The Definitive FDR

by James Macgregor Burns

  CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

  The launching of the National Progressives of America is well described in Max Lerner, “Phil La Follette, an Interview,” The Nation, May 14, 1938, pp. 552-555; for strategic aspects of the new party see Jay Franklin, 1940 (Viking, 1940), a vivid contemporary account. Roosevelt’s reaction is indicated in PLFDR, p. 785, and in Ickes2 (B), pp. 379, 395. On La Follette for Secretary of State, see Ickes, ibid., and Sherwood (B), p. 95. Like most of Roosevelt’s important political moves, the purge was not conceived overnight but was the subject of conversation a long time in advance; see Ickes1’ 2, passim. Roosevelt’s frame of mind in the winter and spring of 1938 is reflected in two extraordinarily long and frank press conferences, one with editors and publishers of trade newspapers, April 8, 1938, and one with members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 21, 1938. Both of these are included in PPAFDR.

  The Donkey and the Stick. Data in FDRL on the management of the purge is widely scattered in PPF and OF files for states and individuals, and at best it is still rather fragmentary. Barkley [chap. 15], and Connally and Steinberg (B), relate their own experiences briefly. Farley2 presents a full picture of Farley’s dragging of heels during the purge. Intra-White House memoranda suggest the improvised nature of many of the purge attempts. The fullest information available in any single campaign is that on the Fay-O’Connor race; see especially PPF 2841 (Morris Ernst), PPF 245, PSF, Box 28. and Harry Hopkins to FDR, August 3, 1938, Hopkins Paper. See also Ickes2, pp. 466, 475, and Edward J. Flynn (B), p. 150, although there is a major contradiction between these two sources on the importance of Corcoran’s role. Roosevelt’s election prediction is in PC 499, Nov. 11, 1938, as is the exchange with a reporter on the coalition situation.

  The Struggle for Power. Roosevelt’s talk at Chapel Hill is in PPAFDR, 1938 vol., pp. 613-621. He mentioned his “antediluvian” friends in a candid letter to Herbert C. Pell, FDRPL, p. 849. Floyd M. Riddick, “First Session of the Seventy-Sixth Congress,” American Political Science Review, Vol. XXXIII, No. 6, December 1939, is a useful summary of the 1939 session. The investigating power of Congress has been well and extensively treated; two excellent recent treatments are Alan Barth, Government by Investigation (Viking, 1955) and Telford Taylor, Grand Inquest (Simon and Schuster, 1955). A full and critical treatment of the House Un-American Activities Committee, 1938-1944, is Father August R. Ogden’s study, The Dies Committee (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1945). The exchange between Garner and Roosevelt at Cabinet is recorded in Ickes2, p. 549, as is Roosevelt’s cautious approach toward Dies, p. 546. On the tilt between Roosevelt and Glass over the Virginia judgeship, the President’s statements are presented in PPAFDR, Vol. 1939, pp. 126-133, and the Senator’s side of the case in Rixey Smith and Norman Beasley, Carter Glass (Longmans, Green, 1939). The nature of the congressional attack on the bureaucracy is taken from Burns, Congress on Trial [chap. 17], pp. 115-116. On the general problem of congressional control of the executive branch see the thoughtful little book, Louis Brownlow, The President and the Presidency (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1949). One of the many virtues of Ickes’ diaries is that the old curmudgeon made no attempt to hide his battles with other Cabinet members; his showdown with Wallace is described in Vol. II, pp. 38-45. Accounts of Roosevelt’s methods of delegating power and the ensuing confusion are too numerous to list here, but again Ickes is a good source. The usual criticism of Roosevelt as administrator and an excellent critique of this point of view are found in a brilliant review of Ickes’ first volume by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The New Republic, December 7, 1953, pp. 14-15. The comment on Roosevelt’s administrative direction by a subordinate is from Molly Dewson, unpublished autobiography, FDRL. On Stalin’s administrative methods see W. W. Rostow, The Dynamics of Soviet Society (W. W. Norton, 1952), p. 247, from which I have quoted on page 373; for Harold Smith’s evaluation of Roosevelt as an administrator see Sherwood (B), pp. 72-73; see also Richberg2 (B), pp. 286-287. Such respected students of administration as Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, in their Public Administration (Knopf, 1950), p. 168, state that his way of delegating power gave his own personality a greater impact on the shaping of policy. The Roosevelt-Ickes exchange is from Ickes2, p. 659. Rowe interview was helpful in evaluating Roosevelt as an administrator. The concept of the test of efficiency as survival is from Chester Barnard.

