Verdun 1916
Page 11
The Germans entered the war with a number of Taube monoplanes of limited value. They also had Aviatik B.II, the LVG B.I and Albatros B.II biplanes. Like the French, they established bomber units. However, reconnaissance or scouting aircraft were the mainstay of aviation in 1914, but they had their limitations. The aerial observers were able to impart detailed information to the ground forces after they landed, they could drop messages to men on the ground or they could use simple signals from the air. By the end of 1914, the German equipped the first aircraft with radios for artillery spotting. The French did not lag far behind; in 1915, they installed transmitters (no receivers) on Caudron G III aircraft to send Morse code messages. In 1915, the more powerful twin-engine Caudron G IV replaced the G III. The French attached a squadron of radio-equipped aircraft to each army corps to support its artillery. The Germans did not attach radioequipped aircraft squadrons to their artillery until late 1915 when aircraft began to play a key role in artillery observation.
Fighting enemy planes in the air was a problem in 1914 because there was no effective way to mount machine guns. The Allies worked on a way to mount a machine gun so that it could be fired through the spinning propellers. The first method of placing a machine gun on an aeroplane was to put it on a swivel for operation by an observer located in the front in the case of a pusher engine aircraft or in the rear in the case of a tractor engine. One solution in 1915 was to mount the fixed machine guns on the nose of the craft and sheathing the propellers in steel to prevent them from being shot off. By 1916, the French mounted fixed, forward-firing machine guns on the top wing so they fired over the propeller. The problem with this method was the difficulty in changing magazines in flight. The French also tried to devise a more effective method, which would rely on the synchronization of the machine gun with the rotation of the propeller and required some type of interrupter gear. However, before they could perfect this method, Anthony Fokker, a Dutch aircraft designer, came up with a synchronization device in the spring of 1915, which allowed the Germans to beat the Allies to the draw. The first machine guns that fired through the propellers were mounted on Fokker E.I and E.II monoplanes. The Germans began to clear the sky of Allied aircraft during the ‘Fokker Scourge’ of 1915.
Meanwhile, in 1915, Roland Garros and Sergeant Jean Navarre gained instant popularity in France by downing five enemy aircraft each. The French press coined the term ‘ace’ for them. Shortly after that, Oswald Boelcke and Max Immelmann became Germany’s first ‘aces’ flying the Fokker E model monoplanes. The ‘Fokker Scourge’ forced the Allies to shift their bombing efforts from day to night raids, which were less effective. Thus, the Allies lost the slight advantage they had held in the air on the Western Front since the beginning of the war. In 1916, the Allies finally managed to synchronize Vickers machine guns but they did not mount them on aeroplanes until the spring of 1916. Meanwhile, the French developed the Nieuport 11, known as the Bébé, which mounted a machine gun on top of the upper wing. This aircraft replaced the Morane-Saulnier Types L and N, which had a Hotchkiss machine gun that fired through the armour-sheathed propeller. These Nieuports proved superior to German Eindeckers (single wing) in early 1916. The Allies did not regain air superiority until many weeks after the Battle of Verdun began. Before the end of the battle, the Germans began to use new and more effective types of biplane fighters. Thus, during 1916, the biplane gradually replaced the monoplane in the air over the Western Front.
Both sides used aircraft to fly reconnaissance missions and photograph enemy positions as they slowly learned how to interpret aerial photographs. By 1916, these functions assumed greater importance over the Verdun battlefield, which forced the troops to begin camouflaging exposed positions. Balloons continued to be a primary source of observation for the artillery. Pétain even remarked that control of the air was critical during the battle. Before long, aerial observation became a dangerous duty for the observer since both sides converted some guns into a form of anti-balloon or anti-aircraft gun and it was not difficult to hit and set these hydrogen gasbags on fire. Some observers were issued a parachute to make a quick escape if the ground troops were unable to pull it to earth fast enough. Aircraft were able to penetrate enemy lines and send back reports as well as drive off enemy aircraft and attack observation balloons or airships. During 1916, the aeroplane added a new dimension to the battlefield as both sides strove to win air dominance over Verdun.
