man', states the property of the present time, and so he cannot have
rendered the property correctly, seeing that he has described it
without any definite proviso. For constructive purposes, on the
other hand, see whether, in rendering the property of the present
time, he has, in stating it, made a definite proviso that it is the
property of the present time that he is stating: for then the property
will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who
has said that it is the property of a particular man 'to be walking
now', has made this distinction in his statement, and so the
property would have been correctly stated.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered a
property of the kind whose appropriateness is not obvious except by
sensation: for then the property will not have been correctly
stated. For every sensible attribute, once it is taken beyond the
sphere of sensation, becomes uncertain. For it is not clear whether it
still belongs, because it is evidenced only by sensation. This
principle will be true in the case of any attributes that do not
always and necessarily follow. Thus (e.g.) any one who has stated that
it is a property of the sun to be 'the brightest star that moves
over the earth', has used in describing the property an expression
of that kind, viz. 'to move over the earth', which is evidenced by
sensation; and so the sun's property could not have been correctly
rendered: for it will be uncertain, whenever the sun sets, whether
it continues to move over the earth, because sensation then fails
us. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has
rendered the property of a kind that is not obvious to sensation,
or, if it be sensible, must clearly belong of necessity: for then
the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus
(e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a surface to be
'the primary thing that is coloured', has introduced amongst the
rest a sensible quality, 'to be coloured', but still a quality such as
manifestly always belongs, and so the property of 'surface' would in
this respect have been correctly rendered.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the
definition as a property: for then the property will not have been
correctly stated: for the property of a thing ought not to show its
essence. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is the property of man
to be 'a walking, biped animal' has rendered a property of man so as
to signify his essence, and so the property of man could not have been
correctly rendered. For constructive purposes, on the other hand,
see whether the property which he has rendered forms a predicate
convertible with its subject, without, however, signifying its
essence: for then the property will in this respect have been
correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that it is a
property of man to be a 'naturally civilized animal' has rendered
the property so as to be convertible with its subject, without,
however, showing its essence, and so the property of man' would in
this respect have been correctly rendered.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the
property without having placed the subject within its essence. For
of properties, as also of definitions, the first term to be rendered
should be the genus, and then the rest of it should be appended
immediately afterwards, and should distinguish its subject from
other things. Hence a property which is not stated in this way could
not have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said
that it is a property of a living creature to 'have a soul' has not
placed 'living creature' within its essence, and so the property of
a living creature could not have been correctly stated. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether a man first
places within its essence the subject whose property he is
rendering, and then appends the rest: for then the property will in
this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has
stated that is a property of man to be an 'animal capable of receiving
knowledge', has rendered the property after placing the subject within
its essence, and so the property of 'man' would in this respect have
been correctly rendered.
4
The inquiry, then, whether the property has been correctly
rendered or no, should be made by these means. The question, on the
other hand, whether what is stated is or is not a property at all, you
should examine from the following points of view. For the
commonplace arguments which establish absolutely that the property
is accurately stated will be the same as those that constitute it a
property at all: accordingly they will be described in the course of
them.
Firstly, then, for destructive purposes, take a look at each subject
of which he has rendered the property, and see (e.g.) if it fails to
belong to any of them at all, or to be true of them in that particular
respect, or to be a property of each of them in respect of that
character of which he has rendered the property: for then what is
stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus, for example,
inasmuch as it is not true of the geometrician that he 'cannot be
deceived by an argument' (for a geometrician is deceived when his
figure is misdrawn), it could not be a property of the man of
science that he is not deceived by an argument. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see whether the property rendered be true
of every instance, and true in that particular respect: for then
what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus, for
example, in as much as the description 'an animal capable of receiving
knowledge' is true of every man, and true of him qua man, it would
be a property of man to be 'an animal capable of receiving knowledge'.
commonplace rule means-for destructive purposes, see if the
description fails to be true of that of which the name is true; and if
the name fails to be true of that of which the description is true:
for constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the description
too is predicated of that of which the name is predicated, and if
the name too is predicated of that of which the description is
predicated.]