  Roosevelt as Party Leader. The quotation from Walter Millis is taken from The Yale Review, October 1938. Any evaluation of Roosevelt as party leader must take into consideration the question of both what the American political party is, and what it should be. On this see E. E. Schattschneider’s pioneering study [chap. 10], which combines brilliant analysis with basic postulates on party reorganization; Herring, The Politics of Democracy [chap. 10], a shrewd evaluation and defense of the present party arrangements; Herbert Agar, The Price of Union (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), a searching historical analysis; and the extensive investigations of the presidential nominating process recently being conducted under the leadership of Paul T. David at the Brookings Institution. Many examples could be cited of Roosevelt’s refusal to intervene openly in Democratic primaries during the early presidential years; see Roosevelt to McIntyre, Feb. 2, 1938, PPF 4658; Roosevelt wire to Eleanor Roosevelt, July 19, 1936, PPF 3, FDRL; and Roosevelt to Frank Murphy, June 30, 1934, PPF 1662, as instances. The Pittman case is Roosevelt to Pittman, Aug. 25, 1934, PPF 745, FDRL. A good example of Roosevelt’s emphasis on party after 1936 is PPAFDR, Vol. VI, pp. 113 ff., 326. The nature of Roosevelt’s reaction to the 1938 election results can be seen best in Roosevelt to Pell, Nov. 12, 1938, and Roosevelt to Daniels, Nov. 14, 1938, PLFDR, Vol. II, pp. 826, 827, resp. Among those who urged party rejuvenation on Roosevelt were Emil Hurja, Box 45, Howe Papers, FDRL, and David Stern, OHP; see also OF 1535, FDRL; and Norris and Ickes Papers, LC. On the condition of the New York state and city Democracy, see PPF 149, 206, 239, FDRL; Krock and Flynn interviews, OHP; Norris Papers, LC; A. A. Berle, in The Reporter, Dec. 1, 1955; and Moscow (B). The White remark is from White to Farley, Dec. 28, 1937, PPF 1196, FDRL.

  CHAPTER NINETEEN

  Curiously, although newspapers and magazines of the period are filled with gossipy accounts about the Roosevelts and the White House, it is not easy to find a dependable description for a particular period. I have used PPF 1, FDRL, which includes a file of personal detail on the President, including letters written by his secretaries to journalists and others writing in for information; Roosevelt’s own description of his working day in letter to Rep. Frank W. Fries, PPF 4142, FDRL; and Sherwood (B), p. 115. His statement on short letters is in Roosevelt to James Roosevelt, PLFDR, p. 798. One of the best descriptions of the White House environment during the second term is Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, American White Paper (Simon and Schuster, 1940), by two correspondents who had access to it. The letter to McIntyre is in PLFDR, p. 814. Langer and Gleason (B), chap. 1, have a balanced account of Roosevelt’s working relationships with Hull and other officials.

  Munich: No Risks, No Commitments. My main sources for the substantive account and interpretation in this chapter, aside from FDRL files and works cited in bibliographical notes for chapters 13 and 17, are: Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (Harper, 1953), a comprehensive biography that makes exhaustive use of German sources; Galeazzo Ciano, Hidden Diary (Dutton, 1953), which covers the 1937-38 period; Frederick L. Schuman, Night over Europe (Knopf, 1941), a brilliant and absorbing contemporary account; and Alsop and Kintner, American White Paper. While this last source may err in indicating a more consistent attempt at final decision making after Munich than actually occurred, in most respects it is a remarkably authentic account of White House activities and reactions during the period, based on extensive interviews and checked in the White House itself (see PPF 300, FDRL). The Ickes diary (B) is another important source. While Ickes’ own bias sometimes renders misleading his accounts of his own political and admi
nistrative activities, his relative open-mindedness on foreign policy lends, I think, somewhat more authenticity to his reports of presidential and cabinet discussions in that area. Roosevelt’s comment about wanting to assassinate Hitler is in Roosevelt to Frederick B. Adams, Oct. 1, 1938, PLFDR, pp. 813-814. On Roosevelt’s views in the weeks after Munich see Alsop and Kintner; Hull (B); PPF 3884 (Roosevelt to an English friend on the peanut vendor’s remarks, Nov. 15, 1938); and PSF, Phillips to Roosevelt, Sept. 29, 1938. The description of Roosevelt dictating his message to Congress is from Alsop and Kintner. Roosevelt’s instructions to Morgenthau to keep the French plane situation confidential are in PSF 33, FDRL, handwritten note by FDR on top of a memorandum from Morgenthau. The minutes of Roosevelt’s confidential session with members of the Senate Military Affairs Committee are in FDRL.

