Bloody Beaches : Marine Raiders History in the Pacific War (WW2 Pacific Military History Series)

by Daniel Wrinn

  While this raid was only a minor tactical victory in the actual fighting, raiders counted twenty-seven enemy dead and estimated they killed over fifty. Raider losses were six wounded and two dead.

  This battle had significant repercussions. Raiders had now damaged Japanese logistics, communications, and fire support. The intelligence gathered by the raiders had even farther reaching consequences—it revealed many details of the coming Japanese offensive.

  Marines had defeated the Japanese again and literally feasted on the fruits of their victory.

  Battle of Bloody Ridge

  The next day Edson discussed the situation with his Allied planners. Intelligence officers translating the captured documents confirmed that over 3,000 enemy troops were cutting their way through the jungle southwest of Tasimboko. Edson realized they planned to attack the unguarded southern portion of the perimeter.

  From aerial surveillance, he picked out a grass-covered ridge shaped like a knife’s edge at the airfield. From his experiences of jungle fighting with the Japanese (and a hunch), Edson believed the enemy would attack at night, as that was the only time they could get fire support from the sea. A night attack in the jungle could only succeed if it moved along a well-defined avenue of approach. This ridge was the obvious choice. General Vandergrift disagreed, but Edson convinced the general to let the parachutists and raiders shift their bivouac to the ridge to get out of the pattern of bombs falling around the airfield.

  On September 10, Marines moved to the new location. It was not a rest zone. Enemy planes bombed the ridge on the nights of the 11th and 12th. Native scouts reported an approaching Japanese column. Raider patrols soon made contact with the advance elements of the Japanese force. Marines worked desperately to improve their position under a harsh handicap. They had very little barbed wire and no sandbags or engineering tools. Marines on the ridge couldn’t dig far before hitting coral. Those on both flanks were hampered by thick jungle, concealing enemy movement. Casualties, illness, and a lack of nutritious food had thinned the raider’s ranks and sapped the strength of the Marines still fighting on the lines.

  Edson’s Ridge

  Night of 12–13 Sep 1942

  Edson did the best he could with the resources he had available. He used the spine of one ridge as a dividing point between his two battalions. One company of parachutists held the left of his line while the rest of his Marines protected his flank. Two raider companies occupied the right flank anchored on the Lunga River. A lagoon separated the two raider units.

  Edson attached machine guns to the three forward companies and kept Company D in reserve. Company D wasn’t much larger than a platoon by this time, and Edson used much of their manpower to fill holes in the other three rifle companies. He also set up his forward command post on Hill 120, a few hundred yards behind the front lines.

  Edson placed the 2/5 Marines in reserve between the ridge and airfield. Artillery observers joined Edson and registered the howitzers. The Marines were now as ready as they could be. The selection of the ridge as the heart of the defense was a gamble. To the west of Lunga Point, there were only a few strong points occupied by men from the amphibious tractor and pioneer battalions. To the east of Edson’s line, there was nothing but a mile of empty jungle.

  General Kawaguchi had his own problems. His troops had a tough time cutting their way through the heavy jungle and along many ridges in their path. Some of these difficulties were self-inflicted. Kawaguchi’s decision to attack from the south required him to leave his artillery and most of his supplies behind, since they couldn’t be hauled over that rough jungle trail. Now he was going into battle with little fire support. He ordered one of his four battalions to make a diversionary attack along the Tenaru River. This reduced his ranks to 2,500 troops for his main assault. He’d also underestimated the time he needed to reach his objective.

  On the evening of September 12, Kawaguchi realized that only one battalion had reached the assigned jump off point. He tried to delay the attack, but his communications failed, and his order was not passed. He was now behind schedule and without guides. His battalions blundered forward and broke up into small groups as his men fought their way through a tangled growth in total darkness.

