by Martha Twine
‘WHITES OUT! BLACKS IN! WHITES OUT! BLACKS IN!’
‘But you’re a white yourself, Katherine,’ I said.
‘I know’, she replied, ‘But Al-Qaida says that we must now think of ourselves as being black. We will be treated as though we are black, and we must work with our black brothers and sisters.’
When this message was relayed to the IRA in the UK, there was some dismay. At the next Al-Qaida conference in the North West, senior IRA figures questioned the Al-Qaida representative about it and received confirmation that this new approach would not affect the standing of the IRA, who were regarded as ‘honorary blacks’.
Further talks which I had with Algerian Daesh illegal immigrants, working in the terrorist unit where I lived, confirmed Al-Qaida’s racist intentions. The Algerians were very clear that their purpose was to come to Britain, kill all the white people, starting with the women, and to take their possessions. I spoke to one Algerian who stated he had been promised that he and his family could live in our house, but he had to kill all the white people living in it first. He wasn’t very keen to do this, as it seemed a bit risky, so he kept trying to subcontract the work to other Algerian Daesh immigrants who were less aware of the activities of our Counter Terrorism people, and our British Military.
There is ethnic discrimination against black people within the US mafia. In the British Isles, North American mafia blacks work in separate buildings, in low-quality jobs. This is not in line with Al-Qaida’s guidance, but Al-Qaida cannot enforce its guidance, although it raises such issues at funding meetings with terrorist groups. The IRA’s London Metropolitan Regiment does not segregate blacks by building, but it only offers them limited promotion opportunities.
Within Al-Qaida’s ranks, there are some sincere Muslims who believe in the teachings of the Quran, and say that everyone should protect women, widows, and respect the elderly, irrespective of race or ethnicity. These people do what they can within Al-Qaida to practice their principles. But they are not the ones with greatest influence.
Al-Qaida provides funds for the training of Islamic State and Daesh soldiers. They are not the only organisation to fund these activities, and they do not fund all terrorist activities, but there is a formal hierarchical Al-Qaida training wing dedicated to this work.
Al-Qaida has bases in many countries. Some of these are fairly well-known, such as those in Afghanistan and the Philippines. There is a large Al-Qaida base in Algeria, and a smaller one in Tunisia. I have spoken to Al-Qaida employees from Tunisia and Algeria. Some of them were nationals of those countries, seeking to migrate to Britain. Others were US, Canadian and French nationals, based in North Africa, drawn from the North American mafia or similar groups. The North Americans were responsible for setting up the large underground science research base in Algeria.
Al-Qaida used to have bases in the British Isles, but in 2014, owing to the increased surveillance activities of the security services and the British military, they found it safer to withdraw the management of their UK operations to the Irish Republic and France. They still visit the UK, and their training wing hold conferences once a quarter, in different parts of the UK or the Irish Republic. On one occasion, the conference was held in the North West, near Birmingham.
During conferences, an official Al-Qaida representative makes an appearance at some point and gives an update on Al-Qaida’s strategy or tactics, followed by discussion about how this should be translated into action in the UK.
Our local IRA terrorist unit’s Al-Qaida representative lives in France. He facilitates the illegal importation of terrorists from Alegria and Tunisia to IRA units in the UK. The IRA are responsible for meeting them at sea ports and transporting them to IRA registration points, where they are enrolled on the international computer system, and provided with false identity documents for themselves, and any family members they wish to follow them.
A Tunisian terrorist affiliated to Islamic State, whom I met locally, told me that he and his colleagues crossed from Morocco to Spain, where they took a coach to Paris. In Paris, they were met by French Al-Qaida supporters, who provided them with vehicles. They boarded the ferry to a British port and made their way from there to whichever IRA unit they had been allocated.
