Chasing Perfection: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the High-Stakes Game of Creating an NBA Champion

by Andy Glockner

  Korver is not a dynamic athlete by NBA standards, but he doesn’t have to be. As Elliott says, given what Korver’s role is, “It doesn’t matter if he can [vertical] jump forty inches. It matters if he can get to twenty-four inches first,” because that’s the height of his jump-shot release, and Korver just needs a fractional amount of space to let fly. So instead of working to improve Korver’s vertical leap max, Elliott and Korver worked on improving Korver’s vertical “quickness.”

  They also worked on pushing the limits of Korver’s mental strength, in part through an annual, one-day exploration of pain called a misogi, a type of Japanese purification ritual. Basically, the goal was to come up with a physical challenge that seemed impossible, and then do it in order to push through mental and physical boundaries. In that first summer, Korver, Elliott, and others paddleboarded twenty-seven miles from Santa Barbara to the Channel Islands out in the Pacific Ocean. Korver had never paddleboarded before the attempt, but got through the adventure by micro-focusing on perfecting his strokes while blocking out the fatigue, pain, and potential danger.

  In 2014, the misogi of choice was an underwater 5K “run,” with the group taking turns picking up an eighty-five-pound rock at the bottom of the ocean, running as far underwater as they could with it, and then dropping it for the next “runner” before surfacing and treading water until it was their turn again. In 2015, the plan was to run repeatedly up a stairwell in a Los Angeles skyscraper until they reached the total vertical height of Mount Everest (29,035 vertical feet), pausing only to take the elevator back down to the ground floor before immediately heading back up the stairs for the next stage of the climb, but Korver was not able to partake because he was recovering from injury.

  Overall, Korver says he felt better at thirty-three years old than he did at twenty-three, and the combination of a fitter Korver and the arrival of Budenholzer proved to be extremely potent. As detailed in Lowe’s column, Budenholzer’s designs on a free-flowing, 3-point-heavy attack mapped very well with Korver’s constant needs for movement and tinkering—with some growing pains attached. In their first season together, Korver often would end up freelancing on plays that would wind up with multiple Hawks standing near each other, ruining the set’s spacing. Still, Budenholzer pretty quickly understood what he had with Korver, and he started crafting creative offshoots of standard NBA actions to best unleash his new weapon with space to operate.

  The Hawks started running what approximated as pick and rolls, but included short pitches from the big man setting the screen to Korver rather than Korver initiating the action, since he is not a particularly refined dribbler. The pitch instead of a handoff or Korver having to dribble himself sometimes provided Korver with enough space to immediately squeeze off a catch-and-shoot three, but over time, Korver also has built improvements into his game that allow him to take a dribble or two off that action and find a pass (back to the screener or kicking out to the other wing) or even pull up in the lane for an occasional floater.

  When opponents started sniffing out these actions, the Hawks then started running counters to them, often involving a smaller guard in the post and/or Korver actually setting a screen to help unsettle the defense before the main action ended up being run. And he kept burying shots, making 47.2 percent of 392 3-point attempts while bumping up his 2-point field goal percentage a bit and also getting to the free throw line a touch more often, where he made himself into a 90-plus percent shooter. He wasn’t the key to the Hawks’ 2013–14 offense, but he was a guy opponents quickly realized they absolutely had to start keying on.

  “One of the things about Korver that’s really unbelievable is that he averages about thirteen points per game, but you go into the game and you have to treat him like he averages thirty, or else it could be thirty,” said Boston Celtics head coach Brad Stevens. “I think that’s where he presents a whole lot of challenges. He presents a whole lot of challenges in his cuts, how much attention you give him off the cuts, how much he opens up for everyone else. He’s a really good player, as we all know.”

  A good part of Korver’s excellence comes from his rigorous pre-game routines. He says he’s not superstitious about what he does to get ready for games, but he continuously tinkers with his regimen to best prepare him for the types of movements and shots he’s going to get in a game.

