War as I Knew It

by George S. Patton

  1The code name of the plan for the occupation of Germany.

  After lunch, General Walker arranged for us to witness one of the exhibitions, which was extremely interesting and magnificently performed. However, it struck me as rather strange that, in the midst of a world at war, some twenty young and middle-aged men in great physical condition, together with about thirty grooms, had spent their entire time teaching a group of horses to wiggle their butts and raise their feet in consonance with certain signals from the heels and reins. Much as I like horses, this seemed to me wasted energy. On the other hand, it is probably wrong to permit any highly developed art, no matter how fatuous, to perish from the earth—and which arts are fatuous depends on the point of view. To me the high-schooling of horses is certainly more interesting than either painting or music.

  After leaving the XX Corps, the Under-Secretary and I flew over Linz, which was much more destroyed than I had thought. We then landed at the Headquarters of the XII Corps, where we were met by General Irwin. From there we flew back to Headquarters, arriving at 2000 o’clock.

  The Under-Secretary has a most remarkable memory for names, and could tell the officers to whom he was introduced where he had last seen them. He is also exceptionally well informed on history, particularly that of the Civil War, so we had a very enjoyable talk together. He is the only member of the Government, so far as I know, who possesses the Distinguished Service Cross, which he won in the infantry in World War I.

  After he left on the eighth, Bradley and Allen came to lunch and we discussed a number of points which we wished to determine about the zones we would occupy. However, owing to the fact that SHAEF had as yet not come to a decision, it was impossible to do more than surmise what was going to happen.

  At the regular briefing on the morning of the eighth, I spoke to the officers stating that this was the last briefing we would have in Europe, emphasizing the word “Europe.” I think most of them realized I was hoping to have some more briefings in Asia, but “The best-laid plans of mice and men,” etc. I then thanked each member of the Staff for what he had done and assured them that no one man can conduct an army, but that the success of any army depends on the harmonious working of its staff and the magnificent fighting ability of the combat officers and enlisted men. Without this teamwork, war cannot be successfully fought.

  The eighth of May marked exactly two and one-half years since we had landed in Africa. During all that time until midnight of May 8-9, we had been in practically continuous battle, and, when not in battle, had been under the strain of continuous criticism, which I believe is harder to bear.

  At 1130 I said good-bye to the war correspondents after having a final briefing with them, during which one of them said, “General, why didn’t we take Prague?” I said, “I can tell you exactly why,” whereupon they all got out their notebooks and looked expectant. I said, “Because we were ordered not to,” which produced a laugh, even though they were disappointed. Afterward I signed a great many short snorter notes and posed for innumerable photographs with them. By and large the correspondents with the Third Army did a splendid and loyal job and succeeded in getting to the people at home an excellent and intimate picture of war as we fought it.1

  1Little or nothing is known or has ever been said of the Third Army’s duplication of Hannibal’s feat—crossing the Alps.

  At war’s end, when the situation in Jugoslavia was not clear, the Third Army was ordered to move five divisions into the Fifth Army and British Area, south of the Alps, north of Trieste. Without so much as a wink of an eyelash, the 3d United States Cavalry Group moved out. In twelve hours, it had crossed the Alps and was thoroughly mixed up with British troops in northern Italy. General Clark, who had not been informed of such a movement, made haste to congratulate General Patton on the alacrity and boldness of his movement; however, he lost no time in informing General Eisenhower that additional troops were not needed. General Clark requested that the troops be withdrawn—for administrative reasons.

  They were—with the same zest and determination as aforementioned.

  I received a very fine letter of congratulation fromthe Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, which reads as follows:

  I congratulate you and your heroic soldiers of the Third Army. I commend you for the dashing and spectacular victories which have played a great part in bringing about this glorious day. The exploits of the Third Army have been in the highest traditions of the armies that have defended America throughout its history.

  You and your gallant forces well deserve the nation’s homage.

  This letter, I think, very fittingly marks the termination of the war, and, I fear, my last one.

  I can say this, that throughout the campaign in Europe I know of no error I made except that of failing to send a Combat Command to take Hammelburg. Otherwise, my operations were, to me, strictly satisfactory. In every case, practically throughout the campaign, I was under wraps from the Higher Command. This may have been a good thing, as perhaps I am too impetuous. However, I do not believe I was, and feel that had I been permitted to go all out, the war would have ended sooner and more lives would have been saved. Particularly I think this statement applies to the time when, in the early days of September, we were halted, owing to the desire, or necessity, on the part of General Eisenhower in backing Montgomery’s move to the north. At that time there was no question of doubt but that we could have gone through and on across the Rhine within ten days. This would have saved a great many thousand men.

  As the Church says, “Here endeth the Second Lesson.”)

  The final casualty report, that of May 8, 1945, follows:

  1The prisoners of war scored above were those taken in actual battle prior to midnight of May 8-9. Subsequent to that date the taking of prisoners was not a sporting event, so I have not recorded it, although the numbers went into the millions. Author's note.

