The 83d Division closed in on the city of Luxembourg on the fourth of October. I drove up to inspect it, and was amazed that the whole duchy was untouched by war, save for the railroad yards in the city itself. There must be something peculiar about the status of the country, because nobody bombed it.
This was the anniversary of the day I first started my efforts with the Ordnance to secure two co-axial machine guns in the mantles of all tanks. Up to the present I have had no success.
On the fifth, it was necessary to add a second battalion to the Driant attack.
Eddy came to see me about one of his division commanders, who had the pernicious habit of commanding battalions instead of combat teams. We discussed relieving him, but finally decided we didn’t know anyone any better, so it would be necessary to educate him. Subsequently, he became one of the finest Division Commanders in the Third Army.
This habit of commanding too far down, I believe, is inculcated at schools and at maneuvers. Actually, a General should command one echelon down, and know the position of units two echelons down. For example, an Army Commander should command corps, and show on his battle map the locations of corps and divisions, but he should not command the division. A Corps Commander should command divisions and show on his map the location of combat teams. A Division Commander should command combat teams and show on his map the location of battalions. The Regimental Commander should command battalions and show on his map the location of companies; similarly, with the Battalion and Company Commanders.
It has been my observation that any general officer who violates this rule and at, let us say, the Army level, shows the location of battalions, starts commanding them and loses his efficiency. In Tunisia, the British G-3 to General Alexander, began telling me where to put battalions and it was necessary for me to refuse flatly to receive such orders. Alexander backed me up.
The 26th Division closed in, taking over the sector held by the 4th Armored, and one combat team relieved the northern combat team of the 80th Division.
The Germans bombarded the Headquarters of the XX Corps near Conflans with a 280 mm. gun. From the thickness of the wall of the shell and the size of the fragments, this was apparently a naval gun, probably fired from a railroad car concealed in a tunnel.
The plans for the XII Corps attack on the eighth of October were completed and approved at this time. The operation was as follows: The 80th Division to attack straight east, with its rested combat team taking the three hills in its front; one battalion of the 35th, with a tank company attached, was to attack northwest to clear the woods on the division sector, while two combat commands of the 6th Armored Division attacked north between the left of the 35th Division and the right of the 80th Division. The operation was planned as an inexpensive method of straightening the line and maintaining the offensive spirit of the troops.
On the seventh of October, General Marshall and General Bradley came, and after lunch the whole Staff was assembled and we went over the plans for taking Fort Driant, and also for the XII Corps attack. As usual, General Marshall asked very incisive questions, but I believe we were able to answer him. He was very disappointed that, owing to a promise to see Montgomery, he would not be able to be present on the eighth of October to watch our attack.
On the eighth, I decided to fly to Nancy, which was a mistake, because, owing to the weather, I could not take off until too late to see the opening phase of the battle. When I did get to the Observation Post of the XII Corps, four towns in our immediate foreground were blazing brightly and from one of them there was a column of smoke at least four thousand feet high. The tanks of the 6th Armored were moving forward against the southern flank of two villages, from which they were receiving considerable fire, while in the background the P-47’s of the XIX Tactical Air Command were doing a wonderful job of bombing. Immediately in front of us, several hundred prisoners were grouped in a field awaiting further disposition. It was unfortunate that General Marshall could not have seen the fight.
German Railway Gun
After watching this for some hours. I visited General Paul, who commanded the 26th Division. He had been Adjutant of the 27th Infantry at Schofield Barracks in 1925 and 1926, where I had formed a very high opinion of him, which was subsequently amply justified. From his Headquarters we drove to the Observation Post of the 80th Division. The southernmost of the two hills in its front had been taken, but the northern hill, which was heavily wooded, was apparently still occupied by the Germans. When I arrived, they seemed content to let the Germans stay there until morning. I conceived this to be dangerous and directed the hill to be taken that night; this was done.
On the tenth, the three Army Commanders (Hodges, Patton, and Simpson), with their G-4’s (Chiefs of Supply), assembled at Army Group Headquarters. When we arrived, General Bradley explained that Montgomery claimed that the capture of the Ruhr was a two-army job under one commander, and that he, Montgomery, should be that commander, using his own Army and the First United States Army. General Eisenhower agreed that it was a two-army job, but felt that it should be two American armies. Therefore, the Ninth Army, instead of remaining between the First and Third Armies and using as its initial corps the VIII Corps which was then closing in from Brest, would move north of the First Army and take over its XIX Corps, while the VIII Corps would join the First Army with a Command Post in the vicinity of Bitburg. The Third Army would lose the 83d Division to the VIII Corps, but would eventually receive the 95th Division and 10th Armored Division. The First and Ninth Armies were to start the attack on the Ruhr as soon as ammunition was available, which at that time was supposed to be October 23.