  At 2200, Japanese planes dropped green flares over the Marine perimeter. Then a cruiser and three destroyers opened up on the ridge. For thirty minutes, they poured down shells in the Marines’ direction. Most rounds sailed over the high ground and landed in the jungle, some even exploded among the Japanese infantry.

  After the bombardment ended, Kawaguchi’s troops launched flares and began their assault. Their initial attack concentrated on the low ground around the lagoon. While they may have been trying to find the Marine flank or were unfamiliar with the terrain, the thick jungle counteracted the Marine advantage in firepower.

  Soon, Japanese troops were able to infiltrate between the platoon’s strong points. They had isolated three platoons of Company C, each of which had made their way to the rear. Marines on the ridge remained untouched for the most part. As dawn approached, the Japanese broke off but kept possession of Company C’s former positions. Kawaguchi’s officers started the slow process of regrouping their scattered and disoriented units all over the jungle.

  The next morning Edson ordered his reserve companies to counterattack. They made little progress against the more numerous Japanese, and Edson recalled them. He could not restore an unbroken front and withdrew the entire line to the reserve position. Edson now had the added benefit of forcing the enemy to cross more open ground on the ridge before reaching the Marine fighting holes. In late afternoon, Company B (mixed with raiders and parachutists) pulled back and anchored themselves on the ridge between Hill 120. Raider Company A covered the remaining distance between the engineers and Lunga Point. The other two parachute companies withdrew and bulked up the left flank. What remained of Companies C and D assumed a new reserve position on the west slope of the ridge—behind Hill 120. Edson’s command post stayed in its previous location.

  The Japanese made good use of daylight and prepared for a fresh assault. Kawaguchi wouldn’t make another mistake of getting bogged down in the jungle. He’d now use the tactics Edson had initially expected and concentrate his attack on the open ground of the ridge.

  The next enemy attack kicked off after dark. Their initial blow struck Company B’s right flank near the lagoon. A mad rush of screaming banzai soldiers drove the right half of the raider company out of position. Those men fell back to link up with Company C on the ridge. But Kawaguchi failed to exploit the gap he created. The maneuver had possibly been a diversion to draw the Marine reserves off the ridge and out of the way of the main assault.

  Edson had to make a quick decision of whether to plug the hole with his dwindling reserve or risk having the center of his line encircled in the next Japanese assault. The enemy supplied the answer. At 2100, Japanese soldiers massed around the southern nose of the ridge. They made their presence known with a cacophony of loud chanting. It was obvious they were going to launch a frontal assault on the center of the Marine line. Edson ordered Companies A and C to form a reserve line around the sides and front of Hill 120. Japanese machine gun and mortar fire swept through the ridge. Marines responded with artillery fire.

  The attack pulsed forward at 2200. The front-line assault across the ridge unhinged the Marine center. The Japanese swung around the left flank of Company B’s Captain Harry Torgerson, the parachute battalion XO, and he ordered his men to withdraw. The parachutists in Company C soon followed. Torgerson gathered the two units in the rear of Company A’s position on Hill 120 and reorganized them. Raider Company B was isolated in the center, and their situation was desperate.

  Now the enemy took a rest. Heavy fire still raked the ridge, but the Japanese made no new attacks. Edson arranged more artillery support and got his own force to provide covering fire for Company B’s withdrawal. The rearguard movements looked like Edson’s Raiders would be routed. Edson took i
mmediate action to avert this disaster. From his command post a dozen yards behind the front, he made it known that this was the Alamo. The word went out: “no one moves, die in your holes.”

  Edson ranged up and down the line trying to breathe fresh nerve into those on the verge of giving up. When the parachute battalion commander broke down, Edson relieved him on the spot and put Torgerson in command.

  The raiders’ new position wasn’t strong. A small horseshoe bend around the hill, with men from several units mingled on the barren slopes. Edson directed artillery to keep a continuous barrage close along its front. When the enemy renewed their attack, each wave of Japanese troops boiled out of the jungle into a storm of lead. Besides their firepower of automatic weapons and artillery, men on the lines tossed grenade after grenade at whatever shapes or sounds they saw.

