Aristotle

by Various Works [lit]

  the other; and upon the one it follows that it is desirable, while

  upon the other it follows that it is objectionable. The sequence,

  therefore, in the latter case also is direct; for the desirable is the

  contrary of the objectionable. Likewise also in other cases. The

  sequence is, on the other hand, converse in such a case as this:

  Health follows upon vigour, but disease does not follow upon debility;

  rather debility follows upon disease. In this case, then, clearly

  the sequence is converse. Converse sequence is, however, rare in the

  case of contraries; usually the sequence is direct. If, therefore, the

  contrary of the one term does not follow upon the contrary of the

  other either directly or conversely, clearly neither does the one term

  follow upon the other in the statement made: whereas if the one

  followed the other in the case of the contraries, it must of necessity

  do so as well in the original statement.

  You should look also into cases of the privation or presence of a

  state in like manner to the case of contraries. Only, in the case of

  such privations the converse sequence does not occur: the sequence

  is always bound to be direct: e.g. as sensation follows sight, while

  absence of sensation follows blindness. For the opposition of

  sensation to absence of sensation is an opposition of the presence

  to the privation of a state: for the one of them is a state, and the

  other the privation of it.

  The case of relative terms should also be studied in like manner

  to that of a state and its privation: for the sequence of these as

  well is direct; e.g. if 3/1 is a multiple, then 1/3 is a fraction: for

  3/1 is relative to 1/3, and so is a multiple to a fraction. Again,

  if knowledge be a conceiving, then also the object of knowledge is

  an object of conception; and if sight be a sensation, then also the

  object of sight is an object of sensation. An objection may be made

  that there is no necessity for the sequence to take place, in the case

  of relative terms, in the way described: for the object of sensation

  is an object of knowledge, whereas sensation is not knowledge. The

  objection is, however, not generally received as really true; for many

  people deny that there is knowledge of objects of sensation. Moreover,

  the principle stated is just as useful for the contrary purpose,

  e.g. to show that the object of sensation is not an object of

  knowledge, on the ground that neither is sensation knowledge.

  9

  Again look at the case of the co-ordinates and inflected forms of

  the terms in the thesis, both in demolishing and in establishing it.

  By co-ordinates' are meant terms such as the following: 'Just deeds'

  and the 'just man' are coordinates of 'justice', and 'courageous

  deeds' and the 'courageous man' are co-ordinates of courage.

  Likewise also things that tend to produce and to preserve anything are

  called co-ordinates of that which they tend to produce and to

  preserve, as e.g. 'healthy habits' are co-ordinates of 'health' and

  a 'vigorous constitutional' of a 'vigorous constitution' and so

  forth also in other cases. 'Co-ordinate', then, usually describes

  cases such as these, whereas 'inflected forms' are such as the

  following: 'justly', 'courageously', 'healthily', and such as are

  formed in this way. It is usually held that words when used in their

  inflected forms as well are co-ordinates, as (e.g.) 'justly' in

  relation to justice, and 'courageously' to courage; and then

  'co-ordinate' describes all the members of the same kindred series,

  e.g. 'justice', 'just', of a man or an act, 'justly'. Clearly, then,

  when any one member, whatever its kind, of the same kindred series

  is shown to be good or praiseworthy, then all the rest as well come to

  be shown to be so: e.g. if 'justice' be something praiseworthy, then

  so will 'just', of a man or thing, and 'justly' connote something

  praiseworthy. Then 'justly' will be rendered also 'praiseworthily',

  derived will by the same inflexion from 'the praiseworthy' whereby

  'justly' is derived from 'justice'.

  Look not only in the case of the subject mentioned, but also in

  the case of its contrary, for the contrary predicate: e.g. argue

  that good is not necessarily pleasant; for neither is evil painful: or

  that, if the latter be the case, so is the former. Also, if justice be

  knowledge, then injustice is ignorance: and if 'justly' means

  'knowingly' and 'skilfully', then 'unjustly' means 'ignorantly' and

  'unskilfully': whereas if the latter be not true, neither is the

  former, as in the instance given just now: for 'unjustly' is more

  likely to seem equivalent to 'skilfully' than to 'unskilfully'. This

  commonplace rule has been stated before in dealing with the sequence

  of contraries; for all we are claiming now is that the contrary of P

  shall follow the contrary of S.

