Hitler's Raid to Save Mussolini

by Greg Annussek

  Undaunted, Badoglio decided that the Allies might be more receptive to a visit from one of his military men. He therefore selected General Giuseppe Castellano, a suave, quick-witted Sicilian who worked under Ambrosio, chief of Comando Supremo, to make another attempt at negotiating with the enemy.11 He left by train on August 12 and did not arrive in Lisbon until four days later.12 Castellano, who traveled incognito for reasons of security, could easily have taken a plane and reached his destination sooner, but was told not to hurry.13 Badoglio, it seems, was still stalling for time as he and the king tried to figure out who posed the greater threat, the Nazis or the Allies.

  A few days after arriving in Portugal, Castellano met with General Eisenhower’s representatives, General Walter Bedell Smith, Ike’s chief of staff, and Brigadier Kenneth W. D. Strong of the British army, who had traveled to Lisbon in a disguise that consisted of a “motley collection of garments.”*14 The peace talks took place in a cloak-and-dagger atmosphere. “Lisbon was said to be full of German spies,” explained Strong, who was Eisenhower’s intelligence chief, “so the fewer people who knew of our presence the better.”15

  General Castellano, it turned out, was not especially anxious to surrender Italy to the Allies.16 Like D’Ajeta before him, he did not even possess the official authority to do so.17 As Eisenhower’s men could not help but notice, he seemed much more interested in trying to learn the details of the top-secret Allied invasion plans for mainland Italy.18 This was information they had no intention of sharing with their new would-be ally.* “What Castellano really wanted,” Strong believed, “was to get the maximum amount of information before the Italians made up their minds on which side of the fence they would come down.”19

  As the Allies suspected, this seemingly strange and somewhat suspicious behavior on Castellano’s part was best understood in light of the anxiety pervading Rome. Before making any deals with the West, the king and Badoglio wanted assurances that the Allies would storm the peninsula in overwhelming strength and chase the Germans right up to the Alps. As later became evident, Rome’s lessthan-dynamic duo had no intention of fighting the Nazis themselves, though hardier souls among their countrymen did not cower at the possibility.

  Even so, Badoglio was not discouraged by the unproductive nature of the Lisbon talks. How could he be? Castellano had failed to send a single progress report back to Rome during the two weeks he was gone!20 Inexplicably, he had neglected to bring a radio along with him for use during his mission.21 The Italian intelligence services possessed several secure communications links in the Portuguese capital, but no one had bothered to inform Castellano of this.22

  Badoglio eventually became so frustrated by the lack of news from Lisbon that he dispatched yet another envoy, General Giacomo Zanussi, on the heels of the first. Zanussi, who was on the staff of the Italian army, left for Lisbon by plane and arrived on August 26.23 He brought with him a British POW as a sign of good faith, but the sight of this unexpected pair merely served to create more confusion in the minds of the Allies.24

  “The purpose of this latest visitor was far from clear,” Churchill wrote of Zanussi.25 Fearing that the Italian might be an imposter, one of Eisenhower’s men even considered having Zanussi shot as a Nazi spy.26 He was spared, but the peace talks remained primarily in the hands of Castellano.*

  In the middle of the month, Badoglio found himself engaged in a delicate balancing act. At the same time that General Castellano was traveling to Lisbon to meet with the Allies, Badoglio was sending other of his envoys to an Axis war council at Bologna to discuss plans for defending the peninsula against the expected Allied invasion.

  Hitler welcomed another Axis military conference because he believed it might prove helpful in revealing Italian intentions. Though he had received hints of Badoglio’s peace offensive—he knew about Grandi’s trip to Lisbon and had remarked as recently as August 11 that “everything so far indicates treason” where the Italians were concerned—he still had no definitive proof that Badoglio was planning to double-cross him.27 So while Hitler continued to build up the German army in northern Italy, he sent two of his most trusted lieutenants to the Bologna conference on August 15 in an effort to further “clarify” how the Italians really felt about the Axis.**28

