At 1130 on the nineteenth, Walker called up to say he felt the situation was ripe for a break-through in the Saar Triangle, provided he could get an armored division. Bradley was away, so I called General Bull and succeeded in getting the 10th Armored, but with a string tied to it— namely, “Only for this operation.”
It always made me mad to have to beg for opportunities to win battles.
On the twentieth, the 10th Armored Division joined the XX Corps and started to attack north on the west (left) of the 94th Division. This attack was well done and the divisions were closing in on Saarburg by dark. The 10th Armored had fought in this area in November, so knew the ground and conditions.
Joined by Eddy, I visited the front of the XII Corps and came to a bridge over the Sauer River with the sign: “General Patton’s Bridge—Built by the Mighty Midgets.” The story behind this was that the last time I had gone along the river line, the bridge was under construction, and I made a remark that I had never seen so many little men doing such a big job. The “midgets” actually were Company “F” of the 1303d General Service Engineer Regiment (commanded by Captain Walford T. Gradison).
Leaving Eddy, I drove up the “Skyline Drive” with General Middleton and we inspected his roads. He had done a remarkable job in keeping them going, and as soon as the railroad reached St. Vith, the situation would be safe, for then he could abandon the road in his rear area and use only the railway, thus saving all his Engineers for work at the front. Furthermore, he would be in Germany, where the roads are much better than in Belgium or Luxembourg. As a matter of fact, the roads in the two latter countries are extremely poor—probably because they are not built to carry heavy traffic in winter, and the local inhabitants state that in winter all heavy traffic is barred from the roads by law.
After looking over the road, we visited the 6th Armored, the 90th and the 4th Infantry Divisions. General Grow, of the 6th Armored, was not well, so I told him to pull out for a couple of days and let his second in command (Brigadier General George W. Read, Jr.) run the show.
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1
The 101st Airborne Division, commanded by Brigadier General
2
A. C. McAuliffe. Major General M. D. Taylor was in the United
3
States at this time.
4
^The 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, commanded by Lieuten
5
ant Colonel Clifford Templeton; Combat Command “B,” 10th
6
Armored Division, Colonel W. L. Roberts, Commanding; Combat
7
Command “R,” 9th Armored Division, Colonel J. H. Gilbreath, Commanding.
8
In order to co-ordinate activities of the Third Army in the area northeast of Luxembourg, General Patton put all units in that vicinity initially under the command of Major General Morris.
9
*On this matter, General Patton called for an opinion from his Staff. Their answer is embodied in the following letter:
26 December, 1944
Memorandum:
For: The Army Commander
10
It is our belief that the Third Army should continue the offensive and carry the fight to the enemy, and destroy him
11
a Pinched out: The converging attacks of other units made it impossible for VIII Corps units to operate. Therefore, it was considered the VIII Corps was pinched out.
12
The Russians were advancing through East Prussia, had captured Tannenberg and Lodz and were within twenty-five miles of Breslau and 165 miles from Berlin.
13
On this day the XIX TAC flew seven hundred sorties and destroyed two thousand enemy vehicles, to date their best day of the war.
14
^Major General J. F. M. Whitely, British Deputy G-3, for SHAEF.
15
For further details of this gallant fight read Audie Murphy’s To Hell and Back, another infantry action volume in the Bantam War Book Series.
On the twenty-first, General Bradley came to Third Army Headquarters to give us the general plan for future operations, which was as follows: The Twenty-First Army Group and Ninth United States Army were to attack beginning on the twenty-third. When they reached the Rhine, they were to attempt to get a bridgehead. While this was going on, the First Army was to protect the right of the Ninth, and the Third was to stay put—at least in theory. When the Twenty-First Army Group had reached the river, the First Army was to start on Cologne with its left corps. When Cologne was invested, but not necessarily taken, the III and V Corps—that is, the middle and right corps of the First Army—were to attack successively while the Third Army was to drive from the direction of Prum on Coblentz. This phase of the operation was to end when the Allied Armies were bellied up against the Rhine from Cologne to Coblentz.
