An American Life

by Ronald Reagan

  Your approach is determined by the fact that the strategic programs being carried out by the United States are about to collide with the limitations established by the SALT II treaty, and the choice is being made not in favor of these programs. And this cannot be disavowed or concealed, to put it bluntly, by unseemly attempts to accuse the Soviet Union of all mortal sins. [The United States has criticized] imaginary Soviet violations of the SALT agreement and their publication did not and cannot serve any useful purpose if one is guided by the task of preserving and continuing the process of arms limitations. Why mince words, the objective is quite different: to cast aspersions on the policy of the Soviet Union in general, to sow distrust towards it and to create an artificial pretext for an accelerated and uncontrolled arms race. All this became evident to us long ago.

  M. Gorbachev

  We were both speaking with frankness. But we were talking. Although Gorbachev refused to come to Washington for a summit, he agreed to meet me in Geneva in November.

  77

  DURING THE SAME VISIT to my bedside at Bethesda Naval Hospital on July 18, 1985, at which he informed me a group of Iranian moderates wanted to open a dialogue with American officials leading to possible improvement in our relations and release of our hostages in Beirut, Bud McFarlane told me Mikhail Gorbachev had sent word endorsing a proposal I’d made suggesting that before the summit the two of us continue our direct and private communications. “We tried to get such a thing with his predecessors and couldn’t make it,” I mentioned in the diary. “I gave the word to proceed.”

  Meanwhile, we were starting to see indications of other changes in the Kremlin—although we still didn’t know yet what they signified.

  Two weeks earlier, Gorbachev had arranged for Andrei Gromyko to be designated president of the USSR, a purely ceremonial job that ended Gromyko’s twenty-eight-year career as foreign minister.

  His successor was Eduard A. Shevardnadze, a Communist Party official from the Soviet republic of Georgia about whom we knew relatively little. In late July, George Shultz flew to Finland to meet Shevardnadze and make arrangements for the upcoming summit. Calling from Helsinki on a secure phone, George told me his instinctive reaction to the new Soviet foreign minister was positive: He was tough, but less hostile and more personable than Gromyko.

  After the plans for the summit were announced, I told the White House staff and cabinet to do nothing that would raise expectations of great progress at the meeting in Geneva.

  George Shultz said it would be a success if the only thing that came out of it was an agreement to hold another summit. As far as I was concerned, I wanted to size up Gorbachev and let him know I was serious about reducing the nuclear threat. “Let’s paint with a broad brush and not give the press specifics as to our agenda,” I said.

  As this was going on, Gorbachev and I continued our correspondence, much of it repetitious as both of us let the other side know where we stood.

  This is a portion of one letter I received from Gorbachev in September 1985 that summarized the Soviet view of the United States before the meeting in Geneva:

  Dear Mr. President:

  I would like to communicate some thoughts and considerations and continue the correspondence between us, specifically with the view to our forthcoming personal meeting. I assume that both of us take this meeting very seriously and are thoroughly preparing for it. The range of problems which we are to discuss has been fairly clearly delineated. They are all very important.

  Of course the differences between our two countries are not minor and our approaches to many fundamental issues are different. All this is true, but at the same time, the reality is such that our nations have to coexist whether we like each other or not. If things ever come to a military confrontation, it would be catastrophic for our countries and for the world as a whole. Judging by what you have said, Mr. President, you also regard a military conflict between the USSR and USA as inadmissible.

  Since, then, in other words, preventing nuclear war and removing the threat of war is our mutual and, for that matter, primary interest, it is imperative, I believe, to use it as the main lever which can help to bring cardinal changes in the nature of the relationship between our nations, to make it constructive and stable and thus contribute to the improvement of the international climate in general. It is this central component of our relations that should be put to work in the period left before the November meeting, during the Summit itself and afterwards.

  We are convinced that there are considerable opportunities in this regard. My meeting with you may serve as a good catalyst for their realization. It seems that we could indeed reach a clear understanding on the inadmissibility of nuclear war, on the fact that there could be no winners in such a war, and we could resolutely speak out against seeking military superiority and against attempts to infringe upon the legitimate security interests of the other side. At the same time we are convinced that a mutual understanding of this kind should be organically complemented by a clearly expressed intention of the sides to take actions of a material nature in terms of the limitation in reduction of weapons, of terminating the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. It is such an understanding that would be an expression of the determination of the two sides to move in the direction of removing threat of war. Given an agreement on this central issue it would be easier for us to find mutual understanding and solutions of other problems. What specific measures should receive priority? Naturally, those relating to the solution of the complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms. An agreement on non-militarization of space is the only road to the most radical reductions of nuclear arms. We favor following this road unswervingly and are determined to search for mutually acceptable solutions. I think that in this field both sides should act energetically and not postpone decisions. It would be good to be able to count on having obtained some positive results by the time of my meeting with you.

