Stalling for Time

by Gary Noesner

  At 9:15 p.m., we sent in a copy of the video showing Kathy’s emotional reunion with young Bryan. We thought it sent a powerful message about embracing life. Two hours later, Steve Schneider told us once again that the forward command had cut off all the power. It was sad that we heard this from Schneider before we were notified by our own people.

  On Sunday afternoon, despite the progress we were making through negotiation, Dick Rogers ratcheted up the coercive pressure by installing high-power lights aimed at the compound. This meant that our perimeter people could see the Davidians, but not the other way around. Was this a necessary protection, or another form of harassment?

  We learned from our HRT liaison that on Monday morning, March 15, Jamar authorized the use of several armored combat engineering vehicles (CEVs) to clear away trash piles fifty yards to the rear of the compound. His rationale was that, conceivably, the Davidians could come out and hide behind those piles and fire on our agents on the perimeter. But the Davidians had not tried to exit the compound and had not fired on the FBI at any time. Where had this newfound concern come from? And why now?

  Not surprisingly, the introduction of these heavy vehicles was seen by those inside the compound as being a decidedly hostile act. More than once, to our surprise, these huge machines severed the dedicated phone line installed to communicate with those inside. This forced us to set up a loudspeaker system to send messages and to alert the Davidians that the line had been cut and that we would supply a replacement.

  Even with these setbacks, we were able to keep our efforts moving forward. The same day the CEVs showed up we had our first face-to-face meeting with the Davidians. At 4:20 in the afternoon, Byron Sage and Sheriff Jack Harwell went forward and had an open-air discussion with Steve Schneider and Wayne Martin just inside the perimeter. The primary item on the agenda was the safety of the children, and our desire to get them all out. This also allowed us to demonstrate our willingness to address their concerns about property seizure, continuing ministry in jail, preservation of the crime scene for their defense, and other issues of concern. These two were willing to talk about possibilities in a calm manner, but, unfortunately, both of them were loyal to Koresh and repeatedly made it clear that he alone made all the decisions.

  On Tuesday, day seventeen of the situation, another SAC, Dick Schwein from El Paso, arrived to assist SACs Jamar, Ricks, and Dick Swensen. A caricature of the gung ho type, he wore a dark blue SWAT-type uniform (the other SACs wore casual civilian clothes) complete with a web belt holding a canteen. He also seemed surprisingly cavalier and flippant about the process. Once I heard him say in passing, “No use trying to talk to these bastards. We’ve got to just go in there and cut their balls off.”

  SAC Schwein contributed perhaps the single strangest element of the whole sad saga of the Waco siege: harassing the Davidians by blasting bizarre sound recordings—Tibetan chants, recorded sounds of dying rabbits (used by hunters to attract coyotes), Nancy Sinatra’s “These Boots Are Made for Walking”—over loudspeakers. Schwein had picked up the idea from the U.S. Army. They had used such tapes during the Panama invasion, when they were trying to force General Manuel Noriega out of the papal nuncio’s residence, where he had sought sanctuary. When I learned of this plan, again from our tactical liaison, I went immediately to Jamar and urged him not to allow this. I made the case that playing harassing music was not a recommended negotiation tactic, that it was not something taught by the FBI, and that it would send the wrong message to the Davidians, who were now starting to cooperate again. At best these tapes would be ineffective; at worst they would make us look foolish. But most fundamentally, what SAC Schwein failed to realize was that this technique had not succeeded in Panama, and it wasn’t likely to work for us in Waco. Jamar assured me that he would speak to Schwein when he came on duty that night and make sure the tapes were not played.

  Feeling somewhat reassured, I staggered back to my motel just before midnight. I took a shower, then turned on the television. There on the news, covered live, was the Davidian compound, brightly illuminated, with torturous sounds blaring over speakers. I was both embarrassed for the FBI and personally enraged. I immediately called the command post and asked to speak with Jamar, but he had gone for the evening.

  The next morning I raised the issue with him again. Jamar was unaware that the tapes had been played. Evidently he had forgotten to speak with SAC Schwein on the matter, and he assured me it wouldn’t happen again. But it did happen again—the very next night. When I confronted Jamar about this again, he shrugged off my complaint, saying that Schwein had nothing better to do on the night shift. He brushed it off as no big deal. It took several more nights before we were able to bring it to an end, and then only by going behind his back to appeal to leaders at FBI headquarters.

  One of the most frustrating aspects of the whole affair was that many critics of the FBI’s handling of Waco have blamed the use of these audiotapes on the negotiation team. They assumed the use of these tapes was part of our negotiation strategy, when nothing could be further from the truth. Again, the FBI was hamstrung by a failure to appreciate—and teach its regional leaders—the skills necessary for crisis management. That was coupled with an ingrained hubris that served to foster a false sense of capability and skill where in fact it did not exist.

  When Steve Schneider next spoke with us, he asked in seeming disbelief what message the FBI was trying to convey to them with these sounds. Schneider said he had been working to convince more individuals to come out, but the tapes had put an end to it. Instead of being able to build on our success, we now had to dig ourselves out of yet another hole created by others.