  Night of 13–14 Sep 1942

  The Japanese assault, trying to avoid the concentrated fire sweeping the crest, advanced along the jungle edge at the bottom of the slope and threatened to envelop the left flank. Edson ordered Torgerson to launch a counterattack with his reorganized parachute companies.

  The Marines advanced, checked any enemy progress, and extended the line to prevent any further breaches. Edson later cited this effort as: “a decisive factor in our ultimate victory.”

  At 0400, Edson committed his reserve battalion to strengthen his depleted line. One company at a time, the 2/5 Marines filed along the top of the ridge and into place between those who had survived that long night. The Japanese were exhausted, but Kawaguchi still attacked twice more. The enemy assaults were stalled with artillery fire and never presented much of a threat. A small band of enemy troops made it past the ridge and reached the vicinity of the airfield. Marines providing security eliminated them.

  Dawn brought an end to any organized resistance, though fragments of Japanese assault units were scattered through the jungle and in the flanks and rear of Marine positions. Squads began the long process of rooting out snipers. Edson ordered an air assault against enemy units clinging to the southern edge of the ridge. P-400s answered the call and strafed exposed enemy groups. Kawaguchi ordered his battered brigade to retreat.

  The next morning, parachutists and raiders turned over the ridge to other Marines. The 1st Raiders had lost 135 men while the 1st Parachute Battalion lost 128. Of those Marines were sixty men missing in action. Over 700 Japanese bodies littered the battlefield, and very few of Kawaguchi’s 525 wounded would survive the trek back to the coast.

  This battle was a tremendous tactical victory for Edson. He and his men had turned back one of the most serious threats the Japanese were ever to mount against Henderson Airfield. If the parachutists and raiders had failed, the landing strip would’ve fallen into enemy hands. The lack of air cover probably would have led to the defeat of the 1st Marine Division and the loss of Guadalcanal. This reversal would have had a serious impact on the course of the war and the future of the Marine Corps.

  General Vandegrift wasted no time recommending Edson for a Medal of Honor. Edson’s citation reads: “a marked degree of cool leadership and personal courage. At the height of the battle, with friendly artillery shells landing 75 yards to the front and enemy bullets and mortars sweeping past the knoll, Edson never took cover. He stood in a shallow hole that passed for a command post and calmly issued orders and served as an inspiration for all who saw him.”

  War correspondents who visited the scene days after the battle dubbed it: “Battle of Bloody Ridge.”

  Defeat on the Matanikau

  On September 17, the dwindling parachutist battalion (58 percent casualties in the campaign) left Guadalcanal onboard the same convoy that brought in the 7th Marines. The 1st Raiders (34 percent casualties) stayed in the fight and received little precious rest.

  Only six days after the battle, General Vandergrift ordered the 1st Raiders to patrol south of Edson’s ridge and eliminate enemy stragglers. The raiders passed through their former position, now well defended by the 7th Marines. They followed the tracks of their retreating enemy on a trail marked by abandoned weapons and bodies.

  Edson used artillery and crew-served weapons at any sign of resistance. At the cost of three wounded Marines, raiders captured a single dismantled howitzer and killed twenty-four enemy soldiers. The most significant danger of this patrol was the return trip. As the raiders neared friendly lines, jittery new arrivals in the 7th Marines opened fire on the raiders. Fortunately, no one was hit.

  That same day, Vandegrift reorganized the senior ranks of his division. Edson assumed command of the 5th Marines, and his XO Griffith succeeded him as head of the 1st Raiders. Edson’s departure did not take the raider battalion out of the spotlight. Colonel “Chesty” Puller’s 1/7 Marines left the perimeter on September 23 with the mission of eliminating enemy troops from the Matanikau River area. Once Puller completed that mission, division wanted to put the raiders in a patrol base near Kokumbona to prevent any enemy counterattack. This would keep Japanese artillery out of range of the airfield.

