaggeration of the Persian forces and inaccurate estimates of distances – his account, and therefore Arrian’s, can be generally considered as reliable. Quintus Curtius (3.8–11) also seems to be drawing on the same tradition for much of his information about the build-up to the battle and thus, apart from his usual dramatic and sensational treatment of events, helps to provide a consistent picture of events. However, his version differs radically from Arrian’s about the fighting around Darius and Darius’ behaviour in the battle, and it would seem that he, together with Diodorus (17.32–36), was following a different tradition for this stage of the battle.
The deployment of the armies
The size of the Persian army under Darius can only be guessed, since the numbers given by all the sources are clearly exaggerated: 600,000, including 30,000 Greek mercenaries and 60,000 Cardaces, a specialized group of infantry, possibly similar to peltasts (A.A. 2.8.8); 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry (D.S. 17.31.2); and 310,000 in total (Quintus Curtius 3.2). All that can be said with confidence was that Alexander must have been outnumbered, since he organized his forces in such a way as to avoid being outflanked. When news of Alexander’s approach was brought to Darius, he sent the whole of his cavalry and some light-armed troops across the Pinarus in order to draw up his battle-formation in safety. He placed the Greek mercenaries, his best infantry troops, in the middle to confront the Macedonian phalanx; on either side of them he placed the Cardaces (A.A. 2.8.6), in front of whom were posted archers (A.A. 2.10.3). Behind these he placed the rest of the Asiatic infantry, a mixture of heavy- and light-armed troops as a reserve force (A.A. 2.8.8). Furthermore:
He also stationed about 20,000 troops on the mountain on their left against Alexander’s right wing, and some of these were actually positioned to Alexander’s rear.
(Arrian, Anabasis 2.8.7)
These had been placed on the foothills of the Amanus mountains, in advance of his line of battle. Their role was, defensively, to prevent the Persian left wing from being outflanked and, offensively, to outflank Alexander’s right wing.
Having deployed his infantry, Darius recalled the cavalry from the southern side of the Pinarus:
and placed most of them on the right wing, next to the sea opposite Parmenion, because the terrain there was suitable for horses.
(Arrian, Anabasis 2.8.10)
Darius had now covered the whole coastal plain from the sea to the mountains with his forces. He now took his place in the centre with his 3,000-strong Royal Cavalry Guard, presumably behind the Greek mercenaries. His battle-plan is revealed by Curtius:
Darius wanted to make it an issue between the cavalry, since he believed that the phalanx was the main strength of the Macedonian army.
(Quintus Curtius 3.11.1)
Darius, without necessarily realizing it, was intending to imitate Alexander’s tactics by using his cavalry on the Persian right to defeat and rout Alexander’s left wing, and then attack the phalanx in the flank and the rear.
Alexander marched northwards with his infantry in front and his cavalry behind them but, when he reached the coastal plain that gradually became broader, he deployed his infantry in a widening line of battle as he advanced, at first 32 men deep, then 16, then 8 (Polybius 19.6, 21.1), keeping the right flank close to the mountains, and the left close to the sea (A.A. 2.8.2). Finally there was enough room to deploy his cavalry: he positioned the Companion Cavalry on the immediate right of the hypaspists, next the Thessalians and presumably (there is a missing section in Arrian’s text) the Prodromoi and the Paeonians on the extreme right wing; he sent the allied Greek cavalry to Parmenion to take up position on his left wing (A.A. 2.8.9). However, when Alexander drew closer to the Pinarus and saw Darius’ final battle-formation, he made some key changes to his line of battle. He quickly realized that he had to strengthen his left wing, since the bulk of the Persian cavalry had been drawn up on the Persian right next to the sea. Therefore he removed the Thessalians from the Macedonian right and transferred them to the left, but he ordered them to carry out this manoeuvre behind the front line so that the Persians would not see what was happening. In addition, he placed the Thracian javelin-men and the Cretan archers between the reinforced cavalry on the left wing and the phalanx in the centre (A.A. 2.9.1, 9.3 – see Map 12).
Alexander now had to reorganize his right wing to fill the space made by the withdrawal of the Thessalians and to defend his right flank from the Persians positioned on the foothills of the Amanus Mountains. He placed the archers under Antiochus on the immediate right of the hypaspists, thus moving the Companion Cavalry further right, and closed up the line by moving the Prodromoi and the Paeonians leftwards to link up with the Companion Cavalry (A.A 2.9.2). As for the Persians in the foothills of the mountains:
He drew up the Agrianians under Attalus, some of the cavalry and some of the archers at an angle towards the mountain in his rear with the result that, on his right wing, his line of battle was split into two prongs, one facing Darius and all of the Persians on the opposite side of the river, the other facing those Persians who had been stationed on the mountain to the Macedonian rear.
(Arrian, Anabasis 2.9.2)
In other words, Alexander’s right wing formed a right-angle to prevent an encircling movement by that force of Persians. The Greek mercenaries were drawn up as a reserve behind the phalanx.
The battle
As he advanced, Alexander decided to test the mettle of the Persians in the foothills by launching the Agrianians and some archers against them. The result was an easy victory for the Macedonians, who drove the Persians in flight to the summit, thereby excluding them from any further part in the battle (A.A. 2.9.4). With the threat to his right flank virtually removed, Alexander carried out the final reorganization of his battle-formation (see Map 12):
Since the battle-line on his right wing did not seem solid enough to him, and because the Persians seemed to be greatly outflanking him here, he ordered two squadrons of the Companion Cavalry … to go from the centre unobserved to the right wing. He also brought over the archers [i.e. those on the right of the hypaspists], some of the Agrianians and some of the Greek mercenaries [i.e. from the second line] to the right wing, and thus extended his battle-line to outflank the Persian left wing.
(Arrian, Anabasis 2.9.3–4)
The two squadrons of Companion Cavalry were presumably sent to join the Prodromoi and the Paeonians to provide depth at that part of the line. Alexander wa
s now in an excellent position: by driving off the Persians from the foothills and by extending his right wing, he had effectively cut off
Map 12 The battle of Issus
the Persian left wing on the north side of the Pinarus from its advance force on the south side in the hills. Alexander decided that a detachment of 300 cavalry (possibly with the remaining Agrianians) was sufficient to keep watch on the hill-men (A.A. 2.9.4).
The battle began either when the Persian cavalry charged across the river against the Macedonian left wing (Quintus Curtius 3.11.1; Polybius 12.18.11) or when Alexander led the Companion Cavalry in a charge against the Cardaces on the Persian left wing (A.A. 2.10.3). The shock of Alexander’s frontal attack with the cavalry, aided by the Agrianians and the other Greeks working around the flank, broke the resistance of the Cardaces on the left, who fled in disorder (A.A. 2.10.3–4). However, the Macedonian centre quickly ran into trouble:
The Greek mercenaries with Darius attacked at the point where the Macedonian phalanx had split and come apart on the right. The cause of this was that, when Alexander had plunged very swiftly into the river and, fighting at close quarters, was forcing back the Persian forces placed there, those in the Macedonian centre had not attacked with the same speed, and finding the river banks steep in many places, were unable to maintain a regular and unbroken line. And it was at this point that the Greeks attacked the Macedonians, where they saw the line of battle especially broken.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 70