In the next phase, the First Army was to sit tight along the river, while the Third Army attacked up the old Frankfurt corridor, starting the attack from Saarlautern and either Saarguemines or Saarburg, depending on circumstances.
I asked definitely whether or not I could make a rush at Coblentz prior to the investment of Cologne, and was told that if the opportunity presented itself, I might do so.
On the twenty-second, I decorated a number of nurses with Bronze stars and also Lieutenant James H. Fields of the 4th Armored Division with the Medal of Honor. I told Gaffey I did not want Lieutenant Fields sent to the front any more, because it has been my unfortunate observation that whenever a man gets the Medal of Honor or even the Distinguished Service Cross, he usually attempts to outdo himself and gets killed, whereas, in order to produce a virile race, such men should be kept alive.
From this formation I drove to Remich and met Generals Walker and Morris. I found that Morris had let his bridge train get lost, and therefore was not across at Saarburg, and that, at a late hour in the afternoon when I met him, he was being held up by small-arms fire from the far side of the river. I told him he would have to get the bridge in at once, fire or no fire. General Walker went to Saarburg to put some life into the operation.
The VIII Corps was advancing well and promised to be on the Pram River on the twenty-third.
On that date, the situation in the triangle was very annoying, but due to SHAEF and not to the Germans. The idea of the SHAEF Reserve was very unfortunate, for whenever we succeeded in getting any men from it, we had to put another division back into it. This despite the fact that the three divisions of armor which I had were all properly placed for the attack, and two of them were actually engaged. The best I could do was secure a further respite of forty-eight hours before I would have to send something to replace the 10th Armored Division.
Bradley called and said we would get two new infantry divisions, provided we could send two old divisions to rest. Both the 80th and 90th needed a rest, so this was not difficult—particularly as we did not have to move them out of the Third Army area.
The twenty-fourth of February was noteworthy for the fact that, on this date, non-battle casualties of 13,976 for the operation since January exceeded the battle casualties of 12,296. This was the first time in the history of the Third Army that the non-battle exceeded the battle casualties. It was not due to a great increase in the number of non-battle, but to a marked decrease in the number of battle casualties. The proportion between the two types of casualty is a good index of the efficiency of a division, provided you remember what the normal nonbattle rate usually is.
On the twenty-fifth, I had in for lunch Middleton, Walker, and Gaffey (who was Acting Corps Commander of the XII Corps, as Eddy was on sick leave). General Bradley called and asked if he and Allen could come down also. I coached the three Corps Commanders and General Weyland on persuading Bradley to let us continue the use of the 10th Armored Division for the purpose of taking Trier. Weyland in particular was most eloquent. I am sure Bradley agreed with us, but felt he had to carry out orders. However, we persuaded him to let us cont
inue the attack until dark on the twenty-seventh, provided General Eisenhower would let me call the 90th Division, which was actually not fighting, a reserve division for the purpose of abiding by the rule. Had we been refused permission to continue this attack, the whole history of the war might have been changed, because the capture of Trier was one of the turning points.
I again got Bradley’s assent to attempt a breakthrough east of the Pram River, if and when an opportunity offered. Both Bradley and Allen were much pleased, I am sure, in fact Allen so stated, to be among a group of people who were eager to fight.
The sequence of events leading up to the capture of Trier is of interest, because it violates the normal conception of how generals plan. The initial attack on the Saar—Moselle Triangle had been started by the XX Corps for the purpose of breaking in the 94th Division to battle. Then, on the nineteenth, Walker, who had a very good sense of timing, called to say that, with the assistance of an armored division, he thought he could clear out the triangle. As will be remembered, I borrowed the 10th Armored Division, and things went moderately well until we had forced the crossing at Saarburg. It then occurred to both Walker and me that we had never intended simply to take Saarburg, but had had our eyes fixed on Trier, so we continued.