  Around 6:20 p.m., on March 18, day nineteen, matters went from bad to worse. Again over my protest, SAC Jamar authorized HRT to advance with the armored vehicles and knock down and remove four fuel tanks located on the right side of the compound. He also authorized them to remove a bus parked near the building. These removals were done recklessly, with no effort to minimize damage. It seemed that the FBI was deliberately seeking to irritate the Davidians. Some of my negotiators began to speculate that this was being done to deliberately undercut the negotiation process.

  I went to Jamar again and reminded him that the fuel tanks had been there since the beginning of the incident and had not been seen as a problem before. I asked him why it was so critical to remove them now. His response was short, vague, and off the point—something about the Davidians being able to use the fuel to blow up our vehicles. Yet again, I suspected this idea had originated with Dick Rogers.

  Even though Koresh was angry, he continued to take our calls. Henry Garcia, John Dolan, and the other negotiators continued to float the idea that if Koresh came out, he would be able to continue to meet with his followers while in jail awaiting trial. We reminded him that he might be found innocent in court as having acted in self-defense, an idea we didn’t believe but hoped he might. Surprisingly, this possibility seemed to intrigue him.

  We drafted a letter signed by Sheriff Harwell and SAC Jamar, which verified that Koresh would be allowed to meet regularly with his followers in jail while awaiting trial. We also sent in copies of national magazines that Koresh wanted to see, each with his photograph on the cover. Again his ego was coming to the fore, and again we tried to use this. We suggested that if he killed himself, he would receive only brief coverage, whereas if he was going through a trial, he would be in the media constantly.

  We continued to pursue our negotiation strategy and once more things began to turn our way. At 8:00 p.m. on March 19, the twentieth day of the siege, Brad Branch and Kevin Whitecliff, both in their thirties, came out, bringing our total to twenty-seven. We had yet to achieve the tipping point that might convince Koresh to get out in front of where his followers were heading, but we were definitely getting back on track.

  Two days later, seven more adults came out: Victorine Hollingsworth, Anetta Richards, Rita Riddle, Gladys Ottman, Sheila Martin, Ofelia Santoya, and Jame
s Lawter. These people had simply grown weary of the standoff and wanted to leave, further evidence that the “trickle, flow, gush” approach was working. When I reported to Jamar, he acknowledged this achievement but made clear that he wanted everybody out now. He apparently didn’t value our incremental success. But once again, it was as if the command was purposely derailing our momentum. Three hours later armored CEVs were sent out again, this time to remove various items from the no-man’s-land between the HRT perimeter and the compound. One such item was a beautiful, completely restored red Chevy Ranchero. In case Koresh wasn’t getting the point as he watched from the compound, the CEV crushed the car flat as a pancake before dragging it off. To me this was the purest manifestation to date of the HRT’s frustration, because it made absolutely no sense.

  I couldn’t believe they had done this when nine individuals had come out over the preceding three days. Were they blind to this fact? Once again I made the case to Jamar that positive behavior—the release of individuals—needed to be met with positive reinforcement, not humiliating punishment. This is one of the most basic tenets of psychology going back to Pavlov. If you want to train your dog to fetch a newspaper, you don’t kick the dog when it brings you the paper. We had just kicked the dog for doing what we wanted. Despite this, at 10:12 a.m. on Tuesday, March 23, Livingstone Fagan came out, bringing the total to thirty-five. Two days later, on March 25, more clearing operations took place.

  These acts of unnecessary exercise in pique—crushing a car and destroying other property needlessly—convinced me that our opportunity for meaningful negotiations had passed. Koresh quickly confirmed my intuition. Clearly angry, Koresh called the negotiation team and stated flatly, “No one else will be coming out.” Jamar and Rogers’s actions had finally put us negotiators in a hole so deep that we couldn’t dig our way out. Steve Schneider got on the phone and pleaded with us to explain why things had suddenly turned so ugly when we had been working so well together. We had no good answer for him.

  I had the same question for SAC Jamar. He looked at me with fire in his eyes and said that not enough people were coming out. We needed to punish Koresh for not moving fast enough. But I think the real story was that, with the FBI seemingly helpless to compel the Davidians to surrender, he was feeling the heat. The entire nation was watching, and the FBI was spending about $128,000 a day, a rate of expenditure that would add up to more than $5 million before all was said and done. This was a serious concern, but not as serious as the lives of dozens and dozens of men, women, and innocent children.

  Venting my frustrations more strongly than before, I told him that I didn’t think we would get anyone else out after these recent actions. He appeared unconcerned. I realized then that he had already determined what he was going to do.

  I met with my team and told them that we were on a crashing airplane. We could parachute to safety or we could try to control the descent and minimize destruction on the ground. Despite their anger and disappointment, and despite the bad decisions coming down from our commanders, the entire negotiation team felt we needed to continue our efforts.

  That night I received a call in my motel room from Rob Grace, my boss at Quantico. He thanked me for my work on the case but said it was time for me to step down as negotiation coordinator. Negotiators usually stayed on for three weeks, and I was well into my fourth. Only Byron Sage had been on the scene longer than me.