  On the 24th, Puller’s men surprised an enemy unit and destroyed it, but at a cost of twenty-five Marines wounded and seven killed. Division sent the 2/5 Marines as a relief force since Puller had to use most of his battalion to get casualties back to the perimeter. Puller pushed forward with his one remaining rifle company and the 2nd Battalion. His combined force reached the Matanikau River on September 26. They moved on the east bank and crossed the sandbar at the river’s mouth. An enemy company blocked their way and drove the Marines back with heavy fire. Meanwhile, another Japanese company moved into defensive positions on the eastern end of the single log bridge—the only upstream crossing.

  That afternoon Vandergrift ordered Edson to take charge of the operation and sent the raiders along to assist. Edson and Puller developed a new plan. In the morning, raiders would move upriver and cross the bridge. They would then come back downriver on the far bank, taking the enemy at the river mouth on their flank. To ensure that the enemy force didn’t retreat out of their trap, the 2/5 Marines would pressure them with their own attack across the sandbar. Then, after the casualty evacuation, the 1/7 Marines would make an amphibious landing behind Point Cruz and secure any enemy escape route.

  After a night of heavy rain, the 2nd Battalion launched an assault on the river mouth. They made no progress against ongoing strong opposition. The raiders, reinforced by Puller’s company, advanced upriver and soon found themselves pinned in a narrow shelf between the water and a steep ridge.

  The enemy had placed infantry supported by mortars and machine guns. Griffith ordered Company C up the ridge to outflank the Japanese. But the enemy had this approach covered as well. When the battalion commander appeared in the ridgeline to observe the action firsthand, a sniper put a bullet in his shoulder. With no outside fire support, the raiders couldn’t make any headway against the entrenched Japanese.

  Poor communications only made things worse. Edson misunderstood a message from the raiders and thought they were across the river. Then, he launched the 2/5 Marines in another attack with support from mortars and 37mm Antitank guns—but it met the same fate as previous attempts.

  Upon landing in the enemy’s rear, the 1/7 Marines were surrounded by a large enemy force camped in the area. The Marines hadn’t brought radios ashore and could not inform the division of their situation. The Marines eventually used air panels to signal supporting aircraft. When the word reached Puller, he wanted the 2nd Battalion to renew the assault and take pressure off his men. But Edson refused to take further casualties in a hopeless frontal attack.

  Puller withdrew his struggling force with support from naval gunfire, and messages passed by semaphore flags. Edson then ordered the raiders to pull back to the river mouth and join up with the 2/5 Marines when both units withdrew to the division perimeter. The engaged units suffered 125 wounded and sixty-seven dead Marines in this operation. This action along the Matanikau was the only defeat the Marines sustained during the Guadalca
nal campaign.

  Raider casualties had been light—eleven wounded and two killed—but included both senior officers in the battalion. The raiders had been worn down by two months of continuous fighting. Huge numbers of men were sick with malaria and other tropical diseases. The battalion had seen more action than any other on the island. Rumors continued they would soon ship out like the parachutists. According to one raider: “I’d never seen a more sickly, miserable, bedraggled bunch of Marines than on that island.”

  But the 1st Raiders were still in the fight on Guadalcanal. At the beginning of October, intelligence reported that the enemy was building up their forces west of the Matanikau River for another offensive against the perimeter.

  Division headquarters wanted to strike first and secure the crossing over the river. In a plan similar to the previous operation, two battalions of the 5th Marines would move down the coast road and secure the bank of the Matanikau. This would divert the attention of the Japanese forces to the far side. Three other battalions would then cross the Matanikau at the log bridge and attack north toward the sea.

  Once they had secured the far side of the river, Marines would garrison Kokumbona and slam the door shut on any other enemy operations in the area. Division would provide ample fire support and strengthen the assault forces. All units would move into position on October 7 to prepare for the next morning’s assault.