An American Life

by Ronald Reagan

  I want to add that we would consider it quite possible to have mutual constructive steps for ending the arms race in other directions as well—for example, as regards strategic nuclear weapons and the use of space—but only on the basis of equality and genuine respect for each other’s interests.

  Mr. President, you propose a discussion of the situation in various geographic regions and mention certain ones. What is there to be said? We have adequate grounds for expressing our assessment of U.S. policy in the areas you mention and others. But at this time I want to emphasize only one thing: every people, every country, wherever they may be located, should be masters of their fate. They should be given the possibility to live as they wish, and no one has the right to interfere in their internal affairs. In our policy we proceed and continue to proceed from this unshakeable principle which is embodied in the U.N. Charter signed by our countries. If the United States is guided by this principle, then our countries would be able to cooperate on that basis at great benefit to ourselves and to others.

  Mr. President, it is not my aim to raise many issues in this letter, but to select those which I consider central. I shall welcome a concrete, businesslike and candid exchange of opinions with you on these and other questions. I agree that the exchange be confidential when the interests of the matter so dictate. For my part I would propose to do this through the Soviet Ambassador in Washington and a person whom you would designate.

  Respectfully,

  Andropov

  August 4, 1983

  There was a handwritten postscript at the bottom of Andropov’s letter:

  I sincerely hope, Mr. President, that you will give serious consideration to the thoughts I have expressed and that you will be able to respond to them in a constructive spirit.

  The letter made me more certain than ever that we had to go ahead with plans to deploy the new intermediate-range NATO missiles in Europe, because once that threat was removed, the Soviets wouldn’t have any reason to eliminate their INF weapons.

  This was my reply to Andropov:

  Dear Mr. Chairman:

  Thank you for your letter which was conveyed to me on August 5. I have of course given it my most serious attention and welcome the assurances of your commitment to finding solutions to the problems that confront us. I can see that we both recognize the awesome responsibility history has placed on our shoulders to guide the two most powerful countries in the world in this difficult and dangerous period.

  I agree with you that, if we are to make progress in our joint endeavor, we cannot bypass important issues merely because they are difficult. I also agree that our attention must be directed above all to the central issue of consolidating security in the world.

  In my view, this central issue has three key aspects: first, the vital need for the world to move toward the principle of settling international disputes by peaceful means, without the use or threat of force; second, the urgent need to reduce stocks of weaponry, particularly the most destructive and destabilizing types; and third, the necessity of creating a sufficient level of trust and confidence between us to permit us to reach the first two objectives.

  Now it is obviously impossible for us to solve all the many problems in our relationship at the same time. But it also seems to me that we will find it most difficult to solve individual problems, even the most critical ones, in total isolation. To be successful, I believe we must find a way to make steady progress in all three areas simultaneously. Permit me to make a few observations on each in total candor.

  On the first, I am pleased that you endorse the principles of the United Nations Charter and that you feel that every people and every country should be master of its fate. I am pleased because I do too, and indeed feel very strongly about this principle, which is absolutely essential for a peaceful world. Since we agree on the principle, the problem must be that we interpret it in different ways, because we do have problems here, and very serious ones at that.

  You have asked me to try to understand Moscow’s view of some of the critical issues, and I can assure you that I do try. Could I ask in return that you take a look at the world as it appears from Washington? As Commander-in-Chief, I have not a single military unit on combat status. If all national leaders could say the same we would be on our way to a safer world. If each of us determined we would not resort to war as a solution to any problem, arms reduction would be simply and easily achieved. If on the other hand we approach the issue holding to a belief that war is somehow inevitable, then we are doomed to failure. I think that we must find a way either to discuss these problems frankly, or at the very least, to give greater weight to the attitudes of the other party when making fateful decisions. In the end, it really makes no difference whether we reduce these problems by specific understandings or by simply acting so that they are reduced. The essential point is that they must be reduced if we are to give the other important items on our agenda a fair chance of success.

  Regarding the second facet of consolidating world security, reducing armaments, I have been pleased by the recent progress in the MBFR [Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks pertaining to conventional forces] in Vienna. And although serious problems remain, I can assure you of good will on our side in trying to resolve them. I also concur that the two sets of negotiations in Geneva, on strategic arms and intermediate-range nuclear weapons affecting Europe, are central and require our most serious attention. I, too, believe that agreements are possible, and as far as I am concerned, the sooner the better.

  I appreciated your explanation of the Soviet position in the INF negotiations in Geneva. I can fully understand that your offer to reduce SS-20 deployments was not an easy one. It is rarely easy to give up something one has. But I think we must view the situation in a broader historical context if we are to find a solution that preserves the security of both sides and yet allows us to lower the level of nuclear arms. Throughout most of the 1970’s, our Allies and we felt—and prominent Soviet leaders agreed in numerous public statements—that there was a rough military balance in Europe. But then, in 1977, the Soviet Union started deploying a new class of nuclear weapons with much greater range and overall capability than had existed in Europe. This obviously threatened the balance and led to the December, 1979, NATO decision [to deploy the Pershing II and cruise missiles].