  The Storm- Breaks. Roosevelt’s letter on the “cross currents” was to Gertrude Ely, March 25, 1939, PLFDR, p. 872. The President’s indirect warning to Mussolini was via the newly appointed Italian Ambassador, whom Roosevelt asked to communicate it to the Duce; notes were taken by Sumner Welles and are to be found in PSF, Box 53, FDRL. Roosevelt’s reflections on the events of March-April 1939 can be seen best in three press conferences, PC 534, March 31, 1939, PC 437, April 8, 1939, and PC 540-A, April 20, 1939. Only the last of these is not included in PPA, but it is by far the most useful, a long, probing discussion of domestic and especially foreign affairs with members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Roosevelt’s view toward his policy toward Spain is reflected in Ickes2, pp. 569-570, and in Bowers [chap. 17]. See also Connally and Steinberg (B), p. 226, and Morgenthau (B). Bullock, pp. 461-464, has a good account of Hitler’s reply to Roosevelt; see N. H. Baynes (ed.), The Speeches of Adolf Hitler (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 1605-1656, for virtually the whole text. Roosevelt’s reaction to Hitler’s bad manners is in his letter to Francis W. Hirst, May 13, 1939, PSF 1147, FDRL. Langer and Gleason, and Alsop and Kintner have good accounts of the Neutrality bill fight of spring 1939; for an account emphasizing the nature of the various bills considered see Francis O. Wilcox, “The Neutrality Fight in Congress: 1939,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. XXXIII, October 1939, pp. 811-825; useful though spotty notes and records of the fight are in PPF 1147 and in OF 1561 (Neutrality), FDRL. All accounts agree substantially on the proceedings of the famous White House conference where Borah spoke of his own sources of information; I have taken my language mainly from Alsop and Kintner, pp. 44-46, Connally and Steinberg, pp. 227-228, and Barkley [chap. 15], pp. 260-261. “Neutrality, Peace Legislation, and Our Foreign Policy,” Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 76th Cong., 1st sess., Parts 1-22, April 5, 1939 to May 8, 1939, are a valuable source of information on attitudes toward neutrality legislation at this time. Time magazine, June 19, 1939, and Eleanor Roosevelt1 present useful accounts of the royal visit from different perspectives: the meeting late at night between the King and the President is described in Daniel Roper to Roosevelt, July 5, 1939, PSF 43, FDRL. The description of the “war before the war” is taken in part from Time magazine, August 21, 1939. Alsop and Kintner is the chief source for the Roosevelt-Bullitt dialogue on the morning of the German attack on Poland. Charles Edison foresightedly took notes on Roosevelt’s statements to the Cabinet, September 1, 1939, and these indicate Roosevelt’s memories of World War I crisis times; Edison’s notes are printed verbatim in PLFDR, pp. 915-917. Ickes2, p. 700, and series of exchanges between White House and Treasury Department, PSF 42, FDRL, show that Roosevelt tried to hold up the Bremen from departing; see also PSF 42, FDRL, for Roosevelt’s consideration of seizing German ships. OF 1561 has a rich body of materials on Roosevelt’s role in getting the embargo provision repealed, including the minutes of his conference with Democratic and Republican leaders, September 20, 1939, marred unhappily by the failure of the reporter to indicate names of conferees speaking and by incomplete transcription of some of the remarks by conferees. This file also contains correspondence between Roosevelt and the changeable North Dakota Representative. Gunther2 has a useful account of Roosevelt and the early discussions about the military exploitation of atomic energy.

  Roosevelt as a Political Leader. The letter quoted here was forwarded to Roosevelt by George T. Bye, Feb. 14, 1939, PPF 2865, FDRL. PSF, Box 47, FDRL, contains exchanges between the Administration and Pittman in regard to tactics on neutrality legislation revision. The press conference involving Guam was PC 519, January 20, 1939; for another example of Rooseveltian circumspection see Langer and Gleason, p. 126. Roosevelt’s attitude toward Kennedy is reflected in Ickes2, pp. 676 and 707; Farley2 (B), p. 198; Hull (B), pp. 763, 766. Public opinion polling data are from Cantril (B), pp. 966-970, especially items 2, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22-27, 30, 42-44, 49. I have rounded most figures. It is to be noted that there is a contradictory aspect to some of the findings, especially in respect to the non-extremist elements; compare items 22-23 and 24-25 in this respect. I believe, however, that this contradiction is a faithful reflection of the many-sidedness of attitudes of this element and indicate again the possibilities of attitude change induced by strong leadership. Hadley Cantril, Gauging Public Opinion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944) has been of use in interpreting this polling material both because of his excellent interpretation of polling material and also because he uses foreign policy in the late 1930’s as examples in illustrating his analyses. The Whitehead quotation is from Thomas North Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 230. An interesting question bearing on Roosevelt’s leadership is whether he saw polling results. While he rarely mentioned such results, he read newspapers that carried them, and much polling data was sent to him by friends. In the case of an important Fortune poll in September 1939, Robert Sherrod sent the President an advance copy of the release (see PPF 1820, 1939, folder on Neutrality, FDRL). The White House had a special file of polling returns. Evidence that the President knew before September 15, 1939 that Congress would probably repeal the embargo provision is in OF 1561, Box 2, FDRL; see also Early memo to Roosevelt, Sept. 7, 1939, PLFDR, p. 918.

