Aristotle

by Various Works [lit]

  possible. For this reason questions of this kind are not dialectical

  unless the questioner himself draws distinctions or divisions before

  expressing them, e.g. 'Good means this, or this, does it not?' For

  questions of this sort are easily answered by a Yes or a No. Hence one

  should endeavour to formulate propositions of this kind in this

  form. It is at the same time also perhaps fair to ask the other man

  how many meanings of 'the good' there are, whenever you have

  yourself distinguished and formulated them, and he will not admit them

  at all.

  Any one who keeps on asking one thing for a long time is a bad

  inquirer. For if he does so though the person questioned keeps on

  answering the questions, clearly he asks a large number of

  questions, or else asks the same question a large number of times:

  in the one case he merely babbles, in the other he fails to reason:

  for reasoning always consists of a small number of premisses. If, on

  the other hand, he does it because the person questioned does not

  answer the questions, he is at fault in not taking him to task or

  breaking off the discussion.

  3

  There are certain hypotheses upon which it is at once difficult to

  bring, and easy to stand up to, an argument. Such (e.g.) are those

  things which stand first and those which stand last in the order of

  nature. For the former require definition, while the latter have to be

  arrived at through many steps if one wishes to secure a continuous

  proof from first principles, or else all discussion about them wears

  the air of mere sophistry: for to prove anything is impossible

  unless one begins with the appropriate principles, and connects

  inference with inference till the last are reached. Now to define

  first principles is just what answerers do not care to do, nor do they

  pay any attention if the questioner makes a definition: and yet

  until it is clear what it is that is proposed, it is not easy to

  discuss it. This sort of thing happens particularly in the case of the

  first principles: for while the other propositions are shown through

  these, these cannot be shown through anything else: we are obliged

  to understand every item of that sort by a definition. The inferences,

  too, that lie too close to the first principle are hard to treat in

  argument: for it is not possible to bring many arguments in regard

  to them, because of the small number of those steps, between the

  conclusion and the principle, whereby the succeeding propositions have

  to be shown. The hardest, however, of all definitions to treat in

  argument are those that employ terms about which, in the first

  place, it is uncertain whether they are used in one sense or

  several, and, further, whether they are used literally or

  metaphorically by the definer. For because of their obscurity, it is

  impossible to argue upon such terms; and because of the

  impossibility of saying whether this obscurity is due to their being

  used metaphorically, it is impossible to refute them.

  In general, it is safe to suppose that, whenever any problem

  proves intractable, it either needs definition or else bears either

  several senses, or a metaphorical sense, or it is not far removed from

  the first principles; or else the reason is that we have yet to

  discover in the first place just this-in which of the aforesaid

  directions the source of our difficulty lies: when we have made this

  clear, then obviously our business must be either to define or to

  distinguish, or to supply the intermediate premisses: for it is

  through these that the final conclusions are shown.

  It often happens that a difficulty is found in discussing or arguing

  a given position because the definition has not been correctly

  rendered: e.g. 'Has one thing one contrary or many?': here when the

  term 'contraries' has been properly defined, it is easy to bring

  people to see whether it is possible for the same thing to have

  several contraries or not: in the same way also with other terms

  requiring definition. It appears also in mathematics that the

  difficulty in using a figure is sometimes due to a defect in

  definition; e.g. in proving that the line which cuts the plane

  parallel to one side divides similarly both the line which it cuts and

  the area; whereas if the definition be given, the fact asserted

  becomes immediately clear: for the areas have the same fraction

  subtracted from them as have the sides: and this is the definition

  of 'the same ratio'. The most primary of the elementary principles are

  without exception very easy to show, if the definitions involved, e.g.

  the nature of a line or of a circle, be laid down; only the

  arguments that can be brought in regard to each of them are not

  many, because there are not many intermediate steps. If, on the

  other hand, the definition of the starting-points be not laid down, to

  show them is difficult and may even prove quite impossible. The case

  of the significance of verbal expressions is like that of these

  mathematical conceptions.

