An American Life

by Ronald Reagan

  Once again Begin had told me, in effect, to mind my own business.

  Over the next few days, Habib’s reports from Beirut still gave me some hope that his tireless negotiations would pay off, despite mounting attacks by Israel that were taking an increasing death toll among the women and children of Beirut. On August 9, Ariel Sharon sent me a cable asking if he could come to Washington the next day to meet on the crisis. He apparently wanted to defend the attack. George Shultz cabled Sharon a message saying that I would not meet with him because I didn’t want to undercut Habib, and that Sharon should do his talking with Shultz. The following day, Shimon Peres, the leader of the Israeli opposition, came to the Oval Office for a meeting. I found him less combative and much more reasonable than Begin. He agreed that the Israeli-Arab conflict would never be settled without terms agreeable to all sides regarding political autonomy for the Palestinians and, unlike Begin, he encouraged us to continue befriending Jordan and other moderate Arab states in hopes they could help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

  Despite our appeals for restraint, the Israelis on August 12 opened a new and even more brutal attack on civilian neighborhoods in Beirut that sickened me and many others in the White House. This provoked me into an angry demand for an end to the bloodletting. Here are excerpts from my diary:

  Aug. 12

  Met with the news the Israelis delivered the most devastating bomb and artillery attack Israel on West Beirut lasting 14 hours. Habib cabled—desperate—has basic agreement from all parties but can’t arrange details of P.L.O. withdrawal because of the barrage.

  King Fahd [of Saudi Arabia] called begging me to do something. I told him I was calling P.M. Begin immediately. And I did. I was angry.

  I told him [Begin] it had to stop or our entire future relationship was endangered. I used the word “Holocaust” deliberately and said the symbol of his country was becoming “a picture of a seven month old baby with its arms blown off.”

  He told me he had ordered the bombing stopped. I asked about the artillery fire. He claimed the P.L.O. had started that and Israeli forces had taken casualties. End of call. Twenty minutes later, he called to tell me he’d ordered an end to the barrage and pleaded for our continued friendship.

  The phone calls worked, at least briefly bringing a cessation to the slaughter in Beirut. I had consciously used the word holocaust to describe the indiscriminate bombardment of Beirut because I knew it would have a special meaning for Begin.

  After the phone calls, Israel reduced the intensity of its bombardment of Beirut—but its ground and air forces then began attacking populated areas in northern Lebanon, apparently with the intent of eradicating PLO strongholds in that region. This put a new monkey wrench in Habib’s delicate negotiations with the Palestinians and Syrians.

  To reinforce my remarks during the telephone calls, I sent a follow-up letter to Begin the next day:

  This message follows our telephone conversation to emphasize the depth of my personal concerns about recent Israeli military actions and their destructive effect;. . . at this crucial moment in Ambassador Habib’s mission, when he is only a few days away from working out the final detailed points of his package plan for departure of the P.L.O. from Beirut, Israeli air strikes, shelling and other military moves have stopped progress in the negotiations. I find this incomprehensible and unacceptable. Israel must adhere to an immediate strict cease fire in place. The assurances which we hear from Jerusalem must be borne out by the actions of Israel’s defense forces, who must stop these massive eruptions to any provocation. I cannot stress to you enough how seriously I regard this situation. Our entire future relations are at stake if these military eruptions continue . . . the Ambassador must be able to fulfill the last steps in his mission. Israeli military actions of the past several hours may have made further alteration of the package impossible. If this proves to be the case, we will look to Israel to accept it fully so the agony of Beirut will end . . . I cannot accept this new military advance as compatible with pledges of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and support for the emergence of a stable Lebanese government. . . .

  Begin replied the following day, explaining that he had not responded immediately to my message because his wife had decided not to awaken him when it arrived the night before, as he had been asleep after a long and difficult day. He went on to say that he had always spoken to me with frankness and that he now wanted to tell me how deeply offended he felt by the tone of my letter following the two telephone conversations.

  I would have understood perfectly well were it written after our first talk, in which you voiced anger and in which you also hurt me personally and deeply, especially through the use of the word “Holocaust,” of which I know some facts which may be unknown to my fellow man . . . but after the second conversation, you ended it with the words, “Menachem, Shalom.” How can I have shalom of mind having now read your written message?

  Referring to my assertion that the new Israeli military campaign in northern Lebanon might make impossible further changes in the package being negotiated by Habib, and that Israel therefore would have to accept it as is, Begin said: “We shall not accept any package agreement if we are not fully consulted about the contents before the package is wrapped up.” As for the new Israeli offensive, he said:

  Everywhere in Lebanon where our forces are, is related to our determined right to stamp out the scourge of terrorism; it has nothing to do with our resolve to withdraw our forces from Lebanon simultaneously, as Mr. Habib put it to me at his own initiative, with the departure of the foreign Syrian forces.

