In the XII Corps, the 5th Infantry Division had forced its bridgehead over the Kyll and in the XX Corps the 10th Armored Division forced a crossing over the Kyll River farther south and moved east, north of the Moselle.
On March 5, the 4th Armored Division of the XII Corps started its break for the Rhine with an advance of sixteen kilometers, and in spite of rain and mud, reached the vicinity of the town of Daun.
At 1000 on the sixth, I called Bradley and told him for the first time that the XII Corps was on its way to the Rhine, and urged that the right of the First Army be ordered to get a move on so as not to delay the left of the 87th Division on the left of the Third Army.
During the course of the day, the 4th Armored overran and captured the Commanding General of the German 53d Army Corps (commanded by General von Rothkirch and General Lieutenant Botsch).
In the VIII Corps, on our north flank, three bridges, one for the 4th Infantry, one for the 11th Armored, and one for the 90th Division, were placed over the Kyll.
Prince Felix of Luxembourg, escorted by General Gay, visited the front and inspected the 10th Armored Division and also the city of Trier. As a result of this trip, General Gay believed that the area north of the Rhine in the zone of the Third Army was almost cleaned up, and that we should make plans for an attack to the southeast in the Palatinate. He recommended that the attack of the 10th Armored be discontinued, as it would eventually be pinched out by the continued attack of the XII Corps, and he thought it could be used more profitably elsewhere.
On March 7, at 1700, the 4th Armored Division reached the Rhine River. The 11th Armored Division, which began to do better on this day, pushed forward to the vicinity of Kyllberg. The attack of the 10th Armored Division was ordered stopped.
On this day we processed through the cages and photographed the two hundred thousandth German prisoner. When we sent this to Public Relations, Twelfth Army Group, they would not publish the picture, because, as the man had a sign on him stating he was the two hundred thousandth prisoner of war, they said he was being degraded, which was contrary to the Geneva Convention.
On the eighth, on orders from above, we lost the 6th Armored Division to the Sixth Army Group.
We had a Staff conference at which all the Staff, including General Weyland, was present, to determine the future plan of action of the Third Army and XIX Tactical Air Command. The scheme then devised, and later executed, was as follows: To attack with two corps with the purpose of seizing bridgeheads over the Rhine River in the vicinity of Mainz, Oppenheim, and Worms. The XX Corps, consisting of the 94th, 26th, and 80th Infantry Divisions and the 10th Armored Division, later reinforced by the 65th Infantry and the 12th Armored, was to attack from Trier—Saarburg in the direction of Kaiserslautern. The XII Corps, consisting of the 4th Armored, the 5th, 76th, 90th, and 89th Infantry Divisions,1 was to attack south across the Moselle River southeast of Mayen, heading initially on Bingen and Bad Kreuznach, with the purpose of cutting off the recrossing of the Rhine by the enemy and securing a crossing for us somewhere between Mainz and Worms. The VIII Corps, with the 87th and 4th Infantry and 11th Armored, was to continue mopping up north of the Moselle and west of the Rhine, with the distinct understanding that if we could secure a crossing over the Rhine, it was to be exploited.
General Bradley stated he would prefer us not to attack south, over the Moselle, unless we secured a bridge intact.
The First Army seemed to be doing very well at the Remagen bridgehead. We were quite happy over it, but just a little envious.
On the ninth, I joined Generals Bradley, Hodges, Doolittle, Simpson, and some others to receive the French Legion of Honor, Grand Officer grade, and Croix de Guerre with Palm. Before the ceremony, Bradley and I arranged to have the boundary of the Third Army moved to the south, so as to give us Saarlautem as a place to cross over the Saar River. I then ordered Gay, over the telephone, to have the 80th Division join the XX Corps and the 90th Division join the XII Corps. We all felt it was essential that the First and Third Armies should get themselves so involved that Montgomery’s plan to use most of the divisions on the western front, British and American, under his command, for an attack on the Ruhr plains, could not come off, and the First and Third Armies be left out on a limb.