After our Al-Qaida representative left the UK for good, he recorded CDs with messages for different IRA units in Britain. On 1 November 2014, at three a.m., someone broadcast the message to our local IRA unit on the synthetic telepathy system, and I heard it. I assume that the message was in English, but, as it is possible to bypass language differences and relate at a pre-verbal stage via the electromagnetic environment, I could never be sure. The message was delivered in a grave, serious tone. The main points were as follows:
Strategic Issues:
- It was not possible for Al-Qaida staff to carry on their work in the UK as before. Staff should not worry about this. Al-Qaida would arrange for them to be moved to places where their good work could continue.
- The raising of batches of children ‘outside of Christendom’ had proved non-viable in a Western context and would be dropped from Al-Qaida contract objectives. (That meant Al-Qaida would no longer fund these activities).
Local Issues:
- There was praise for several women’s groups, who were singled out for their sterling service.
- The contribution of local [IRA] management in the past had been good, but motivation appeared to have declined. Nevertheless, in recognition of past services, their work would continue to be supported by Al-Qaida.
- The behaviour of some men had not been in line with Islamic principles. These men had been spoken to in the past and repented, but they had slipped back.
- As for the ‘four thieves’, suffice to say that if Al-Qaida were operating under their own jurisdiction, they would know how to deal with them.
- Al-Qaida had received representation from a number of women’s groups, about the continued uses of an elderly woman (me) over some years as a target for training of warriors. Al-Qaida deplored this practice and begged that it should cease.
The local IRA and their subcontractors took no notice of this, as attacking me on training courses had become one of their main income sources. In 2016, I decided to make contact with Al-Qaida in France. By then I had learned much more about how to travel using the terrorists’ multinational electromagnetic operating system. I recalled the sound of the voice of the person who delivered the message on the CD and tuned-in to the frequency. I found myself in the French countryside, in a modest cottage, more like a barn. It was night. A man dressed in a long black robe and hood was talking to some Asian soldiers, wearing military camouflage uniforms. The man hurried to a large wooden trunk, and drew out several rifles, which he gave to the soldiers.
The robed man did not have the frequency of the person who delivered the message on the CD (who, it turned out, had died a year before). I greeted his replacement. He cried out in shock and fell on the ground. I decided to withdraw and try again when he had recovered. The next night, I returned. The man was lying on a bed, still in a nervous state. An Asian soldier was looking after him. When I appeared, the man moaned.
‘The ghost is over there! Look!’ he cried, pointing at me.
The Asian could see me clearly, probably because he was fully logged on to the multinational computer system, using either an inner ear implant or an external earpiece. He saw a figure clad in a long black down coat and hood, - my default outer clothing in winter, but in keeping with Muslim women’s dress.
‘What is it, sister?’ he asked.
‘I have come about the warrior training courses in Exton,’ I said.
The man went to a table, where there was a bound volume of training courses for 2016.
‘Ah yes’, he said. ‘I see we have three courses currently operating at that location this month.’
‘I want you to stop treating me as a target for your training courses,’ I said.
‘That is not something that I can authori
se,’ said the man. ‘You will have to speak to my boss’.
‘Where is he?’ I asked.
‘He lives in the big house up the road,’ said the man. ‘But I suggest that you visit him tomorrow afternoon.’ I agreed and withdrew.
The next day, I looked for the big house up the road. It was not hard to find – a gracious nineteenth century building, with a pleasant back garden sloping down a hill. There was a wall with a wrought iron gate, leading to what looked like the vegetable garden. The house was on a high hill, with a panoramic view, overlooking a grass plain, dotted with trees, in a remote part of the French countryside.
I went to the front door. I saw a man of mixed Arab-French descent, clean shaven and in his late fifties, wearing an old chunky-knit grey crew-necked jumper and grey jeans. When I arrived, he beckoned me into the patio at the top of the garden, and three of his henchmen showed up. They were Asians with dark hair and beards, wearing layers of dark clothes, reflecting an Arab-French fusion chic.
‘I know why you are here,’ he said, politely. ‘And I understand that things are not being done as they should be in your area.’ Then he lowered his voice, so that his braves could not hear what he said.