  Sincerely,

  Menachem Begin

  During the next two weeks, Habib finally got all sides to agree on our plan, which provided for a new cease-fire, withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon under international supervision, and the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli armies. At the request of Lebanese leaders, I agreed that the United States would send a contingent of marines to Beirut for three or four weeks as part of a multinational peacekeeping force that would help supervise the departure of PLO forces to Tunisia and other countries.

  With the shooting stopped, George Shultz and I regarded this moment in the explosive history of the Middle East as a possible golden opportunity to make a fresh start toward achieving a long-term settlement of the region’s problems. We decided to offer the framework for a new peace initiative.

  As we saw it, any long-term solution must require, first of all, that the Arab world acknowledge Israel’s right to exist, and must provide adequate guarantees of Israel’s security and the integrity of its borders. It should also provide for completion of the Camp David agreement, granting full autonomy to Palestinians living in the territories taken by Israel in the Six Day War, with free elections and a five-year transition period leading to full self-government; and a freeze by Israel on the establishment of new settlements in the occupied territories during the transition period, when there would be a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinians.

  After its years of war against the PLO, we knew Israel would oppose (as would some Arab countries fearful of a strong Palestinian state) the creation of an independent Palestinian nation next to it on the West Bank and in Gaza. At the same time, we believed that peace would never come to the Middle East as long as the occupied territories remained under the permanent political control of Israel. We believed that the Palestinians living in these areas had to be given freedom, the right of self-determination and self-government, and that the best way of accomplishing this was not through creation of a Palestinian state, but through some sort of political association of these areas with the government of Jordan under which the Palestinians would have self-rule and autonomy, perhaps like an American state.

  Thus, we believed that the solution lay in what came to be known as the “land for peace” option: Israel’s withdrawal, under provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242, from Gaza and most of the West Bank and an undivided Jerusalem
, in exchange for peace and the Arabs’ acceptance of its right to exist. I felt then—and still do—that Israel will never resolve its conflict with the Arabs unless it gives up some of the land won in the 1967 war in return for peace and safe borders, and that so long as Israel continues building new settlements in the occupied territories, a lasting peace will remain extremely difficult to forge.

  In my view, Israel wouldn’t have to return all of the forty-mile-wide stretch of land between the Mediterranean and the West Bank of the Jordan River; there are one or two points along the West Bank near the narrowest portion of Israel’s pre-1967 borders that Israel could retain because of its legitimate security concerns—to prevent, for example, hostile artillery from firing into Israel. But without Israel agreeing to “land for peace,” I don’t think there will ever be peace in the Middle East.

  By late August of 1982, with the cease-fire still in place, we had completed work on the details of our new Middle East peace initiative; I planned to announce it in a nationally televised speech on September 1. Several days before that, officials of our administration presented an outline of the plan to the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. This was part of our long effort to persuade King Hussein to take part in negotiations with Israel. We were never able to get him completely on board. Expecting Begin to look unfavorably on any proposal that called on Israel to give up any part of the West Bank and its claim to all of Jerusalem, I sent a personal letter to him meant to supplement a more detailed briefing on the plan to be given to him by our excellent ambassador in Israel, Samuel Lewis. My letter read in part:

  Dear Menachem:

  Much has happened since we last met in Washington in June. We both have been witness to historic events culminating in the departure of the P.L.O. from Beirut and from its dominant position in Lebanese affairs. . . .

  The population in the north of Israel is now secure and I hope it will remain so. I feel there are now opportunities which lie before us with the P.L.O. military weakened and the Soviet Union shown once again to have minimal impact on the truly significant developments in the Middle East.

  I have done much soul searching in an effort to determine how to best take advantage of this situation in a way that will promote the interests of both the United States and Israel. I feel now is the appropriate time for the two of us to mount a major new effort in the Camp David peace process . . . history will not forgive us if we fail to do so. . . . We have a unique opportunity to take a major step toward a comprehensive peace which provides for the security of Israel while recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. . . .

  I have asked Ambassador Lewis to share with you my thoughts on the key issues that must be resolved if we are to achieve genuine peace as Israel and the U.S. so devoutly wish.

  I am well aware your view varies considerably from some of my positions. I am convinced, nevertheless, that taken together the positions we are advocating can lead to a just and comprehensive and durable settlement promised by the Camp David framework. . . . Wherever negotiations may lead, I pledge my absolute commitment to Israel’s security. . . .

  My friend, I am convinced that we are about to embark together on a journey of historic dimensions. I know that the road will not be easy but I am determined to stay the course, confident that the world will judge our efforts as necessary to insure the permanent security of Israel. I take comfort in the fact that you’ve already traveled a difficult road to a successful destination of peace with Egypt. I will look to you for counsel and sustenance as we work in the cause of peace.