  My general analysis in this evaluation of Roosevelt as a political leader stems largely from the leadership studies that are described in my discussion of method; see Note on the Study of Political Leadership, above, pp. 479-485. Data on prevailing popular attitudes toward party realignment are found in Cantril (B), pp. 575-578; compare especially items 1 and 17. The statement on the importance of the leader’s own personality is taken, slightly paraphrased, from Lewis A. Dexter, “Some Strategic Considerations in Innovating Leadership,” in Gouldner (B), p. 592. The influence of the leader on unstructured attitudes is spelled out in Cantril, Gauging Public Opinion, pp. 228-229. Among other important studies of political leadership are Sidney Hook, The Hero in History (John Day, 1943), a fruitful study in “limitation and possibility”; and Elmer Cornwell, “Lloyd George: A Study in Political Leadership” (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1954), a pioneering comparative study.

  CHAPTER TWENTY

  This description of the White House over the 1939 holidays is based on Eleanor Roosevelt1, pp. 155-160; Time magazine, December 25, 1939; the New York Times, December 23, 1939–January 2, 1940; Ickes3 (B), p. 100; and personal observation, December 24, 1939.

  The Sphinx. Virtually all the memoirs of the time give extensive treatment to the preliminaries to the third-term campaign. All of these are worth consulting, and all, I think, give faithful accounts of factual developments and conversations without necessarily interpreting Roosevelt’s motives correctly. Those motives emerge out of the total impressions and descriptions of all the memoirs involved: see Farley2 (B), chaps. 15-25; Edward J. Flynn (B), pp. 151-157; Hull (B), chap. 62; Ickes2, 3, passim; Rosen-man (B), chap. 13; Michelson (B), chaps. 10-11; Perkins (B), pp. 125-128; Tally (B), pp. 236ff.; Creel (B), pp. 311ff.; Timmons (B), chaps. 15-16; Barkley [chap. 15], chap. 13; I have also made u
se of my Cohen interview, and Krock interview, OHP. There is not much on the third-term problem in the President’s files, FDRL, although PSF, Box 49, contains an interesting description of Garner’s probable tactics as seen from the White House. P. H. Appleby, “Roosevelt’s Third-Term Decision,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, September, 1952, pp. 754-765, is an indispensable analysis by an official who was on the outer fringes of the inner circle. Charles W. Stein, The Third-Term Tradition (Columbia University Press, 1943), amply and objectively covers the subject through 1940. My own analysis of Roosevelt’s motives and methods treats the President’s conscious and deliberate approach to the problem, and I have concluded that he was not sure until the convention as to whether he would accept the nomination (even though all the while keeping alternatives open). My interpretation of Roosevelt’s personality, however, leads me to think that even if there had been no intensified international crisis, Roosevelt would have run again. It is inconceivable to me that a man still in his prime, conscious of Theodore Roosevelt’s difficulties after quitting the Presidency, eager to play a role on the international scene, and not very confident of the abilities of his possible successors, would give up the nomination to someone else. Roosevelt’s attempts to widen the presidential field can be seen from the works cited above; on Lehman, see Roosevelt to Lehman, March 26, 1940, PPF 93, FDRL. Cantril (B) covers extensively polling of anti-third-term sentiment; see especially pp. 647-653. Contrary to general impression, the Constitution does not prohibit two men from the same state from running on the same presidential ticket, but would deny the ticket the electoral votes of the state from which both came; see the 13th Amendment. My sources on the Mundelein intercession with Farley are Farley2, chap. 17, and Ickes2, p. 688; FDRL files show the close relationship the President had with the Catholic hierarchy. Roosevelt’s satisfaction with the confused situation in the Democratic party is reflected in Ickes3, p. 160.