  The reason I recount these well-known facts is to explain why the current Soviet proposal does not satisfy our concerns. Of course it is encouraging that you recognize that you need many fewer SS-20’s than you have deployed, but a monopoly of a weapons system is a monopoly, whether the numbers are small or large, and that is a feature which we cannot accept. You mentioned the British and French systems, and I understand the point you make. But I really believe that is not a relevant point. Most important, the British and French weapons in question are not at all in the same category as the land-based SS-20, and in addition, the French systems are not committed to the defense of NATO. Now these considerations might conceivably be viewed as secondary if the British and French systems constituted a realistic threat to the Soviet Union. Yet how could you possibly consider them a threat, given the tremendous nuclear arsenal which you possess (and ICBM’s which can be targeted on Britain and France)? I simply cannot understand why you feel you must have a “counter-balance” to them, when your Central systems exceed their size by many, many times.

  The deployment of American Pershing II’s and cruise missiles in Europe in December—if we fail to reach an agreement which makes it unnecessary—also should not be viewed as a threat to the Soviet Union. Their only function would be to balance Soviet systems potentially threatening to Europe, and to ensure that no one in the future could doubt that the security of Western Europe and North America are one and the same. Once again, try to see our point of view. What would be the Soviet reaction if we deployed a new, highly threatening weapon against its allies, and then insisted that you should not balance this with something comparable?

  In sum, we must insist
that any agreement embody a parity of U.S. and Soviet weapons in this category. I cannot understand why this should be incompatible with the security of the Warsaw Pact. If it is a defensive alliance, this could not be. So we also consider our proposal honest and just, aimed only at balance, not superiority. Obviously the best way to achieve parity is to eliminate this class of weapons altogether. This of course was our original proposal? Could you not take a look at that proposal again? To me it seems fully consistent with Soviet and Warsaw Pact security interests.

  You said in your letter that “so long as the United States has not begun deploying missiles in Europe, an agreement is still possible.” Well, I think an agreement should be possible right now and I certainly hope that we will have one before December, but if it takes longer, then we must keep trying. And I can assure you that NATO in the future will not hesitate to remove deployed weapons if this should be required by a mutually acceptable agreement.

  You asked how I could envision an agreement in practical terms. This is difficult to answer before we agree on basic principles, and parity of U.S. and Soviet systems is one of the most basic for us. Whether parity is the elimination of these intermediate-range weapons altogether or reducing their number, doesn’t it follow that we have made peace more likely because neither of us can see an advantage in using those weapons?

  As for the third aspect of consolidating world security, improving confidence and trust, there are many matters which require our attention. The successful conclusion of the Madrid conference should be helpful, but only if we all ensure that the decisions made there, and the understandings connected with it, are faithfully implemented. Mr. Chairman, I cannot exaggerate the importance of clarifying any misunderstandings which arise regarding the implementation of prior agreements. For nothing is so destructive of confidence as a perception by one party to an agreement that its provisions are being disregarded by the other. I am sure you will understand that it is in our mutual interest if we call your government’s attention to matters in this area which give us concern; I expect you to do the same if any doubts arise on your side. . . .

  In accord with the last paragraph of your letter, I shall request Secretary Shultz to be in touch with Ambassador Dobrynin to receive in complete confidence communications you have for me. I would also expect, of course, to convey my thoughts by Ambassador Hart-man and would appreciate your designating an appropriate official to deal with him as the need arises. In addition, we may find that occasionally it will be useful to arrange more direct contact, as now.

  Respectfully,

  Ronald Reagan

  August 24, 1983

  If the Free World needed any more evidence in the summer of 1983 that it was facing an evil empire, we got it the night of August 31 when a Russian military plane cold-bloodedly shot down a Korean airliner, Flight 007, murdering 269 innocent passengers, including a U.S. congressman and sixty other Americans.

  This crime against humanity not only set back my attempt at “quiet diplomacy” with the Kremlin, but put virtually all our efforts to improve Soviet-American relations on hold.

  I received word of the tragedy while I was at Rancho del Cielo and shared the revulsion that gripped all of the civilized world at this act of savagery in the skies. At first, the Soviets denied any knowledge of the shoot-down, although we knew from the start exactly what had happened, based on the contents of radio transmissions by the Soviet pilots that were monitored by Japanese air traffic controllers. When Andropov finally admitted that Soviet fighters had downed the jumbo jet, he claimed the massacre was justified because the Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 was flying through Soviet airspace on a “spy mission” for the United States.

  I was outraged. After a series of middle-of-the-night conference calls, I cut short my California vacation and returned to Washington, and as soon as we landed I called a special evening meeting of the National Security Council at which we decided to ask our allies to join us in imposing sanctions and demanding reparations for the victims’ families.