There was some talk of trying to co-ordinate the plans of attack of the Third and Seventh Armies, but since the Seventh Army could not jump off until the fifteenth, I determined to attack as soon as I could, as I felt that time was more valuable than co-ordination. In fact, it is my opinion that co-ordination is a very much-misused word and its accomplishment is difficult.
1Commanded by Major General T. D. Finley.
The tenth and eleventh were very slow days, as everybody was getting set for the next operation. However, it gave us time to assemble the Corps Commanders. Fortunately, General Patch, Seventh Army, was also present at the meeting, so everyone knew what was going to happen, and Patch agreed to let Walker (my south corps) co-ordinate with Haislip, commanding his north corps. Patch was always extremely easy to work with.
This was the day that I received my set of Third Army table silver, which I had ordered through General Littlejohn,1 and paid for personally.
Walker was unable to get off on the twelfth, but promised to jump at 0300 on the thirteenth. The XII Corps was ready to jump shortly after midnight on the fourteenth.
Littlejohn and I spent a long time discussing and inspecting uniforms. We finally came to the conclusion that the best uniform for war is combat shoes properly made, with the flesh side out, heavy woolen trousers cut not to exceed eighteen inches at the bottom, a woolen shirt, a helmet or helmet liner, and, for winter, a modified trench-coat with a liner and gloves. The shirt and trousers make the most useful, most uniform, and the best-looking outfit which our soldiers possess, and by giving them two weights of shirt and possibly one weight of trousers (heavy), we would have a simple and effective uniform which nobody could easily deface.
A general who had been relieved came in at his own request and tried to explain why he was no good. I offered him a lesser command in another division, but he told me he needed forty-eight hours to consider it. I did not tell him so, but I realized that any man who could not make up his mind in less than forty-eight hours was not fit to command troops in battle.
^ajor General Robert M. Littlejohn, Chief Quartermaster for General Eisenhower.
Here ended the campaign which will probably be referred to in history as that of the Eifel. It had been a long, hard fight with many river crossings, much bad weather, and a great deal of good luck. As of this date, March 12, the casualty balance stood as follows:
6 THE CAPTURE OF COBLENTZ AND THE PALATINE CAMPAIGN
13 March to 21 March, 1945
The Third Army’s Campaign was considered by many, including the Germans, to be one of the greatest campaigns of the entire war.
In ten days, twelve of its divisions catapulted south across the Moselle, each trying to outdo the other, racing through the rear areas of German troops still facing the American Seventh Army in the Siegfried Line farther south, surrounding or destroying two German armies, and capturing over sixty thousand prisoners and ten thousand square miles of territory with minimum losses.
On March 22, eight divisions, set for the kill, were on the Rhine, south of Coblentz. Four armored divisions, followed by supporting infantry units, thundered over the Honsbrouck Mountains, “impassable to armor .” The Germans were confused, bewildered, and helpless. The enemy was a beaten mass of men, women, and children, interspersed with die-hard Nazis. The war had been won west of the Rhine, as General Patton had predicted almost a year before. The Third Army was in a position to cross the Rhine at Mainz, Worms, and Oppenheim. (See Map, pages 244-245.)
In the Sixth Army Group, the offensive to the Rhine continued, and the enemy withdrew on the north flank, offering stiff resistance in the Siegfried Line.
On other fronts, Panay capitulated to Mac Arthur, Mandalay still held out in Burma, and
the fighting progressed slowly in Italy.
The air forces continued pounding Germany, concentrating their heavy raids on Berlin.
P.D.H.
The Beginning of the End
The attack of the XX Corps jumped off on time, March 13, but was not fast, owing to particularly bad terrain in front of both the 94th and 26th Infantry Divisions. The XII Corps was ready to jump off in the vicinity of Treis at 0200 on the morning of the fourteenth. When the XII Corps attacked, with the 5th Infantry Division on the right and the 90th on the left, it built four bridges across the Moselle before noon, and by the end of the day had fourteen battalions on the southern side of the river. Here a case of extremely good luck, or Divine intervention, occurred, because, on the afternoon of the twelfth, at least half of the 2d German Mountain Division was opposite the place of crossing, but apparently they were fooled by the attack of the XX Corps and moved down to meet it, thereby permitting the XII Corps to cross over, practically unopposed. This illustrates the desirability of having a divergence of timing in an attack.
