Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare

by Colin P. Clarke Ph. d.

  Ideology

  From the beginning, Hezbollah militants and their Iranian handlers adhered to an ideological worldview stemming from the shared experience of clerical training and religious study in the Shia seminaries of Najaf, Iraq. This ideological fervor encompassed three uncompromising elements, including a belief in Shia Islam, the supreme rule of the wilayat al-faqih, and a duty to practice jihad, or struggle in the name of Allah.108 The main point here is that from day one, Hezbollah militants were dogmatic in their devotion to the austere version of Shia Islam being exported by Ayatollah Khomeini and his inner circle. Nevertheless, IRGC units provided the nascent movement with ideological guidance to reinforce these beliefs and urged Hezbollah’s core membership to adhere to strict Islamic behavior while adopting an “anti-Zionist” platform that still defines the group to this day.109 This “ideological indoctrination” was a deliberate campaign aimed at recruiting and training radical Shia throughout the Bekaa Valley.110

  Hezbollah’s ideology has been described as “a fiery mix of revolutionary Khomeinism, Shia nationalism, celebration of martyrdom, and militant anti-Zionism, occasionally accompanied by crude, neo-fascist anti-Semitism.”111 Its ideological approach is epitomized by Nasrallah, whose ability to preach in various terms—religious, nationalist, Arab, anti-Israeli—is an effective means to rally supporters to Hezbollah’s cause.112 As Norton observes, “ideological currents have shifted dramatically in the last two decades in favor of Hezbollah, which offers an ideological vision that many Shia now find persuasive.”113

  Not only does the group look to the teachings of the late Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini for inspiration, but many scholars believe that Hezbollah is actually more faithful to the legacy of the Islamic Revolution than are most ordinary Iranians themselves. But not all experts agree on Iran’s role in shaping Hezbollah’s ideology. For example, As’ad Abu Khalil argues that it is “inaccurate” to describe Hezbollah as an Iranian creation and that the group’s ideological platform is the product of the “Islamization” of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and theory.114 Still, even a cursory glance at Hezbollah’s founding charter as captured in its 1985 open letter addressed to the “Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World,” reveals language heavily colored by the Iranian revolution.115 Indeed, Hezbollah’s ideological links to Iran have helped shape the group’s stance on the nature of conflict, the ideal character of the nation-state, how to relate to other Muslims, and finally, its overall approach to dealing with the West.116

  Hezbollah’s outlook can be considered binary. This ideological partition divides the world between the exploited and the exploiters, or the oppressed (mustad’afin) and the oppressors (mustakbirin).117 This dichotomy attempts to convey the dualism and millenarianism of the Shia community which views itself as a perpetual underdog in its struggle to achieve equality and justice.118 In Hezbollah’s worldview, oppression takes many forms, including economic, cultural, political, and social and transcends both nationality and religion.119 The central tenets of Hezbollah’s charter include the obligations to struggle against secularism, injustice, and the oppression of the ummah by foreign imperialists, especially America and Israel.120 In the words of Nasrallah’s deputy Sheikh Na’im Qaseem, “even if hundreds of years should pass by, Israel’s existence will continue to be an illegal existence.”121 According to Hezbollah’s ideology, the mere existence of Israel is anathema.122

  Human Resources and Recruitment

  The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps dispatched to Lebanon was tasked with the difficult mission of creating something from nothing. The leadership in Tehran sought to cultivate a terrorist proxy that would remain faithful to the tenets of the Islamic Revolution while also serving as a strike force capable of carrying out Iran’s dirty work yet affording the mullahs, who were often several steps removed, the luxury of plausible deniability. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 may have provided the impetus for Shia fighters to band together, but benefits helped too. IRGC members organized a comprehensive recruiting drive, which included a monthly stipend and other financial incentives such as subsidized education and no cost medical treatment for fighters and their families.123

