The Room Where It Happened

by John Bolton;

  In late May, Trump traveled to Japan, the first state visitor in the Era of Reiwa (meaning “beautiful harmony”), the name Emperor Naruhito chose for his reign, which began officially on May 1, the day after his father, Emperor Akihito, abdicated. This was an incredible honor for Trump, and Abe was obviously making it clear what Japan’s alliance priorities were. I went a few days early for final preparations on the discussions that would take place, meeting with Abe, who explained his objectives with Trump. What I thought would be an uneventful press briefing on Saturday, May 25, however, left me in an awkward position. A reporter asked if North Korea’s recent missile launches violated Security Council resolutions, which I knew full well they did, having helped write the first two, Resolutions 1695 and 1718, when I was US Ambassador to the UN. I wasn’t about to ignore what I had pressed so hard for at the time. And, as a matter of logic if not perception, it was entirely possible for the launches to violate the resolutions without violating Kim’s pledge to Trump, which involved only ICBM launches. It was equally true that Trump looked foolish for not understanding that Kim had, in effect, sold him the Brooklyn Bridge with that pledge, but we were never able to shake Trump’s faith he had scored a coup in getting it. Shortly after Air Force One arrived in Japan, Trump tweeted: “North Korea fired off some small weapons, which disturbed some of my people, and others, but not me. I have confidence that Chairman Kim will keep his promise to me, & also smiled when he called Swampman Joe Biden a low IQ individual, & worse. Perhaps that’s sending me a signal?” I could tell already this was going to be a fun trip.

  On Monday, May 27, the visiting US delegation attended the honor-guard ceremony with the Emperor on the grounds of the Imperial Palace in central Tokyo, which was impressive. Trump reviewed the honor guard, but the Emperor did not, which I suspected was intended to show a break with pre–World War II Japanese history. After a private meeting between Trump, the First Lady, and the imperial couple, we motorcaded to the Akasaka Palace. The palace, a huge building that looked as though it had been transported from Versailles to Tokyo, was built right after World War I to copy the French style of architecture. Several Japanese told us the palace was now unpopular, because who wouldn’t dislike a massive French chateau in the middle of Tokyo?

  I tried to focus Trump on North Korea’s missile tests. While he might have viewed them as insignificant, the Japanese, who lived a lot closer to North Korea, had a different view. He said, “I don’t mind having people who disagree with me,” which wasn’t really my point. Before I could try again, we were ushered into a large, ornate room for the first meeting, with just the two leaders, Yachi and me, and the interpreters. Abe began by thanking Trump for meeting later with the families of Japanese citizens whom North Korea had kidnapped over the years. North Korea repeatedly denied the kidnappings, but the contrary evidence was overwhelming.16 Abe himself, early in his political career, had made standing up for the hostage families a signature issue, so he personally appreciated Trump’s gesture. (Later, the family members, whom I had previously met several times in Washington, didn’t mince words with Trump. “North Korea lied to you and tried to cheat you,” said one, and another added, “North Korea has been a terrorist nation for three generations.” Trump responded warmly, saying to one relative, “Don’t ever stop. Don’t ever stop,” regarding his attempts to free his family member. To the mother of another abductee, he said, “You’ll see her again.” In their joint remarks to the press after the meeting, which was a big boost for Abe, Trump said, “We’ll work on it together to bring the abductees home.”)

  After further discussions with Abe, largely on China, when we were in the US holding rooms, Trump asked why the US Trade Representative, Bob Lighthizer, hadn’t been in the meeting. I explained about the scheduling of the different subjects, which Trump ignored. “Lighthizer should have heard that speech [on China],” Trump said, and then, looking at me, added, “When you write your book, get it right.” I laughed and said I would, and even Trump laughed at that point. Request fulfilled.

  At three p.m., Abe and Trump had a joint press conference, with Trump saying again he was not worried by North Korea’s missile launches and Abe saying publicly, with Trump standing beside him, that he believed they had violated Security Council resolutions. The press just loved the split, but more important, it showed to North Korea that despite the efforts under way all day to show the solidarity of the US-Japan alliance, it was clear Abe and Trump had different views on North Korea.