  Each game night, Korver was assigned to be in the final pregame shooting block, and had half of the court to himself. Before he stepped onto the floor, he would undertake a lengthy stretching and movement routine, using a variety of poles, exercise bands, and advertising signage boards to work through a series of muscle-loosening, static stretches, and resistance movements before he even takes a shot. He then spends the remainder of the period going through a sequence of plays that attempt to simulate where he will get the ball in games and what options he will have.

  So, Korver will come full speed off curls, catch inside the arc, and drive for a layup. He’ll use the same motion and pull up for a floater. He’ll shoot some free throws. He’ll take some catch-and-shoot threes from the corner. He’ll interact with multiple coaches to set and receive screens, and simulate pick and rolls and pitches to him, finding his range with one sweet arc after another. Everything is done with pace and purpose, mimicking how the Hawks want to play, and this sets Korver up for another night of relentless movement and catch and shoots off the dead run that stretch and bend even the better NBA defenses in really uncomfortable ways.

  “We were talking about it before [the game],” said New Orleans Pelicans wing Ryan Anderson, himself a quality 3-point shooter, after losing to the Hawks in Atlanta. “Ninety percent of their plays could end with an opportunity for him to score, so even though the ball’s not in his hands, he’s always a threat.

  “You have to watch out for screens. There’s some guys like Ray Allen, Reggie Miller, guys in history . . . those guys commanded as much attention as him. There’s not a lot of guys [like that] anymore, guys coming off screens looking for a shot, guys always active coming off pindowns, or guys in transition you always have to be aware of. That’s dangerous in this league now because it’s [about] such stretched-out offense. You want to get those quick buckets, and you can really hurt a team with those huge dagger threes.”

  In Korver’s second season under Budenholzer, with big man Al Horford back in the fold and other Hawks like Jeff Teague and DeMarre Carroll blossoming around him, he stretched the limits of NBA history, nearly becoming the first player to have a “50–50–90” field goal percentage–3-point percentage–free throw percentage season. (Golden State Warriors head coach Steve Kerr actually reached that summit in the 1995–96 season, but didn’t make enough field goals or free throws for it to “officially” count.)

  Korver had to settle for a (rounded) 49–49–90 campaign, still one of the greatest shooting seasons in NBA history, making 221 of his 449 3-point attempts. His 3-point shot chart on NBA.com looked like a minimalist painting, with all five regions outside the arc bathed in the sweet light green color of outperformance, and his marksmanship attracted the attention of the league’s best players.

  “The numbers he’s putting up this year, shooting over 50 percent, that’s crazy,” said Golden State Warriors guard and future league MVP Stephen Curry ahead of the teams’ first meeting of the 2014–15 season. “I think I’ve had—Klay [Thompson] can say the same thing—stretches of the season where you feel like you are on fire, and I haven’t touched that 53 percent number or whatever. It’s pretty remarkable to keep that going. I think he’s made some big shots, as well. You enjoy it when you see another shooter do what he does.”

  Korver’s “worst” area from behind the arc was the left wing, where he “only” made 40 percent of his 90 attempts (which was still six percentage points above league average from that quadrant). From three of the five zones around the arc, Korver shot at least 15 percentage points better than the league average, converting nearly half of his attempts from straightaway and from deep
er on the right wing while the league barely makes a third of its attempts from those regions. Given how often Korver is shooting, especially after sprinting around a screen, his success rates are astounding. He was even more lethal from the shorter right corner, where he knocked down thirty-three of his fifty-eight tries for an effective field goal percentage of 85.3 percent.

  For perspective on that last figure, Los Angeles Clippers put-back and pick-and-roll lob dunk specialist DeAndre Jordan converted 72.7 percent of his “restricted area” field goal attempts in 2014–15. Players with similar profiles, like the Phoenix Suns’ Brendan Wright and the Dallas Mavericks’ Tyson Chandler (now also in Phoenix after signing as a free agent in the offseason) were at 75.1 and 72.2 percent, respectively, per the SportVU data available on NBA.com. So, incredibly, a Korver right-corner 3-point attempt was worth considerably more in expected points per shot (1.706) than an array of dunks and putbacks from the league’s most efficient big man rim finishers (between 1.444 and 1.502, for the three big men above). You sometimes hear an announcer yell that an open shot is “like a layup” to a great jump shooter, and in this case, that was true—and then some.