  I have to admit that I was relieved, but I was also concerned about who would take over and how they would manage. Despite my many disagreements with SAC Jamar, I believe he is an honorable man who did what he thought was best. This could also be said of Dick Rogers, but he consistently failed to recognize the progress we were making. His aggressive approach continually undercut negotiation progress. It was his attitude that infected HRT operators at the scene, SAC Jamar, and some leaders back at FBI headquarters. (Later I learned that Rogers had complained that I was personally impeding HRT’s efforts to take a more aggressive approach with the Davidians to resolve the situation sooner. That was certainly true enough.)

  Rob told me that a high-level official at FBI headquarters wanted Clint Van Zandt, a former member of our unit, to replace me. I expressed deep concerns about this and recommended other negotiators I felt were better suited for the job. My main concern was that Van Zandt had a history of not being a team player. I also knew him to be a vocal born-again Christian, which is fine under normal conditions, but that might present issues when dealing with the self-deluded “Lamb of God.” I worried that Van Zandt would attempt to try to convince Koresh to surrender by presenting his own competing interpretation of biblical prophecy. None of the thirty-five individuals released during the negotiation process so far had come out because of anything having to do with theology, and so I felt that attacking the group’s beliefs was a dangerous way to proceed. Given Koresh’s love of religious debate, such talk was far more likely to draw out the negotiations than persuade him to abandon his stand. Van Zandt was approved nonetheless, and when he arrived at the scene, accompanied by Rob Grace, the three of us met to formalize the handover of leadership. I expressed my belief that attempting to engage Koresh on religious issues was a dead end. Van Zandt assured both Rob and me that he would not try to inject his own beliefs into the negotiation process. At six in the morning on March 25, Van Zandt took over. No further Davidians would come out.

  I had been at Ranch Apocalypse for twenty-six days, and I left exhausted, frustrated, and emotionally drained, but there was little time to dwell on any of that. Before the incident began, I had scheduled a trip to Amman, Jordan, for a negotiation training mission. I had a few days at home with my family before I had to leave again for the Middle East.

  After I handed over the negotiations to Van Zandt, the situation in Waco deteriorated.

  Despite his promises, Van Zandt did in fact spend many hours on the phone trying to convince Koresh that his interpretations of the Bible were wrong. Various negotiators on the team later told me of their frustrations with this nightly religious debate, which only served to keep Koresh awake all night, then sleeping all day.

  I also learned that Van Zandt did not get along with SAC Jamar, who cut him out of the decision-making process. Byron Sage became the de facto team leader and through the remainder of the incident played the key negotiation leadership role in trying to save the lives of those who remained inside the compound.

  Part of this effort was allowing attorneys Dick DeGuerin and Jack Zimmerman to speak on the phone and later go inside the compound to meet with Koresh. Their objective was to convince him that he had a valid legal defense against the charges that would be brought. Allowing defense attorneys to walk into an active crime scene did not sit well with the tactical team. When Sage accompanied the attorneys forward he noticed one of the Porta-Johns on which the words Sage is a Davidian had been scrawled into the accumulated dust, presumably by an angry tactical team member—a sign of continuing discontent and misunderstanding.

  But the attorneys’ forays seemed to offer some hope. Koresh told them he would surrender as soon as he wrote down his unique interpretation of the seven seals described in the book of Revelation. The lawyers appealed for time to allow Koresh to undertake and complete that effort, but after a number of days passed, it became increasingly clear that Koresh was again stalling. Days later, Steve Schneider confirmed that Koresh had not even started to write. For FBI decision makers, this was the ultimate confirmation that Koresh had no intention of coming out peacefully.

  My own view is that Koresh was still ambivalent. Part of him wanted to live, and part of him was attracted to martyrdom. Despite his attorneys’ efforts to convince him otherwise, he must have known that he was unlikely to avoid the death penalty for killing the ATF agents. This knowledge may have set the stage for the mass suicide he seemed to be planning. Consider that it was our formidable task to try to convince Koresh and his devoted followers to lay down their weapons and come out to face four counts of first-d
egree murder in the state that leads the nation in capital punishment.

  The most appalling aspect of Koresh’s narcissism and megalomania was that he seemed to have no concern for the innocent people who would die with him—he appeared to see nothing but his own personal drama.

  Amid growing frustration, an FBI delegation flew to Washington to brief newly appointed Attorney General Janet Reno, but in fact it was more a sales pitch for one course of action than a complete presentation of all the information. Jamar brought Dick Rogers from HRT but no one from the negotiation team. The delegation expressed their legitimate concerns that the now significantly deteriorating sanitary conditions within the compound were endangering the lives of the children inside. They also made much of the suspicion that Koresh was sexually abusing underage girls in the compound. But even though this was alleged in past reports, and later confirmed by witnesses, we had no evidence that this was currently ongoing. And, if it was ongoing, why had it not been an issue over the preceding fifty days of the siege? Having provided a very one-sided picture of Waco as a crisis in need of immediate tactical intervention, Jamar requested authorization to use tear gas as a way to drive the Davidians out. Persuaded that children were indeed very much at risk, Attorney General Reno approved.