This business being settled, as Caesar says, we then discussed the supply situation, pending the arrival of Major General Walter B. Smith, Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower. When Smith arrived, he stated that my suggestion of having a senior officer umpire the decisions of the Communications Zone, as to supplies, had been put into effect, and that General R. C. Crawford, G-4 of SHAEF, would be the officer. At this meeting, I emphasized the fact that too much attention was paid to tonnage and not enough to requisitions. For instance, it is perfectly useless to get a thousand tons of gasoline when you need five hundred tons of gasoline, two hundred tons of ammunition, and three hundred tons of bridging material. Yet the Communications Zone told you they had
moved so much tonnage. We also succeeded in putting over the point that ammunition should be issued in kind, and that we should not be told what to shoot, but what we would get, and allowed to use our own judgment on how to make the savings. It was further determined that, from this date forward, ammunition would be listed in rounds per gun per day and not in units of fire, because nobody knew what a unit of fire was. We believed at this time that sixty rounds per gun per day for 105’s and forty rounds for the larger caliber were the minimum. This meant that if the supply people could average that number of rounds, an army could make a saving, so that on days of battle we could fire up to three hundred and fifty or four hundred rounds of 105’s.
Casualties for October 8:
On the morning of the tenth, I drove to Nancy in time to have breakfast with General Marshall, who had spent the night with Eddy. Eddy had arranged an excellent itinerary which we followed, and saw all the divisions in his corps. During the drive, I had an opportunity of arguing for stars for Colonels Bruce Clark (later Brigadier General, Combat Command Commander, 4th Armored Division) and George W. Read (later Brigadier General, Combat Command Commander, 6th Armored Division). On the way back from the 35th Division, two salvos of enemy shell hit on the mountain above us, about three
hundred yards away. This was the third time I had been shelled on that road and it seems probable that the enemy had good observation, or else a radio.
After leaving the XII Corps, we inspected the divisions of the XX Corps, accompanied by General Walker. When we visited the 90th Division, I was very emphatic in praising General McLain. After we left, General Marshall stated he had hopes of be
ing able to give McLain a corps. During the course of the day I had several opportunities to talk at length to General Handy,1 which was always a pleasure to me.
On the eleventh, we decided to abandon the attack on Driant. The ammunition supply at this time was extremely precarious, averaging about seven rounds per day for the* 155’s and not much more than twice that for the 105’s.
On the twelfth, at General Bradley’s invitation, I went to Verdun to meet Mr. J. F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, and, as Bradley had to go to see General Eisenhower, I spent the rest of the day taking Mr. Byrnes over the battlefields of the St. Mihiel and Meuse—Argonne. I found him one of the most interesting and well-informed men I have ever met, and enjoyed his company and comments.
On the thirteenth, we moved the Command Post to Nancy, where we were very well established in a German barracks. This was one of six barracks originally built by the French, which had been bombed at our request when we were taking Nancy. Fortunately for us, the bombing had not been very effective; when Spaatz saw it he said he hoped I would never tell anyone the Americans had done it.
On the fourteenth, General Eisenhower invited all Corps and Army Commanders to come to the Headquarters of the First Army, east of Liege, and lunch with King George of England. After the departure of His Majesty, General Eisenhower gave us a pep talk on keeping up the spirit of the offensive and also on not criticizing the Communications Zone. Under the circumstances, both of these things were easier said than done.
On the fifteenth, accompanied by General Eddy and General Wood, I gave the officers, and as many non-commissioned officers and privates of the 26th Division aswe could collect, my usual pep talk. I particularly emphasized marching fire. This division was one of the first to adopt the doctrines I advocate, and throughout its fightingsecured good results with small casualties.
1Lieutenant General T. T. Handy, Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army.
Casualties for October 15:
Shortly after this, McLain was relieved to get the XIX Corps whose former commander, Major General C. H. Corlett, had gone home sick, and Major General J. A. Van Fleet took over the 90th Division. General Van Fleet, who made a wonderful Division and Corps Commander, had landed in Normandy commanding a regiment of the 4th Division, and had been among the first officers to be recommended for temporary promotion. He terminated the war commanding the III Corps.
I also visited the 95th Division which had just come in under Major General H. L. Twaddle, and gave my usual talk to the field and company officers. We drove about eight hours in the rain that day, in an open car, and got extremely wet.
On the seventeenth, Generals Gaffey and Gay and Colonels Harkins, Maddox,1 Muller,1 Koch,1 and I went over the plans for the next operation. The plan was to initiate the assault with the three infantry divisions of the XII Corps for the purpose of getting a bridgehead over the Seille River. When this had been accomplished, the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions were to move through the infantry.
1Colonel H, G. Maddox, G-3, Third Army, Colonel Walter J. Muller, G-4, Third Army, and Colonel Oscar W. Koch, G-2, Third Army, were with General Patton throughout the war.
The 6th Armored Division was to secure the high ground east of Metz while the 4th Armored Division was to go on directly to the Saar River and secure a crossing south of Saargemund. One day later, the XX Corps was to attack, the 5th Division south of Metz following the 80th. The 95th Division was to contain—keep the defenders occupied—Metz and make a feint crossing north of the city, while the 90th Division was to cross north of Thionville and be followed immediately by the 10th Armored. As soon as the high ground east of Metz had been secured, the 10th Armored was to turn north and attack Saarburg, which, prior to the arrival of the 90th Division, was to be attacked by a task force under Colonel J. K. Polk, 3d Cavalry Group. It was hoped that the operation would eventuate in the capture of Metz and in the release of two armored divisions, the 4th and 6th, for a rupture of the Siegfried Line and subsequent assault on the Rhine River.
