Bloody Beaches : Marine Raiders History in the Pacific War (WW2 Pacific Military History Series)

by Daniel Wrinn

  Admiral Halsey chose to seize the Russell’s before any other action in the Solomons. Halsey believed in having Allied fighter planes stationed on the Russell Islands to provide more effective support on the ensuing assault on New Georgia.

  Operation Cleanslate was the codename for the Russell Islands assault. The Army’s 43rd Infantry Division would take Banika Island and the 3rd Raiders would seize nearby Pavuvu. APDs had carried the raiders from Espirito Santo to Guadalcanal in mid-February. On February 19, two days before D-Day on Pavuvu, a sergeant and a lieutenant from the 3rd Raiders scouted both objectives and found no Japanese. The 3rd Raiders made an unopposed landing in their first offensive action. The Army’s 159th Infantry followed and helped to occupy the island.

  The most significant challenges the raiders faced on Pavuvu were medical and logistics. Because the Navy was worried about a Japanese air and naval response, the landing plan was a quick offload and rapid withdrawal of transports. The APDs and Higgins boats were preloaded with supplies, while the Marines went ashore in rubber boats. A rash of outboard motor failures caused chaos among the landing formations. Once ashore, raiders suffered from a lack of transport and struggled to manhandle supplies from the beach to the inland dumps.

  Throughout the raiders’ one-month stay on Pavuvu, their diet of field chow and harsh tropical conditions sapped the troops. Over a third developed skin problems, raiders lost weight, and dozens suffered from malaria and other diseases. While not entirely the fault of the Marine planners, the hard-hitting capabilities of the 3rd Raiders were wasted on Operation Cleanslate.

  At the end of February, a lieutenant and five raiders landed at Ravinia Lagoon on New Georgia. With the help of native guides and coastwatchers, they spent the next three weeks collecting information about the terrain, hydrographic conditions, and enemy defenses. On March 21, Catalina PBYs landed four more raider patrols at Segi Point. Raiders fanned out with their native guides in canoes to scout out Vangunu, Kolombangara, and New Georgia. These Marine patrols supplied vital information to help shape future landing plans. The final raider groups were placed in small detachments near designated beaches to guide the assault forces.

  In June, the enemy reinforced their garrisons in the Central Solomons to 11,000 men. But this was not enough troops to cover all the potential landing sites on the several large islands. This lack of manpower gave Halsey a massive advantage. The eventual plan called for multiple assaults against lightly defended or undefended targets. On D-Day, the Eastern Landing Force consisting of the Army’s 103rd Infantry and the 4th Raiders would occupy Segi Point and Viru Harbor. Navy construction units would immediately build a fighter strip at Segi and a torpedo boat base at Viru.

  The Northern Landing Group (1st Raiders and two Army battalions) would go ashore at Rice Anchorage and attack overland to seize Bairoko Harbor and Enogai Inlet. Halsey believed this would cut off Japanese barge traffic supplying reinforcements and logistics.

  The Southern Landing Group would seize the northern end of Rendova and its outer islands. Units from the 43rd Infantry Division would execute a shore-to-shore assault against undefended beaches on Piraka and Zanana on New Georgia. Aircraft from Segi Point and artillery from the Renova beachhead would support the Army regiments’ overland advance to capture Munda Airfield.

  D-Day was now set for June 30, 1943.

  Russell Islands Assault

  Things did not go according to plan.

  In June, the Japanese reinforced New Georgia. They sent a battalion to Segi Point with instructions to eliminate native forces operating in the area.

  The native forces under the command of Coastwatcher Don Kennedy had harassed enemy outposts and attacked patrols in the area. As the Japanese battalion advanced their units closer to Segi Point, Kennedy requested support.

  On June 20, Admiral Turner ordered Colonel Currin and half of his 4th Raiders to move immediately from Guadalcanal to Segi Point. Companies O and P embarked on APDs that day to make an unopposed landing the following morning. On June 22, two Army infantry companies were diverted from airfield construction to also help reinforce the coastwatchers.