On the twenty-sixth, the XX Corps was not doing much, as it had been violently attacked east of the Saar and north of Zerf by the German 2d Mountain Division (commanded by General Major Degen), and at that time it looked as if we should have to turn east to remove this division. On the other hand, the XII Corps was doing very well, with the 4th Armored, which was on its left at the Kyll River in the vicinity of Bitburg, while the 5th and 76th Divisions were at or approaching the Kyll. Knowing this, I conceived the idea of moving the 4th Armored south behind the 5th and 76th Infantry Divisions and attacking Trier from the north. General Gaffey, temporarily in command of the XII Corps, pointed out the difficulty, from a logistical standpoint, of moving the 4th Armored, and suggested using the 76th Division,, which was on the right, reinforced by the tank battalion of the 80th Division, which was then resting.
The lesson to be gained from this is that successful generals make plans to fit circumstances, but do not try to create circumstances to fit plans.
The mention of Bitburg reminds me of an incident I saw there, which is very illustrative of the Germans. I entered the town from the south while fighting was still going on along the northern edge, which was not too far distant, as Bitburg is a small place. In spite of the fact that shells were falling with considerable regularity, I saw five Germans, three women and two men, re-roofing a house. They were not even waiting for Lend-Lease, as would be the case in several other countries I could mention.
On the twenty-seventh, the 10th Armored Division advanced eight kilometers north from Zerf and was, therefore, halfway to Trier. The enemy had brought up the 2d Mountain Division the day previously, but had made a mistake in the direction of attack of the 10th Armored. He apparently thought the 10th Armored was to attack southeast from Zerf to get behind the Siegfried Line, so he put in his counter-attack from that direction. Actually the 10th Armored turned north toward Pellingen, but did expose its right rear to attack.
I called Bradley at dark, as I had promised, to tell him that I was not yet in Trier, but was within eight kilometers of it, and asked if I could keep on. He said to keep on until he was ordered by higher authority to stop me, and added that he would keep away from the telephone.
On the twenty-eighth, the 10th Armored was still out of Trier, but was doing better, having reached country in which it could attack with multiple columns. Heretofore it had been necessary to attack in a single column, which, for an armored division, is always difficult.
A visit to General Morris on this date proved rather convincingly that our telephone lines were tapped. Before starting, Codman telephoned and got the name of the town where we were to meet General Morris. When we reached the crossroads near there, an MP met us and stated that the General was in another town, to which he led us. While we were there, the first town received a heavy artillery concentration at the exact time we were supposed to be in it.
Saarburg, the Headquarters of the 94th Division, was the home of John the Blind, King of Bohemia and Duke of Luxembourg, who was killed at the Battle of Crecy in 1346. His crest of three feathers is that now used by the Prince of Wales. He was the founder of the Order of the Red Lion of Luxembourg and of the White Lion of Bohemia—both of which decorations I subsequently received.
On the way home General Malony took me to see what he thought might be a medieval chateau. It turned out to be a modem winery with some very bad wine. While we were looking it over, a shell came about as close to our heads as it could without hitting us.
I suppose the near-miss put our minds on religion. In any event, driving back from this place, one of the officers with me was quite emphatic about his religious ancestry, and finally, to prove his sanctity, said, “By God, General, my people have been Catholics for more than three thousand years.” I remarked, “What, B.C. Catholics?” and he said, “Yes, sir.” I have told this story many times and few people have laughed.
On the first of March, I flew to Bastogne and talked over with General Middleton the proposed plans for his next operation. His idea was to use the 11th Armored Division on the third in order to punch a hole to the Kyll River through the German 5th Paratroop Division. When they reached the river, the crossing was to be effected by the 4th Division following immediately behind the 11th Armored. The rest of his corps was doing well.
In the XII Corps all units were on the line of the Kyll River and the 76'th Division alone had picked up one thousand prisoners.
