The ammunition situation had improved, except in the case of 240 mm. howitzers and eight-inch guns.
General Eisenhower called to tell me he had removed General Silvester, Commander of the 7th Armored Division, from his command, and that Silvester had stated I had a personal animus against him. This was not true, because I had kept corps commanders from reducing him as early as August.
On the thirteenth, the Seventh Army jumped off. Bradley and Bonesteel2 visited me and we drove to the Headquarters of the XII Corps at Chateau Salins. We also visited the 4th Armored Division, and Bradley had an opportunity of seeing how really bad the mud conditions were. Tanks actually bellied down when off the roads.
We were promised the infantry of the 75th Division3 on December 10 and the whole of the division by December 15. Also, that we would get the 11th Armored Division, which was then embarking in the United Kingdom.
1Ingredients of the original: Juice of one lemon, sugar to taste, one and one-half ounces of rye or bourbon, one teacup of shaved ice; whirl in a mixer.
2Major General Charles H. Bonesteel, of General Eisenhower’s staff.
3Commanded by Major General Fay B. Prickett. This division did not become assigned to the Third Army at this time.
At that time Bradley had the idea that, when the Fifteenth United States Army was organized, he would use it to take over the area back of the Third and First Armies so as to give us a smaller army area to look after.
Later in the evening, we visited the wounded in the hospital, and found them in excellent spirits. The attitude of the wounded throughout this operation was magnificent.
On the fourteenth, I had to dissuade General Eddy from by-passing Falkenberg.
I visited Walker and we inspected the 95th Division. The losses of this division since November 8 had been 80 killed and 482 wounded. This was too many casualties for the little ground gained, and I so told Twaddle.
At Thionville we saw the longest Bailey bridge in the world. It had just been completed by the Engineers, and was built under fire. Some fire was then falling in the vicinity, but the bridge was not hit while we were on it. We then drove to Cattenom and crossed a treadway bridge under a smoke screen, and visited the 90th Division. The crossing of the 90th Division over the Moselle was an epic river crossing done under terrific difficulties. After they got two battalions over, the bridge went out and everything else had to come across in assault boats.
General Van Fleet took us to see the battlefield of the twelfth, and I have never seen so many dead Germans2 in one place in my life. They extended for a distance of about a mile, practically shoulder to shoulder.
The 10th Armored Division started crossing at this date, so we were really making progress.
On the fifteenth, General Eisenhower came, and we visited the XII Corps and the 26th and 35th Divisions. He was very well pleased with what was going on and was photographed walking in the mud, of which there was an ample supply.
That night we had a very amusing incident. I wanted to have a good fire for General Eisenhower in his room, and we had such a good one that the hotel caught fire and we had considerable difficulty in putting it out. In fact, Colonel Jimmy Gault, his British Aide, and myself got in quite a sweat.
As of November 15, the operation was quite satisfactory, except that the 4th Amored had been set back a little bit and the Seventh Army had not done as much as we hoped. The XII Corps started to shift divisions with the idea of getting the 6th Armored Division ready to exploit, should they get a break-through.
Casualties as of November 15 were:
On the sixteenth, General Eisenhower left, after visiting the Ordnance and Quartermaster installations, and also a hospital.
I heard from Marlene Dietrich,3 who was in Germany during the First World War, that the Germans used tetanus antitoxin, or serum, as a treatment for trenchfoot, so we started trying it on a few volunteers in the hospital; it had no results.
At Falkenberg, on the seventeenth, we learned from prisoners that there were a number of delayed bombs with as much as twenty-one days’ delay fuses buried throughout the town. Subsequently, about fifteen of these went off.
Eddy called me to state that his allowance of shells for the eighteenth was nine thousand, but I told him to go ahead and shoot twenty thousand, because I could see no reason for hoarding ammunition. You either use it or you don’t. I would lose more men by shooting nine thousand rounds a day for three days than I would by shooting twenty thousand in one day—and probably not get as far. I believe in fighting until lack of supplies forces you to stop—then digging in.