  Viru was a trickier problem. It had a narrow entrance to the harbor flanked by high cliffs and covered by a 3-inch coastal defense gun. Several enemy machine guns (including the newest .50-caliber models) occupied support positions. Most enemy defenses were oriented toward an attack from the sea, so Allied planners chose an overland approach. But this wasn’t easy, given the difficulty of the trails.

  After a brief reconnaissance and discussion with headquarters, Colonel Currin took his raiders to Regi via a rubber boat. The assault on Viru Harbor would be a double envelopment. Lieutenant Devillo Brown’s 3rd Platoon would assault the village of Tombe on the eastern side of the harbor. The remainder of the task force would assault enemy defenses at Tetemara on the opposite shore. These simultaneous assaults would take place on the initially scheduled D-Day of June 30. Once the approaches were secured, APDs would land reinforcements of two Army infantry companies.

  Raiders departed Segi in the evening of June 27 and landed at Regi just after midnight. After an hour of rest, they moved out on the narrow trail in a single file—Company O in front, with Company P as the rear guard. Native scouts served as guides. The small force hadn’t gotten far when the path disappeared into a swamp. After another three hours of tough movement, a firefight exploded at the end of the column. An enemy patrol known to be in the area stumbled into the rear guard. Raiders killed four Japanese and suffered no casualties. An hour later, another enemy force of twenty (possibly the same patrol) came off a side trail and ambushed the right flank and rearguard. After an hourlong firefight, the Japanese broke off the action. Five raiders in the rearguard were killed in the ambush.

  The raiders crossed the Mohi river and set up a perimeter defense for the night. Wicked terrain and several forced halts convinced Colonel Currin that he would not make it to Viru Harbor in time for D-Day. He had no working radios. Currin sent native runners to Kennedy, asking him to relay a message to command that the 4th Raiders would begin their assault a day late.

  After another rainy and dreary night, the raiders moved out. They arrived at the Choi River late in the afternoon. As rear elements of the raiders crossed the river, a Japanese force entrenched on a hill to the raiders flank opened up with heavy fire from machine guns and rifles. Currin halted the battalion and tried to figure out what was happening. After two hours, he knew his rear had probably engaged another enemy patrol—so the rest of his force continued on its way. Raiders crossed the snakelike Choi River twice more before stopping for the night at 1800. The rear elements arrived at the perimeter at 2100. They’d suffered five killed, and another man wounded but counted nineteen enemy dead.

  By now, the Japanese had to be aware of the Marine’s presence. When native scouts showed the area north of the harbor was impassable, Currin believed the Japanese would reinforce the village of Tombe from an eastern assault. Colonel Currin strengthened the left-wing of his attack and put Captain Anthony “Cold Steel” Walker in charge of two platoons to lead the assault on Tombe. Because of communication and terrain challenges, there would be no attempt to coordinate the two arms of this envelopment. Captain Walker was free to attack whenever he chose after dawn on July 1. With plans finalized, the Marines settled in for another night of rain.

  Raiders were on the move early next morning. Captain Walker’s two platoons branched off in a shorter route to Tombe. The main force crossed several bridges on the Tita and Viru rivers. Everyone, even the native porters carrying the heavy weapons and ammo, was worn out. But the worst was still to come. In a twilight, raiders forded a wide river that was six feet deep. They formed a human chain and somehow got everyone across without losing a man. Rugged hills disappeared, and in their place were now waist-deep mangrove swamps. In pitch darkness, men lurched forward through a mess of mud, water, and roots. Native scouts returned with bits of rotting jungle vegetation from the banks of the r
iver. With this luminescent material on their backs, raiders could follow the man in front. At the end of the mangrove swamp was a half-mile climb to the top of a ridge where the men could rest and prepare for the next assault.

  The nightly rain had made the steep slope nearly impassable. After nightfall, the battalion finally reached level ground. The raiders spent the night huddled on the sides of the trail until dawn.

  Unknown to the raiders, the amphibious portion of the assault against Viru had already taken place. The Navy commander in charge was aware of Colonel Currin’s message altering the date of the land attack, but he ordered the APDs to approach the harbor on June 30. Japanese 3-inch guns swiftly drove them off. Unable to contact Colonel Currin, headquarters landed the Army force in the APDs at the same spot where the raiders were to have begun their attack. The new mission was to move overland and support the raiders, now experiencing difficulties. The enemy commander of Viru Harbor reported he’d repulsed an American landing.

