The Good Man of Nanking

by John Rabe

  FRIDAY, 11 MAY

  Ursi’s birthday—dear Ursi, our loving thoughts are with you. May God protect you and your Mutti, Gudrun, and all the others there in Bünde. That is our daily prayer.

  Yesterday the Russian soldiers left our building on Harries Strasse. Our apartment and our cellar are in a crazy state. The bed frames are gone, and the couches have vanished as well. They’re probably somewhere in the neighborhood and we’ll have to go looking for them. We found most of our tables and chairs out in the garden. All the crates in the cellar were broken into, the contents fished out and thrown on the floor. I suppose they were looking for jewelry or the like, which we no longer have. We shall try to put it all back in order a little and thank our Creator that we didn’t have to go through worse. I have no idea what state the things are in that we left with Peschke or in our cellar in the city. We’ll all pretty exhausted, but composed. I expected nothing different, actually even worse. Let’s hope we are spared further surprises.

  SATURDAY, 12 MAY

  We spent all day yesterday straightening up our apartment on Harries Strasse, and we’re still not finished. Willi went to forced labor this morning: shipping off machines and other materials, etc., so that he can get something to eat. I hope to be able to go along on Monday. A man really does want to work, as long as he knows that there is not a constant danger that his apartment will be confiscated while he’s gone. And when we do have to move, Mutti can’t drag the bags etc. around by herself, and usually we’re given a leeway of only 2 to 3 hours.

  1 p.m. Willi comes home truly exhausted. His only job today was “shoveling rubble,” and he was given nothing to eat. I return from Frau Dr. Orlich, the woman who was mistakenly said to have died along with her children. I wasn’t feeling well this morning—dizziness, heart palpitations, etc., symptoms of a weakened body. Her examination revealed: high blood pressure and some weakness in the heart muscle. I had her give me a signed statement that unfortunately I am unable to work.

  I’m in a very poor mood. The Fatherland is defeated, vanquished, smashed to smithereens, unconditional surrender! After all the great words and promises of our government: This is the end of their dream of a thousand-year German Reich.

  Still no word whatever from the children and grandchildren. Not in the best of health. Tossed out of the apartment twice on short notice, to take refuge with strangers, always worried and afraid that Russian soldiers will force their way in again, always short of our daily bread, for most of which Mutti literally has to go begging to neighbors and good friends, worried about what will become of the firm of Siemens and of us, meaning of Willi and me. Worried about how Eva is doing, who is expecting her first child about now. Want and worry wherever you turn! And yet you have to be happy that you’ve been spared even worse blows. And there are worse things, I saw more than enough of that in Nanking. But, chin up, even if it’s bitterly hard to do! Onward!

  SUNDAY, 13 MAY, OTTO’S 28 TH BIRTHDAY!

  My dear Otto, best wishes! Last night for the first time in a long time I slept in normal pajamas. That’s been impossible up to now. We’ve lain in bed with our boots on to be ready at a moment’s notice to clear out or to respond to a military inspection. We don’t have our beds anymore, maybe we’ll still find them. We sleep on the floor, but we’re happy that we could save our mattresses and our bed linens.

  MONDAY, 14 MAY

  Willi has been called back to work at the cable works. The call comes from the Antifascist Central Office. Today and tomorrow machine and materials are to be dismantled and shipped. Ostensibly the Russians are to pull out of here tomorrow. Nobody knows who or what comes then. The aforementioned Central Office has distributed a number of Russian propaganda fliers, dated from between 1 and 7 May. According to them, Hitler is dead and Mussolini has been hanged by his own countrymen.