  Imad Mughniyeh functioned as the go-between among various factions of the organization and its associates. One of his main areas of effort was recruiting Lebanese expatriates abroad and preparing them for terrorist operations inside of Israel.124 Highly prized recruits included anyone with foreign language skills, a “Western looking appearance,” or a European passport, which would make international travel much less onerous. Much like Al-Qaida does today, Mugniyeh attempted to recruit foreign nationals who had converted Islam and could be thoroughly vetted and indoctrinated by the group. These individuals would be used for myriad purposes, from suicide attacks to auxiliary reconnaissance. According to Ranstorp, Germany was one of Mugniyeh’s favorite recruiting spots. For missions that involved infiltrating Israel, he sought to build a network of Israeli Arabs.125

  Hezbollah is a prominent example of an insurgent group that enjoys a significant amount of popular support, both domestically and within the wider Arab and Islamic world. Hezbollah’s main base of support is located in three general areas: Beirut and its surrounding environs; southern Lebanon; and the Bekaa Valley/Hirmil Region.126 Support for Hezbollah in Lebanon is apparent by its role as a major political player in Lebanon, as the group continues to consolidate power.127 Anecdotal evidence from newspapers and journal articles suggests that Hezbollah is perhaps more popular than ever before.

  In an effort to quantify this support, Simon Haddad of Notre Dame University in Jounieh, Lebanon has conducted comprehensive survey research to unearth the reasons for the group’s “rock ‘n roll” like status. Haddad’s study concludes that the Party of God is so beloved in the Shia community for its adherence to religious piety and the social aspects of Islam. Furthermore, the majority of respondents polled held positive views toward the growth of the organization and its use of force, while backing Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559.128

  According to a World Public Opinion.org poll conducted in August 2006, support for Hezbollah was measured as the following: 96 percent of Shias, 87 percent of Sunnis, 80 percent of Christians, and 80 percent of Druze.129 Hezbollah’s popularity should come as little surprise. In contrast to other political parties and even the Lebanese state, Hezbollah provides a wide range of social services at little or no cost to the community. Hezbollah offers a “vast network of womb-to-tomb services” including hospitals, schools, orphanages, and credit programs.130 In the absence of the state’s ability to provide for all of its citizens, Hezbollah has filled the void and come to the rescue of the oft-neglected Shia community of southern Lebanon.131 The Lebanese government has welcomed these efforts in recognition that they are required for domestic stability. Several scholars have found that when an insurgent group is the only provider of goods and services in an area, support for these organizations is higher than in areas where multiple entities supply services.132

  These programs can be divided between large service providers and smaller, more specifically targeted outreach efforts.133 Some of the larger services include JAB, or Construction Jihad, and the Islamic Health Committee (IHC), both opened in 1984. Three years later, in 1987, the Relief Committee of Imam Khomenei (RCIK) was opened in the Hrat Hreik section of the southern suburbs around Beirut.134 The Relief Committee was responsible for the creation of an employment office as well as the formation of several technical trade institutes, including those open to women. These services, in addition to many others throughout Lebanon, receive funding from Iran. In the early years, Hezbollah reportedly received between five and ten million dollars a month, although Jaber suggests that it is possible that the figures are higher.135 The funding has decreased over time, but financing from Iran is still considered a major resource for Hezbollah, which uses the money to maintain its ubiquitous social welfare infrastructure.

>   Media, PR, Propaganda, and Publicity

  Hezbollah transmitted the first broadcast of its television station Al-Manar (“The Beacon”) in 1991 and began regularly scheduled broadcasts a mere three years later. Al-Manar is also known as Qanat Al-Moqawama, or the Station of Resistance, and serves a critical function as the main dissemination point for Hezbollah news and propaganda. In addition to Al-Manar, Hezbollah maintains an extensive media operation that includes Al-Nur Radio, Al-Intiqad Weekly Journal, Baqiatollah Islamic Magazine, as well as a network of over 50 Web sites that operate in several languages, including English, French, German, and Arabic.136 Al-Manar is not just a Lebanese phenomenon. Rather, its popularity has facilitated its growth into one of the leading news organizations of the Arab world. The station broadcasts worldwide via satellite and runs on an annual budget of roughly $15 million.137