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the description fails to
apply to that to which the name applies, and if the name fails to
apply to that to which the description applies: for then what is
stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch
as the description 'a living being that partakes of knowledge' is true
of God, while 'man' is not predicated of God, to be a living being
that partakes of knowledge' could not be a property of man. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the name as well be
predicated of that of which the description is predicated, and if
the description as well be predicated of that of which the name is
predicated. For then what
is stated not to be a property will be a
property. Thus (e.g.) the predicate 'living creature' is true of
that of which 'having a soul' is true, and 'having a soul' is true
of that of which the predicate 'living creature' is true; and so
'having a soul would be a property of 'living creature'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered a subject
as a property of that which is described as 'in the subject': for then
what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus
(e.g.) inasmuch as he who has rendered 'fire' as the property of
'the body with the most rarefied particles', has rendered the
subject as the property of its predicate, 'fire' could not be a
property of 'the body with the most rarefied particles'. The reason
why the subject will not be a property of that which is found in the
subject is this, that then the same thing will be the property of a
number of things that are specifically different. For the same thing
has quite a number of specifically different predicates that belong to
it alone, and the subject will be a property of all of these, if any
one states the property in this way. For constructive purposes, on the
other hand, see if he has rendered what is found in the subject as a
property of the subject: for then what has been stated not to be a
property will be a property, if it be predicated only of the things of
which it has been stated to be the property. Thus (e.g.) he who has
said that it is a property of 'earth' to be 'specifically the heaviest
body' has rendered of the subject as its property something that is
said of the thing in question alone, and is said of it in the manner
in which a property is predicated, and so the property of earth
would have been rightly stated.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered the
property as partaken of: for then what is stated to be a property will
not be a property. For an attribute of which the subject partakes is a
constituent part of its essence: and an attribute of that kind would
be a differentia applying to some one species. E.g. inasmuch as he who
has said that 'walking on two feet' is property of man has rendered
the property as partaken of, 'walking on two feet' could not be a
property of 'man'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see
if he has avoided rendering the property as partaken of, or as showing
the essence, though the subject is predicated convertibly with it: for
then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus
(e.g.) he who has stated that to be 'naturally sentient' is a property
of 'animal' has rendered the property neither as partaken of nor as
showing the essence, though the subject is predicated convertibly with
it; and so to be 'naturally sentient' would be a property of 'animal'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property cannot
possibly belong simultaneously, but must belong either as posterior or
as prior to the attribute described in the name: for then what is
stated to be a property will not be a property either never, or not
always. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is possible for the attribute
'walking through the market-place' to belong to an object as prior and
as posterior to the attribute 'man', 'walking through the
market-place' could not be a property of 'man' either never, or not
always. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if it always
and of necessity belongs simultaneously, without being either a
definition or a differentia: for then what is stated not to be a
property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) the attribute 'an animal
capable of receiving knowledge' always and of necessity belongs
simultaneously with the attribute 'man', and is neither differentia
nor definition of its subject, and so 'an animal capable of
receiving knowledge' would be a property of 'man'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the same thing fails to be
a property of things that are the same as the subject, so far as
they are the same: for then what is stated to be a property will not
be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is no property of a
'proper object of pursuit' to 'appear good to certain persons', it
could not be a property of the 'desirable' either to 'appear good to
certain persons': for 'proper object of pursuit' and 'desirable'
mean the same. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if
the same thing be a property of something that is the same as the
subject, in so far as it is the same. For then is stated not to be a
property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is called a
property of a man, in so far as he is a man, 'to have a tripartite
soul', it would also be a property of a mortal, in so far as he is a
mortal, to have a tripartite soul. This commonplace rule is useful
also in dealing with Accident: for the same attributes ought either to
belong or not belong to the same things, in so far as they are the
same.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property of things that
are the same in kind as the subject fails to be always the same in
kind as the alleged property: for then neither will what is stated
to be the property of the subject in question. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as
a man and a horse are the same in kind, and it is not always a
property of a horse to stand by its own initiative, it could not be
a property of a man to move by his own initiative; for to stand and to
move by his own initiative are the same in kind, because they belong
to each of them in so far as each is an 'animal'. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see if of things that are the same in
kind as the subject the property that is the same as the alleged
property is always true: for then what is stated not to be a
property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) since it is a property of man
to be a 'walking biped,' it would also be a property of a bird to be a
'flying biped': for each of these is the same in kind, in so far as
the one pair have the sameness of species that fall under the same
genus, being under the genus 'animal', while the other pair have
that of differentiae of the genus, viz. of 'animal'. This
commonplace rule is deceptive whenever one of the properties mentioned
belongs to some one species only while the other belongs to many, as
does 'walking quadruped'.
Inasmuch as 'same' and 'different' are terms used in several senses,
it is a job to render to a sophistical questioner a property that
belongs to one thing and that only. For an attribute that belongs to
something qualified by an accident will also belong to the accident
taken along with the subject which it qualifies; e.g. an attribute
that belongs to 'man' will belong also to 'white man', if there be a
white man, and one that belongs to 'white man' will belong also to
'man'. One might, then, bring captious criticism against the
majority of properties, by representing the subject as being one thing
in itself, and another thing when combined with its accident,
saying, for example, that 'man' is one
thing, and white man'
another, and moreover by representing as different a certain state and
what is called after that state. For an attribute that belongs to
the state will belong also to what is called after that state, and one
that belongs to what is called after a state will belong also to the
state: e.g. inasmuch as the condition of the scientist is called after
his science, it could not be a property of 'science' that it is
'incontrovertible by argument'; for then the scientist also will be
incontrovertible by argument. For constructive purposes, however,
you should say that the subject of an accident is not absolutely
different from the accident taken along with its subject; though it is
called 'another' thing because the mode of being of the two is
different: for it is not the same thing for a man to be a man and
for a white man to be a white man. Moreover, you should take a look
along at the inflections, and say that the description of the man of
science is wrong: one should say not 'it' but 'he is
incontrovertible by argument'; while the description of Science is
wrong too: one should say not 'it' but 'she is incontrovertible by
argument'. For against an objector who sticks at nothing the defence
should stick at nothing.
5
Next, for destructive purposes, see if, while intending to render an
attribute that naturally belongs, he states it in his language in such
a way as to indicate one that invariably belongs: for then it would be
generally agreed that what has been stated to be a property is
upset. Thus (e.g.) the man who has said that 'biped' is a property
of man intends to render the attribute that naturally belongs, but his
expression actually indicates one that invariably belongs:
accordingly, 'biped' could not be a property of man: for not every man
is possessed of two feet. For constructive purposes, on the other
hand, see if he intends to render the property that naturally belongs,
and indicates it in that way in his language: for then the property
will not be upset in this respect. Thus (e.g.) he who renders as a
property of 'man' the phrase 'an animal capable of receiving
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