  Because the Hawks had effectively wrapped up the Eastern Conference’s top seed so prematurely, there wasn’t a lot riding on their stretch run of games, and the team tried to stay sharp and healthy beyond anything else. As such, conversation more frequently turned toward Korver’s run at history, as he had spent much of the season over the necessary benchmarks.

  The chase, as it was—along with some roster shuffling and the relative lack of meaning in the games they were playing—may have affected Korver a little bit. Acknowledging that players “have to speak to the media every day,” he copped to being aware of where he stood, but “if you’re going to think about that, there’s a chance you’re going to start shooting tentatively. You know what I mean? You’re not going to shoot [as freely].” Korver said his late-season drop-off that pushed him just below the thresholds was more a case that his shooting elbow started flaring up down the stretch of the season than any pressure to maintain some round-number benchmarks. Korver ultimately had surgery on that elbow over the summer (along with surgery for an ankle injury caused by Cleveland Cavaliers guard Matthew Dellavedova when he somewhat controversially rolled up on Korver’s leg during a loose-ball scramble during the conference finals).

  Regardless, 2014–15 was Korver’s third straight season shooting at least 45 percent on at least 200 3-point attempts, tying him with two-time league MVP Steve Nash for the most such seasons in a career. There have only been thirty-four instances of that combo since the NBA first installed the 3-point arc in the 1979–80 season, and Korver’s shooting way more than most others on the list. All three of Korver’s qualifying seasons included at least 392 3-point attempts; Nash never tried more than 293 in any of his 45-percenters.

  And, for the record, it was Korver who received the advice from Kevin Durant about his heels, and he did end up sticking with the approach to better shot-loading.

  “It’s really good advice,” Korver said from Santa Barbara, where he was back preparing for the 2015–16 season. “It’s all about just feeling strong, feeling loaded, and lift up with your legs. Yeah, [it’s] definitely one of the things that I think about [when I’m shooting].” Korver said it took him awhile to really get comfortable with staying more solid through his heels, but “it’s like the story with my elbow, though. You feel like you’re doing it right.”

  After the Hawks’ regular-season success, the end of the campaign didn’t go as expected. Hampered by an increasing number of injuries to key players, and perhaps having lost their sharpness during the insignificant final stretch of the regular season, the Hawks made hard work of a series with the mediocre Brooklyn Nets, were helped significantly in the second round when Washington Wizards star point guard John Wall injured his hand, and then were whitewashed in four straight by LeBron James and the Cavaliers in the Eastern Conference Finals.

  Nonetheless, at an age where most players are fading, Korver finally had arrived, feeling healthier than he had in years, playing better than he ever had, and impacting the NBA in ways that very few others are capable. The once-reluctant Hawk now loves being in Atlanta, and the Hawks fans have embraced “Threezus” as one of their favorite players. Three decades after Showtime influenced him at the very start of his path to the NBA, the way Korver is playing—and how he’s made himself into what he now is—is setting an all-around example for future players who want to reach their absolute personal max.

  “What I love about Kyle is what I loved about Steve Nash and Grant Hill,” said Kerr. “There’s sort of an intellectual approach to the craft, not just a physical one. It’s not about just going out and practicing a bunch of shots. It’s thinking about how to get better, preparing your mind, it’s challenging yourself with different routines, different activities to search out what helps you the most. I’ve read a little bit about Kyle this year, doing so many things to improve himself, and the guy’s a pro. He’s great for the league, and obviously great for the Hawks. He’s a hell of a player.”

  EPILOGUE

  The Warriors Come Out to Play

  The 2015 NBA Finals between the Cleveland Cavaliers and the Golden State Warriors featured two major storylines that are incredibly relevant to this book, but neither may have surfaced if not for the dramatic ending of Game 1 in the series.