  Insurgency is armed politics, and a large part of politics is disseminating a favorable message to a target audience. Hezbollah’s propaganda operations are sophisticated enough to allow for a two-pronged approach. The group targets both the “enemy audience” (Israel) and a “neutral audience.” The main themes directed toward Israel are Hezbollah’s unremitting resolve and determination to continue the fight; the notion that this conflict will be a long struggle; the futility of Israeli aggression; the quagmire of the conflict; the well-defined political aim of Hezbollah’s cause; and finally, guilt-induced messages geared toward exploiting sympathetic Israelis, both citizens and soldiers alike.138 To the neutrals, Hezbollah’s propaganda reinforces the portrait of the Israelis as foreign occupiers intent on sullying Islam and occupying Muslim lands. Furthermore, Hezbollah attempts to convince neutral audiences that Hezbollah alone is the most legitimate entity in Lebanon and the only force capable of regaining Lebanon’s sovereignty following decades of war and occupation.

  Just as impressive as Hezbollah’s television and video production is the group’s extensive use of new media and information technologies, including its widespread presence on the Internet.139 Nasrallah has his own personal Web site, complete with archives of his speeches and a photo gallery divided into various sections, including: military operations, Lebanese brigade, Islamic resistance, Al-Aqsa intifada attacks, Qana massacre, Mansoura massacre, and “other massacres.” On Hezbollah-run Web sites, the term Israel is always placed in quotation marks and Israelis are frequently referred to as Nazis.

  The content available on Hezbollah’s Web sites is a reflection of the group’s diverse agenda and includes: news and information, welfare and social services, religious indoctrination, personal information of Hezbollah leaders, anti-Israeli content, bulletin boards, and youth-oriented features.140 Targeting youth is a bald attempt at recruitment. In 2010, to further its effort toward engaging the younger generation, Hezbollah developed an online video game application where players wage a war against Hezbollah’s enemies, mainly the Israelis. Before the game begins, a player takes rounds of target practice against a lineup of well-known Israeli politicians.141 The two primary Hezbollah-run Web sites are www.hizbollah.org and www.ghaliboun.net. When Israeli hackers interrupted service on these Web sites during the July 2006 war, Hezbollah’s own hackers hijacked communication portals of companies, cable providers, and web-hosting servers in south Texas, suburban Virginia, as well as Delhi, Montreal, Brooklyn, and New Jersey.142

  HOW HEZBOLLAH FINANCING WAS COUNTERED

  Hezbollah’s finances have been targeted by a number of countries, most prominently the United States and Israel. But going after Hezbollah’s funding stream is not sufficient. To truly curtail Hezbollah’s ability to operate, it is also necessary to target Iran, Syria, the Lebanese diaspora, and if necessary, segments of the Lebanese government and the Lebanese population (seeking to change the behavior of each entity). By targeting Iran directly, Hezbollah is being targeted by extension.

  Still, Israel has relied in part, perhaps there has even been an overreliance, on kinetic force to disrupt Hezbollah operations. While seductive for their ability to solve short-term problems, kinetic actions like air strikes (especially in south Lebanon) merely play into Hezbollah’s favor. After property is destroyed in Hezbollah territory, the group comes in with JAB and gets to play the role of “hero,” thus further solidifying popular support for Nasrallah and his organization. Indeed, rather than targeted assassinations, Israel could also benefit from focusing on targeted sanctions against Hezbollah’s patchwork of quasi-licit and illicit ventures.