  PART THREE

  RETROSPECT

  REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

  1 2

  Probably there is nothing original in what I shall now put down, because war is an ancient subject and I, an ancient man, have studied and practiced it for over forty years. So, what appears to me as original thought may be simply subconscious memories.

  I

  CONCERNING THE SOLDIER

  The soldier is the Army. No army is better than its soldiers. The soldier is also a citizen. In fact, the highest obligation and privilege of citizenship is that of bearing arms for one’s country. Hence it is a proud privilege to be a soldier—a good soldier. Anyone, in any walk of life, who is content with mediocrity is untrue to himself and to American tradition. To be a good soldier a man must have discipline, self-respect, pride in his unit and in his country, a high sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and to his superiors, and self-confidence bom of demonstrated ability.

  There has been, and is now, a great deal of talk about discipline; but few people, in or out of the Army, know what it is or why it is necessary.

  When a man enters the Army, he leaves home, usually for the first time, and also he leaves behind him the inhibitions resulting from his respect for the opinion of his parents and his friends; which inhibitions, unknown to himself, have largely guided his existence. When he joins a unit and lacks this corrective influence, he is apt to slip in morals, in neatness, and in energy. Administrative discipline must replace the absent inhibitions.

  All human beings have an innate resistance to obedience. Discipline removes this resistance and, by constant repetition, makes obedience habitual and subconscious. Where would an undisciplined football team get? The players react subconsciously to the signals. They must, because the split second required for thought would give the enemy the jump.

  Battle is much more exigent than football. No sane man is unafraid in battle, but discipline produces in him a form of vicarious courage which, with his manhood, makes for victory. Self-respect grows directly from discipline. The Army saying, “Who ever saw a dirty soldier with
a medal?” is largely true. Pride, in turn, stems from self-respect and from the knowledge that the soldier is an American. The sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and superiors comes from a knowledge of reciprocal obligation, and from the sharing of the same way of life. Self-confidence, the greatest military virtue, results from the demonstrated ability derived from the acquisition of all the preceding qualities and from exercise in the use of weapons.

  It is an unfortunate and, to me, tragic fact that, in our attempts to prevent war, we have taught our people to belittle the heroic qualities of the soldier. They do not realize that, as Shakespeare put it, the pursuit of “The bubble reputation even at the cannon’s mouth” is not only a good military characteristic, but also very helpful to the young man when bullets and shells are whistling and cracking around him. Much more could be done if the women of America would praise their heroes, and if papers would publish the citations of soldiers in their home towns; and further, if foolish ideas of security did not make the citations so unrealistic. Perhaps the returning soldiers of this war may correct this very unfortunate situation.

  One of Kipling’s poems starts as follows:

  When the ’arf-made recruity goes out to the East,

  ’E acts like a babe an’’e drinks like a beast,

  An' 'e wonders because 'e is frequent deceased

  Ere e's fit for to serve as a soldier .. -3

  All our soldiers do not drink like beasts. In fact, the lack of drinking in our Army is remarkable. However, many do act like babes. What follows is an attempt to make certain suggestions which have proved useful.

  Do not dig slit trenches under trees if you can avoid it, because a shell passing overhead and striking the tree acts as an airburst and the fragments come straight down, so that your slit trench is useless to you, although it may be of some assistance to the Graves Registration people.

  Slit trenches for gun crews must be in the close vicinity of the gun, else the men waste too much time getting from the trenches to the gun. Also they are just as apt to get killed while making the run as they would be if they stayed by the gun. Finally, a gun that is not firing is useless and its crew are disloyal to the soldiers in front of them, whom they are supposed to be supporting.

  The trick expression, “Dig or die,” is much overused and much misunderstood. Wars are not won by defensive tactics. Digging is primarily defensive. The only time it is proper for a soldier to dig is when he has reached his final objective in an attack, or when he is bivouacking under circumstances where he thinks he may be strafed from the air or is within artillery range of the enemy. Personally, I am opposed to digging under such circumstances, as the chance of getting killed while sleeping normally on the ground is quite remote, and the fatigue from digging innumerable slit trenches is avoided. Also, the psychological effect on the soldier is bad, because if he thinks he has to dig he must think the enemy is dangerous, which he usually is not.

  “Hit the dirt” is another expression which has done much to increase our casualties. Frequently in fighting Germans, and probably other troops in the next war, we will find that they have resort to their knowledge of our custom of hitting the dirt. What they do is wait until we have arrived at a predetermined spot on which they have ranged rockets, mortars, or artillery and then they put on a sudden and violent machine-gun fire—frequently straight up in the air. The soldier, obsessed with the idea of hitting the dirt, lies down and waits supinely for the arrival of the shells from the mortars, rockets, etc. He usually does not have to wait long.