  In connection with certain thoughts contained in your letter of July 27th of this year, I would note that on several occasions we have explicitly expressed our views on the American program of developing space attack weapons and a large scale antiballistic missile system. It is based not on emotions or subjective views, but on facts and realistic assessments.

  Implementation of this program will not solve the problem of nuclear arms, it will only aggravate it, and have the most negative consequences for the whole process of the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms. On the other hand, quite a lot could be done through parallel or joint efforts of our countries to slow the arms race and bring it to a halt, above all in the main arena—the nuclear one. It is indeed for this and no other purpose that we have taken a number of unilateral, practical steps.

  Mr. President, both you and I understand perfectly well the importance of conducting nuclear explosions from the standpoint of the effectiveness of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Consequently, termination of nuclear tests would be a step in the opposite direction. This is what guided our decision to stop all nuclear explosions and appeal to the U.S. to join us in this. Please look at this issue without preconceived notions. It is quite clear that at the present level of nuclear arms our countries possess, a mutual termination of nuclear tests would not hurt either of them.

  Therefore, if there is a true desire to halt the nuclear arms race, then there can be no objections to a mutual moratorium, and the benefit it brings would be great. But the continuation of nuclear tests—albeit in the presence of somebody’s observers—would be nothing else but the same arms race. The U.S. still has time to make the right decision. Imagine how much it would mean and not only for Soviet-American relations but a moratorium on nuclear tests, of course, is still not a radical solution to the problem of preventing nuclear war.

  In order to accomplish that, it is necessary to solve the whole complex of inter-related matters which are the subject of the talks between our delegations in Geneva. It is quite obvious th
at in the final analysis the outcome of these talks will be decisive in determining whether we shall succeed in stopping the arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons in general. Regrettably, the state of affairs at the Geneva talks gives rise to serious concern.

  We should very thoroughly and from every angle, once again examine what could be done there. And I want to propose to you the following formula: the two sides agree to a complete ban on space attack weapons and a truly radical reduction, say by 50%, of their corresponding nuclear arms.

  In other words, we propose a practical solution of the tasks which were agreed upon as objectives of the Geneva negotiations—not only will the nuclear arms race be terminated, but the level of nuclear confrontation would be drastically reduced, and at the same time an arms race in space would be prevented. As a result, strategic stability would be strengthened greatly and mutual trust would grow significantly. Such a step by the USSR and the U.S. would, I believe, be an incentive for other powers possessing nuclear arms to participate in nuclear disarmament, which you pointed out as important in one of your letters. We view things realistically and realize that such a radical solution would require time and effort. Nonetheless, we are convinced that this problem can be solved. The first thing that is needed is to have our political approaches coincide in their essence.

  Secondly, given such coincidence, it is important to agree on practical measures which facilitate the achievement of these goals, including a halt in the development of space attack weapons and a freeze of nuclear arsenals at their present quantitative levels, with a prohibition of the development of new kinds and types of nuclear weapons.

  In addition, major practical measures would include the removal from alert status of and dismantling of an agreed number of strategic weapons . . . and mutually undertaking to refrain from the employment of any nuclear weapons in countries which are now nuclear free, in undertaking not to increase nuclear weapons stock piles and not to replace nuclear weapons with new ones in countries where such weapons are deployed.

  Naturally, the issue of medium range nuclear weapons in Europe also requires resolution. I would like to emphasize once again, the Soviet Union favors a radical solution whereby, as we proposed in Geneva, the USSR would retain in the European zone no more weapons of this type, using warheads as a unit of count, than Britain and France possess. . . .

  In proposing practical measures concerning arms limitation in disarmament we [agree] that they should be accompanied by relevant agreed verification measures. In some cases it would be national technical means, in other cases, when it is really necessary, the latter could be used in conjunction with bilateral and international procedures.

  I have not attempted to give an exhaustive list of measures to limit arms and relax military tensions. There could be other measures as well. We would listen with interest to the proposals of the U.S. side on this score. The main thing is for both sides to be ready to act in a constructive way in order to build up a useful foundation, which, if possible, might also be included in the Summit meeting.

  Mr. President, for obvious reasons, I have paid particular attention to central issues facing our countries. But, of course, we do not belittle the importance of regional problems and bilateral matters. I assume that these questions will be thoroughly discussed by E.M. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz with a view to bringing our positions closer and, better still, finding practical solutions wherever possible.

  We hope that in the course of the meetings which our Minister of Foreign Affairs will have with you and the Secretary of State, as well as through active work at the Geneva talks, in Stockholm and Vienna, and by means of exchanges through diplomatic channels, it will be possible in the time left before my meeting with you to create a situation making for a truly productive meeting.

  We believe that the outcome of this preparatory work as well as the results of my discussions with you at the meeting itself could be reflected in an appropriate joint document. If you agree, it would be worthwhile, I think, to ask our Ministers to determine how work on such a final document would be best organized.