‘It is difficult for me. You see these things are decided at a higher level, and I am not able to change the way things are.’
‘Then I will leave’, I said.
There was no point in further discussion. After that, I made a point of ‘dragging and dropping’ the bodies of Al-Qaida training course students en-masse into Al-Qaida’s back garden from a height of 300 feet. There were so many, particularly at weekends, that all the braves could do was to cover them with tarpaulins and wait for lorries to come and take them away.
ISLAMIC STATE ELECTROMAGNETIC OPERATIONS
Islamic State soldiers did not appear in my area until 2015. They first appeared in buildings owned by the North American mafia’s underground research base. The North American mafia had not wanted to house them but, having been in receipt of Al-Qaida funds for years, they found it hard to refuse.
When terrorists talked to each other on synthetic telepathy, they used avatars so that they could recognise each other without revealing their real identity. Not all participants had the viewing equipment needed to see each other. When Islamic State officers first arrived in the area they could not see me, and they sometimes joined in conversations I could hear. They made the assumption that they were among friends, and that I was a female IRA manager.
I was out gardening one afternoon, when I heard a voice say,
‘Sorry for the delay in arriving; we had to stay, as we had missed a plane crash.’
I made further enquiries about this, and it emerged that the voice belonged to an Islamic State officer, who was one of a group of six from Libya where they had had a schedule of training which had included how to initiate a plane crash. The group had missed their training on plane crashes and had to wait for the next course. It sounded as if ground to air missiles were involved.
The Islamic State officers said that they arrived by freight transport. The following week, I saw a huge lorry attempting to come up our road. It was heading for the secret underground research base. On the side of the lorry were the words ‘freight liner’. Operating in electromagnetic environment mode, via the Al-Qaida telecommunications system, I looked into the secret research base garden, and saw a reception party. There was a bearded religious leader, wearing a kind of black headdress, and another man, both in long black robes. Six tall strong men of Pakistani ethnicity were standing in a line, dressed in khaki uniforms, being greeted. They were escorted to a house within the perimeter of the research base, which was set aside for the use of Islamic State.
The Islamic State group soon made themselves at home. The freightliner lorries arrived twice a week; on Wednesdays and Saturdays, at about lunchtime. I looked inside their house, and saw a Muslim lady housekeeper, wearing a long black robe and headscarf. There was a bookcase in the property, containing Islamic books. I watched as she pushed the bookcase aside, revealing a cache of rifles hidden inside the wall.
An IRA employee came out of the building and walked across to the front of the research centre, where there were some charming Victorian cottages. A high wall concealed a stone staircase going down about twenty feet into an underground area below. My eyes followed him down. He went into a hallway, where there was a door and a doormat outside it. He took off his shoes and placed them in a nearby niche in the wall. Then he entered the room.
I saw a long, low, living room, with white walls. Twelve men of Middle Eastern ethnicity, wearing long black robes, were sitting in a circle on the carpet. An older man with a long grey beard and a black headdress appeared to be leading the group. He held a large parchment-type book in his hands. The other men showed him great respect, but the IRA man did not.
‘You’ve got to get out of here,’ he said, addressing the elderly teacher. ‘She knows where you are. It’s not safe now.’
‘Why should I?’ said the teacher. ‘I’ve told you before, you’ve nothing to fear from her if you just leave her alone. I haven’t attacked her, and she hasn’t attacked me.’
‘But she’s written to the British Military about you,’ said the IRA man. (This was true.)
‘I’ve nothing to fear from the British Military, either,’ said the teacher. ‘I’ve done nothing wrong.’ And he continued his teaching, ignoring the intruder.