  DOCUMENTS

  DOCUMENT 1

  Chiang Kai-shek first expressed to me his profound thanks for Germany’s peace efforts. China is ready, he said, to accept Germany’s mediation because it regards us as a friend of China. I faithfully recapitulated the latest Japanese statement, to which Chiang Kai-shek then asked whether Japan’s . . . [group missing1] were still the same. I replied that that was the case, saying that their telegram had spoken only of main points, but their previous conditions had also contained only main points. Whereupon Chiang Kai-shek said that he could not accept the standpoint that the Japanese had emerged as the victors in the battle. I replied that the whole world had admired the achievements of the Chinese army. At that, Chiang Kai-shek . . . [group missing] that he could also not accept an ultimatum from the Japanese. I responded that this was not an ultimatum. Chiang Kai-shek then formulated the Chinese standpoint as follows:

  China accepts these conditions as the basis for peace talks.

  The sovereignty and integrity as well as the . . . [group missing1] autonomy of northern China are not to be violated.

  Germany should be active as the mediator at all peace negotiations from the start.

  China’s treaties with third parties are not to be affected by peace negotiations.

  As to Point 1: I told him that I considered it necessary for China to declare itself willing to discuss these conditions in a conciliatory spirit and with a desire to . . . [group missing]. Chiang Kai-shek declared that he would do this, but that he expected the same from Japan.

  Point 2: I called Chiang Kai-shek’s attention to the Japanese condition that the chief official in northern China be friendly toward Japan. Chiang Kai-shek responded that, of course, anyone chosen for such a post would not be anti-Japanese.

  Point 3: I explained to Chiang Kai-shek that Germany would probably prefer not to be directly involved in peace negotiations, and certainly not to be in charge of them. We would rather try to do what we could to help China from behind the scenes. Chiang Kai-shek said he hoped that we would choose to be of such good service to the last.

  Point 4: I called Chiang Kai-shek’s attention to the Japanese demand of fighting Communism. I said I was of the opinion that this demand was not contrary to the Sino-Russian nonaggression pact. Chiang Kai-shek did not contradict me.

  As to the cessation of hostilities, I told him that I imagined the procedure would be: that once Chiang Kai-shek’s declaration had been delivered to the Japanese and Japan’s agreement was in hand, the Führer and Reich Chancellor would appeal to both governments to cease hostilities. Chiang Kai-shek agreed. Finally, Chiang Kai-shek urgently requested that the Japanese government keep these preliminary discussions and, most especially, their conditions secret. That would be a precondition for peace. I believe we should support this request to the best of our abilities. Otherwise Chiang Kai-shek’s position would be so badly undermined that he would have to resign and leave the government in the hands of those who hold pro-Russian views. Japan should attempt to do everything it can to make it possible for him to conduct negotiations. Since Chiang Kai-shek told me in my earlier conversation that it was impossible for China to accept the demand of an autonomous Mongolia, as that would mean the loss of two provinces, I asked him if he wished to say anything to me in that regard. He explained that the question of Mongolia could be negotiated with the Japanese. During the entire conversation Chiang Kai-shek was extremely friendly, in a good mood, and showed no signs of nervousness. He was optimistic about his capital’s defense. I am traveling back to Hankow, where I shall await further instructions. All embassy staff and local Germans are all right.

  Same message to Tokyo

  TRAUTMANN2

  DOCUMENT 2

  Ongoing discussions of our military attaché with the General Staff have resulted in the following situation as of early December: Northern China has been conquered, the major assault there has ceased, Japanese troops are being reorganized for occupation. No further battle for Shantung Province is expected.

  In the main Shanghai theater of war, a rapid advance on Nanking, its fall assumed sometime yet in December.

  In offic
ial Japanese circles resistance by Chinese troops is regarded as severely weakened, while new battle-ready troops cannot be brought up before summer 1938. Their battle supplies continue to dwindle, and any Chinese hopes that the Japanese economy will falter will prove to be in error.

  Thirty airplanes have thus far been secured via Russian military aid, which number is allegedly now increasing to 200.

  Within circles of the Japanese General Staff there is renewed consideration being given to accelerated peace negotiations with the Chinese, which serve China’s purposes, given their heavy losses and disappointment at the failure of the Brussels Conference, and also serve Japan’s, given the constant expansion of the theater of war and its costs.