  Erwin Rommel, commander of Army Group B in Italy, and General Alfred Jodl led the German delegation. The Italians sent General Mario Roatta, the Italian army chief of staff, and a few of his colleagues. The meeting took place just outside Bologna at a comfortable villa that had recently belonged to Fascist bigwig Luigi Federzoni but was confiscated after July 25.29 As the subject matter of the talks was intended to be strictly military, the Axis diplomats from both camps were told to stay at home.30

  “From the outset,” recalled Kesselring, who was also in attendance, “a palpable tension brooded over the proceedings.”31 But this was putting it mildly. Rommel had been warned, probably by Hitler, to fear for his life. “The preliminaries to the conference did not augur well,” observed Manfred Rommel, the Desert Fox’s son, “for my father was informed that the Italians intended to use the occasion either to get rid of him by mixing poison with his food or to have him seized by Italian troops.”32 As a result of these fears, the Germans took extensive measures for their own security.

  Once the plane carrying Rommel and Jodl had touched down in Italy, the two men were escorted to the Federzoni villa by a motorized battalion of the Waffen SS, an unusual move. Upon arrival, these soldiers set up a cordon around the building, seemingly oblivious to the presence of a security detachment provided by the Italians. “Outside the open door of the conference room,” according to General Warlimont, “SS men goose-stepped up and down past the Italian ceremonial guard, over whom they towered head and shoulders.”33

  Things generally went downhill from there. Though ostensibly the Axis partners had come to Bologna to discuss the best way to manage the war effort in Italy, the meeting quickly degenerated into accusations and counteraccusations. Each side spent much of the time questioning the motives of the other as well as the position of certain army divisions on the peninsula.

  One issue on the table was the Italian decision to bring back to the homeland some of its divisions stationed in foreign lands. Back on August 11, the Italians had informed the Nazis that they were pulling the Fourth Army out of France and several divisions from the Balkans. It was this announcement that had triggered the August 15 meeting in the first place.34 At Bologna, Jodl gave his sanction to the troop transfers but then, in a peak of audacity, asked Roatta whether he planned to use these additional forces against the Allies or the Germans!

  “Jodl took the floor,” Warlimont later wrote, “and, abandoning all pretence at courtesy, coupled the German agreement to the withdrawal of Italian troops from southern France with the question ‘whether these were for use against the English in southern Italy or against the Germans on the Brenner.’”35 Roatta claimed to be offended by the question and refused to answer.36

  As at Tarvisio, the Axis conference on August 6, progress was almost nonexistent when it came to other important matters.37 The meeting was so tense that even lunch became a bone of contention. Fearful of a poisoning attempt, Hitler had expressly forbidden Rommel and Jodl from breaking bread with the Italians.38 The two Germans eventually relented and sat down for a meal at the Hotel Baglioni in the center of Bologna.39 Just for good measure, the Nazis posted guards around the hotel and instructed a German officer to act as a personal bodyguard and sit at the table with a loaded pistol. This was apparently not enough to put Jodl’s mind completely at ease. Worried that his hosts might attempt to slip him a “Mickey Finn,” Jodl refused to drink his coffee.*40

  The following day, Roatta made a report to the king and Badoglio in which he stressed the distrustful atmosphere of the Bologna conference. 41 He was particularly struck by the fact that the Nazis had surrounded Federzoni’s villa with soldiers of the SS.42 Badoglio cautioned everyone present that it was crucial to handle their allies
with kid gloves for the time being.43 Provocations on their part, he said, might cause the Germans to descend on Rome and arrest them all.44

  The Nazis were no happier. Jodl had captured the mood in a short message he cabled to Germany in the early afternoon of August15.45 “Italian intentions are no clearer than before,” he reported, and added, “[O]ur reasons for suspicion are still as valid as ever.”46

  A few days later, on August 19, Admiral Doenitz summarized Hitler’s view: “Situation Italy: The Fuehrer’s attitude remains generally unchanged. The conference of Rommel and Jodl with Roatta . . . took place in an atmosphere completely void of cordiality. There is still no evidence of Italian treason, only certain indications lend themselves to such an interpretation. Therefore we are carrying on as before and pouring Rommel’s Army Group into Italy according to plan and without Italian interference. The safety of our forces and our supply lines is ruthlessly assured but without giving the Italians an excuse for an open break.”*47