  We determined, based on the circumstances of the incident, that the crew of Flight 007, which originated in New York City and refueled at Anchorage, Alaska, en route to Seoul, apparently set the computer on the plane’s automatic pilot system incorrectly, allowing it to stray north into Soviet airspace instead of flying toward Japan. The further they went, the further off course their mistake led them, and the crew was apparently never aware of what had gone wrong. Their transmissions also indicated they had no idea Soviet planes were stalking them high above the North Pacific. Although an American reconnaissance plane based in Alaska had made a regular patrol in the general area (outside Soviet airspace) a few hours earlier, none of our planes were in the area at the time of the incident, and there was absolutely no basis for Andropov’s claim that the Korean jetliner was an American reconnaissance aircraft. We knew from the intercepted communications that the Soviet pilots flew near the 747 for two and a half hours under a bright half-moon and it seemed impossible that, based on its size and insignia, they did not realize they were tracking a jumbo-jet commercial airliner. But they shot it down anyway—and Soviet leaders never retreated from the claim that the pilots believed they were shooting at a spy plane.

  I called key congressional leaders to the Oval Office on Sunday morning, September 4, and played a tape recording of the voice of one of the Soviet pilots as he said he was arming his plane’s air-to-air missile system, locking its radar antenna onto his target, and launching his missile, after which he said: “The target is destroyed.”

  The next day was Labor Day. I’d planned to spend most of it beside the White House swimming pool. Instead, I spent it in damp swimming trunks sitting on a towel in my study rewriting a speech on the incident sent to me by the White House speech writers. Although I used a few of its paragraphs, I rewrote most of the speech so I could give my unvarnished opinion of the barbarous act and also present verbatim some of the recorded communications of the Soviet pilots before their kill. I wanted to show the American people the utter callousness of this act. Then I changed into a blue suit and delivered my speech to the nation: “Make no mistake about it,” I said,

  this attack was not just against ourselves or the Republic of Korea. This was the Soviet Union against the world and the moral precepts which guide human relations among people everywhere. It was an act of barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations. . . . We shouldn’t be surprised by such inhuman brutality. Memories come back of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the gassing of villages in Afghanistan. If the massacre and their subsequent conduct is intended to intimidate, they have failed in their purpose.

  In response to the incident, we imposed new restrictions on U.S. landing rights for Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, and suspended implementation of several bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union. Several conservative columnists took after me, saying that I should have been even tougher on the Russians and that in not doing so I betrayed the conservative cause. But our arms control talks were near the threshold of an important new phase—and while I wanted to call a spade a spade, I didn’t want to smother the nuclear arms reduction process before it had a chance to get started.

  If anything, the KAL incident demonstrated how close the world had come to the precipice and how much we needed nuclear arms control: If, as some people speculated, the Soviet pilots simply mistook the airliner for a military plane, what kind of imagination did it take to think of a Soviet military man with his finger close to a nuclear push button making an even more tragic mistake?

  If mistakes could be made by a fighter pilot, what about a similar miscalculation by the commander of a missile launch crew?

  Yet, if somebody made that kind of mistake—or a madman got possession of a nuclear missile—we were defenseless against it. Once a nuclear missile was launched, no one could recall it, and until we got something like the Strategic Defense In
itiative system in operation, the world was helpless against nuclear missiles.

  Shocked as I was by the ruthless attack on the plane, it gave me an opportunity to remind people of what the atrocity revealed about the Soviet government and its totalitarian way of life.

  The shooting down of KAL Flight 007 gave badly needed impetus in Congress to the rearmament program and postponed, at least for a while, attempts to gut our efforts to restore American military might.

  A few days after the act of mass murder, George Shultz, who was visibly outraged by its barbarity, met Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at a previously scheduled conference in Madrid at which there had been the possibility of arranging a summit conference between me and Andropov sometime in 1984. But Gromyko, whom George described as defensive and discombobulated, refused to admit any Soviet liability for the attack, and what prospects might have existed for a summit evaporated.

  Other events that autumn besides the KAL incident made me aware of the need for the world to step back from the nuclear precipice. They also made me more aware than ever of the urgent need for a defense against nuclear missiles. This was part of the entry in my diary October 10, 1983:

  Columbus Day. In the morning at Camp D. I ran the tape of the movie ABC is running Nov. 20. It’s called “The Day After” in which Lawrence, Kansas, is wiped out in a nuclear war with Russia. It is powerfully done, all $7 million worth. It’s very effective and left me greatly depressed. So far they haven’t sold any of the 25 ads scheduled and I can see why . . . My own reaction: we have to do all we can to have a deterrent and to see there is never a nuclear war.

  Not long after that, there is this entry in my diary:

  A most sobering experience with Cap W and Gen. Vessey in the Situation room, a briefing on our complete plan in the event of a nuclear attack.

  There are many aspects of the report, which I’d requested of the Pentagon two years earlier, that remain so secret even now that I cannot even begin to discuss them. But, simply put, it was a scenario for a sequence of events that could lead to the end of civilization as we knew it.