knowledge' both intends, and by his language indicates, the property
that belongs by nature, and so 'an animal capable of receiving
knowledge' would not be upset or shown in that respect not to be a
property of man.
Moreover, as regards all the things that are called as they are
primarily after something else, or primarily in themselves, it is a
job to render the property of such things. For if you render a
property as belonging to the subject that is so called after something
else, then it will be true of its primary subject as well; whereas
if you state it of its primary subject, then it will be predicated
also of the thing that is so called after this other. Thus (e.g.) if
any one renders , coloured' as the property of 'surface', 'coloured'
will be true of body as well; whereas if he render it of 'body', it
will be predicated also of 'surface'. Hence the name as well will
not be true of that of which the description is true.
In the case of some properties it mostly happens that some error
is incurred because of a failure to define how as well as to what
things the property is stated to belong. For every one tries to render
as the property of a thing something that belongs to it either
naturally, as 'biped' belongs to 'man', or actually, as 'having four
fingers' belongs to a particular man, or specifically, as
'consisting of most rarefied particles' belongs to 'fire', or
absolutely, as 'life' to 'living being', or one that belongs to a
thing only as called after something else, as 'wisdom' to the
'soul', or on the other hand primarily, as 'wisdom' to the 'rational
faculty', or because the thing is in a certain state, as
'incontrovertible by argument' belongs to a 'scientist' (for simply
and solely by reason of his being in a certain state will he be
'incontrovertible by argument'), or because it is the state
possessed by something, as 'incontrovertible by argument' belongs to
'science', or because it is partaken of, as 'sensation' belongs to
'animal' (for other things as well have sensation, e.g. man, but
they have it because they already partake of 'animal'), or because
it partakes of something else, as 'life' belongs to a particular
kind of 'living being'. Accordingly he makes a mistake if he has
failed to add the word 'naturally', because what belongs naturally may
fail to belong to the thing to which it naturally belongs, as (e.g.)
it belongs to a man to have two feet: so too he errs if he does not
make a definite proviso that he is rendering what actually belongs,
because one day that attribute will not be what it now is, e.g. the
man's possession of four fingers. So he errs if he has not shown
that he states a thing to be such and such primarily, or that he calls
it so after something else, because then its name too will not be true
of that of which the description is true, as is the case with
'coloured', whether rendered as a property of 'surface' or of
'body'. So he errs if he has not said beforehand that he has
rendered a property to a thing either because that thing possesses a
state, or because it is a state possessed by something; because then
it will not be a property. For, supposing he renders the property to
something as being a state possessed, it will belong to what possesses
that state; while supposing he renders it to what possesses the state,
it will belong to the state possessed, as did 'incontrovertible by
argument' when stated as a property of 'science' or of the
'scientist'. So he errs if he has not indicated beforehand that the
property belongs because the thing partakes of, or is partaken of
by, something; because then the property will belong to certain
other things as well. For if he renders it because its subject is
partaken of, it will belong to the things which partake of it; whereas
if he renders it because its subject partakes of something else, it
will belong to the things partaken of, as (e.g.) if he were to state
'life' to be a property of a 'particular kind of living being', or
just of 'living being. So he errs if he has not expressly
distinguished the property that belongs specifically, because then
it will belong only to one of the things that fall under the term of
which he states the property: for the superlative belongs only to
one of them, e.g. 'lightest' as applied to 'fire'. Sometimes, too, a
man may even add the word 'specifically', and still make a mistake.