* P. Truttmann, La Barrière der Fer (Luxembourg: Gerard Klopp, 2000).
Chapter Three
Verdun Campaign, August 1914–February 1916
‘General von Falkenhayn, the new Chief of the General Staff, who in the midst of the Marne disaster had grasped the reins with a firm hand, had for the moment only one thing to do, and that was to place the dislocated strategical position on a sounder basis.’
Crown Prince Wilhelm, My War Experiences (London: Hurst and Blackett Ltd, 1922)
Creating a Salient
At the beginning of the war, the fortress of Verdun anchored one end of the French fortified line. In August and September 1914, the Germans tried to sweep around it while their main armies moved across Belgium and northern France. Crown Prince Wilhelm’s 5th Army formed the hinge of the German right wing that swung through Belgium and Luxembourg into northern France like an opening door. The Crown Prince’s army was concentrated in the vicinity of Metz–Thionville where it observed French covering forces holding the Othain River Line and Étain on the direct approach to Verdun. On 17 August 1914, the 5th Army was ordered to advance. It moved forward in concert with the 4th Army on its right and passed through Luxembourg towards Longwy. The VI Reserve, V and XIII corps moved through Luxembourg. On 20 August, part of the XIII Corps was left behind to reduce the French fortress at Longwy. The VI Reserve Corps, on the left flank of the XIII Corps, passed through Esch and crossed into France on 20 August. On the 5th Army’s left flank, General von Mudra’s corps at Metz pushed back the French outposts in the Woëvre on the direct route to Metz. Meanwhile, the German forces surrounded Longwy on 22 August and took the town on 25 August. On 23 August, Moltke sent the following order: ‘The 5th Army has freedom of movement. I want the enemy driven back from north to west past Verdun. Several French Corps are in action on the front of the 4th Army. German right wing advancing swiftly in a southerly direction.’
On 24 August, the VI Reserve and XVI corps marched on Longuyon while the V Reserve and XVI corps reached the French outposts on the Othain River.1 The Kaiser awarded his son the Iron Cross for his victory on the frontier. Mudra’s corps and the 5th Army tried to complete a double envelopment of French forces, but failed. The French forces on the Othain and north of Verdun escaped to the fortified zone. On 29 August, Moltke ordered the 5th Army to advance to the Meuse. The previous day, the army had received orders to march on Chalons. The Crown Prince’s army advanced north of the Verdun fortress. According to the Crown Prince, a 300mm Beta Mortar was sent to expedite the capture of Montmédy.
In September, after the 5th Army crossed the Meuse west of Montmédy, it thrust southward and through the Argonne in order to trap the French 3rd Army, which had opposed it since the campaign had begun, and to isolate Verdun. The Crown Prince’s army swept around the city and through the Argonne, anchoring the left wing of the German invasion force of four other armies intent on executing the Schlieffen Plan by invading Belgium and racing across northern France. Between 5 and 9 September, the campaign ended when the French forces defeated the invaders at the Battle of the Marne. During those first days of September, the German XVIII Reserve Corps advanced on Grand Pré and on its left, the VI Corps moved into the Argonne to take Varennes where it met up with the XIII Corps advancing south from Dun. To the left of XIII Corps was VI Reserve Corps, which crossed paths with XVI Corps near Montfaucon as they progressed without encountering much opposition. The V Reserve Corps, which held the front north of Verdun, redeployed southeast of Verdun in early September with the intention of isolating the fortres
s. General Mudra’s XVI Corps stormed the key position of the butte at Montfaucon, a mere 10km to the northwest of Verdun, on 3 September and repelled French counter-attacks. The Crown Prince was ordered to send most of his divisions through the Argonne to complete the isolation of Verdun. After it advanced southwest of Metz across the Woëvre, the V Corps set out to capture the forts of Troyon and Camp des Romains and create a bridgehead at St Mihiel. The main force transiting through the Argonne was to drive towards St Mihiel on the Meuse and link up with V Corps to complete a double envelopment of the fortress. According to the Crown Prince, he was short of the special materiel and troops to achieve this objective. Therefore, at the height of the Battle of the Marne, his army launched the first campaign against Verdun.