  Kinetic Activities

  Operation Smokescreen was an FBI intelligence investigation (overseen by the Bureau’s International Terrorism Operations Section) conducted in the mid-1990s that involved running sources and tapping phone lines. For the most part, the operation was a success, and resulted in criminal charges for 26 individuals accused of contraband cigarette trafficking, money laundering, racketeering, wire fraud, conspiracy, visa and marriage fraud, and material support to a terrorist group. Over 500 bank and credit card accounts were investigated as part of the financial analysis of the network.143

  Operation Double Top was the direct result of the 1994 bombings of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) bombings in Argentina. The operation brought together law enforcement and intelligence agencies from the United States and the tri-border countries, Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil. To counter Hezbollah’s financial activities in the region, Operation Double Top focused on disrupting commercial operations, burning containers, blocking bank accounts, stealing passports, and arresting Hezbollah members in the area.144

  In October 1998, Philippine intelligence officials launched CoPlan Pink Poppy, aimed at identifying members of Al-Qaida’s network in Southeast Asia. The operations came about as the result of a request by France that the Filipinos look into connections between Al-Qaida and Hezbollah.145 Though the operation was terminated in 2000 due to a lack of funding, it was rejuvenated post-9/11 under the name Operation Kamikaze. The Operation centered around Hezbollah operative Pandu Yudhawinata, one of the group’s key facilitators, especially with respect to growing its network throughout Southeast Asia, from Thailand to the Philippines.

  Operation Bathwater was conducted to disrupt Hezbollah activities based in Michigan and grew out of information developed in January 1999 by U.S. Secret Service agents working with the Detroit Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). Another operation focused on the financial element of Hezbollah’s criminal enterprise in the United States, Bathwater uncovered the largest credit card fraud scheme in the country at the time.146

  Non-kinetic Activities

  In late 2004, the United States joined with Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina to form the 3 + 1 Group on Tri-Border Area security, which focused on countering Hezbollah activity in the area, strengthening Paraguay’s legal system, as well as the enforcement of immigration and customs laws.147 Cooperation between the United States and the nations comprising the tri-border area has helped to diminish important funding streams to Hezbollah.148 Targeted sanctions have also played an important role amongst the non-kinetic activities that countries have taken to counter Hezbollah financing. According to a report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the United States has used official terrorist designations and listings to impose financial and immigration sanctions on Hezbollah and its supporters, blocking assets under U.S. jurisdiction, prohibited American citizens from providing the group with financial or material support or engaging in financial transactions with Hezbollah and affiliated parties, and has prohibited entry into the United States and authorization of deportation for Hezbollah associated individuals.149

  In addition to designating certain organizations as terrorist groups, individual members of those groups can be isolated for targeting. In June 2004, the U.S. Treasury Department designated Assad Ahmad Barakat, Hezbollah’s treasurer in South America, as a “key terrorist financier” and someone “who has used every financial crime in the book, including his businesses, to generate funding” for Hezbollah.150 More recently, in
July 2013, the European Union designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, essentially blacklisting the group and freezing many of its assets throughout Europe, which in the past has served as a financial conduit for “the Party of God.”151 The move came after years of prodding by both the United States and Israel, as those countries realize the importance of collaboration in countering terrorists’ finances. As Philippone notes, “success against Hezbollah’s crime network will take significant interagency efforts and the ability of multiple organizations to share information and work together. Continuous legislative pressure will be needed to push law enforcement, intelligence and other government agencies to work together against a common enemy.”152

  CONCLUSION

  Hezbollah is a unique insurgent group to analyze because of its truly hybrid nature. It is, without a doubt, part political party and part “army without a state.” Why did Hezbollah choose the path toward “Lebanonization” in the first place and make a foray into politics if it never intended to make the full transition to political party? The short answer is, because it could. Hezbollah’s decision to enter the Lebanese political system was not a default decision, but one that was debated at length within the group.153 The rationale behind the decision was the following: by entering the political process, Hezbollah would become a legitimate actor in Lebanese politics. If the group was legitimate, then so was its continued resistance.154

  At the time that Hezbollah made the decision, the group’s political leverage over the Lebanese government, due in large part to Syrian backing, allowed it to stand for elections without having to jettison its weapons. Just two years removed from a decade and a half long civil war, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were in the process of being reconstructed. Hezbollah’s operational tools, including its training, intelligence, and weapons, meant that it was the only Lebanese entity capable of defending the south of the country, which in 1992 was still occupied by the IDF (and would continue to be for another eight years). Moreover, unlike the nascent LAF, as a military force, Hezbollah was willing to take casualties defending Lebanon.