An American Life

by Ronald Reagan

  Briefing for the [Helmut] Kohl visit. This will be my fifth meeting with him but now he is chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

  We had a full ceremonial on a raw windy day. Our meeting was good. He is entirely different than his predecessor, very warm and outgoing. Mrs. Kohl is the same and very charming.

  We did hit it off and I believe we’ll have a fine relationship. No state dinner but a dinner for about 40 upstairs in our dining room. They felt very good about that and accepted it as something special.

  During the day [a meeting] with John Tower re the MX. No doubt we’re going to have trouble—the Dems will try to cancel out the whole system. It will take a full court press to get it. If we don’t, I shudder to think what it will do to our arms reduction negotiations in Geneva.

  The following week, after reviewing a variety of options about where and how it should be based, I decided to order deployment of the still-under-development MX Peacekeeper long-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in underground silos at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. I was convinced it was essential to deter a Soviet first strike by assuring that the U.S. retaliatory forces could survive an attack by the Soviets’ latest super-ICBMs. On the same day, I sent a message to the new Soviet leadership proposing several confidence-building measures, including suggestions that our two nations agree to notify each other in advance of missile and space tests to remove the mutual surprise and uncertainty that can occur at the sudden appearance of a rocket on a warning screen; that we notify each other before major military exercises, again to reduce surprise and uncertainty in our relationship; and that we upgrade the Washington-Moscow hot line to make it more dependable and rapid. And I also made an address to the nation that day that I hoped would help the people understand why it was so important for us to proceed with the military modernization program—especially the MX, which had created an uproar among liberals and the nuclear freeze crowd—and to explain my hopes for success in Geneva.

  “I intend,” I told the people, “to search for peace along two parallel paths: deterrence and arms reduction. I believe these are the only paths that offer any real hope for an enduring peace.”

  Because it described the situation we faced at the time and because several of the issues raised in that speech were so important, I’m including substantial excerpts from it here:

  In spite of a stagnating Soviet economy, Soviet leaders invest twelve to fourteen percent of their country’s gross national product in military spending—two to three times the level we invest. I might add that the defense share of our United States federal budget has gone way down . . . in 1962, when John Kennedy was President, forty-six percent, almost half, of the federal budget went to our national defense. In recent years, about one quarter of our budget has gone to defense, while the share for social programs has nearly doubled.

  The combination of the Soviets spending more and the United States spending proportionately less changed the military balance and weakened our deterrent. Today, in virtually every measure of military power, the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advantage.

  The Soviet Union has deployed a third more land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles than we have. Believe it or not, we froze our number in 1965 and have deployed no additional missiles since then.

  The Soviet Union put to sea 60 new ballistic missile submarines in the last fifteen years. Until last year we hadn’t commissioned one in that same period. The Soviet Union has built over 200 modern Backfire bombers and is building 30 more a year. For twenty years, the United States has deployed no new strategic bombers. Many of our B-52 bombers are now older than the pilots who fly them.

  The Soviet Union now has 600 of the silos considered most threatening by both sides—the intermediate-range missiles based on land. We have none. The United States withdrew its intermediate-range land-based missiles from Europe almost twenty years ago.

  The world has also witnessed unprecedented growth in the area of Soviet conventional forces. The Soviets far exceed us in the number of tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft, and ships they produce every year. What is more, when I arrived in this office, I learned that in our own forces we had planes that couldn’t fly and ships that couldn’t leave port mainly for lack of spare parts and crew members.

  The Soviet military buildup must not be ignored. We’ve recognized the problem and, together with our allies, we’ve begun to correct the imbalance. If my defense proposals are passed, it will still take five years before we come close to the Soviet level. Yet the modernization of our strategic and conventional forces will assure that deterrence works and peace prevails.

  Our deployed nuclear forces were built before the age of microcircuits. It’s not right to ask our young men and women in uniform to maintain and operate such antiques. Many have already given their lives to missile explosions and aircraft accidents caused by the old age of their equipment. We must replace and modernize our forces, and that’s why I decided to proceed with the production and deployment of the new ICBM known as the MX. Three earlier presidents worked to develop this missile. Based on the best advice that I could get, I concluded that the MX is the right missile at the right time. . . .

  Some may question what modernizing our military has to do with peace. Well, as explained earlier, a secure force keeps others from threatening us, and that keeps the peace. And just as important, it also increases the prospects of reaching significant arms reductions with the Soviets, and that’s what we really want. The United States wants deep cuts in the world’s arsenal of weapons, but unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength and restore the military balance, the Soviets, since they’re so far ahead, have little incentive to negotiate with us. Let me repeat that point because it goes to the heart of our policies: Unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength, the Soviets have little incentive to negotiate. If we hadn’t begun to modernize, the Soviet negotiators would know we had nothing to bargain with except talk. They would know we were bluffing without a good hand, because they know what cards we hold just as we know what’s in their hand. . . .