  The only time it is proper for a soldier to drop is when he is caught at short range—under three hundred yards—by concentrated small-arms fire. But even then he must not hit the dirt and stay supine. He must shoot fast at the enemy, or in the direction of the enemy, because it is as true now as when Farragut stated it in the Civil War that “The best armor (and the best defense) is a rapid and well-directed fire.” It is a sad commentary on our troops that frequently we get the report that such and such a unit is pinned down under fire, and later the same unit comes back.

  When soldiers are caught in a barrage, either from mortars, rockets, or artillery, the surest way to get out of it is to go forward fast, because it is almost the invariable practice of the enemy to increase rather than decrease his range.

  In the days when the chief small-arms fire on the battlefield was delivered by rifles, it may have been necessary to advance by rushing in order to build up the firing line. Today, when the chief small-arms fire on the battlefield and the majority of the neutralizing fire is delivered by machine guns, mortars, and artillery, there is no advantage in advancing by rushes, because, until you get within three hundred yards, small-arms fire has very little effect, whereas when you lie down between rushes you expose yourself to the effect of shrapnel. When you get to three hundred yards, your own small-arms fire, which is superior to anything now existing or which will probably ever exist, will neutralize that of the enemy small-arms fire, so that you do not have to advance by rushes. I say this very feelingly because I have seen, on many occasions in maneuvers and in battle, troops advancing by rushes when they were defiladed behind hills and could have gone forward in limousines, had they been available, with perfect impunity.

  Marching Fire: The proper way to advance, particularly for troops armed with that magnificent weapon, the M-l rifle, is to utilize marching fire and keep moving. This fire can be delivered from the shoulder, but it is just as effective if delivered with the butt of the rifle halfway between the belt and the armpit. One round should be fired every two or three paces. The whistle of the bullets, the scream of the ricochet, and the dust, twigs, and branches which are knocked from the ground and the trees have such an effect on the enemy that his small-arms fire becomes negligible.

  Meanwhile, our troops in rear, using high-angle fire, should put out the enemy’s mortars and artillery. As I have stated, even if we fail to put out the mortars and artillery, the most foolish thing possible is to stop under such fire. Keep walking forward. Furthermore, the fact that you are shooting adds to your self-confidence, because you feel that you are doing something, and are not sitting like a duck in a bathtub being shot at.

  In marching fire all weapons must be used. The light machine guns can be used while walking—one man carrying the belt, the other man carrying the gun. The same is true of the Browning automatic rifle and, of course, as previously stated, of the M-l. The 60 mm. mortar, advanced by alternate sections, can do much in the same way. The 81 mm. usually should support from one position.

  I think, if we should say that “Fire is the Queen of Battles,” we should avoid arm arguments and come nearer telling the truth. Battles are won by fire and by movement. The purpose of the movement is to get the fire in a more advantageous place to play on the enemy. This is from the rear or flank.

  60 mm. Mortar

  Every soldier should realize that casualties in battle are the result of two factors: first, effective enemy fire, and second, the time during which the soldier is exposed to that fire. The enemy’s effectiveness in fire is reduced by your fire or by night attacks. The time you are exposed is reduced by the rapidity of your advance.

  Bravery and Courage: If we take the generally accepted definition of bravery as a quality which knows not fear, I have never seen a brave man. All men are frightened. The more intelligent they are, the more they are frightened. The courageous man is the man who forces himself, in spite of his fear, to carry on. Discipline, pride, self-respect, self-confidence, and the love of glory are attributes which will make a man courageous even when he is afraid.

  The greatest weapon against the so-called “battle fatigue” is ridicule. If soldiers would realize that a large proportion of men allegedly suffering from battle fatigue are really using an easy way out, they would be less sympathetic. Any man who says he has battle fatigue is avoiding danger and forcing on those who have more hardihood than himself the obligation of meeting it. If soldiers would make fun of those who
begin to show battle fatigue, they would prevent its spread, and also save the man who allows himself to malinger by this means from an after-life of humiliation and regret.

  Trench foot: Soldiers must look after themselves, particularly in wet or cold weather. This applies particularly to “trenchfoot,” which, with reasonable assistance by the Higher Command, can be largely prevented if the soldier will only take the trouble to massage his feet and put on dry socks. He is not responsible for the arrival of the dry socks, but, provided they do arrive, he is responsible for putting them on.

  The same thing is true of venereal disease. Soldiers do not have to contract it if they will take the precautions which the military establishment provides. When they do contract it, they are disloyal to their comrades, because, while they are recovering, somebody else is doing their work.

  II

  SMALL UNIT TACTICS

  Squads should seldom be split. However, if it is necessary to split a squad, be sure that the unit separated is at least capable of mutual support. This means that the unit separated from the squad should not be fewer than three men. The squad possesses in itself the weapons necessary for a base of fire and a maneuvering element. This should be its invariable method of attack, but the squad leader should not spend so much time thinking which way he is going to envelop that he suffers casualties which would have been avoided had he attacked at once.