War as I Knew It

by George S. Patton

  On the third of September, I visited the XII Corps at Ligny-en-Barrois and explained our new plan to Eddy. I was delighted to learn he had captured one hundred thousand gallons of aviation gasoline and so could move on; also six hundred thousand pounds of meat.

  1Lieutenant General W. H. Simpson, Commanding General, Ninth Army.

  We then drove via Commercy to the Headquarters of the 80th Division at Gironville. Many of the towns we passed were pretty well smashed up. General McBride seemed to be in good form and the Colonel of his leading regiment, Davidson,4 had the situation very well in hand. From this Regimental Command Post, Montsec stood well out to our left front, while Apremont, Pannes, and Essey were all round and very reminiscent of the time—twenty-six years, less nine days before—when we attacked in this region. Montsec has a huge monument to our dead. I could not help but think that our delay in pushing forward would probably result, after due course of time, in the erection of many other such monuments for men who, had we gone faster, would not have died. Some weeks afterward, I went over this same ground with Mr. Byrnes, later Secretary of State.

  On the way back, we stopped off to see Colonel Clark, Combat Commander of the 4th Armored Division, and learned that at Vitry he had performed another remarkable feat of arms. As they approached the town, a French civilian told him that the bridge was at the end of a certain street and was covered on the far side by four German 88’s, placed hub to hub on a causeway leading from the bridge. Clark charged into the town with a company of light tanks, firing in all directions and throwing hand grenades, rushed across the bridge, smothering the gunners with fire, and actually knocked the 88’s off the causeway without receiving any vehicular casualties.

  Since our progress from now on had to be along the lines of what General Allen calls the “rock soup” method, I will describe it. A tramp once went to a house and asked for some boiling water to make rock soup. The lady was interested and gave him the water, in which he placed two polished white stones. He then asked if he might have some potatoes and carrots to put in the soup to flavor it a little, and finally ended up with some meat. In other words, in order to attack, we had first to pretend to reconnoiter, then reinforce the reconnaissance, and finally put on an attack—all depending on what gasoline and ammunition we could secure.

  M5A1

  There was a rumor, which, officially, I hoped was not true, that some of our Ordnance people passed themselves off as members of the First Army and secured quite a bit of gasoline from one of the dumps of that unit. To reverse the statement made about the Light Brigade, this is not war but is magnificent.

  As of the end of the fourth week, casualties for the Third Army were:

  Our estimate of the German losses was:

  When we moved our Command Post to a point southeast of Chalons, we were visited by Mrs. Anna Rosenberg of the War Mobilization and Reconversion Office. Apparently Willie was much outraged at her appearance in a very tight pair of slacks, so gently but firmly inserted his teeth into her leg. She took it in good part.

  On the fourth of September, we learned from Bradley that, the situation in the north having been stabilized, we would now get our half of the available supplies, and could cross the Moselle and force the Siegfried Line. Also that we were to get the 2d French Armored and 79th Infantry at once, and the 6th Armored and 83d Infantry as soon as they were relieved by elements of the Ninth Army. The return of the 2d French and 79th gave back to the Third Army the XV Corps which we had lost with great regret after crossing the Seine. General Haislip, the Corps Commander, came and was as delighted to be back as we were to have him.

  Pending the arrival of the XV Corps east of Troyes, I had to hold the shoulder from Neufchateau to Nancy with the XII Corps and at the same time secure a crossing over the Moselle at Toul and Pont-à-Mousson. As soon as the XV Corps was operational, the XII Corps was to advance along the line Nancy—Chateau Salins, the XV Corps attacking in echelon to its right rear, crossing the Moselle south of Nancy, probably in the vicinity of Charmes. The XX Corps would attack and force crossings in the vicinity of Metz.