  In June, Trump returned for the Osaka G20 meeting and met with Abe at eight thirty a.m. on Friday the twenty-eighth. In my view, Trump’s best personal relationship among world leaders was with Abe (golf buddies as well as colleagues), although when Boris Johnson became UK Prime Minister, it became a tie. Trump loved mentioning that Abe’s father had been a World War II kamikaze pilot. Trump used it to show how tough the Japanese were generally, and how tough Abe was in particular. In one version, Trump described Abe’s father as disappointed he hadn’t been able to carry out his intended mission for the Emperor, never seeming to realize that had the father succeeded as a kamikaze, there would have been no Shinzo Abe (born in 1954). Mere historical details.

  Abe once again warmly thanked Trump for meeting with the abductee families during the state visit. Abe said North Korea urgently wanted a deal, which meant different things to the two leaders. To Abe, it meant that North Korea must start concrete actions toward denuclearization, and there was no need to relax sanctions. Trump, though, said that Kim was directly writing him beautiful letters and birthday cards, and that the North wanted to do something because the sanctions on North Korea were hurting badly. Trump asked if Japan had imposed the same sanctions as the US, recounting yet again that the first time he had met with Abe and Moon, he had asked them both if they were also imposing sanctions on North Korea. They had replied they were not because the sanctions were too expensive. (I had asked both South Koreans and Japanese if they heard this conversation, and none had, all of them saying that of course Japan and South Korea were applying all UN sanctions. Trump was so firmly convinced of the story there was no point in asking him about it.) In any case, Trump stressed that sanctions cost money, but if one didn’t do them, one paid later. He thought North Korea was sending signals that they might want to close more than one of their nuclear sites, as they had offered in Hanoi, and wanted another meeting. He laughed that they hated Bolton, Pence, and Pompeo, but they loved him. Abe and the Japanese duly laughed, perhaps mostly out of discomfort. Trump said he didn’t care because there were no rocket or nuclear tests.

  Trump had other bilateral meetings that same day, customary at these affairs, and in a brief discussion with Germany’s Merkel touched on North Korea and his post-G20 visit to the South. Trump complained that the US had soldiers everywhere but didn’t get anything out of it. He suggested he might meet Kim Jong Un, whose relationship with him was unparalleled, at the DMZ, because Kim wanted to do something but didn’t know how to get it started. This, I think, was the first reference to Trump’s wanting to meet Kim at the DMZ that anyone in the US delegation heard.

  We also heard about it Saturday morning, waiting to brief Trump for the day ahead. Mulvaney showed me a tweet on his cell phone, asking if I knew about it, which I did not:

  After some very important meetings, including my meeting with President Xi of China, I will be leaving Japan for South Korea (with President Moon). While there, if Chairman Kim of North Korea sees this, I would meet him at the Border/DMZ just to shake his hand and say Hello(?)!

  Mulvaney looked just as flabbergasted as I was. I thought the tweet was a throwaway. In the early afternoon, in the midst of the usual flurry of bilaterals, Mulvaney pulled Pompeo and me aside to say the North Koreans had said the tweet didn’t constitute a formal invitation, which they wanted, and which he was preparing. Mulvaney was then off to something else. Pompeo said to me alone, “I have no value added on this. This is complete chaos,” which was true for both of us. But
the next thing I knew, Trump had signed the “formal” letter of invitation that the North Koreans had asked for. Pompeo had succumbed yet again.

  He had also been managing Moon’s attempts to get into what seemed increasingly likely to be a Kim-Trump meeting. Trump wanted Moon nowhere around, but Moon was determined to be present, making it a trilateral meeting if he could. I entertained the faint hope that this dispute with Moon could tank the whole thing, because it was certain Kim didn’t want Moon around.

  Because we had different planes, we traveled from Osaka to Seoul separately, meaning I couldn’t make it to a dinner Moon hosted. When I reached our hotel in Seoul, I saw that preparations for the DMZ looked more and more like a done deal. As far as I was concerned, any actual Trump-Kim meeting should be limited to a handshake and a photo, although I had no doubt Trump was already thrilling at the expectation of what the morrow would bring. No way would it end quickly. I had not then made any decision on whether to go to the DMZ and travel later to Mongolia on a long-scheduled trip, or just proceed straight to Ulan Bator. I had not originally planned to join the Trump DMZ visit (rescheduled because bad weather had prevented a visit on his first trip to South Korea).