The next day, I was looking inside an underground walkway that connected the Islamic State hideout to a larger IRA safe house. Outside the kitchen of the IRA building there was a tall man of Middle Eastern appearance, wearing a long cream robe and a red hat like a fez. He was in charge of a group of small boys about five years old. They had been trafficked there for the Islamic State soldiers’ ‘refreshment’. They were kept separate from other brothel kids, to ensure that they did not pick up any diseases. They flocked around their handler, hugging his legs. They had no one else in the world.
Later on, I saw one of the Islamic State soldiers mistreating a small boy. I attacked the soldier and he fell, dead. Another Islamic State officer took up the fight. He died as well. Then one of them threatened me with a gun, saying he knew where I lived. In the end, I had to dispatch four of the six.
The last two Islamic State soldiers went into their safe house on the perimeter of the research base and descended into the basement. There was a lift there that went down to the underground living space that I saw before.
By now I figured that it was time to send a short report to the British Military. I emailed MI5 about the Islamic State developments. Two days later, an unusual craft that looked a bit like a flying cigar case with black things suspended from it flew over the research facility. Then some small aircraft flew round the perimeter of the base. The next day, I heard my favourite aircraft, the Chinook, approaching really low. It went to where I had seen the Islamic State soldiers. I was pleased that our Military were on the case.
Things went quiet on the Islamic State front for a while, and then, one day, I heard an Islamic State officer on synthetic telepathy, saying that he had just arrived in Britain, from a sea port, where he had been met by the IRA. They took him to a railway station and put him on a train to a large town, about half an hour from London. He had been told to get out and wait on the station platform. A Muslim cleric met him and directed him to a different platform, where he took a different train, emerging at Exford. The local IRA picked him up there and drove him to our local area.
‘That was quite a journey,’ I commented.
‘Yes,’ said the officer. ‘And I was accompanied by fourteen others, though I left them when I changed trains. My work here is to start up a cell, planning attacks on the European mainland from Britain.’
‘Oh, I see,’ I said, in a neutral tone of voice.
‘Honestly!’ I thought to myself. ‘They just do not understand the meaning of the word “covert”. They must blurt everything out the moment they arrive.’
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This was the second time that an Islamic State officer had mistaken me for a female IRA manager. He naturally assumed that anyone talking on Syntel would be a terrorist too.
In 2016, Al-Qaida held a week-end conference, hosted by our local underground US mafia base. One of the Al-Qaida teenage ‘super soldiers’ told me that she and a friend had been admitted to the conference. Al-Qaida had given a talk about their work on the ‘European Theatre of War’, and described planned Islamic State planned attacks on the European mainland. The conference delegates were then invited to go to another room upstairs, where they could meet Islamic State officers actively engaged in this work and watch them demonstrating how they carried out various tasks.
It never occurred to these people that British military aircraft seemed to be permanently nesting over the area, and that the conference could have been live-streamed straight to the Authorities. Al-Qaida and the North American mafia had access to fairly advanced technology themselves, but they never gave a thought to the technologies that our military might employ.
Some time after this, there were a number of terrorist attacks in Europe, including the one in Nice, where a lorry deliberately drove into crowds of people celebrating Bastille Day in July 2016, and the lorry attack on a Berlin Christmas market in December 2016, for which Islamic State claimed responsibility. I do not think our local Islamic State cell had anything to do with these. However, on 3 February 2017, when an Egyptian man attacked a soldier with a machete outside the Louvre in Paris, all our local terrorists were on the alert.
When news of the attack was announced on the radio, some IRA terrorists went scurrying to check on the internet. Then I heard them whispering that they had been told to expect a terrorist attack that day. That does not necessarily mean that the local Islamic State cell was involved in it; but they were at least aware of it.
It seemed to me that the unsuccessful Louvre attack indicated some lack of preparation and lack of knowledge about security arrangements at the French museum. An Islamic State officer from the local terrorist cell must have heard my thought, as he came on Syntel to say that the terrorist who carried out the Louvre attack did not understand what he had to do and got confused. He added that our local Islamic State cell had carried off some successful projects, but they had to be discreet, and did not need to show off about their achievements.