  I drove to the front, passing through Verdun and Etain, where we turned north and came to Headquarters of the 90th Division. However, we got there before the division arrived. We then returned to Etain and drove to Conflans, which is famous as the birthplace of the imaginary Brigadier Gerard’s Hussars. Conflans was on the front line and was being held by elements of the 2d Infantry of the 5th Division. On the eastern edge of the town, I found a combat command of the 7th Armored, which had been held up for over an hour by machine-gun and mortar fire. Of course it was absurd for an armored unit to make such a statement. I ordered it to advance, and then went back to the Division Headquarters to express my opinion to the Commander. This was the second occasion it had been my personal duty to demand more combat activity from him. General Walker had first noted his lack of pugnacity when we were at Chartres and at that time recommended that I relieve him. In spite of my reputation as a head-cutter, I really am very long-suffering.

  On reaching Headquarters, I found that we were having some trouble with the First Army over gasoline. We also heard that the XII Corps had got a bloody nose at Pont-à-Mousson where one of the battalions of the 5th Division had been thrown back for a loss.

  On the eighth, I drove to Ligney-en-Barrois to see Eddy, and then on to the line south of Toul, where it appeared possible that quite a battle was building up. Eddy and I went up to Wood’s Headquarters, which was too close to the front, as we could actually see the fighting, and shells were dropping across the road from where we sat. It was very refreshing to find a man who got up that close.

  On the ninth, General Bradley agreed to let the 83d Infantry and 6th Armored Division go up, after which we had quite a conversation about the Brest operation. We both felt that the taking of Brest at that time was useless, because it was too far away and the harbor was too badly destroyed. On the other hand, we agreed that, when the American Army had once put its hand to the plow, it should not let go. Therefore, it was necessary to take Brest.

  On this same day I saw Madame de Vaux and her son in Paris, my first visit. I had known them in Bourg1 twenty-seven years before. After lunch she took me to see General Serigny, Petain’s old Chief of Staff, who had broken with Petain as a result of the latter’s actions, Serigny, whom I had known in the old war, was very gushing and said that, while he admired General Pershing, my tactics were a thousand times better. Of course, this was more French than fact. Also the mobility of the present armies is greater than anything General Pershing had. Had he possessed our mobility, I am sure he would have gone as fast or faster.

  On the night of the ninth of September, the Command Post of the 90th Division was attacked by the Germans and General McLain awoke to find an enemy tank firing at a distance of about twenty feet. Fortunately, the tank was not firing at him; it apparently belonged to a group that was lost. They went back and rejoined the rest of the division and attacked at dawn. However, McLain, a great fighter, had not wasted his time and as a result of the second attack the Germans lost forty tanks and nine hundred men killed. One of the few tanks to escape was a Panther. I saw the tracks where it had gone straight into our line, oblivious of what we could do to stop it, and then turned sharply to the left on a road leading to Germany. It disappeared in a cloud of dust and sparks where our tracers were hitting it.

  We learned that the XV Corps would attack along the line Chaumont—Neufchateau—Luneville at 0800 on the eleventh. While the XII Corps had a hard fight east of the river and south of Nancy, it continued to progress. A strange thing about this river crossing was that one regiment received heavy resistance and consequent casualties and the next regiment on its right received no resistance and no casualties. In the books, we would have stopped the attack where the resistance was and pushed the attack where the going was easy, but the books don’t consider the difficulty of communication and the difficulty, or danger, of stopping a night attack once it has been
launched.

  The XX Corps got some infantry across south of Metz, and the 90th Division was pushing up toward the river from Metz to Thionville. Elements of the 2d French headquarters, 1st U.S. Tank Brigade, 1918.

  Armored Division, XV Corps, made contacts with elements of the 1st French Infantry Division, Seventh Army, in the vicinity of Sombernon on the tenth.

  While flying over France, I was continually struck with the amount of human effort that had been spent in the construction of trenches and other lethal agents during both this and World War I. A pacifist could get a splendid text for a sermon on human frailty from such monuments to the evil of war. But he could get even better arguments against himself by looking at the cemeteries, where each little white cross attests to the human folly which has invariably resulted in more wars.