I drove to Trier via Wasservillig. The Roman legions marching on Trier from Luxembourg used this same road, and one could almost smell the coppery sweat and see the low dust clouds where those stark fighters moved forward into battle. As a memorial to their great deeds, the least demolished building standing in Trier was the gateway to the Roman amphitheater. The rest of the middle of the city, and all the bridges, except the one we captured intact, were pretty badly ruined. I visited the 10th Armored, the 80th, 94th, and 26th Infantry Divisions. I was anxious at this time for fear that the Seventh Army, which jumped off on the morning of the fifteenth, would beat me into Mainz. It would have helped my self-confidence if I could have read the future.
On the fifteenth, I flew to Mayen and saw General Eddy of the XII Corps and General Middleton of the VIII Corps. When I told Middleton I would have to take everything away from him except the 87th Division, but would give him the 76th as soon as possible, he made no kick at all, but came back with a brilliant suggestion for the immediate capture of Coblentz with the 87th. He was one of the easiest Corps Commanders to do business with I have ever known, and also one of the most efficient.
The rest of the Army did not do very well except on the front of the 80th and 94th Infantry Divisions, where gains up to six miles were secured.
Flying back to Headquarters, I made detours to get pictures of Vianden and Clairvaux, both of which are excellent chateaux of different types—one the river fort, the other the rock fort.
At 1100 on the sixteenth, Bradley called up to say that General Eisenhower was probably over my town in an airplane, since he had been unable to land at Bradley’s. I hurried to the field and met him shortly after two o’clock. He was accompanied by General Smith. We went at once to the Map Room, and both were quite enthusiastic and complimentary, Smith stating that I could borrow any division I needed after the success I had had with the 10th Armored. In the afternoon we had a guard of honor for Smith, which I believe was the first one he had ever had.
Then General Eisenhower and I took two peeps and drove to Trier, visiting the Command Post of Combat Command “A” of the 10th Armored Division, where we met General Morris and the Assistant Division Commander, General Pibern. Elements of the 10th Armored and the 90th Divisions both reached the Nahe River and secured bridges. The 11th Armored Division joined the XII Corps and assembled in the vicinity of Boullay, preparatory to crossing behind the 89th Division. The 87th Division crossed the Moselle northeast of the 90th and got into the outskirts of Coblentz, while the 28th Division, temporarily loaned to me by the First Army, joined the VIII Corps and took over the river front south of the First Army to Coblentz exclusive.
General Eisenhower told Smith to have the 12th Armored Division from the Seventh Army released to my Army and join the XX Corps, moving on the morning of the seventeenth.
On the seventeenth, General Eisenhower attended the morning briefing and was most complimentary. He stated that we, as veterans, did not realize our own greatness and were not cocky enough, and told us to be sure that other people realized how good the Americans were. As an example, he said that the newspapers referred to the enemy fighting on the front of the 4th Armored Division as done by weak numbers of Germans, but failed to give credit to the 4th Armored for its rapidity of movement, which prevented large numbers of Germans from getting ahead of it.
We flew to Luneville to see Generals Patch and Devers. There was some idea that Patch and I should occupy the same Command Post, but after we explained that we had perfect telephone communication and that our points of interest were widely separated, the thing was not pushed.
On returning to Luxembourg, I had a press conference and brought out the points mentioned by General Eisenhower. I stated also that three divisions of Marines in the Pacific were getting great credit by reporting their tremendous losses, while twelve or thirteen divisions in our Army were getting no credit because we did not have tremendous losses. I asked the newspapers to fix it up, then gave them the score sheet (the American casualty list, actual, compared to the estimated German casualty list) of the Third Army and told them to publish it.