  Moreover, look at the modes of generation and destruction of a

  thing, and at the things which tend to produce or to destroy it,

  both in demolishing and in establishing a view. For those things whose

  modes of generation rank among good things, are themselves also

  good; and if they themselves be good, so also are their modes of

  generation. If, on the other hand, their modes of generation be

  evil, then they themselves also are evil. In regard to modes of

  destruction the converse is true: for if the modes of destruction rank

  as good things, then they themselves rank as evil things; whereas if

  the modes of destruction count as evil, they themselves count as good.

  The same argument applies also to things tending to produce and

  destroy: for things whose productive causes are good, themselves

  also rank as good; whereas if causes destructive of them are good,

  they themselves rank as evil.

  10

  Again, look at things which are like the subject in question, and

  see if they are in like case; e.g. if one branch of knowledge has more

  than one object, so also will one opinion; and if to possess sight

  be to see, then also to possess hearing will be to hear. Likewise also

  in the case of other things, both those which are and those which

  are generally held to be like. The rule in question is useful for both

  purposes; for if it be as stated in the case of some one like thing,

  it is so with the other like things as well, whereas if it be not so

  in the case of some one of them, neither is it so in the case of the

  others. Look and see also whether the cases are alike as regards a

  single thing and a number of things: for sometimes there is a

  discrepancy. Thus, if to 'know' a thing be to 'think of' it, then also

  to 'know many things' is to 'be thinking of many things'; whereas this

  is not true; for it is possible to know many things but not to be

  thinking of them. If, then, the latter proposition be not true,

  neither was the former that dealt with a single thing, viz. that to

  'know' a thing is to 'think of' it.

  Moreover, argue from greater and less degrees. In regard to

  greater degrees there are four commonplace rules. One is: See

  whether a greater
degree of the predicate follows a greater degree

  of the subject: e.g. if pleasure be good, see whether also a greater

  pleasure be a greater good: and if to do a wrong be evil, see

  whether also to do a greater wrong is a greater evil. Now this rule is

  of use for both purposes: for if an increase of the accident follows

  an increase of the subject, as we have said, clearly the accident

  belongs; while if it does not follow, the accident does not belong.

  You should establish this by induction. Another rule is: If one

  predicate be attributed to two subjects; then supposing it does not

  belong to the subject to which it is the more likely to belong,

  neither does it belong where it is less likely to belong; while if

  it does belong where it is less likely to belong, then it belongs as

  well where it is more likely. Again: If two predicates be attributed

  to one subject, then if the one which is more generally thought to

  belong does not belong, neither does the one that is less generally

  thought to belong; or, if the one that is less generally thought to

  belong does belong, so also does the other. Moreover: If two

  predicates be attributed to two subjects, then if the one which is

  more usually thought to belong to the one subject does not belong,

  neither does the remaining predicate belong to the remaining

  subject; or, if the one which is less usually thought to belong to the

  one subject does belong, so too does the remaining predicate to the

  remaining subject.

  Moreover, you can argue from the fact that an attribute belongs,

  or is generally supposed to belong, in a like degree, in three ways,

  viz. those described in the last three rules given in regard to a

  greater degree.' For supposing that one predicate belongs, or is

  supposed to belong, to two subjects in a like degree, then if it

  does not belong to the one, neither does it belong to the other; while

  if it belongs to the one, it belongs to the remaining one as well. Or,

  supposing two predicates to belong in a like degree to the same

  subject, then, if the one does not belong, neither does the

  remaining one; while if the one does belong, the remaining one belongs

  as well. The case is the same also if two predicates belong in a

  like degree to two subjects; for if the one predicate does not

  belong to the one subject, neither does the remaining predicate belong

  to the remaining subject, while if the one predicate does belong to

  the one subject, the remaining predicate belongs to the remaining

  subject as well.

  11

  You can argue, then, from greater or less or like degrees of truth

  in the aforesaid number of ways. Moreover, you should argue from the

  addition of one thing to another. If the addition of one thing to

  another makes that other good or white, whereas formerly it was not

  white or good, then the thing added will be white or good-it will

  possess the character it imparts to the whole as well. Moreover, if an

  addition of something to a given object intensifies the character

  which it had as given, then the thing added will itself as well be

  of that character. Likewise, also, in the case of other attributes.

  The rule is not applicable in all cases, but only in those in which

  the excess described as an 'increased intensity' is found to take

  place. The above rule is, however, not convertible for overthrowing

  a view. For if the thing added does not make the other good, it is not

  thereby made clear whether in itself it may not be good: for the

  addition of good to evil does not necessarily make the whole good, any

  more than the addition of white to black makes the whole white.