  According to personal and confidential information, the General Staff is holding back from Japan’s taking steps toward peace because of radical opposition and an effort by several army groups to remove Chiang Kai-shek entirely. Given this situation, influential persons on the General Staff await an initiative from the Führer and Reich Chancellor that would open the door for negotiations; they believe that should the Führer and Reich Chancellor receive Chiang Kai-shek’s fundamental consent to begin direct negotiations with Japan, the same request would receive Japan’s consent as well.

  In such a case, the General Staff emphasizes the necessity of full secrecy to avoid any interference by England and America, to which it would strongly object.

  Official suggestions in this direction are not to be expected from the Japanese government at present.

  DIRKSEN3

  DOCUMENT 3

  A. Your wires No. 3854and 386 have crossed with that of Ambassador Trautmann from Nanking on 2 inst. concerning his conversation with Chiang Kai-shek. According to Ambassador Trautmann’s wire, almost all the essential points contained in the Japanese suggestions have been satisfied. I therefore believe we have come to a point where the Japanese government must take some step that would lead to an armistice in East Asia and in due course to direct negotiations between the parties.

  In order to avoid all misunderstanding, it will be necessary to provide the Japanese government with a written statement of all German actions thus far. Let me again emphasize that these actions are not those of a mediator, but merely those of an informant passing on views brought to its attention by the two parties involved in the dispute. . . .

  B. The necessity of delivering this foregoing detailed historical account [omitted here] to the Japanese, and soon thereafter to the Chinese government as well, arises from the great responsibility that the German government is assuming in its attempt to contribute to the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace, even if only in the role of a conveyor of information. That responsibility is further increased should the person of the Führer and Reich Chancellor be placed in the foreground at the appropriate moment.

  During the presentation of the foregoing written historical account to the Japanese government, it will be your task to insure that it is on this basis that the Japanese government is prepared to take the steps leading to direct armistice negotiations and subsequent peace negotiations, first at the level of the Japanese and Chinese military authorities and later at the political level. I call to your attention that only this written account can be the valid and determinant basis for negotiations, so that no later reference to earlier objections or reservations (e.g., point No. 8 in your wire No. 386, 3 inst.) can be taken into consideration. As soon as Japanese consent is given, Ambassador Trautmann will be authorized to gain the same consent from the Chinese government, after first presenting it in the same written account. Once the secured agreement of both parties is obtained, this can be followed by a solemn appeal by Germany for both sides to cease hostilities for the purpose of restoring peaceful relations.

  This appeal, which may very well be made by the Führer himself, would refrain from any political position whatever. It would be founded on the need for a restoration of peaceful conditions in East Asia, which is recognized worldwide and is most strongly felt by the two nations engaged in the conflict; but otherwise it would restrict itself to enjoining both governments involved to establish direct contacts for the purpose of ceasing hostilities, leading to negotiations to conclude a peace agreement. In your démarche, I would ask you to make it clear to the Japanese government the strong Chinese desire, which indeed corresponds to Japan’s own express wish, that silence concerning preliminary negotiations must be maintained until the expected German appeal for peace is made. This wish of both parties is fully in accord with that of the German government. It can thus be assumed that all parties involved will comply.

  VON NEURATH5

  DOCUMENT 4

  We, of course, understand that with the continuation of military operations, war goals of the parties involved can change. Despite this fact, however, we are now no longer certain of our original readiness to forward whatever information that is made available to us and that might contribute to those parties finding their way to the negotiation table. There is, after all, a limit to the function of messenger that we have performed thus far, when demeaning, unacceptable demands are made of China. Nor can we allow ourselves to be put in the position of forwarding conditions to the Chinese, which, then, only a short time later the Japanese deem to be in need of enlargement.