  I felt sick that a stray tweet could actually result in a meeting, although I took some solace from believing that what motivated Trump was the press coverage and photo op of this unprecedented DMZ get-together, not anything substantive. Trump had wanted to have one of the earlier summits at the DMZ, but that idea had been short-circuited because it gave Kim Jong Un the home-court advantage (whereas we would fly halfway around the world), and because we still hadn’t figured out how to ensure it was just a Trump-Kim bilateral meeting. Now it was going to happen. North Korea had what it wanted from the United States and Trump had what he wanted personally. This showed the asymmetry of Trump’s view of foreign affairs. He couldn’t tell the difference between his personal interests and the country’s interests.

  On Saturday, June 30, I awoke to the surprise that Pompeo was listed as attending the DMZ meeting. I e-mailed to ask if he had decided to go, and he replied, “Feel like I need to be there.” I didn’t think anyone needed to be there, but I concluded that if he went, I would go too. After a breakfast with South Korean and US business leaders at the hotel, we motorcaded over to South Korea’s Cheong Wa Dae (“the Blue House”) for meetings with Moon and his team. I learned on the way that North Korea didn’t want a large bilateral after the photo op, but instead preferred a leader-plus-one meeting for about forty minutes. Shortly thereafter, I was told they planned to have Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho as their “plus one,” meaning Pompeo would be the “plus one” on our side. Thus, since I wouldn’t be in the substantive meeting with Kim Jong Un, I veered toward simply leaving for Ulan Bator, to get us there at a reasonable hour. I had no desire to be standing around in the DMZ while Trump and Kim met, and I had no faith any advice I gave Trump beforehand would take. I filled Mulvaney in, and he said it was up to me.

  Meanwhile, at the Blue House, at a very restricted bilateral meeting, Moon asked about the plan for the DMZ. Trump said we didn’t know what the plan was. Contrary to reality, Trump said Kim had asked to meet him, but suggested he and Moon go to the DMZ and meet together so it would look great for Moon. This, of course, contradicted what Trump had been telling us, so Pompeo interrupted to describe the latest arrangements with North Koreans, including the format for the Trump-Kim meeting. In response to a Trump question, I seconded Pompeo’s account. Trump said we would find out shortly, perhaps we would meet, perhaps not. Moon said the paramount issue for Trump was to have the meeting. However, when Kim entered South Korean territory, it wouldn’t look right if Moon wasn’t present, suggesting that he greet Kim and then hand him over to Trump and depart. Pompeo interjected again that we had presented Moon’s view the night before, and the North Koreans rejected it. Trump said he would much rather have Moon present, but he could only pass along what the North’s request was (a completely fanciful account). Moon persisted, recalling that there had been several instances of Presidents visiting the DMZ, but this was the first time South Korean and US Presidents would be there together. Trump said he didn’t want to miss this big opportunity, because he naturally had some things to say to Kim, and he could only pass along what the Secret Service said, since they were arranging the trip (another fantasy).

  Moon changed subjects, saying working-level negotiations with North Korea were always very difficult, but with a patient approach, results were possible. Trump responded, out of nowhere that he might ask that the next US–North Korea summit be after the US elections. At this point, Trump motioned to Tony Ornato, the head of his Secret Service detail, I thought perhaps to ask about the DMZ meeting. Instead, it turned out he asked why Jared and Ivanka were not in the meeting (for which there was a perfectly good reason) and for Ornato to bring them into the room (for which there was no reason at all). Even the South Koreans were embarrassed. Trump sailed on, saying he thought he understood at least a bit how Kim Jong Un thinks, and he knew Kim wanted to see him. Perhaps, Trump suggested, Moon could send him off to the DMZ from Seoul, and then they could meet again at Osan air base during the meet-and-greet with US soldiers. Moon wasn’t having any of that, pressing that it was better if he accompanied Trump to OP Ouellette (a DMZ observation post named for a US soldier killed in the Korean War), then they could decide what to do next. Trump said anything Moon wanted to do was fine with him, and they could go to OP Ouellette together. In response to another Trump question, I assured him that that was the plan.