  The twenty thousand Germans who surrendered to the Ninth Army on the eleventh stated that they wished it specifically understood that they surrendered to the Third Army and XIX Tactical Air Command and not to the Ninth Army.

  On the twelfth, we had a meeting at Twelfth Army Group Headquarters on the question of supply. As Colonel R. W. Wilson, G-4 of First Army, was there, I watched my step very carefully. He had been my G-4 in the II Corps. We learned that Montgomery had told Eisenhower that the delay in the advance of the American VII Corps had been due to lack of gasoline. This was not the case; it was simply another instance of Monty trying to force everything to the north to attack the Low Countries and the Ruhr. If the High Command yielded to his blandishment, there would be nothing left for the Third Army to do but hold the west bank of the Moselle defensively, and even move the XX Corps into Luxembourg. However, I felt that could we force a crossing, this unfortunate situation could be prevented, and Bradley gave me until the night of the fourteenth to do it. Had I not secured a good bridgehead by that time, I was to stop arguing and assume the mournful role of a defender.

  General Hughes brought me a new pearl-handled .38 pistol and a new issue winter coat, which was very thoughtful of him. He and I tried to visit the XV Corps, but, owing to a mistake, only got to its rear echelon. Bennett, with two planes, picked us up there on a sloping hill covered with cows. Eventually we got off. The next day Hughes and I went to the XII Corps, only to find that Eddy had gone at daylight to the 80th Division, which was heavily counter-attacked south of Pont-à-Mousson. In fact, the Germans actually got to the bridge, but the ubiquitous Colonel Bruce Clark of the 4th Armored was coming that way with his combat command and drove the Germans back. The 2d Infantry of the 5th Division and one combat command of the 7th Armored were also driven off a hill northwest of Metz by a German counterattack. However, the 35th Division and Dager’s (Brigadier General H. E. Dager) combat command of the 4th Armored were well over the river south of Metz and advancing on Luneville. The 5th Infantry, less the 2d Infantry, got across south of Metz.

  While making this tour, Hughes and I saw a very nice tank fight at a range from one thousand to fifteen hundred yards. We were in a plum orchard, so could combine business with pleasure. In the foreground were two German tanks burning brightly, while beyond them three of our tanks were going up against a line of woods. We could see the gun flashes and could tell the difference between the American and German machine guns. The rate of fire of the latter is much higher than ours. We then drove to the Headquarters of the XV Corps, which we had failed to find on our last attempt. They had done an excellent job taking Neufchateau and by-passing Chaumont. Also, they secured a crossing over the Moselle at Charmes. Archbishop Spellman visited us that evening.

  By the evening of the fourteenth I had made good my promise to Bradley and had secured, in both his opinion and mine, a good bridgehead across the Moselle and felt that I could still, with luck, keep edging toward the east.

  We moved to a new Command Post five miles south of Etain, which had been the German railhead for the Verdun operation in World War I; therefore, the town and the surrounding country had been very heavily shelled. In fact, the town had been completely rebuilt in 1921 with American money. On the way there I stopped for lunch at Verdun with General Bradley and General Bull. Bradley was quite depressed, because apparently Montgomery had again succeeded in persuading the High Command to move all the supplies to the First Army, leaving the Third Army to hold; but Bradley thought that the Third Army could push on. Even more depressing was the news that

  one corps of two divisions from the Twelfth Army Group was to go to the Seventh Army which at the moment had but one corps. Then Simpson of the Ninth Army was to get seven divisions and the First and Third Armies were to be raised to nine infantry and three armored divisions. At that time, being optimistic, I felt that the war would be over before we got the troops. Actually, during the Bulge I commanded seventeen divisions and, in April-May, 1945, eighteen.

  While all this discussion was going on, we received a very welcome message that Nancy had fallen and that the XV Corps had destroyed the 16th German Infantry Division (General Lieutenant Ernst Haeckel), including sixty tanks while these tanks were in the act of attacking the right flank of the XII Corps. The XV Corps had gone over the Moselle at Charmes for the purpose of stopping this attack, and had arrived in time.