  One may be sure then, whenever a position is hard to discuss, that

  one or other of the aforesaid things has happened to it. Whenever,

  on the other hand, it is a harder task to argue to the point

  claimed, i.e. the premiss, than to the resulting position, a doubt may

  arise whether such claims should be admitted or not: for if a man is

  going to refuse to admit it and claim that you shall argue to it as

  well, he will be giving the signal for a harder undertaking than was

  originally proposed: if, on the other hand, he grants it, he will be

  giving the original thesis credence on the strength of what is less

  credible than itself. If, then, it is essential not to enhance the

  difficulty of the problem, he had better grant it; if, on the other

  hand, it be essential to reason through premisses that are better

  assured, he had better refuse. In other words, in serious inquiry he

  ought not to grant it, unless he be more sure about it than about

  the conclusion; whereas in a dialectical exercise he may do so if he

  is merely satisfied of its truth. Clearly, then, the circumstances

  under which such admissions should be claimed are different for a mere

  questioner and for a serious teacher.

  4

  As to the formulation, then, and arrangement of one's questions,

  about enough has been said.

  With regard to the giving of answers, we must first define what is

  the business of a good answerer, as of a good questioner. The business

  of the questioner is so to develop the argument as to make the

  answerer utter the most extrvagant paradoxes that necessarily follow

  because of his position: while that of the answerer is to make it

  appear that it is not he who is responsible for the absurdity or

  paradox, but only his position: for one may, perhaps, distinguish

  between the mistake of taking up a wrong position to start with, and

  that of not maintaining it properly, when once taken up.

  5

  Inasmuch as no rules are laid down for those who argue for the

  sake of trai
ning and of examination:-and the aim of those engaged in

  teaching or learning is quite different from that of those engaged

  in a competition; as is the latter from that of those who discuss

  things together in the spirit of inquiry: for a learner should

  always state what he thinks: for no one is even trying to teach him

  what is false; whereas in a competition the business of the questioner

  is to appear by all means to produce an effect upon the other, while

  that of the answerer is to appear unaffected by him; on the other

  hand, in an assembly of disputants discussing in the spirit not of a

  competition but of an examination and inquiry, there are as yet no

  articulate rules about what the answerer should aim at, and what

  kind of things he should and should not grant for the correct or

  incorrect defence of his position:-inasmuch, then, as we have no

  tradition bequeathed to us by others, let us try to say something upon

  the matter for ourselves.

  The thesis laid down by the answerer before facing the

  questioner's argument is bound of necessity to be one that is either

  generally accepted or generally rejected or else is neither: and

  moreover is so accepted or rejected either absolutely or else with a

  restriction, e.g. by some given person, by the speaker or by some

  one else. The manner, however, of its acceptance or rejection,

  whatever it be, makes no difference: for the right way to answer, i.e.

  to admit or to refuse to admit what has been asked, will be the same

  in either case. If, then, the statement laid down by the answerer be

  generally rejected, the conclusion aimed at by the questioner is bound

  to be one generally accepted, whereas if the former be generally

  accepted, the latter is generally rejected: for the conclusion which

  the questioner tries to draw is always the opposite of the statement

  laid down. If, on the other hand, what is laid down is generally

  neither rejected nor accepted, the conclusion will be of the same type

  as well. Now since a man who reasons correctly demonstrates his

  proposed conclusion from premisses that are more generally accepted,

  and more familiar, it is clear that (1) where the view laid down by

  him is one that generally is absolutely rejected, the answerer ought

  not to grant either what is thus absolutely not accepted at all, or

  what is accepted indeed, but accepted less generally than the

  questioner's conclusion. For if the statement laid down by the

  answerer be generally rejected, the conclusion aimed at by the

  questioner will be one that is generally accepted, so that the

  premisses secured by the questioner should all be views generally

  accepted, and more generally accepted than his proposed conclusion, if

  the less familiar is to be inferred through the more familiar.

  Consequently, if any of the questions put to him be not of this

  character, the answerer should not grant them. (2) If, on the other

  hand, the statement laid down by the answerer be generally accepted

  without qualification, clearly the conclusion sought by the questioner

  will be one generally rejected without qualification. Accordingly, the

  answerer should admit all views that are generally accepted and, of

  those that are not generally accepted, all that are less generally

  rejected than the conclusion sought by the questioner. For then he

  will probably be thought to have argued sufficiently well. (3)