The question of our tanks versus German tanks came up, and I answered that by saying that, in the course of the fighting so far, we had got two German tanks for every one we lost. I stated also that all of our equipment, clothing, etc., was superior to anything the Allies or the Germans had.
Thinking over the criticism of the tanks as a result of the discussion with the war correspondents, I wrote a letter to General Handy restating what I had told the correspondents. This letter was given wide publicity and had considerable effect in stopping the foolish criticism, which was not only untrue, but was also having a bad effect on the morale of our soldiers.1
Walker called up around 1800 with a request to relieve one of his division commanders. I told him if he could name a better one, he could relieve him, but he could not. I then called Eddy and gave him hell because the 11th Armored had not got anywhere. In order to make it a perfect day, I called Middleton and told him that at least he had not been cussed out, and congratulated him on his great feat in capturing Coblentz.
The eighteenth was not a particularly good or bad day. The 4th Armored was held up by a vicious counterattack by two Grenadier regiments of the 2d Panzer Division (commanded by General Lieutenant von Luttwitz and General Major von Lauchert). The remaining units of the VIII, XII, and XX Corps did well, but not brilliantly.
1The story that spread throughout America about our tanks being inferior to German tanks finally reached the soldiers on the front lines and caused some apprehension among them.
Taking two individual tanks and comparing them on a point by point basis—gun, muzzle velocity, armor protection, etc.— perhaps gives a shade to the German tank if you compared their “top” heavies to ours at that time. If the two tanks met on a village street and were to fight it out, everything else being equal the American tank would probably have suffered. However, this was not General Patton’s idea of how tanks should be used in battle. His idea was never to use tanks in a tank-to-tank fight, but to break them through the enemy lines and let them run amuck in the rear areas.
General Patton, knowing how such rumors were apt to affect adversely the morale of the troops, tried to explode the rumor before its unfortunate results took effect. The General probably knew tanks as well as any other American soldier. He had studied them intensely from their inception in World War I. He pointed out the advantage of mobility, lack of mechanical failures, power turrets, gyro stabilizers, and total numbers, in all of which we held the upper hand over the enemy. He showed where we were and with what, compared to where the enemy had retreated to and what he had left.
The results were self-evident, and General Patton’s faith in the American soldier, coupled with the soldier’s ingenuity, guts, and fighting ability when in an American tank, did a lot to spike the nasty rumor that was likely to affect, not only America
n fighting morale at the front, but also the morale of the workers at home, who were striving so hard to produce nothing but the best.
On the nineteenth, the situation was much better. The VIII Corps had completed the cleaning-up of Coblentz. In the XII Corps the 4th Armored was six miles from Worms and ten miles from Mainz. The 90th and 5th Infantry Divisions were across the Nahe River. Part of the 11th Armored Division was at Neisenheim and in contact with the 12th Armored of the XX Corps, which was at Lauterecken. The 10th and part of the 12th Armored were both about twelve miles from Kaiserslautern, with the 80th and 94th right on their tails.
It was my opinion then that, if the war ceased at that moment, troops under my command would have had the best and most successful campaign in history. I am still of that opinion.
Hodges and Bradley came in in the afternoon and things looked gloomy, for if we could not secure a crossing over the Rhine, we would probably lose ten divisions to the Ninth Army under Montgomery, and have to go on the defensive. If, however, we could get across before the British attack, we could carry the ball. Hodges and I determined that he would cross at Remagen and I in the vicinity of Mainz, and make an initial meeting at Geissen. From there he would take the autobahn road and roads to the west, while I would get the roads east and advance through Kassel and Hanau.
On the twentieth, the operations were going particularly well. In the XII Corps, a task force of the 90th Division was approaching the Rhine and closing in south of Mainz, which would cut off all the available escape routes as far south as that town. Combat Command “A” of the 4th Armored (commanded by Colonel H. A. Sears) was nine miles northeast of Kaiserslautern, while Combat Command “B” (commanded by Colonel C. W. Abrams) of the same division was by-passing the town, the occupation of which was left to the 80th Division.
War as I Knew It Page 25