  Ron

  When Begin realized we were getting ready to go public with the proposal, he requested Ambassador Lewis to ask me to promise to notify Israeli officials at least twenty-four hours before I did. But I responded: “In view of the fact that Israeli officials have already given the media in Israel a version of some parts of my letter to the Prime Minister, I feel I have no choice but to state my views for myself openly and without delay. Therefore I have decided to address the public tonight, Sept. 1.”

  The Israeli cabinet wasted no time in rejecting my proposal, and Begin’s reply to my letter urging serious consideration of the peace initiative was blunt. Here are excerpts from his reply:

  Enclosed is a resolution of the Cabinet adopted unanimously. I can elaborate little on it, but I will take a leaf from your book and say that the government of Israel will stand by its decision with total dedication.

  I agree that great events have taken place since our meeting in June, but I have a different view of what took place. . . .

  On June 6, 1982, Israel’s Defense Force entered Lebanon not to conquer territory but to fight and smash the armed bands operating from that country against our land and its citizens.

  This, the IDF did. You will remember we could not accept your suggestion that we proclaim a cease fire on Thursday, June 10, because at that time the enemy was still 18 kilometers from Metulla on our northern border. However, 24 hours later, we pushed the enemy northward and on Friday, June 11, we proclaimed a unilateral cease fire rejected by the terrorists so the fighting continued. And on June 27, we suggested all the terrorists leave Beirut, Lebanon, which they eventually did with the important good offices of Ambassador Habib many weeks later.

  . . . [in the intervening battles] Israel lost 340 men killed and 2,200 wounded, 100 of them severely. Also in the battles following the rejection of our appeals by the Syrian army not to interfere, the IDF destroyed 405 Soviet Syrian tanks, among them 9 T72’s, considered in NATO circles to be invulnerable; we downed 102 Soviet-Syrian MIGs, including one MIG-25, and smashed 21 batteries of SAM6 and SAM8 and SAM9, a deadly weapon. . . .

  Yet in your letter to me and in your speech to the American people you did not, Mr. President, even mention the bravery of the Israeli fighters nor the great sacrifices of the Israeli army and people. One could have gotten the impression that Mr. Philip Habib with the help of expeditionary units achieved the results. Mr. President, I was struck by this omission, but to state a fact, I do not complain.

  I do protest your omission to consult Israel before your decision to forward your proposals to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the former an outspoken opponent of the Camp David accords, the latter a complete stranger to and an adversary of those accords. As there was no prior consultation, the U.S. government could have taken the position that the West Bank should be reassociated with Jordan; what some call the West Bank, Mr. President, is Judea and Samaria and the simple historic truth will never change. There are cynics who will deride history; they may continue their derision as they wish, but I will stand by the truth. And the truth is: Millennia ago, there was a Jewish kingdom of Judea and Samaria where our kings knelt to God, where our prophets brought forth a vision of eternal peace, where we developed a rich civilization which we took with us in our hearts and in our minds on our long global trek for over eighteen centuries and with it we came back home.

  King Abdullah [of Jordan] by invasion conquered parts of Judea and Samaria in 1948 and in a war of most legitimate self defense in 1967 after having been attacked by King Hussein we liberated with God’s help that portion of our homeland. Judea and Samaria will never again be the West Bank of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan which was created by British colonialism after the French army expelled King Faisal from Damascus.

  At Camp David, Begin said that it had been at Israel’s initiative that the agreement had been made to grant autonomy to the Palestinian inhabitants of the region over a five-year period, but he said Israel refused to surrender this land.

  Security is of paramount importance. Judea and Samaria are mountainous country and two thirds of our population live in the coastal plain dominated by those mountains. From them you can hit every city, every town, each township and village, and last but not least, our principal airport in the plain below.

  We used to live penned in eight miles from the seashore and now, Mr. President, you suggest to us in your proposals that we return to almost that same situati
on.

  Mr. President, you declare that you will not support the creation of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district. The Palestinian state will rise of itself the day Judea and Samaria are given to Jordanian jurisdiction; then in no time, you will have a Soviet base in the heart of the Middle East. Under no circumstances shall we accept such a possibility ever arising which would endanger our very existence. We have chosen for the last two years to call our countries friends and allies; such being the case, a friend does not weaken his friend, an ally does not put an ally in jeopardy; this would be the inevitable consequence for the positions transmitted to me on Aug. 31 to become a reality.

  I believe they won’t.

  For Zion’s sake, I will not hold my peace, and for Jerusalem’s sake, I will not rest. (Isaiah, chapter 62)

  Menachem

  In my response to Begin the following day, I said that despite his cabinet’s quick rejection of the proposal, even before it had been made public, I remained confident that it “contained the essential elements for achieving a durable peace in the Middle East which takes full account of Israel’s security requirements. After further study, I hope you will share that belief with me . . . I want to reiterate once more our commitment and my commitment to the security of Israel and the Israeli people. Security can only be found in the context of a genuine peace constructed upon sound and enduring treaties between Israel and its Arab neighbors.”