For the things in question should all be of one species, whenever
the word 'specifically' is added: and in some cases this does not
occur, as it does not, in fact, in the case of fire. For fire is not
all of one species; for live coals and flame and light are each of
them 'fire', but are of different species. The reason why, whenever
'specifically' is added, there should not be any species other than
the one mentioned, is this, that if there be, then the property in
question will belong to some of them in a greater and to others in a
less degree, as happens with 'consisting of most rarefied particles'
in the case of fire: for 'light' consists of more rarefied particles
than live coals and flame. And this should not happen unless the
name too be predicated in a greater degree of that of which the
description is truer; otherwise the rule that where the description is
truer the name too should be truer is not fulfilled. Moreover, in
addition to this, the same attribute will be the property both of
the term which has it absolutely and of that element therein which has
it in the highest degree, as is the condition of the property
'consisting of most rarefied particles' in the case of 'fire': for
this same attribute will be the property of 'light' as well: for it is
'light' that 'consists of the most rarefied particles'. If, then,
any one else renders a property in this way one should attack it;
for oneself, one should not give occasion for this objection, but
should define in what manner one states the property at the actual
time of making the statement.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated a thing as a
property of itself: for then what has been stated to be a property
will not be a property. For a thing itself always shows its own
essence, and what shows the essence is not a property but a
definition. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that 'becoming' is a
property of 'beautiful' has rendered the term as a property of
itself (for 'beautiful' and 'becoming' are the same); and so
'becoming' could not be a property of 'beautiful'. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering a thing
as a property of itself, but has yet stated a convertible predicate:
for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property.
Thus he who has stated 'animate substance' as a property of
'living-creature' has not stated 'living-creature' as a property of
itself, but has rendered a convertible predicate, so that 'animate
substance' would be a property of 'living-creature'.
Next, in the case of things consisting of
like parts, you should
look and see, for destructive purposes, if the property of the whole
be not true of the part, or if that of the part be not predicated of
the whole: for then what has been stated to be the property will not
be a property. In some cases it happens that this is so: for sometimes
in rendering a property in the case of things that consist of like
parts a man may have his eye on the whole, while sometimes he may
address himself to what is predicated of the part: and then in neither
case will it have been rightly rendered. Take an instance referring to
the whole: the man who has said that it is a property of the 'sea'
to be 'the largest volume of salt water', has stated the property of
something that consists of like parts, but has rendered an attribute
of such a kind as is not true of the part (for a particular sea is not
'the largest volume of salt water'); and so the largest volume of salt
water' could not be a property of the 'sea'. Now take one referring to
the part: the man who has stated that it is a property of 'air' to
be 'breathable' has stated the property of something that consists
of like parts, but he has stated an attribute such as, though true
of some air, is still not predicable of the whole (for the whole of
the air is not breathable); and so 'breathable' could not be a
property of 'air'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see
whether, while it is true of each of the things with similar parts, it
is on the other hand a property of them taken as a collective whole:
for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property.
Thus (e.g.) while it is true of earth everywhere that it naturally
falls downwards, it is a property of the various particular pieces
of earth taken as 'the Earth', so that it would be a property of
'earth' 'naturally to fall downwards'.
6
Next, look from the point of view of the respective opposites, and
first (a) from that of the contraries, and see, for destructive
purposes, if the contrary of the term rendered fails to be a
property of the contrary subject. For then neither will the contrary
of the first be a property of the contrary of the second. Thus
(e.g.) inasmuch as injustice is contrary to justice, and the lowest
evil to the highest good, but 'to be the highest good' is not a
property of 'justice', therefore 'to be the lowest evil' could not
be a property of 'injustice'. For constructive purposes, on the
other hand, see if the contrary is the property of the contrary: for
then also the contrary of the first will be the property of the
contrary of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as evil is contrary to
good, and objectionable to desirable, and 'desirable' is a property of
'good', 'objectionable' would be a property of 'evil'.
Secondly (h) look from the point of view of relative opposites and
see, for destructive purposes, if the correlative of the term rendered
fails to be a property of the correlative of the subject: for then
neither will the correlative of the first be a property of the
correlative of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'double' is
relative to 'half', and 'in excess' to 'exceeded', while 'in excess'
is not a property of 'double', exceeded' could not be a property of
'half'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the
correlative of the alleged property is a property of the subject's
correlative: for then also the correlative of the first will be a
property of the correlative of the second: e.g. inasmuch as 'double'
is relative to 'half', and the proportion 1:2 is relative to the
proportion 2:1, while it is a property of 'double' to be 'in the
proportion of 2 to 1', it would be a property of 'half' to be 'in
the proportion of 1 to 2'.
Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if an attribute
described in terms of a state (X) fails to be a property of the
given state (Y): for then neither will the attribute described in
terms of the privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of Y).
Also if, on the other hand, an attribute described in terms of the
privation (of X) be not a property of the given privation (of Y),
neither will the attribute described in terms of the state (X) be a
property of the state (Y). Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is not
predicated as a property of 'deafness' to be a 'lack of sensation',
neither could it be a property of 'hearing' to be a 'sensation'. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if an attribute
described in terms of a state (X) is a property of the given state
(Y): for then also the attribute that is described in terms of the
privation (of X) will be a property of the privation (of Y). Also,
if an attribute described in terms of a privation (of X) be a property
of the privation (of Y), then also the attribute that is described
in terms of the state (X) will be a property of the state (Y). Thus
(e.g.) inasmuch as 'to see' is a property of 'sight', inasmuch as we
have sight, 'failure to see' would be a property of 'blindness',
inasmuch as we have not got the sight we should naturally have.
Next, look from the point of view of positive and negative terms;
and first (a) from the point of view of the predicates taken by
themselves. This common-place rule is useful only for a destructive
purpose. Thus (e.g.) see if the positive term or the attribute
described in terms of it is a property of the subject: for then the
negative term or the attribute described in terms of it will not be
a property of the subject. Also if, on the other hand, the negative
term or the attribute described in terms of it is a property of the
subject, then the positive term or the attribute described in terms of
it will not be a property of the subject: e.g. inasmuch as 'animate'
is a property of 'living creature', 'inanimate' could not be a
property of 'living creature'.
Secondly (b) look from the point of view of the predicates, positive
or negative, and their respective subjects; and see, for destructive
purposes, if the positive term falls to be a property of the
positive subject: for then neither will the negative term be a
property of the negative subject. Also, if the negative term fails
to be a property of the negative subject, neither will the positive
term be a property of the positive subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as
'animal' is not a property of 'man', neither could 'not-animal' be a
property of 'not-man'. Also if 'not-animal' seems not to be a property
of 'not-man', neither will 'animal' be a property of 'man'. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the positive term
is a property of the positive subject: for then the negative term will
be a property of the negative subject as well. Also if the negative
term be a property of the negative subject, the positive will be a
property of the positive as well. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a
property of 'not-living being' 'not to live', it would be a property
of 'living being' 'to live': also if it seems to be a property of
'living b
eing' 'to live', it will also seem to be a property of
'not-living being' 'not to live'.
Thirdly (c) look from the point of view of the subjects taken by
themselves, and see, for destructive purposes, if the property
rendered is a property of the positive subject: for then the same term
will not be a property of the negative subject as well. Also, if the
term rendered be a property of the negative subject, it will not be
a property of the positive. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'animate' is a
property of 'living creature', 'animate' could not be a property of
'not-living creature'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand,
if the term rendered fails to be a property of the affirmative subject
it would be a property of the negative. This commonplace rule is,
however, deceptive: for a positive term is not a property of a
negative, or a negative of a positive. For a positive term does not
belong at all to a negative, while a negative term, though it
belongs to a positive, does not belong as a property.
Next, look from the point of view of the coordinate members of a
division, and see, for destructive purposes, if none of the
co-ordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a
property of any of the remaining set of co-ordinate members
(parallel with the subject): for then neither will the term stated
be a property of that of which it is stated to be a property. Thus
(e.g.) inasmuch as 'sensible living being' is not a property of any of
the other living beings, 'intelligible living being' could not be a
property of God. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see
if some one or other of the remaining co-ordinate members (parallel
with the property rendered) be a property of each of these co-ordinate
members (parallel with the subject): for then the remaining one too
will be a property of that of which it has been stated not to be a
property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a property of 'wisdom' to be
essentially 'the natural virtue of the rational faculty', then, taking
each of the other virtues as well in this way, it would be a
property of 'temperance' to be essentially 'the natural virtue of
the faculty of desire'.
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