  [ . . . ] VON NEURATH6

  DOCUMENT 5

  Memorandum of Secretary of

  the Foreign Ministry von Mackensen

  Berlin, 3 November 1937

  On the basis of impressions received thus far, the Reich foreign minister does not believe that in Field Marshal von Blomberg’s discussion scheduled for tomorrow with the Führer about the issue of withdrawing German military advisors from China, he will restrict himself to a simple acceptance of such an order. Moreover, he—the Reich foreign minister— will point out to the field marshal that counterarguments are necessary. As a crucial argument I suggested the question of whether the Führer would prefer General von Falkenhausen or a Soviet general on the side of the Chinese.

  MACKENSEN7

  DOCUMENT 6

  From a Memorandum of Secretary of the Foreign Ministry

  von Mackensen, Dated 8November 1937

  [When asked if in his meeting with the Reich War Minister, Hitler had clarified the question of withdrawing German military advisors, General Keitel said the issue had not been touched upon but] . . .“the Führer had told Field Marshal von Blomberg that the Reich War Ministry should see to it that it rids itself of the odor of pro-Chinese sentiments.”8

  DOCUMENT 7

  Release to Chinese Press and Police of the International

  Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, Dated 4December 19379

  Housing Plans.

  The area is not yet ready for large-scale moving in of the population and the military situation does not yet make any such movement necessary.

  In order to reduce the numbers of people that have to move when it becomes more urgent, the Committee suggests that individual families who can make private arrangements for houses with friends or others in the Safety Zone do so at once. The Committee reserves the right to put more people in houses later, if necessary.

  Meanwhile the Housing commission is making a survey of housing facilities in the Safety Zone and will try to make arrangements for those who cannot make their own private arrangements. But these facilities will not be opened until absolutely necessary in view of the military situation. At that time definite announcement of the opening of the area will be made public.

  In these private arrangements, only private houses are to be used. No public building or institutional building is to be used for this purpose.

  No furniture or other movable property is to be brought into the Zone because all available housing space is needed for people. People moving in should only bring with them bedding, clothing, and food.

  Food Plans.

  The Zone is not ready for any large numbers of people to move into because there is not enough food in the Zo
ne yet to feed them. All people moving in now should bring with them at least enough food for a week.

  Private dealers are encouraged to move their stocks of rice, flour and other food supplies and fuel in and carry on their regular business.

  Supplies of rice and flour assigned to the committee for use in the Safety Zone are to be held in reserve in case the stocks of private dealers run out. Then these reserve supplies will be sold out through the private dealers having a license from the Committee.

  Trucks and Autos.

  The Committee needs trucks and cars badly and would welcome any given or loaned to the Committee for use in moving in supplies and other necessary services.

  Time Zone will be opened.

  The Zone cannot be opened as a Refugee Zone until all Chinese military establishments have been moved out of the area.

  INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR SAFETY ZONE IN NANKING

  DOCUMENT 8

  Organization of Safety Zone Administration

  I. Officers:

  Chairman of International Committee: John H. D. Rabe.

  Secretary of International Committee: Lewis S. C. Smythe.

  Director: George Fitch.

  2nd Director: Dr. Han Liwu.

  Treasurer: Christian Kröger.

  Chief of Chinese Secretariat: Dean Tang.

  II. Commissions:

  Inspector General: Eduard Sperling.

  Food Commission: Han Hsiang-Lin, Chairman. Hubert L. Sone, Associate.

  Housing Commission: Wang-Ting, Chairman. Charles Riggs, Associate. Charles Gee.

  Sanitation commission: Shen Yü-shu, Chairman. Dr. C. S. Trimmer, Associate.

  Transport Control: E. L. Hirschberg, Chairman. R. R. Hatz, Associate.

  DOCUMENT 9

  Press Release, 5December 1937

  This morning the Committee received a direct reply from the Japanese authorities in Shanghai through the courtesy of the American Naval Radio.