  Both wings of the raider force moved out in the early morning of July 1. At 0845, Captain Walker’s detachment reached the outskirts of Tombe, undiscovered. Raiders opened fire on the tiny village and surged forward.

  Most of the defenders were killed in the initial burst of gunfire. Two raider platoons secured the village without a single casualty and counted fourteen dead enemy. As the battle ended, six Allied aircraft appeared over the harbor. They were not part of the plan but were sent by headquarters to soften up the enemy when they learned the raiders would be delayed.

  This uncoordinated air support could have resulted in a horrific disaster but worked out well as the fighters ignored Tombe and concentrated their efforts on Tetemara. The Japanese abandoned their fixed defenses and withdrew inland, directly into the path of the oncoming raiders.

  Colonel Currin made contact with the enemy after the bombing ceased. The lead company deployed two platoons on both sides of the trail. Raiders continued forward and destroyed several Japanese outputs before slamming into the main enemy force, bolstered by multiple machine guns.

  Progress was painfully slow as sporadic, heavy rain swept the battlefield. Company O’s reserve platoon went on line to the left after the enemy was seen gathering for a counterattack. As the day wore on, raiders shoved the Japanese back until the raiders right flank rested on high ground overlooking the harbor. Colonel Currin sent machine guns to the line and put his remaining platoon on his right flank. Demolitions men advanced to deal with any machine guns.

  Later that afternoon, enemy soldiers launched a banzai attack against the raiders’ left flank. Not long after they were repulsed, Colonel Currin launched his right flank platoon against the enemy’s left flank. Under a concentrated base of fire, raiders swiftly overran the enemy’s 3-inch guns and rolled up the Japanese flank as the remainder of the enemy defenders withdrew to the northwest. Raiders suffered fifteen wounded and eight dead while killing nearly fifty-four enemy troops and capturing a dozen machine guns and a handful of heavier weapons.

  The 4th Raiders tightened their grip on Viru and organized several patrols over the next few days. Two Army companies finally landed near Regi and reached Tombe on July 4. When the Navy ferried in more Army units on July 9, the raiders boarded the LCIs (Landing Craft, Infantry) bound for Guadalcanal.

  Companies N and Q of the 4th Raider Battalion also received their baptism under fire during the same period. This unit was under the command of the battalion XO, Major James Clark. These companies were assigned to assist the Army’s 103rd Infantry and secure the approach to Wickham Anchorage on June 30. Intelligence from the coastwatchers showed that over one hundred enemy troops occupied the island.

  The 4th Raiders would make a predawn landing at the undefended Oloana Bay. Army infantry would follow them ashore after daylight and deal with any enemy stragglers believed to be in a village on the coast several miles to the east.

  Low visibility and heavy seas turned the night landing into a disaster. APDs debarked in the wrong spot. Higgins boats lost formations when they tried to pass through LCIs loaded with soldiers. Two raider companies ended up scattered along seven miles of jagged coastline.

  When Army units landed at dawn, they found only seventy-five raiders holding the beachhead. Since mid-June, a two-man patrol had been ashore to harass the enemy with the help of native guides and scouts. They provided the exact location of the Japanese garrison. The joint force moved northeast toward their objective. Native scouts led the handful of raiders with the two Army companies following close behind. The remaining raiders would join up with their units as soon as they could: all but one platoon were caught up by the time the Allies reached the line of departure a few hundred yards north of the village.

  The plan of attack was straightforward. Army units passed through raider lines on the east-west trail to assume the easternmost position. After that, the entire column would face right, placing the battalion on line and pointing south toward the enemy.

  Company Q would hold the right flank on the bank of the Kaeruka River. Company F on the left flank and Company N in the center. Company G would be held in reserve. Within minutes, the attack ran into heavy resistance. Japanese fire from the west bank of the river was intense, and company Q crossed over to deal with this threat. Company F moved to its left to skirt around the powerful defenses. Company G moved to fill the gap. By late afternoon, the Allies had cleared the east bank of the river. Company Q disengaged from the west bank and joined the battalion’s perimeter defense at the river’s mouth.