  Again, any predicate of which we can speak of greater or less

  degrees belongs also absolutely: for greater or less degrees of good

  or of white will not be attributed to what is not good or white: for a

  bad thing will never be said to have a greater or less degree of

  goodness than another, but always of badness. This rule is not

  convertible, either, for the purpose of overthrowing a predication:

  for several predicates of which we cannot speak of a greater degree

  belong absolutely: for the term 'man' is not attributed in greater and

  less degrees, but a man is a man for all that.

  You should examine in the same way predicates attributed in a

  given respect, and at a given time and place: for if the predicate

  be possible in some respect, it is possible also absolutely. Likewise,

  also, is what is predicated at a given time or place: for what is

  absolutely impossible is not possible either in any respect or at

  any place or time. An objection may be raised that in a given

  respect people may be good by nature, e.g. they may be generous or

  temperately inclined, while absolutely they are not good by nature,

  because no one is prudent by nature. Likewise, also, it is possible

  for a destructible thing to escape destruction at a given time,

  whereas it is not possible for it to escape absolutely. In the same

  way also it is a good thing at certain places to follow see and such a

  diet, e.g. in infected areas, though it is not a good thing

  absolutely. Moreover, in certain places it is possible to live

  singly and alone, but absolutely it is not possible to exist singly

  and alone. In the same way also it is in certain places honourable

  to sacrifice one's father, e.g. among the Triballi, whereas,

  absolutely, it is not honourable. Or possibly this may indicate a

  relativity not to places but to persons: for it is all the same

  wherever they may be: for everywhere it will be held honourable

  among the Triballi themselves, just because they are Triballi.

  Again, at certain times it is a good thing to take medicines, e.g.

  when one is ill, but it is not so absolutely. Or possibly this again

  may indicate a relativity not to a certain time, but to a certain

  state of health: for it is all the same whenever it occurs, if only

  one be in that state. A thing is 'absolutely' so which without any

  addition you are prepared to say is honourable or the contrary. Thus

  (e.g.) you will deny that to sacrifice one's father is honourable:

  it is honourable only to certain persons: it is not therefore

  honourable absolutely. On the other hand, to honour the gods you

  will declare to be honourable without adding anything, because that is

  honourable absolutely. So that whatever without any addition is

  generally accounted to be honourable or dishonourable or anything else

  of that kind, will be said to be so 'absolutely'.

  Book III

  1

  THE question which is the more desirable, or the better, of two or

  more things, should be examined upon the following lines: only first

  of all it must be clearly laid down that the inquiry we are making

  concerns not things that are widely divergent and that exhibit great

  differences from one another (for nobody raises any doubt whether

  happiness or wealth is more desirable), but things that are nearly

  related and about which we commonly discuss for which of the two we

  ought rather to vote, because we do not see any advantage on either
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br />   side as compared with the other. Clearly, in such cases if we can show

  a single advantage, or more than one, our judgement will record our

  assent that whichever side happens to have the advantage is the more

  desirable.

  First, then, that which is more lasting or secure is more

  desirable than that which is less so: and so is that which is more

  likely to be chosen by the prudent or by the good man or by the

  right law, or by men who are good in any particular line, when they

  make their choice as such, or by the experts in regard to any

  particular class of things; i.e. either whatever most of them or

  what all of them would choose; e.g. in medicine or in carpentry

  those things are more desirable which most, or all, doctors would

  choose; or, in general, whatever most men or all men or all things

  would choose, e.g. the good: for everything aims at the good. You

  should direct the argument you intend to employ to whatever purpose

  you require. Of what is 'better' or 'more desirable' the absolute

  standard is the verdict of the better science, though relatively to

  a given individual the standard may be his own particular science.

  In the second place, that which is known as 'an x' is more desirable

  than that which does not come within the genus 'x'-e.g. justice than a

  just man; for the former falls within the genus 'good', whereas the

  other does not, and the former is called 'a good', whereas the

  latter is not: for nothing which does not happen to belong to the

  genus in question is called by the generic name; e.g. a 'white man' is

  not 'a colour'. Likewise also in other cases.

  Also, that which is desired for itself is more desirable than that

  which is desired for something else; e.g. health is more desirable

  than gymnastics: for the former is desired for itself, the latter

  for something else. Also, that which is desirable in itself is more

  desirable than what is desirable per accidens; e.g. justice in our

  friends than justice in our enemies: for the former is desirable in

  itself, the latter per accidens: for we desire that our enemies should