The supply situation, particularly as to rations, gasoline, and ammunition, was exceptionally bad; so much so that, as of October 25, General Lee and his adherents paid us a personal visit and, I believe, made every effort to ameliorate the situation.
On the twenty-fifth, Colonel D. T. Colley’s 104th Infantry Regiment, of the 26th Division, made an attack. They were about three-quarters successful, as a portion of the hill remained still in enemy possession. However, General Paul thought that they had had sufficient practice and directed another regiment to take over the assault, as of 1800. Colley got wind of this at about 1300, went up to his leading battalion and told them that the honor of the regiment did not permit them to turn over an incomplete job. He stated he would lead the assault himself, which he did with great gallantry. The position was taken, but Colley was shot in the right shoulder, the bullet progressing diagonally through both lungs and emerging from the lower part of his left lung, miraculously missing heart and blood vessels on the way. I gave him an Oak-Leaf Cluster to the Distinguished Service Cross which he had won in World War I. He made a complete recovery and returned, at his own urgent request, to command a regiment.
I visited the three combat teams of the 95th Division and made them a speech on combat.
About this time we thought we had figured out the observation posts from which the person directing the 280 mm. gun operated, and a very complicated plan was made for their capture, as they were supposed to be within our lines. Actually they were not. The P-47 dive-bombers probably accounted for the gun, because we had very little more trouble from it.
The ammunition supply was still bad, and the gasoline was not sufficient to replace the daily expenditure.
The 761st Tank Battalion (colored, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel P. T. Bates) reported to the Army on the twenty-eighth of October. This was the first of such battalions to report.
On the twenty-eighth, I directed General Walker to stop fooling around with Maizieres-le-Metz, which the 357th Regiment of the 90th Division had been attacking for some days, and go in and take it. This was done successfully on the twenty-ninth, but in the action Colonel G. B. Barth, the Regimental Commander, received a wound which at the time was considered fatal. However, he recovered.
On the twenty-ninth, Weyland and I visited the Twelfth Army Group for the purpose of securing the assistance of the 83d Infantry Division in our impending attack. The idea was to have the 83d cross the bridge secured by the 90th and advance rapidly, covered by Polk’s cavalry group, to take Saarburg and possibly Trier, then revert to First Army. After considerable discussion, Bradley consented to give me operational control of the 83d Division, provided I would not use more than two regimental combat teams.
Another point of discussion was whether or not we would have to reduce our units to T/O1 strength prior to the anticipated assault, as, during the lull, we had secured sufficient replacements to be over strength for the first time. General Bradley was very cute about this. He said, “You will notice that the order for reduction of over strength takes effect after the fifteenth of November, by which time the action of the enemy will probably have done it.” General Weyland, with my assistance, argued for the retention of one of the fighter groups of the XIX Tactical Air Command, which was being sent to the Ninth Army, but we were unsuccessful.
On the thirty-first, I inspected and made a talk to the 761st Tank Battalion. A good many of the lieutenants and some of the captains had been my sergeants in the 9th and 10th Cavalry. Individually they were good soldiers, but I expressed my belief at that time, and have never found the necessity of changing it, that a colored soldier cannot think fast enough to fight in armor.
Before we left England, Bradley and I evolved the idea of having one extra colonel in each division, so that in the event of a casualty we would have a man immediately available. This was necessary, because the difference in age between the regimental and battalion commanders was such that the latter did not have the necessary experience to take over a regiment. One of the colonels I secured for this job was my classmate, Bob Sears, who is three years older than myself. He took command of a regiment of the 35th Division about the third of August and commanded it through all its fighting until the thirty-first of October, when, in spite of his great heart and meticulous personal care, it became evident that he would have to be relieved, or die at his post. He had made a great reputation for himself and had actually killed seven Germans with his own hands. I believe this is a record for a regimental commander in any war.
1Tables of Organization, the controlling documents for the strength of Army units.
When General Spaatz visited General Wood, as already recounted, he was distressed at the fact that Wood lived in a very wet and muddy tent, so he sent him his own trailer. We had a presentation of this trailer to General Wood. It was a huge affair and most luxurious. I have never seen a man more pleased than Wood, and yet more determined not to use the trailer.
On November 2 at 1400, we had a conference of Corps Commanders, General Weyland, myself, and the Army General Staff, and representatives of the 8th and 9th Air Forces to make a definite arrangement as to when and where the Air would strike in the impending attack. As the result of this meeting, the priorities on targets, notably the Metz forts and the woods in front of the 80th Division, were established, and it was decided that the date of the First Army’s attack would be called D-Day; that the XII Corps would launch its infantry attack on D plus 1 and its armor on D plus 2, unless the situation permitted a more rapid engagement of armor; that the XX Corps would launch a demonstration by the 95th Division to the north and west of Metz on D plus 1 and the 90th Division would launch its attack north of Thionville on D plus 2. After much discussion, the boundary between the XX and XII Corps was also established.