  Trump then turned unexpectedly to base costs, recounting that Pompeo and I had previously raised the issue with Moon. Trump loved South Korea, but the US was losing $20 billion a year on trade with them. Some people wanted to put tariffs on South Korea so that instead of losing $38 billion (these numbers tended to come and go), the US would make $30 billion, but Trump had resisted because of his relationship with Moon. The year before, he had asked me to calculate the amount of the base costs, and work with South Korea for a fair and equitable share, and that amount had been $5 billion a year, or $5.5 billion (more numbers coming and going). Trump then said that, in all other cases, countries had agreed to pay more for base costs (which wasn’t true, at least not yet), noting that at the end of 2018, South Korea had agreed to pay just under $1 billion, postponing the reckoning for one year. Now, we had to come up with something fair and equitable for the US, since we were losing $4 billion a year to defend South Korea from North Korea. The North was nuking up, and there would be serious consequences if the US wasn’t present on the Peninsula. He asked Moon to assign someone to deal with Pompeo or me so we could make things happen, stressing how hostile the South’s next-door neighbor in Pyongyang was. Trump said that people were talking about this issue, and he had gotten elected on it.

  Moon, perhaps forgetting Trump had raised the $5 billion figure at the White House in April, said that on economic issues, the trade surplus had decreased since Trump’s inauguration, that South Korea was the biggest importer of U.S. LNG, that Korean investment in the US has increased, and that the bilateral balance of trade was now more favorable to the US. Nonetheless, the South would engage in consultations, noting the $1 billion payment Trump had mentioned and the free land and construction for various facilities, as well as weapons purchases, all of which amount to significant contributions to our joint defense. By then, Trump was growing visibly frustrated, gesturing for Moon to speed up and giving exasperated looks to us and the other South Koreans. More embarrassment. Trump said the US shouldn’t pay real estate taxes for land to protect the South since we didn’t own the land, and perhaps we would leave when things were peaceful. Trump said he had an obligation to do this; we didn’t want a profit, just reimbursement from a very wealthy nation for protecting it from its northern neighbor.

  Trump was now waving his hands, shrugging and sighing, tired of listening, obviously eager to move on, but Moon obviously was not. South Korea paid 2.4 percent of GDP
for its defense budget, the highest level of all US allies, he urged. Trump agreed, saying Germany and Japan were in the same boat as South Korea, and they were not under threat. Trump wanted $5 billion, and told me to lead the negotiations. The US had been the South’s military for seventy years, and now he was going to see Kim Jong Un so we could save the South. Moon resisted, while acknowledging the vast amounts of US assistance, arguing that it wasn’t true that Seoul had only been a recipient of aid. South Korea had sent troops to Vietnam and Afghanistan, for example. But Trump was done, telling me to call up someone and start dealing.

  During lunch, after the press had exited, Trump repeated that Kim wanted to meet very badly. Trump asked the US side again about the arrangement for Moon, wondering disingenuously in my opinion, why Kim would not want South Korea represented. Moon answered that there had not been meaningful talks between the two Koreas because of North Korea’s rigidity, based on the North’s perception that because the South was taking the US side, the North would be at a disadvantage. Trump said that in his bilateral meeting, he would stress the aid that the South was providing, and would tell Moon everything that happened between him and Kim. Trump was happy that the world had been going crazy over the meeting, and that it had taken over the G20 (in his mind). Kim had agreed to cross the border and wanted working-level negotiations right afterward, so Trump wanted to leave the lunch early. All of this was nonsense. There was no doubt who wanted to meet badly, and that was the one doing the talking.

  Trump restated that the discussion about base costs was very important, and that he was assigning me to it, asking whom I had dealt with before, and suggesting I find someone else, which couldn’t have made Chung very happy. Then he was off riffing on Chinese currency manipulations. Moon tried to get the discussion back to Kim’s wanting security guarantees for his regime. Trump agreed that Kim wanted a guarantee only from the US, not from China or Russia. Trump said we guaranteed the safety of South Korea already but got nothing out of it. He thought he would have a short but very successful meeting with Kim, which would be very good for Moon. Moon said the Korean people respected and liked Trump, who preened that he knew he was popular. He explained how Korean women in his clubs came up and hugged him, then lectured on how different things were in Korea since he became President. He thought it was a big sign that Kim had agreed to meet based on a tweet. No one else knew how to get him. Moon confessed that the South had set up a hot line to Chairman Kim, but it was in the Korean Workers Party headquarters, and Kim never went there.17 Nor did the phone work on weekends.