The eighteenth was a great day for the Air. The XIX Tactical Air Command started flying at dawn and flew until well after dark; then they sent out their night fighters which attacked some fifteen convoys in the darkness.
The XX Corps made good progress. The 90th and 95th Divisions both advanced long distances and were practically within contact of the 5th Division east of Metz. The 10th Armored Division was on its objective. Things looked so good that I could almost picture myself going through the Siegfried Line any day. I was slightly overoptimistic.
I visited the Headquarters of the 5th Division at Fort Leisne in the vicinity of Vemy. The 10th Infantry (commanded by Colonel Robert P. Bell) in that division made a night attack and advanced six kilometers to cut the last enemy escape route from Metz. While I was at the fort, this unit made physical contact with elements of the 90th Division, and elements of both the 5th and 90th started fighting in the streets of Metz by 1100 that day. The night attack was interesting, because they had to advance through a mine field. They chose to do it in the dark and, as a result, lost about thirty-five men. Had they advanced in the daytime, they would probably have lost the same thirty-five men to mines; and, in addition, several hundred men to machine gun and rifle fire.
At Vemy we saw a very good example of heavy bombing. When a direct hit with a big bomb was made on one of the forts, the bombs crippled it, but not to the extent one would imagine. However, the shock effect due to the detonation is probably very great.
The last German column to attempt to get out of Metz was caught on the road by a company of medium tanks from the 6th Armored Division, who opened fire on them at a range of about one hundred and fifty yards.
I visited the road and have seldom viewed a scene of greater devastation.
Another nice piece of work was capturing the bridge leading from the west bank to an island in the Moselle opposite Metz. This was found intact and was covered with airbursts until some tanks ran out on it and drove the enemy away from detonating the charges.
I advised Bradley that while Metz had not officially surrendered, it was ours and the credit for its capture belonged to the XX Corps.
On the twentieth, weather prevented any air support. However, the French broke through at Belfort and the Seventh Army was going ahead excellently. This was good news.
On this same date we made arrangements to have the III Corps absorb the 5th Division and take over Metz. This would not only relieve the XX Corps from looking over its shoulder, but would also get the III Corps operational; so that in the event the enemy attacked the VII Corps to our north, we would have something to use against him. The XX Corps, then consisting of the 10th Armored, the 90th and the 95th Divisions, could continue the attack already in progress against Saarburg and initiate a second attack between Merzig and Saarlautem. At first glance an attack at this point seemed foolhardy, as it was the strongest position of the Siegfried Line. However, apparent strength sometimes produces weakness, because people are inclined not to occupy strong positions with as many men as they should.
Both the XX and XII Corps were worried about their inside flanks, in the vicinity of St. Avoid, each demanding that the other occupy a vacancy which existed there. However, I felt that it was better to narrow the fronts of the corps and trust to the Lord that the Germans would not come through between them. As far as I know, the Germans never tried to make this attack.
; Unquestionably the impetus of the attack was deteriorating, due to exhaustion and lack of replacements. The only solution seemed to me to get a narrow front for each corps. As of the twenty-second, the final plans for the continuation of the offensive were: XX Corps — the 10th Armored Division and one combat team of the 90th — to attack Saarburg and Merzig; the rest of the 90th Division and the 95th Division to attack in the vicinity of Saarlautem. The 5th Division, less one combat team which was to remain in Metz, would be a reserve to follow whichever of the two attacks proved successful.
At this time the resistance in Metz had completely broken down and we were actually shelling the remaining forts with German materiel and ammunition. In the XII Corps the 80th and 6th Armored Divisions were to attack in the vicinity of Saarguemines; one combat team of the 35th Division was to accompany the 6th Armored; the 26th Division and the rest of the 35th were to stand fast, refit, and dry out. The 4th Armored was to attack south of Saarbriicken. One of the unfortunate things about this campaign was that it had been planned when the weather was good and the country dry. Therefore, the operations were envisaged as of a blitz nature. When it actually came off, we were in the middle of the greatest flood in eighty years.