  The bickering at Bologna merely reinforced Hitler’s belief that Badoglio was dead set on betrayal. And it was this conviction, in turn, that helped to shape his strategy for defending Italy in case of an Allied invasion. This strategy was based on the notion that he could not hold on to all of Italy without the active support of the Italian military, which he now expected to join the enemy camp.48

  “Without the Italian Army we cannot defend the entire peninsula,” Hitler had said during a military conference back on July 17. “In that case we would have to withdraw to a relatively short line.”49 Under the circumstances, his primary goal was to defend the northern enclave, where much of Italy’s agriculture and 80 percent of its industry were located.50 If necessary, Hitler was prepared to retreat all the way back to the area around Florence, well over a hundred miles north of Rome.

  Hitler’s plans for defending Italy inevitably gave rise to a personal drama between Rommel and Kesselring. Rommel was in charge of Army Group B, the collective name given to the numerous German divisions that were pouring into northern Italy through the Alpine passes during August. (By mid-month, half of Army Group B had made its way into Italy.)51

  According to Hitler’s thinking, once the Allies attacked the mainland and the Italians “showed their true colors,” as he liked to say, Kesselring’s divisions would withdraw from the south and regroup in the Rome area.52 If all went as planned, they would then be incorporated into Army Group B, at which point Rommel would assume control of all German forces in Italy, and Kesselring would be out of a job.53 Indeed, rumor had it that the latter was being considered for an assignment in Norway.54

  Needlessly to say, none of this sat well with Kesselring. He liked Italy and he liked the Italians—or so he claimed—and he still held out hope that they would remain loyal to the Axis. Ever the optimist, Kesselring believed that it was better to contest every inch of Italian territory rather than hand over southern Italy, or more, to the enemy without so much as a fight.

  During the summer of 1943, a rivalry developed between Kesselring and Rommel for Hitler’s ear, Rommel advocating the eventual evacuation of southern and central Italy.55 In reality, it was not much of a competition: Hitler always seemed to side with Rommel over the Italophile Kesselring, whom Hitler believed had spent too much time in the Mediterranean sun.

  “I was written down as an ‘Italophile’ and consequently suitable for employment in Italy only for as long as my presence there could help maintain friendly relations with the royal house,” Kesselring recalled after the war. “For when the time should come to grasp the nettle and talk a different language the man had been chosen, namely Rommel, whose Army Group was already standing to in my rear.”56 In contrast to Kesselring, Rommel had a reputation for being hostile to the Italians, with whom he had quarreled during the Axis retreats in North Africa.57

  Now, in mid-August—which is around the time he transferred his Army Group B headquarters from Munich to Lake Garda in northern Italy—Rommel was one half of Hitler’s temporary dual command structure for Italy. “His area of command was for the moment limited to northern Italy,” General Warlimont observed, “with the result that we now had in Italy two German senior headquarters, one behind the other, while alongside them and loosely connected to them, was the whole Italian command organization.”58

  As shall be seen later, this rivalry between Rommel and Kesselring came to a head a few weeks later when the latter made a bid for total control of German forces in Italy—with surprising results.

  The Nazis’ military considerations were becoming more important than ever during the second half of the month, when the Allies began to set their sights on the Italian mainland. On August 17, after thirty-eight days of fighting, Sicily fell to the Western Powers.59 Over the course of a week prior to that date, the Nazis managed to transfer some 40,000 German troops to southern Italy via the Straits of Messina, an impressive feat under the circumstances.60 These soldiers, who brought their vehicles and equipment with them, would live to fight another day—and the Allies would soon pay a high price for letting them escape.61 Incredibly, no one bothered to ask Hitler’s permission for this minor Dunkirk. He was so equivocal on the subject of Sicily that Kesselring and Jodl went ahead and made the decision for him.62