  We know that one-sided arms control doesn’t work. We’ve tried time and time again to set an example by cutting our own forces in the hope that the Soviets would do likewise. The result has always been that they keep building.

  I believe our strategy for peace will succeed. Never before has the United States proposed such a comprehensive program of nuclear arms control. Never in our history have we engaged in so many negotiations with the Soviets to reduce nuclear arms and to find a stable peace. What we are saying to them is this: We will modernize our military in order to keep the balance for peace, but wouldn’t it be better if we both simply reduced our arsenals to a much lower level?

  Let me begin with the negotiations on the intermediate-range nuclear forces that are currently underway in Geneva. As I said earlier, the most threatening of these forces are the land-based missiles which the Soviet Union now has aimed at Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In 1972 there were 600 of these missiles. The United States was at zero. In 1977 there were 600. The United States was still at zero. Then the Soviets began deploying powerful new missiles with three warheads and a reach of thousands of miles—the SS-20. Since then the Soviets have added a missile with three warheads every week. Although the Soviet leaders earlier this year declared they’d frozen deployment of this dangerous missile, they have in fact continued deployment.

  Last year, on November 18th, I proposed the total, global elimination of all these missiles. I proposed that the United States would deploy no comparable missiles, which are scheduled for late 1983, if the Soviet Union would dismantle theirs. We would follow agreement on the land-based missiles with limits on other intermediate-range systems. The European governments strongly support our initiative. The Soviet Union has thus far shown little inclination to take this major step to zero levels. Yet I believe, and I’m hoping, that as the talks proceed and as we approach the scheduled placement of our new syste
ms in Europe, the Soviet leaders will see the benefits of such a far-reaching agreement. This summer we also began negotiations on strategic arms reductions, the proposal we call START. Here we’re talking about intercontinental missiles, the weapons with a longer range than the intermediate-range ones I was just discussing. We’re negotiating on the basis of deep reductions. I proposed in May that we cut the number of warheads on these missiles to an equal number, roughly one-third below current levels. I also proposed that we cut the number of missiles themselves to an equal number, about half the current U.S. level. Our proposals would eliminate some 4,700 warheads and some 2,250 missiles. I think that would be quite a service to mankind. . . .

  We intend to convince the Soviets it would be in their own best interest to reduce these missiles. We also seek to reduce the total destructive power of these missiles and other elements of United States and Soviet strategic forces. In 1977, when the last administration proposed more limited reductions, the Soviet Union refused even to discuss them. This time their reaction has been quite different. Their opening position is a serious one, and even though it doesn’t meet our objective of deep reductions, there’s no question we’re heading in the right direction. One reason for this change is clear. The Soviet Union knows that we are now serious about our own strategic programs and that they must be prepared to negotiate in earnest.

  Through a heavy volume of phone calls and letters to the White House and public opinion polls after the speech, I felt I had convinced millions of Americans that we were on the right track with the Peace through Strength policy, but there was one person I did not convince that night—my daughter Patti.

  Unlike many previous presidents and their wives, Nancy and I didn’t have small children with us when we lived in the White House. Although they traveled east often, Maureen, Michael, Patti, Ron, and their spouses all had their own lives in California during the eight years I was president. Because of this gap of almost three thousand miles, we didn’t see them nearly as often as we wanted to, and that was one of the things Nancy and I missed most while we were in Washington. We usually saw the children (and our grandchildren) at Christmas and Thanksgiving and managed get-togethers at the White House and the ranch. But we missed just being able to pick up the telephone and call the children and say, “Why don’t you come over for dinner tonight?”

  Like all parents, we had occasional problems with the children. All four children had minds of their own, and in different ways they all were capable of expressing their independence. Ron and Maureen showed that when they demanded I act more decisively about the Iran-Contra situation. I’d always encouraged the children to speak their minds.

  I suspect it’s never easy for children who grow up in a family with celebrities, and I’m sure that the added prominence that fell on the shoulders of the children after I was elected president didn’t make their lives any easier. Ron and Patti at times were especially unhappy about having to submit to round-the-clock Secret Service protection, which became especially tight after the CIA received reports of terrorist attacks planned against me and my family. And the prominence of my job may have exacerbated a problem for Michael. During the years I was president, Mike started having difficulty coming to terms with the fact that he was adopted. Although I’d always given him as much love as the other children, he suddenly found it difficult to live with the fact that he was adopted and felt worthless because of it. His wife, Colleen, tried to convince him he had no reason for this concern, but it really weighed heavily on his mind, and as a result, after I’d call or see him to find out whether I could work out the problem, we had several confrontations in which he accused me of not loving him. Then something happened that was almost a miracle: He decided to write a book about his life that became a catharsis for dealing with the problems that had bothered him. After Mike and Colleen brought their children, Cameron and Ashley, to the ranch for one visit, I wrote in my diary: “It was a new Mike. He’s writing a book and it has led to a soul searching about himself which resulted in a confession of how he had done things to all of us and that he now saw himself as he had been and what he wanted to be.” Later, when I read his book, I had even more of a fatherly pride in Mike than I had had before: I could almost see a transformation taking place as the book progressed, as if it was begun by an unhappy and rebellious young man and ended by a completely different person who was happy and at peace with himself. Mike described a journey of discovery in which he learned he had rebelled against the knowledge that his biological mother didn’t want him and had done things to get even. I’ve since recommended his book many times as an aid to those who are adopted—it can help them understand themselves and their families.