On the twenty-third, we had a guard of honor for Generals Eddy and Walker to celebrate their respective captures of Nancy and Metz. While they were still Major Generals, we had the band play the “Ruffles and Flourishes” for Lieutenant Generals, and I hoped these would be prophetic. In the case of Walker they were, and I believe that Eddy will eventually get his three stars.
General Giraud, of the French Army, spent part of the day with me and was very comforting. He had been in command at Metz for a number of years and had studied all routes of attack from that vicinity toward Germany. He was wholly in accord with those we had picked out. He also pointed out certain pieces of terrain where he said attacks were impossible. At that time I took his advice, but when the XX Corps attacked on March 13, 1945, we actually went over the impassable country.
Elements of the 130th Panzer Lehr Division (General Lieutenant Fritz Bayerlein) were identified between the XII and XV Corps and were struck in flank with considerable success by the 4th Armored.
We had a study prepared for the utilization of the XV Corps, as a part of the Third Army, in the projected attack from the Saar to the Rhine. On the twenty-fourth, Generals Eisenhower and Bradley passed through Nancy
on their way to the Sixth Army Group and I tried to sell the idea of using the XV Corps, basing my demand for it on the fact that between Luneville and Thionville there was room for only one army, and there was just one natural corridor. While this was a sound argument, it did not succeed.
The short days and tremendous distances made it very desirable to move the Command Post forward, but, with the exception of St. Avoid, there was no road net from which one could command, and at that time St. Avoid was occupied by the XII Corps. In picking a Command Post, you must always have a road net from which you can move forward to any portion of your line. A Command Post situated at a spot where it is necessary to move to the rear is disadvantageous. In this connection it is always best, where practicable, to drive to the front, so that the soldiers can see you going in that direction, and to save time, fly back by Cub so that you are never seen going to the rear.
Speaking of flying reminds me that, when we first began moving across France, I used to notice from the air innumerable fox holes on each side of the main roads. On inquiry it turned out that, in order to make the German truck drivers stick to their jobs, such protection had to be provided, so that when our bombers came down on them they could jump into a hole. The local inhabitants were required to dig and maintain these places and they very promptly filled them up once we had passed.
Piper Cub
Another thing which impressed me was the number of shell craters in open fields, where they had apparently I done no harm at all. Unquestionably this was often the case, but when one thinks how seldom bullets from either guns or rifles find their billets, one should not be too critical of the air bombing. On the other hand, practically all the German airfields looked as if they had had a recent case of erysipelas, they were so full of craters.
On the twenty-fifth, I visited the 95th Division. The morale of the men was good, but their method of attack seemed to me wanting in push. Several 88’s or 105’s struck near us on this drive. We then passed through Metz, and it was a very pleasant feeling to enter a city which had not been captured for thirteen hundred years.
We received a number of replacement captains. I initially assigned them to companies under lieutenants until they had learned the ropes. While this is not authorized in Regulations, I did it in both this and the First , World War, and it works.
The Seventh Army sent a proposed boundary between themselves and the Third Army which would have pinched us completely out, but we finally persuaded them to accept the boundary which we would have used between the XII and XV Corps had we secured the XV Corps; namely, north boundary: Lorentzen—Rahlingen —Boutin—Waltholben—Kaiserslautern—Bobenheim. I called General Haislip to congratulate him on his breakthrough, which had really been a fine piece of work.
Averell Harriman, Ambassador to Russia, visited us, and I took him to the 4th Armored Division to show him that the Russians were not the only people who had to contend against mud. On this drive we traversed four old and two new tank ditches, varying from twelve to fifteen feet deep and from twenty-five to thirty-five feet in width. Also innumerable lines of trenches, all of which had been passed by our men, because, almost invariably, they had not been adequately defended. The amount of man-hours used in digging these futile defenses is appalling. When we were with the 4th Armored, we crossed the Saar River and spat on the far bank.