  In that contest, the Cavaliers—sizable underdogs on the road in Oakland—had a wonderful chance to win the game on their final possession, but LeBron James missed a makeable driving layup and, after the rebound kicked out toward the right corner, guard Iman Shumpert was fractionally short on a catch-and-shoot fling that looked good when he let it go. The game went to overtime, and early in the extra session, Cavaliers star point guard Kyrie Irving went down with a knee injury. The Cavaliers ended up losing that game, and Irving never played again in the series.

  With the Cavaliers’ other standout, forward Kevin Love, already having sustained a shoulder injury in the team’s first-round playoff series against the Boston Celtics and also declared out for the remainder of the playoffs, Irving’s injury left the Cavaliers with LeBron and a cast of role players. Shorthanded Cleveland suddenly looked extraordinarily overmatched against the best and deepest team in the league, which had hurt opponents all season with its shooting and interchangeable personnel, and after the Cavaliers missed their chance to steal Game 1, most NBA observers expected the series to last five games, if that many.

  Then a funny thing happened: the Cavaliers won Game 2 on the road. Then they went home and won Game 3, as well. Beyond the shock of the unexpected back-to-back wins, it was James’s role in how those games unfolded that created the series’ first major discussion point.

  To be certain, a lot of things beyond the best player in the world carrying his team had to go right for Cleveland, given how short on firepower the Cavaliers were. In Game 2, the Warriors’ Stephen Curry shot a woeful five of twenty-three from the field, Cleveland big man Timofey Mozgov destroyed Andrew Bogut and the other Golden State bigs with a seventeen-point, eleven-rebound statement, and backup Cleveland point guard Matthew Dellavedova made some huge plays down the stretch of the 2-point overtime victory. In Game 3, Cleveland’s “Delly” poured in an improbable twenty points while Warriors forwards Draymond Green and Harrison Barnes shot a combined two for eighteen from the field as the Cavaliers won by five.

  But the two wins were mostly about LeBron—who played 96 of the 101 total minutes—and how Cleveland head coach David Blatt orchestrated the Cavaliers’ approach, slowing the tempo of the contests against the league’s most up-tempo team down to an absolute crawl.

  Time and time again, LeBron brought the ball up the court, pounded the dribble, and then tried to attack out of isolation sets. Sometimes, he scored (he had thirty-six points in Game 2 and forty in Game 3, albeit on twenty-five of sixty-nine combined shooting). Sometimes, he passed (he had nineteen combined assists
, even though his teammates didn’t make many shots in Game 2). And if he missed, Cleveland was in good shape positionally to get back on defense and defuse any Golden State fastbreaks.

  It was the most prudent (and perhaps only) approach for the Cavaliers, as they were constituted. It also was a strategy that had some quantitative merit. Remember that, somewhat surprisingly during the regular season, Cleveland had been quite good when it only had LeBron on the court without either Irving or Love, and most of the success in those (admittedly small-sample) situations came on the defensive end of the floor. The Cavaliers held opponents to just 88.2 points per forty-eight minutes in those situations, which was seven points better than the defensive per-forty-eight rate with all three stars on the court together. The trouble (understandably) came when LeBron also was off the court, leaving Cleveland without any of its stars. Understanding that many of those situations likely came later in blowouts, so the data could be skewed by game situations, Cleveland dropped to a -5.6 net per forty-eight minutes, and only scored 95 points per forty-eight minutes with only its role players on the court.

  Basically, Blatt realized that the lineups with James could compete with Golden State, at least on the defensive end. He also knew the Cavaliers would be mostly incapable of scoring against the league’s most efficient defense when James sat. So, the plan became James playing as many minutes as possible, and hoping that gorging on isos and floor balance would limit the total number of possessions in the game and put Cleveland in position to steal wins down the stretch.

  All Blatt needed was for James, essentially, to be inhuman.

  That’s not hyperbole. During the series, ESPN Insider’s Tom Haberstroh penned a column about a gathering of elite sports scientists who ostensibly were at a conference to swap the latest in athlete maintenance techniques but ended up being transfixed by the NBA Finals, almost unable to comprehend the stress “load” that LeBron was carrying for the Cavaliers. Haberstroh spoke with Michael Young, the owner and founder of Athlete Lab Sports Performance Training Center in North Carolina, about what Young was seeing in LeBron’s effort.