Crown Prince Wilhelm explained:*
We only had at our disposal for the attack against the Meuse forts the 10th Infantry Division, with a battery of heavy field howitzers and an Austrian motor-mortar battery…. In order to secure a prompt execution of his task, we telegraphed to General von Strantz, informing him that the 5th Army’s front was facing east, towards the line Bar le Duc–Beauzée and to the north; we reckoned upon his attacking the enemy’s rear immediately with his army corps.
The fort of Troyon was silenced by heavy howitzer fire on the 8th September. It responded but feebly to our bombardment, and showed no further signs of life after 11 a.m. The 30 cm [305mm] Austrian mortar … was expected to open fire at four in the afternoon, and it was hoped that the fort would be taken on the 8th September. Then the work of Les Peroches, on the left bank of the Meuse, was to be shelled by the heavy howitzers and taken under fire, and the mortars to be brought from Metz were to be directed against the fort of Génicourt to the north of Troyon. Our infantry lay about 100 m in front of the works of Troyon Fort. With the fall of Troyon and Les Paroches the gap still existing to the south in the circular front we were forming around Verdun was only reduced by seventeen km. But the most important thing of all was that the 3rd Army’s road to the French rear was now free. The Metz Main Reserve (the 3rd Reserve Division) had remained in the Woëvre plain, between the Côtes Lorraines and the Moselle, to guard against any danger from Toul-Nancy. It had already strengthened its position in the area between Thiaucourt and Pont-à-Mousson, and had warded off a number of violent enemy attacks.
The 6th Army, after much sanguinary fighting, was confining itself to the bombardment of the strong positons around Nancy. After their preliminary bombardment, they still hoped, with the expected steady advance of the 5th Army beyond Bar-le-Duc to the south-east and towards the rearward communications of Nancy, to be able to break through the Trouée-de-Charmes between Nancy and Épinal. And thus forces which were badly needed elsewhere remained here involved in a hopeless struggle.
The Crown Prince doubted that this massive envelopment of the French fortified line Verdun–Toul was possible because of the critical situation developing on the Marne. Events vindicated his opinion. The 5th Army, which acted as the German left wing, became involved in the Battle of the Marne. However, it made its last attempt to march through the Argonne on 8 and 9 September. The Crown Prince boasted that this advance was successful, but French General Herr, commanding the artillery brigade of VI Corps, claimed that his 75mm guns smashed a desperate German infantry assault. Whatever the case, the front of the 5th Army in the Argonne area was pulling back on 11 September on orders from higher up.
Before the order to retreat, the V Corps and von Strantz’s troops were unable to break the barrier of forts on either side of St Mihiel in time to cross the Meuse and expose Sarrail’s 3rd Army from two directions. On 7 September, the Duke of Würtemberg’s 4th Army and the Crown Prince’s army had been ordered to strike at the junction of the French 4th and 3rd armies respectively. The German 4th Army advanced towards St Dizier while the 5th Army marched on Bar-le-Duc. General Langle’s 4th Army gave ground. Sarrail’s 3rd Army, now reinforced, held the Crown Prince’s army. The XVIII Reserve Corps had already reached Revigny on 9 September, while the VI Corps on its left had taken Ste Ménehould. Bar-le-Duc, on Verdun’s lifeline, was threatened. During this march through the Argonne, the German XIII Corps had also moved through the forest while the XVI Corps on its left reached Souilly. This was as far as the Crown Prince’s army’s tentacles extended by 9 September. The German armies began to retreat on 10 September. Joffre ordered his armies to press forward and General Michel Coutanceau, Military Governor of Verdun, to attack towards the north and prevent enemy convoys from crossing the Meuse and his territorial divisions to attack eastward. When the German V Corps took St Mihiel on the Meuse it established a bridgehead, but it was too late to make any difference. When the Germans pulled back in the Argonne, Verdun formed a salient. One of its main rail connections was cut at St Mihiel and the other to the west soon was interdicted by German artillery located on the heights of the Argonne. The Germans occupied their own salient at St Mihiel from which they tried to penetrate the Côtes de Meuse.2
The battle for St Mihiel opened on 8 September with an artillery bombardment of Fort Troyon. To breach the river line, the Germans had to neutralize the forts. One objective in crossing the Marne in this area was to split the French 2nd Army from the 3rd Army. On 8 September, Joffre was so alarmed by the situation that he informed General Sarrail that he must maintain contact with de Langle’s 4th Army on his left on the Argonne front and gave him permission to pull back from the fortress of Verdun, which could fend for itself, he believed. However, he was not authorizing Sarrail to retreat from the Meuse line south of Verdun.3 On 9 September, only two French cavalry divisions – the 2nd near St Mihiel with a provisional brigade sent by Castelnau from Toul and the 7th near Troyon – stood to the east of the Meuse to cover the gap between the French 3rd and 2nd armies. As the French were still clinging to Nancy, the line of the Meuse would not fall without a major battle. By the time the Germans brought up their heavy artillery to deal with the forts between Verdun and Toul, it was too late for them to do anything besides establishing a salient at St Mihiel for future operations against Verdun.