I decorated a lieutenant, who, in command of one of our M-4 Shermans had put out five German Panther tanks. I then searched out the location of this great exploit and found all the destroyed vehicles still smoking. The tracks in the mud showed what had happened. Our tank had been coming down the road, hugging a high bank, and suddenly saw slightly ahead, in a hollow to its right, two Panther tanks at a range of about two hundred and fifty yards. These it engaged and put out of action; then, apparently, charged to finish them, and, by so doing, uncovered three more tanks, which it engaged at a range of not more than forty yards. All the German tanks were put out and so was ours.
Harriman told me that Stalin, in the presence of the Chief of Staff of the Russian Army, had paid the Third Army a very high compliment when he stated, “The Red Army could not have conceived and certainly could not have executed the advance made by the Third Army across France.”
On the twenty-eighth, Generals Brereton1 and Ridgway4 5 called at Third Army Headquarters looking for a job for the Airborne Army. I showed them an area between Worms and Mainz which, from a ground standpoint, was the most desirable crossing place. They stated that it looked all right to them and that they would make a study.
The trouble with the Airborne Army is that it is too ponderous in its methods. At the present stage in airborne development, it is my belief that one airborne regiment per army, available on twelve hours’ notice, would be more useful than several airborne divisions which usually take several weeks to get moving. Three times in our crossing over France, plans were made to use the airborne divisions, but we always got to the place they were to drop before they could get ready to drop.
General Walker stated that he could attack Saarlautern any time after the morning of the twenty-ninth of November, and that, while he would like air support, he did not have to have it. Bradley called to say that the First and Ninth Armies seemed stalled, and that, if we got a breakthrough, we would get the support which would otherwise have been sent to them.
On the twenty-ninth of November, I went over with the XII Corps plans to secure a crossing over the Saar River by using the 26th Division northwest of the 4th Armored, with the idea of working down the east bank of the river to facilitate the cro
ssing of the 35th Division at Saar-Union which, in turn, would probably permit the 6th Armored to cross at the same point.
In driving from Chateau Salins to St. Avoid, we crossed the Maginot Line and were impressed by its lack of impressiveness. In fact, elements of the 80th Division fought their way through this part of the line without knowing it.
The shortage of replacements had now reached nine thousand, and I took five per cent of the Corps and Army Headquarters troops to train as infantry. This produced loud wails from all the Section Chiefs, who declared they could not run their offices if any cut were effected. As matter of fact, even the ten per cent cut which we subsequently made had no adverse effect.
Among the other shortages experienced at this time was that of liquor. The good old days when we captured twenty-six thousand cases of champagne at one town and fourteen thousand cases of cognac at another (all the property of the German Army and so marked) had gone forever.
General Weyland and I, with our Staffs, went over the use of medium bombers on Saarlautem and decided that, if they could not bomb visually before the first or second of December, they would have to bomb on OBO;1 and that if they could not bomb prior to the second of December, the 90th and 95th would attack anyway. Late that evening, Weyland called up to say he feared that, if we did not attack on the first of December, the bombers might not get off at all, so I directed Walker to follow them in on that date. This was probably a mistake on my part, as the 95th Division would have been better set with an additional day’s delay.
1Air Corps expression for bombing by instruments when visibility is poor.
When the medium bombers attacked Saarlautem on the first of December, only four of the eight groups succeeded in dropping their bombs on the target, and the 95th Division found a great deal more trouble getting to the river than they had anticipated. On the second, ten groups of medium bombers did get in. their attack on Saarlautem with fine effects, one of the most significant being that they put out the city electric plant. The Germans were using electricity from this plant as the power to detonate the bridges across the river. As the result of this bombing, the bridges were taken intact.
War as I Knew It Page 17