On November 2, General Bradley and General A. Franklin Kibler (his G-3), came to Nancy and stated it was evident that the British would not be ready to jump off prior to November 10, and probably not before the first of December. He further stated that the First Army could not jump off until at least two of the American divisions, then attached to the British, were released and returned to the First or Ninth Armies. He wanted to know when I could jump off. I told him that, as already stated, I could jump off the day after a successful air attack, or not later than the eighth in the event that weather prevented an air attack. General Bradley said he was very glad to find somebody who wanted to attack.
On November 3, I addressed the assembled officers and non-commissioned officers and a few selected privates of the three infantry divisions of the XII Corps; namely, the 26th, 35th, and 80th. I impressed upon them the honor which had been given the Third Army of being permitted to attack alone. I also reiterated my insistence on the use of marching fire and of all supporting weapons.
Final arrangements were made through Weyland that, in the event the Air could not bomb prior to darkness on November 7, the XII Corps would jump off on November 8 without air support. I had a telephone conversation with Bradley, at this time, on the use of 83d Division. I requested that some of the corps artillery with it be authorized to cross the Moselle River and support the two combat teams in their attack. We did not get to a definite decision on this subject.
Due to bad weather the tentative air bombardment of Metz set for the fifth was impossible, and the bombers went deep into Germany to release their loads.
Devers visited me that day and promised that the Seventh Army would support my right flank.
On the fifth, I addressed the officers of the 10th Armored 90th Infantry, 95th Infantry Divisions and Headquarters of the XX Corps. Each of these addresses took place in the rain. They were my usual pre-battle pep talks.
General Hughes came to visit me on the fifth. On the sixth, he and I made talks to the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions at their request. I had not originally included them in my schedule, because I felt they were such veteran and experienced divisions that it was painting the lily to talk to them; but they seemed to fee
l quite hurt, so I talked to them. In talking to the 4th, I said, making a joke of the fact that the First Army was not coming in as originally planned, “the First shall be last and the 4th shall be first.”
On the sixth, I told the press that the attack would come off on or before the morning of the eighth of November. I gave them full details and asked them to keep the thing a secret. I further asked a radio representative to announce on the air that the attack was a limited objective attack for the purpose of straightening the line for winter occupation and told him I would inform him when he could change this statement. He did exactly as asked, and I believe the broadcast had some effect in deceiving the Germans.
It was strange to think that two years ago on the seventh of November we were approaching Africa aboard the Augusta. It blew hard all afternoon, but at 1600 the wind stopped and we made a perfect landing on the Moroccan coast. At 1430 on the afternoon of the seventh this year, it was raining hard as it had been for some time. At 1900, Generals Eddy and Grow came to the house and argued with me to hold off the attack on account of bad weather and swollen rivers. I asked them whom they wished to name as their successors because the attack was to go off as scheduled. They immediately assented and, as usual, did great work.
The casualty report as of November 7 was:
It is interesting to note that the necessity of halting on the Moselle resulted in the above losses, which, had we been able to continue our advance on September 24 might not have occurred and certainly not in such numbers.
Materiel losses as of November 7 were:
—————
1
Colonel Jacques de Chambrun, a French officer who acted as General Pershing’s personal liaison officer in World War I.
2
lieutenant General A. M. Patch, Command General, Seventh Army.
3
Ducks’ feet was a name given to extensions put on the outer edge of tracks of tanks to give more flotation in mud. They were manufactured in France and Luxembourg specifically for Third Army tanks.
3 THE CAPTURE OF METZ AND THE SAAR CAMPAIGN
8 November to 8 December, 1944
It was not difficult to get the troops of the Third Army out of the lethargy produced by the inactivity of October. They were never defensive-minded, and were ready at the drop of a hat to take off in any direction.
The hat dropped with the beginning of the November 8 offensive. Though the elements were against them, through October, Third Army units had nudged farther forward into the German lines in order to gain the use of better springboards.
From September 25 to November 7, they had pushed forward an average of four thousand kilometers to the east, south of Metz, and north of that city they were strong enough to cross the Moselle at any place.
The new offensive to the east began early on the morning of November 8. One thousand thundering guns opened the attack, which jumped off despite floods, rain, and fog. Slow, tedious, and costly though the advance, by mid-December operations had progressed sufficiently to call for a new set of plans—a new co-ordinated effort —a break-through to the Rhine. Metz fell to the Third Army on December 13, the first time it had been taken by assault a.d. 641. {See Map pages 160-161.)
This new offensive was planned, with the help of General Spaatz and his Eighth Air Force, for the nineteenth of December. The air-blitz was to be the greatest of its kind yet attempted. One thousand heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force were to pound enemy positions for
three consecutive days. Orders were issued, commanders informed, replacements promised, troop movements begun, prayers offered: everything was in readiness. One thing only was amiss—the German High Command had not been consulted. The result—“The Bulge." (See Map, page 190.)