  After Nancy and I were married, Maureen was away at school, so we didn’t get to see her as much as we wanted to. When I ran for the presidency, she went out and worked hard campaigning for me, and that meant a great deal to Nancy and me. Once we were in the White House, she stayed with us often because she was co-chairman of the Republican National Committee and we grew even closer. It was wonderful for us to be able to spend so much time together, and we were always delighted when our son-in-law, Dennis, was able to join us during Maureen’s visits.

  Patti, as I’ve mentioned, cried over the telephone when Nancy and I called her at school to tell her I’d been elected governor. “Oh, no,” she said, “how could you do this to me?” She was only fourteen, but she was a child of the sixties who didn’t want a member of the establishment in the family. Later on, Patti came under the influence of people with similar views and, philosophically, at least, I guess I lost her.

  As president, I was devoting every effort I could to ending the threat of nuclear war. But Patti was convinced I was doing the opposite. She just didn’t believe in me.

  I suppose because we both knew where we stood, we generally avoided this topic when I was in the White House. But two weeks after I gave my speech about the MX missile and arms control, she asked me if I would meet with Helen Caldicott, one of the leaders of the nuclear freeze movement. I agreed to Patti’s wish and the three of us spent more than an hour discussing the problems of nuclear war. “She seems like a nice, caring person,” I wrote afterward in my diary of Dr. Caldicott, “but she is all steamed up and knows an awful lot of things that aren’t true. I tried but couldn’t get through her fixation. For that matter I couldn’t get through to Patti. I’m afraid our daughter has been taken over by that whole gang. . . .”

  Patti had told me Dr. Caldicott had promised that if I spoke to her she would say nothing publicly about the conversation. But almost immediately she went public with the details of our meeting.

  I still dream and hope for a day when Patti and I will develop a close relationship again.

  Nancy and I love her very much, as we do all the children. We’ve reached out to Patti since I left the White House, but so far she’s made it plain to me that she thinks I am wrong and that she is against everything I stand for.

  72

  AFTER A LONG National Security Council meeting in early 1983 at which we considered possible ways to accelerate progress at the deadlocked arms control negotiations in Geneva, I wrote in my diary: “We’ll stick with our zero option plan. Found I was wishing I could do the negotiating with the Soviets. . . .”

  I felt that if I could ever get in a room alone with one of the top Soviet leaders, there was a chance the two of us could make some progress in easing tensions between our two countries. I have always placed a lot of faith in the simple power of human contact in solving problems.

  I had made no progress with Brezhnev. Now there was a new leader in the Kremlin, Yuri Andropov, former head of the KGB. I didn’t expect him to be any less of a doctrinaire Communist than Brezhnev, but at least there was a clean slate. I still believed the Soviets had done nothing to merit inviting them to a summit meeting—a lot of confidence-building was necessary first—but I decided to experiment with some personal diplomacy using back channels to the Kremlin, outside th
e spotlight of publicity, through which both sides could speak frankly without the posturing and attempts at diplomatic face-saving that usually accompanied formal dealings between the United States and the USSR.

  For a while, my attempts at quiet diplomacy seemed to be working. Then there was a series of events that made U.S.-Soviet relations go from bad to worse. Meanwhile, I kept trying to win the support of our people and Congress for staying the course on the military modernization program. The Democrats were fighting tooth and nail to repeal virtually all the new programs we had started in 1981: They were fighting to cut defense spending by more than $163 billion over five years, increase social spending by $200 billion, and increase taxes $315 billion, and to win their case they were exploiting some of the public’s understandable fears about nuclear war. When several prominent Senate Republicans joined in calling for the abandonment of the Pentagon modernization program partly because of the heavily publicized views of the minority of Americans who were demonstrating in favor of a nuclear freeze, I commented in my diary in early March:

  I’m going to take our case to the people, only this time we are declassifying some of our reports on the Soviets and can tell the people a few frightening facts: We are still dangerously behind the Soviets and getting farther behind.

  Besides wanting to get my message across to the people, I wanted to get Andropov’s attention.

  On March 8, 1983, one day after I made the note above and two days after we bid good-bye to Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip following their visit to a nearly flooded Rancho del Cielo, I flew to Florida to make a pair of speeches. The first was an address at Walt Disney’s EPCOT Center to a group of young people regarding the challenges facing their generation in the future. Next I spoke in Orlando to the annual convention of the National Association of Evangelicals, an organization of ministers.