  Sincerely yours,

  M. Gorbachev

  September 12, 1985

  After an NSPG meeting a few days before Shevardnadze brought this letter to Washington, I made this note in my diary: “Made a decision we would not trade away our program of research—SDI—for a promise of Soviet reduction in nuclear arms.”

  Cap Weinberger strongly believed we should resist all Soviet efforts to limit research on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Our scientists and engineers, he said, were making great progress and becoming more optimistic each day that it would be possible to solve the enormously difficult problems of pinpointing missiles rising from their silos and shooting them down from space.

  Cap said what made him especially angry was that the Russians were whining about our research on the SDI while they had been conducting similar research of their own for more than twenty years. Even though I agreed entirely with Cap on this one, I sometimes had to ask him to mute his most critical public comments about the Soviets and turned him down when he wanted me to speak more harshly toward the Russians than I thought was prudent at a time we were trying to improve relations with them.

  In fact, once we’d agreed to hold a summit, I made a conscious decision to tone down my rhetoric to avoid goading Gorbachev with remarks about the “evil empire.”

  During this period, Cap and George Shultz were often at odds (this was when Bud McFarlane, who also had considerable friction with Cap, started bringing them together at weekly breakfasts to iron out differences) over how to deal with the Russians, as this entry in my diary on September 11, 1985, reflected: “. . . met with George Shultz about summit. I sense he and Bud feel ‘Defense’ is going to be uncooperative and not want to settle anything with the Soviets. I can’t agree on that. One thing I do know is, I won’t trade our SDI off for some Soviet offer of weapon reductions. . . . Got fitted for a new bulletproof raincoat and went home.”

  After Eduard Shevardnadze came to Washington with the letter from Gorbachev, to make preparations for the summit, I subsequently saw him briefly at the United Nations in New York and noted afterward in my diary: “He’s a personable fellow, but we had our differences. My goal was to send him back to Gorbachev with a message that I really meant ‘arms reductions’; for the first time, they talked real verification procedures. Now I have to decide how to respond to Gorbachev’s letter to me.”

  After an NSPG meeting at which various options were discussed on how to respond to Gorbachev’s proposal for a fifty-percent reduction in nuclear weapons—the same proposal I’d made in 1983—1 wrote:

  “My idea is that we undermine their propaganda plan by offering a counter proposal which stresses our acceptance of some of their figures, such as a 50 percent cut in weapons and a total of 6000 warheads, etc. Those are pretty much like what we’ve already proposed.”

  Here are excerpts from my reply to Gorbachev’s letter, which summarized much of our position on the eve of the meeting in Geneva:

  Dear Mr. General Secretary:

  As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in New York October 24, I have given careful consideration to your letter dated September 12. The issues you raised are important ones, the ideas you have put forward are in many ways interesting, and I have wanted to study them thoroughly before replying.

  Many of the specific points you addressed in your letter have been or will be dealt with by our delegations in the Geneva arms control negotiations or by our foreign ministers. In this letter, I will therefore focus on what I consider the most significant issues you have raised.

  You suggested in your letter that we might reach an understanding on the inadmissibility of nuclear war and other general principles which should guide us. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has since proposed specific language for our consideration. As I have repeatedly made clear, it is indeed my view that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. I therefore have instru
cted Secretary Shultz to discuss this matter with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in their meetings next week.

  As we address this and other elements which figure in any document we may issue in Geneva, I believe it is important to give the most careful consideration to our words. Experience of the past has been that overly vague or rhetorical language has led to expectations which, given the competitive aspect of our relationship to which you referred in your letter, cannot be sustained.

  If we are to avoid subsequent misunderstanding and disillusionment, our own achievements should be clear and based on concrete achievements. I am convinced there is substantial common ground on the range of areas that we have been discussing in connection with our forthcoming meeting and I would hope that this common ground can be expanded during our meeting in Geneva. Secretary Shultz will be prepared to discuss all your ideas in concrete terms while he is in Moscow. I believe you will find that we are indeed prepared to go our fair share of the way to insure that our meeting is a productive one.

  I do, however, want to address your response to the proposals we have previously made in the Geneva arms control talks, which were foreshadowed in your letter and which your delegation subsequently tabled in Geneva. We have been assessing your counterproposal over the past month. As I stated in my address to the United Nations on Oct. 24, I believe that within it there are seeds which we should nurture and that in the coming weeks we should seek to establish a genuine process of give and take.

  In order to foster such a process, I have approved a new and comprehensive proposal designed to build upon the positive elements of your counterproposal and bridge the positions of our two sides. I have asked our negotiators to extend the current round to permit your experts to achieve a full understanding of our approach. This new proposal deals with all three areas under discussion in the Geneva negotiations. Its essence is a proposal for radical and stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive arms and a separate agreement on intermediate range missile systems, both of which bridge U.S. and Soviet ideas. We also propose that both sides provide assurances that their strategic defense programs are and will remain in full accord with the ABM treaty. Such assurances assume a resolution of our current differences over compliance with the treaty.