On other fronts the Twenty-First Army Group moved slowly against strong resistance. The First Army consolidated its gains. The Russians advanced to Budapest. In Italy, Ravenna was taken. The Sixth Army Group swept through the Vosges Mountains and reached the Rhine at Strasbourg Colmar, and beyond Hagenau. The Air Force continued its heavy offensive strikes. In the Pacific, Tokyo began to feel the full weight of the American offensive, while the Navy supported the ground troops in taking Leyte.
P. D. H.
Stuck in the Mud 1
ing. I had not let him know for fear I might get a stop order. He seemed delighted that we were going ahead. Then General Eisenhower came on the phone and said, “I expect you to carry the ball all the way.” Codman, Stiller, and I immediately drove to the Observation Post of the XII Corps, but there was so much artificial fog and smoke from the pots covering the bridges that we could see little. At about 1000, fighter-bombers appeared in force and attacked the known enemy command posts. The day was the brightest and best we had had for two months.
I visited the Headquarters of the 80th, 35th, and 26th Divisions and also saw General Wood. By dark that night every unit was on its assigned objective for the day; unfortunately it started to rain.
Visiting the front on the ninth was very disheartening. Many of the bridges were out; trucks, airplanes, and one hospital platoon were marooned by the flood waters, and things looked bad. However, when I got to the 5th Division, General Irwin, Division Commander, and Colonel A. W. Roffe, Commander of the 2d Infantry, and myself went up on a hill and saw 1476 planes of the Eighth Air Force come over and bomb the targets at Metz. It was a great sight. At first we saw smoke corkscrews in the air, and some of us thought they were German anti-aircraft rockets. Actually they were markers from our lead planes. We were close enough so that the roar of the motors was very distinct, and the ground where we were shook constantly.
On the way back, we found that every bridge on the Moselle River, except one at Pont-à-Mousson, was out, and that the Seille River had increased in width from two hundred to five hundred feet. On the other hand, I ran into Combat Command “B” of the 10th Armored Division, Brigadier General E. W. Piburn, near Mars la Tour, the scene of the great cavalry battle in 1870, and they were looking fine and moving right into action with beautiful discipline. Five battalions of the 90th Division were over the Moselle River that night
Generals Spaatz, Doolittle,1 and Curtis,1 and Professor Bruce Hopper, historian for the Air Force, spent the night. I was very grateful to them, because I am quite sure that the wonderful air support we had received that day was due largely to the friendship of these men.
On the tenth, the river had gone down a little and the bridge at Pont-à-Mousson, which went out on the night of the ninth, was again usable. This was very satisfactory, as, prior to that time, I had seven divisions across an unfordable river, and no bridges. The 4th Armored Division went well and the 6th Armored Division, moving northeast, caught a column of Germans between it and the 5th Infantry Division and had a big killing. Haislip of the XV Corps came in to assure me that the XV Corps would cover the right flank of the Third Army. The XV Corps was at this time assigned to the Seventh Army.
I had hoped to win this battle by the eleventh, as it was my birthday and my lucky day in West Africa. However, I did not win it.
Bradley called up at 1710 and, in my opinion, crawfished quite flagrantly in forbidding me to use the 83d Division. I believe he had been overtalked, either by Middleton or Hodges, or both. I was very sore at the time, and still regard it as a great mistake. Had two combat teams of the 83d been used to attack Saarburg, that town would have fallen on the twelfth or thirteenth, and we would probably have captured Trier. With Trier in our hands, Von Rundstedt’s break-through could not have occurred. This probably is another case of “On account of a nail a shoe was lost,” etc.
Trenchfoot was becoming very acute at this time. In one division alone there were three thousand cases. This could not have been wholly prevented, because the men had to ford rivers more than waist-deep, so that even rubber boots would not have helped. However, a good deal of the fault was due to the officers and non-coms not taking corrective measures. I wrote a personal letter on trenchfoot and the situation im
proved. I ordered that all shoes be dubbed prior to issue, and directed that prisoners of war be used for this purpose. Also that one dry pair of socks per man be sent forward each day with the rations. Owing to the efforts of Colonel Muller, we were now practically equipped with overshoes for the infantry, but in some of the regiments the unfortunate mistake was made of thinking that the overshoes tired the men too much, and they did not wear them when they should have. Because of the difficulty with trenchfoot, it became more and more evident that it was desirable to get both corps into column of divisions so that some divisions could rest and dry out while others went on.
The heads of the Staff sections gave me a birthday party in Colonel Koch’s quarters, where we had Armored Diesels1 to drink, field expedient type—“field expedient” meaning that the adequate liquors for making the old 2d Armored Diesel were not available.
On the twelfth, the 90th Division received a violent counter-attack by the equivalent of a German infantry division. This they repelled in a very gallant manner, although they had no tanks and no tank-destroyer guns on the east side of the Moselle River, and the bridge behind them was out. However, the corps artillery, to the extent of some thirty battalions, came in effectively.
War as I Knew It Page 16