  Likewise, too, if the statement laid down by the answerer be neither

  rejected generally nor generally accepted; for then, too, anything

  that appears to be true should be granted, and, of the views not

  generally accepted, any that are more generally accepted than the

  questioner's conclusion; for in that case the result will be that

  the arguments will be more generally accepted. If, then, the view laid

  down by the answerer be one that is generally accepted or rejected

  without qualification, then the views that are accepted absolutely

  must be taken as the standard of comparison: whereas if the view

  laid down be one that is not generally accepted or rejected, but

  only by the answerer, then the standard whereby the latter must

  judge what is generally accepted or not, and must grant or refuse to

  grant the point asked, is himself. If, again, the answerer be

  defending some one else's opinion, then clearly it will be the

  latter's judgement to which he must have regard in granting or denying

  the various points. This is why those, too, who introduce other's

  opinions, e.g. that 'good and evil are the same thing, as Heraclitus

  says,' refuse to admit the impossibility of contraries belonging at

  the same time to the same thing; not because they do not themselves

  believe this, but because on Heraclitus' principles one has to say so.

  The same thing is done also by those who take on the defence of one

  another's positions; their aim being to speak as would the man who

  stated the position.

  6

  It is clear, then, what the aims of the answerer should be,

  whether the position he lays down be a view generally accepted without

  qualification or accepted by some definite person. Now every

  question asked is bound to involve some view that is either

  generally held or generally rejected or neither, and is also bound

  to be either relevant to the argument or irrelevant: if then it be a

  view generally accepted and irrelevant, the answerer should grant it

  and remark that it is the accepted view: if it be a view not generally

  accepted and irrelevant, he should grant it but add a comment that

  it is not generally accepted, in order to avoid the appearance of

  being a simpleton. If it be relevant and also be generally accepted,

  he should admit that it is the view generally accepted but say that it

  lies too close to the original proposition, and that if it be

  granted the problem proposed collapses. If what is claimed by the

  questioner be relevant but too generally rejected, the answerer, while

  admitting that if it be granted the conclusion sought follows,

  should yet protest that the proposition is too absurd to be

  admitted. Suppose, again, it be a view that is neither rejected

  generally nor generally accepted, then, if it be irrelevant to the

  argument, it may be granted without restriction; if, however, it be

  relevant, the answerer should add the comment that, if it be

  granted, the original problem collapses. For then the answerer will

  not be held to be personally accountable for what happens to him, if

  he grants the several points with his eyes open, and also the

  questioner will be able to draw his inference, seeing that all the

  premisses that are more generally accepted than the conclusion are

  granted him. Those who try to draw an inference from premisses more

  generally rejected than the conclusion clearly do not reason

  correctly: hence, when men ask these things, they ought not to be

  granted.

  7

  The questioner should be met in a like manner also in the case of

  terms used obscurely, i.e. in several senses. For the answerer, if

  he does not understand, is always permi
tted to say 'I do not

  understand': he is not compelled to reply 'Yes' or 'No' to a

  question which may mean different things. Clearly, then, in the

  first place, if what is said be not clear, he ought not to hesitate to

  say that he does not understand it; for often people encounter some

  difficulty from assenting to questions that are not clearly put. If he

  understands the question and yet it covers many senses, then supposing

  what it says to be universally true or false, he should give it an

  unqualified assent or denial: if, on the other hand, it be partly true

  and partly false, he should add a comment that it bears different

  senses, and also that in one it is true, in the other false: for if he

  leave this distinction till later, it becomes uncertain whether

  originally as well he perceived the ambiguity or not. If he does not

  foresee the ambiguity, but assents to the question having in view

  the one sense of the words, then, if the questioner takes it in the

  other sense, he should say, 'That was not what I had in view when I

  admitted it; I meant the other sense': for if a term or expression

  covers more than one thing, it is easy to disagree. If, however, the

  question is both clear and simple, he should answer either 'Yes' or

  'No'.

  8

  A premiss in reasoning always either is one of the constituent

  elements in the reasoning, or else goes to establish one of these:

  (and you can always tell when it is secured in order to establish

  something else by the fact of a number of similar questions being put:

  for as a rule people secure their universal by means either of

  induction or of likeness):-accordingly the particular propositions

  should all be admitted, if they are true and generally held. On the

  other hand, against the universal one should try to bring some

  negative instance; for to bring the argument to a standstill without a

  negative instance, either real or apparent, shows ill-temper. If,

  then, a man refuses to grant the universal when supported by many

  instances, although he has no negative instance to show, he