It will be noted that both the plans for the operation for the capture of Metz and the Saar campaign were worked out with much greater detail than were our operations while going across France. The reason for this is evident. Touring France was a catch-as-catch-can performance where we had to keep going to maintain our initial advantage. In this operation we had to start moving from an initial disadvantage.
On the nineteenth, Harkins took the plans to Bradley for approval. Brigadier General R. E. Jenkins (G-3, Sixth Army Group) and Colonel J. S. Guthrie (G-3, Seventh Army) called to arrange a boundary between the Seventh and Third Armies. They also wanted to procure the railroad from Toul to Nancy. There was no trouble about the boundary, since they took the one we proposed, and there was no trouble about the railroad, since I refused to share it—not from any ungenerous attitude, but simply because it was being used to the utmost to supply the Third Army.
This same evening an alleged sixty enemy planes flew over Nancy and our anti-aircraft got three certains and three probables. I have never found out what these planes were doing, as they did not drop any bombs.
On the twentieth, General Patch1 of the Seventh Army asked me for a treadway bridge company for an operation he proposed for November 1. I arranged to give it to him.
On the twentieth, General Spaatz and I visited General Wood and saw a very interesting demonstration of tanks with and without ducks’ feet.2 3
General Spaatz stayed on with Wood, and I went to visit the regiments of the 26th Division, as they were each shortly going to put on an initial show. Everything was in excellent shape, except for the lack of ingenuity in taking care of men. I showed them how to make drying rooms, and cautioned them particularly about keeping the men’s feet dry. This is of interest because, shortly afterward, this division had over three thousand cases of trenchfoot.
On the twenty-first, Major General John Millikin, Commanding General, III Corps, now part of the Third Army, reported. I was opposed to having Millikin because I believed it wrong to put an officer in command of a corps who had never commanded a division in battle, while all the Division Commanders were veterans. Aside from this, I considered Millikin an excellent general.
I told Millikin to send up all the senior officers of his Corps Staff to do duty with their opposite numbers on the Army Staff, so that, when he became operational, he would know what to expect.
Eddy brought in his plan for the offensive, which was approved.
That same night the only V-l bomb to enter the territory of the Third Army hit a hill east of the city, doing no harm.
The first attack of the 26th Division was successful, and the casualties whom I visited in the hospital were in good spirits and much elated over their triumph.
Casualties as of October 22 were:
On the twenty-second, Bradley and Allen, his Chief of Staff, came and we went over the plans for the impending attack. General Bradley’s contention was that if all the armies—that is, the two British, three American in the Twelfth Army Group, and Seventh Army in the Sixth Army Group—attacked simultaneously, it might well end the war. I contended, as I had set forth to him in the letter of October 19, that we were fighting three enemies. One was the German, the second was the weather, and the third was time. Of these three I conceived the weather to be the most important, because, at that moment, our sick rate for the first time equaled our battle casualty rate, and the weather was not improving. As to time, every day’s delay meant more defenses to attack. I further stated there was not enough ammunition to supply all the armies, but there was enough to supply one army, and that the Third Army could attack twenty-four hours after getting the signal from then on. After considerable argument, I was given a minimum date of November 5, the attack to take place any time on or after that date that air bombardment would be available.
On the twenty-third, Walker and Eddy had a meeting under my supervision to arrange the details for their attack. General Millikin, commanding the III Corps, which was
not then operational, was also present. After the meeting, I made an inspection of the supply installations
in the vicinity of Toul, using for the first time a special railway car, captured from the Germans, that Muller had provided for Army Headquarters. The car was reputed to be Hindenburg’s, and later Goering’s, special car.
On the early morning of October 24, the Germans opened fire on Nancy with a 280 mm. gun or howitzer, continuing to fire until 0445. Three of the shells hit in the immediate vicinity of our quarters; none, I should say, more than thirty-five yards from my house. One struck the house exactly across the street from us, and the angle of fall was such that it could not have missed the roof of General Galley’s room by more than a few inches. Nearly all the glass in our house was broken.
I heard quite a lot of screaming in the ruins and, taking my flashlight, went across the street, where I encountered a Frenchman pulling vigorously at the leg of a man who seemed to be stuck in the ruin. Taking the other leg, I joined in the good deed, with the result that the man began to scream and eventually to choke and finally ceased all noise. On investigation, we found that his head was stuck under a table and we had almost pulled it off. Aside from a sore neck, he was uninjured.
While this was going on, an old lady, caught in the ruins farther back, kept screaming, and my French friend kept reassuring her in this fashion: ‘1 implore you, Madame, do not derange yourself; be calm, be tranquil. Try to realize that the great General Patton is himself occupying himself with the removal of the bricks so that you, too, may be saved. He has further had the humanity to send for a doctor and an ambulance. I again urge you to be tranquil.” While we were getting the untranquil lady, the third near-miss arrived and threw quite a lot of rocks on us. I really believe that I was more frightened that night than at any time in my career.
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