  But mainland Italy was no sanctuary for the Axis. Despite ongoing talks with the Italians, Churchill decreed that “the war should be carried forward against Italy in every way that the Americans [would] allow.”63 During August and early September, the Allies frequently bombed Italian cities.64 Large areas of Milan, Naples, Turin, and Genoa suffered severe damage as a result.65 Rome was targeted for the second time on August 13—it had already been hit on July 19, the day of the Axis conference at Feltre—inspiring the Badoglio regime unilaterally to declare Rome an Open City the following day.66 According to General Student, the frequent bombings of Italy seemed to undermine the idea that the Italians were forging a separate peace.67

  Elsewhere, the Allies continued to step up the pressure. On the eastern front, where Hitler’s forces had been weakened so that Italy could be fortified with additional German troops, the Russians continued to reclaim lost territory, capturing Kharkov on August 23 and Taganrog one week later.68 August 23 was an important date for another reason. On that day, the Americans unleashed a massive bombing raid against Berlin, igniting fires that could be seen hundreds of miles away.69 Unable to protect the Reich capital, the Nazis ultimately evacuated one million civilians from the city.70

  With the relentless stream of bad news on the war front, Hitler was growing increasingly concerned about a possible July 25 in Germany. To counter this, on August 24, Heinrich Himmler, the SS chief (and all-around bad guy), was made Minister of the Interior, replacing the elderly Wilhelm Frick.

  Badoglio had rebels on his mind as well. By the fourth week of August, anxiety in Rome had reached fever pitch. The Italians had heard nothing from Castellano since he left for Lisbon, and there were fears that the Allies might not be receptive to their desire to switch sides in the war.71 Badoglio worried constantly about the Nazis as well as the Fascists of the Mussolini era, who he feared might join forces to overthrow his government.72 He therefore began to clamp down on subversive activities, be they real or imagined.

  It was at this time that Badoglio exposed, or manufactured, the so-called Cavallero plot, which he portrayed as a secret conspiracy involving former Fascists who were planning to topple the Italian regime in connivance with the Nazis.*73 Ugo Cavallero, the supposed ringleader, was arrested along with other Fascist personalities—and alleged plotters—some of whom had been locked up immediately after July 25 and subsequently released.74

  Though Badoglio claimed he was acting in the best interests of the nation, some Italians cried foul. They charged that the Head of the Government was using trumped-up allegations to carry out a preemptive strike against the remnants of the old regime, settle accounts with personal enemies, and eliminate potential rivals for power.75 In any event, Badoglio summoned the cou
rage to send a missive to the Nazis in which he complained about German involvement. Ribbentrop responded immediately, asking Badoglio to explain himself and to identify individuals who were thought to be involved. This, in turn, elicited a quick apology from Raffaele Guariglia, Ribbentrop’s opposite number in Rome. Badoglio then reportedly received a tongue lashing from the king, who was angered to learn that his Capo del Governo was provoking the Nazis with vague accusations.76

  Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Duce’s son-in-law and onetime foreign minister, was almost snagged in Badoglio’s net. Galeazzo was married to Edda but he had voted against the Duce in the meeting of the Grand Council. After the events of July 25, he had resigned from his post at the Vatican and maintained a low profile.

  There had been calls for his arrest after the coup, but Badoglio refrained from taking action until the Cavallero plot had surfaced, after which he apparently ordered that Ciano be arrested and sent to Ponza, the same penal island on which Mussolini had been interned in early August. Though Ciano seems to have been innocent of collusion with the alleged conspirators, he was under investigation for having illegally enriched himself during the Fascist glory days.77 In any event, he did not hang around long enough to plead his case.

  On the morning of August 27, Ciano, his wife, and their three children were willingly spirited out of Rome and flown to Germany by the Nazis in an operation conducted by Herbert Kappler, the police attaché at the German embassy in Rome.78 “No one could understand,” Edda later wrote, “why Galeazzo Ciano had thrown himself to the wolves in taking refuge with Hitler and his cohorts, whom he had been openly criticizing for many months. The truth is that we had decided together to flee Rome and take refuge in Spain because we felt the vise closing on us ever more tightly.”79