  This action cost the Marines twenty-one wounded and ten killed. The Army suffered similar losses.

  Dragons Peninsula

  On July 5, the 1st Raiders joined the New Georgia operation. They spearheaded a night landing at Rice Anchorage, a spot selected because previous reconnaissance showed it to be undefended. Coastal guns from the island of Kolombangara fired on the APDs during the landing, but their accuracy was poor in the heavy rain. The only serious threat came from enemy destroyers—a long-range torpedo sank one of the Allied transports. However, most troops, equipment, and supplies made it ashore.

  The 1st Raiders advanced overland from Rice Anchorage and took Dragons Peninsula and the enemy barge bases at Bairoko and Enogai. Army soldiers from the 148th Infantry headed deeper into the interior to establish a blocking position on the trail connecting Munda with Bairoko. The 145th Army Infantry divided itself in half to secure the beachhead, with the rest serving as a reserve force. Allied intelligence reported that over 500 Japanese troops were in place to defend Dragons Peninsula. Colonel Liversedge and the 4th Raiders accompanied the 1st Raiders.

  Captain Clay Boyd had already been on the island for some time when the raider force landed on July 5. His small coastwatcher detachment and the ever-present native scouts helped guide the initial waves of Marines to shore. Native scouts had cut fresh trails leading to the Giza Giza River at the mouth of the Enogai Inlet. Because of these preparations, units covered the seven miles of rough terrain to the Giza Giza before nightfall. The darkness brought heavy rain. There were no trails through the swamp on the far side of the Giza Giza, and the rain made the Tomoko River impossible to ford. It took the entire next day for the raider force to move less than one mile across the Tomoko. There, they halted to endure another day and night of heavy rain.

  On the morning of July 7, a raider advance guard met up with the Japanese for the first time. In a brief firefight near the village of Maranusa, two soldiers from a Japanese patrol were killed, and six were captured. Raiders followed the trail up the steep sides of a coral ridge for over a mile. At the western edge of the ridge, in a village called Triri, the advance guard encountered another patrol. Raiders killed a dozen Japanese at the cost of three dead and four wounded. The Marines set up ambushes along the trails entering the village. At dawn the next day, a large Japanese force bumped into a platoon of raiders blocking the trail to Bairoko. This fierce fight lasted all morning: the Japanese did not withdraw from the fight until a compa
ny of raider reinforcements arrived. The Japanese left behind sixty dead soldiers.

  Now that the Army held Triri, the raiders moved out to seize Enogai. They followed another trail that entered yet another swamp along the southern edge of the inlet. This one was so bad that Griffith returned to Triri to try an alternative route the following morning. It was just as well because the enemy had renewed their counterattack on the Bairoko trail and pressed the soldiers hard. A raider platoon slipped around the enemy flank, causing the Japanese to withdraw again.

  At dawn on July 9, the 1st Raiders took a different trail toward Enogai. They crossed the swamp via a more accessible route, which led to the high ground dominating the objective. At 1500, Raider Company C made contact with enemy defenders. Company A moved to the left and anchored its flank on the Leland Lagoon. Company B took the right flank. A thick jungle canopy prevented any mortar use, but the lack of light also kept the undergrowth to a minimum, leaving a good field of fire for small arms.

  Companies A and C were pinned down, while Company B reported no contact to its front. As darkness fell, the firing slacked off.

  Early the following day, a Company B patrol advanced to see their portion of the front was unoccupied. Griffith ordered his right flank to attack through the open terrain of the inlet. Mortars provided valuable support, and Company B swiftly advanced. When the enemy realized their flank had been turned, they pulled out across the spit of land on the north side of the lagoon.

  Company A’s machine guns turned the Japanese retreat into a bloodbath, but Allied platoons could still not break through the tough enemy resistance to their immediate front. Raiders had surrounded the final enemy holdouts. At first light, on the next morning of July 11, raiders attacked with hand grenades and cleaned out the area, killing several enemy soldiers.