  While the Command Post was at Etain, I visited the Verdun battlefields of World War I, particularly Fort Douaumont. This is a magnificent, though futile, monument to heroism. You can see all over the ruinous fragments where brave men died to maintain something they could have saved much more easily by attacking. To me Douaumont epitomizes the folly of defensive warfare.

  At this time it appeared that there was a possibility of the XII Corps breaking through, and I planned that, in such an event, I would give it the 7th Armored Division and let the XX Corps, with the 83 d, 90th, and 5th, contain Metz while the XII Corps, with 7th, 6th, and 4th Armored and the 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions, would drive through to the Rhine.

  Next day we had a visitation of Russians, whom I avoided by going to the front, but I retaliated for their treatment of our observers by fixing them a G-2 map which showed exactly nothing. On visiting the XII Corps, I found General Eddy quite nervous. I told him to go to bed early and take a large drink, as I wished him to be in position to rush the Siegfried Line.

  I was certainly very full of hopes that day and saw myself crossing the Rhine. I even advised Eddy that, in the advance, he should form a column of divisions and, after securing the gap in the Siegfried Line, he should send

  some armor, backed by a mounted combat team, straight on with the hope of securing a bridge at Worms, while, -with the remainder of his command, he pushed back the shoulders of the hole and mopped up the area between the Saar and the Moselle. “The best-laid plans of mice and men gang aft agley.”

  In driving to the XII Corps via Toul, Pannes, and Essey, I went over the same places I had lived in and attacked twenty-six years and four days before. Some of the landmarks were very clear, but a wall behind which I had lain while directing an attack was made of cement, whereas in my memory it had been stone. Possibly they had built a new one. In any event, I must have walked a terribly long way on that twelfth of September, 1918.

  At this same time the French were again trying to gain control of the 2d French Armored Division, which was kicking vigorously through its Corps Commander, Haislip.

  Casualties for the seventeenth:

  Bradley called to say that Monty wanted all the American troops to stop so that he, Monty, could make a “dagger thrust with the Twenty-First Army Group at the heart of Germany.” Bradley said he thought it would be more like a “butter-knife thrust.” In order to avoid such an eventuality, it was evident that the Third Army should get deeply involved at once, so I asked Bradley not to call me until after dark on the nineteenth.

  On the eighteenth, I decorated General LeClerc with the Silver Star and also gave him six Silver Stars and twenty-five bronze Stars to spread among the soldiers of his divisions. At this time Colonel Vennard Wilson’s 106th Cavalry Group reported two columns of German
infantry attacking Luneville from the direction of Baccarat. I told Haislip to attack at once. He issued the orders most expeditiously, and since Wyche happened to be there, everything started at once.

  I then went to see Eddy at Nancy and found him unworried. He was sending Combat Command “B” of the 6th Armored, which had closed at Toul, on Luneville to stop the counter-attack. I was determined that the attack of the XII Corps on the Siegfried Line should go on in spite of what happened at Luneville. I was also glad to find that the XII and XX Corps had made physical contact north of Pont-à-Mousson.

  When going over an Engineer and G-2 study of the Siegfried Line, I found that the two places already picked for a probably break-through by a study of the road map exactly accorded with what a meticulous study of contoured maps had developed.

  The nineteenth, instead of being the day I hoped it would be, was bad. The 35th Division had been pushed off a hill northeast of Nancy, so the enemy had observation and could fire into the town. The 4th Armored was being heavily attacked and the XV Corps had not yet reached Luneville. To cheer Eddy up, I told him two stories: first, that Grant once said, “In every battle there comes a time when both sides consider themselves beaten; then he who continues the attack wins”; second, what Lee is supposed to have said at Chancellorsville, “I was too weak to defend, so I attacked.” As a result, Eddy retook the hill at once.