At 1415, Walker called up to say the 10th Armored Division was in Trier and had captured a bridge over the Moselle intact. The capture of this bridge was due to the heroic act of Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Richardson, deceased. He was riding in the leading vehicle of his battalion of armored infantry when he saw the wires leading to the demolition charges at the far end of the bridge. Jumping out of the vehicle, he raced across the bridge under heavy fire and cut the wires. The acid test of battle brings out the pure metal.
I called Generals Smith and Bradley and told them Trier was ours. Both seemed very pleased.
On March 2, Walker and I were discussing plans for the reduction of the so-called Mettalach Salient south of Saarburg as soon as the 26th Infantry Division, which had rested, had relieved the 94th Division, which was tired. As we were talking, it suddenly occurred to me that a more telling operation would be to cross the Moselle at Schweich with the 10th Armored Division, reinforce it by a regimental combat team of the 76th Infantry Division and move on Wittlich. Walker started working on the plan at once.
Eddy and I crossed the Saar at Echtemach and drove to Bitburg, visiting the 76th, 5th, and 80th Infantry Divisions and the 4th Armored Division. The trip was very interesting for two reasons. First, it showed the tremendous difficulties overcome by the 76th Division in forcing the Siegfried Line at this point, and second, the utter futility of fixed defenses.
From one point on the road along which the 76th Division had successfully advanced, fifteen pillboxes were visible in addition to dragons’ teeth and anti-tank ditches. Yet this relatively green division went through them. We visited the command pillbox for the sector. It consisted of a three-story submerged barracks with toilets, shower baths, a hospital, laundry, kitchen, storerooms, and every conceivable convenience plus an enormous telephone installation. Electricity and heat were produced by a pair of identical diesel engines with generators. Yet the whole offensive capacity of this installation consisted of two machine guns and a 60 mm. mortar operating from steel cupolas which worked up and down by means of hydraulic lifts. The 60 mm. mortar was peculiar in that it was operated by remote control. As in all cases, this particular pillbox was taken by a dynamite charge against the back door. We found marks on the cupolas, which were ten inches thick, where our 90 mm. shells, fired at a range of two hun
dred yards, had simply bounced.
Pacifists would do well to study the Siegfried and Maginot Lines, remembering that these defenses were forced; that Troy fell; that the walls of Hadrian succumbed; that the Great Wall of China was futile; and that, by the same token, the mighty seas which are alleged to defend us can also be circumvented by a resolute and ingenious opponent. In war, the only sure defense is offense, and the efficiency of offense depends on the warlike souls of those conducting it.
On March 3, Gay delivered the order in person to the Commanding General of the 10th Armored Division to cross the Moselle, and, attacking in conjunction with one combat team of the 76th Division, to get a crossing over the Kyll River and continue east parallel to the Moselle. The rest of the XX Corps mopped up rear areas. The XII Corps, 5th Division, forced a bridgehead across the Kyll River for the purpose of breaking loose the 4th Armored. In the VIII Corps, the 11th Armored Division attacked six hours late, through the 4th Infantry Division and ran into considerable resistance.
General Bradley was of the opinion that the Third Army was getting too much spread out, and would not be in a position to make what he called a “power drive” on Coblentz. He was assured that, owing to the road net, no power drive bigger than two divisions could be made, and that those drives were under way: in the VIII Corps the 11th and 90th; in the XII Corps the 4th Armored and 5th Divisions; in the XX Corps the 10th Armored and part of the 76th Division. The 65th Division joined the Third Army in the area of the XX Corps and the 26th Division relieved the 94th Division.
On this date, March 4, the Ninth Army and the First Army were along the line of the Rhine River. During the preceding thirty days the prisoners taken by the Third Army had averaged one thousand per day, and the total number of prisoners taken since the start of the operation on January 29 exceeded the total number of battle casualties inflicted on the Third Army for the same period.
War as I Knew It Page 24