Built in 1880, Fort Troyon had positions for twenty-two artillery pieces. Since it had undergone limited renovations, it still had to rely on its caponiers to defend its surrounding ditch and a large ravelin to cover the entrance when the war began. It occupied an advantageous position about 260m above the village from where its guns could cover the interval between itself and Fort Génicourt, Fort Paroches on its left and Fort Camp des Romains at St Mihiel on its right. In the 1890s, the army added concrete barracks. The garrison consisted of over 430 troops, including the gunners of the 2 120mm L Mle 1878 guns for indirect fire and the 12 antiquated 90mm guns – 4 on siege-gun mounts and the remaining on field-gun mounts. Machine guns as well as Hotchkiss 40mm revolver guns covered the fossé.
On 8 September late in the day, two days before Moltke’s headquarters ordered a general withdrawal of the German army, the 10th Division from Strantz’s army detachment started bombarding Fort Troyon with 150mm guns, a detachment of 210mm Mörser and two Austrian 305mm Mörser. The next day, a German officer demanded the surrender of the fort, the commandant of which refused. The bombardment resumed, interrupted only by an infantry assault late in the morning, which was repelled after heavy losses among the attackers. The fort continued to resist the heavy bombardment and its 90mm guns fired upon the German troops busily digging trenches. By 10 September, only half of Troyon’s 90mm guns were still serviceable, but the Germans had lost their chance to isolate Verdun. The bombardment continued. The artillery of the two neighbouring forts fired in support of Fort Troyon, which suffered additional damage during 11 and 12 September. The German bombardment ended when French reinforcements arrived. The fort took about 3,000 hits from artillery rounds of 105mm to 305mm calibre. It sustained some damage, but only four men died and another forty-one were wounded. During the week that followed, the garrison repaired the damage.
Meanwhile, the Crown Prince’s army prepared for a
new assault on the Côtes de Meuse (or Côtes Lorraines) to regain territory it had surrendered near Ste Ménehould. On 19 September, the Germans took Beaumont and marched on Fort Liouville and the two forts to the south at Gironville, which covered the eastern approaches to Commercy. Strantz’s force was reinforced with the Bavarian III Corps, four Austrian 305mm Mörser and the 33rd Division from the Metz reserve. The V Corps continued on its mission against Troyon, securing the crests of Combres and Éparges during its advance. Éparges became the scene of heavy fighting. The Bavarian corps moved against St Mihiel. The XIV Corps took up positions against the left flank near Fortress Toul. Additional siege artillery lumbered forward hindered by mud left after heavy rains. On 18 September, the French brought back several divisions they had removed from the area during the Battle of the Marne so the forts could defend the heights more adequately. Since the rains and late arrival of the Bavarian corps had prevented the Germans from getting all their units into position, the new offensive began on 20 September in piecemeal fashion. The German 10th Division made the first move by bombarding Fort Troyon until 24 September.4 According to the Crown Prince, his V Corps silenced the guns of Fort Troyon on 22 September. A 305mm round destroyed a magazine, killing eighteen soldiers taking shelter there. On 24 September, Troyon’s commandant received permission from Verdun to evacuate the heavily damaged fort, which still remained under French control.5