The Battle over Hetch Hetchy: America's Most Controversial Dam and the Birth of Modern Environmentalism

by Robert W. Righter

  Alden Sampson, an avid mountain climber and member of the Sierra Club, made an effort to keep William Colby informed through telegrams. On November 25 he wired that City Attorney Long had "Presented Case Well Enough," but that Mayor Rolfe had "Made a Donkey of Himself." He did not think that the city had gained much ground in the first two days. Two days later McFarland wired that Freeman had "Seriously Discredited Himself by Evasions" and that a member of the army engineers "Had Brought out Failure of Freeman to Supply Information-Whole Situation Encouraging." On the same day, Bade offered his opinion that it was "Hard to Tell Outcome-May Grant Hetch Hetchy with Severe RestrictionsSpring Valley and Irrigationists Still to Be Heard-Reported City Will Try Congress.."56

  The last two days of testimony featured heated exchanges between the attorneys from San Francisco and the Modesto andTurlock irrigation districts. In dispute, of course, were questions regarding the volume of water that flowed in the Tuolumne River, the irrigation districts' legal right to that water, and the guarantees that San Francisco would be required to make before the districts would sign off on the Hetch Hetchy plan. In their distrust of San Francisco they often found themselves strange bedfellows with the nature lovers. Alden Sampson said he was "betting on our side." J. Horace McFarland, however, was not so sure. He wrote Mather that from what he heard at the conclusion of the hearings, "the Secretary rather abruptly put it up to San Francisco to get busy," since the Board of Army Engineers required more information before it could make a recommendation.57

  At the conclusion of the hearing, Secretary Fisher turned over all of the testimony and supplementary reports and information to his advisory board, employed by the Army Corps of Engineers. This board would make recommendations to the secretary and his staff. Fisher would rely heavily on their opinion, for he judged their views the only objective, impartial ones. Both sides understood the importance of the army engineers' report, and both hoped that its conclusions would vindicate their position.

  Although Fisher considered the board objective and free from bias, all three were military men and all three were engineers. Colonel John Biddle headed the board, with the assistance of Lieutenant Colonel Harry Taylor and Major Spencer Cosby, but H. H. Wadsworth, as assistant engineer in the U.S. Army, carried out the actual investigation. One might assume that the U.S. Army might have leaned toward the city's position, but that would not be true. Ever since 1896, when Lieutenant Colonel S. B. M.Young had arrested a San Francisco party for carrying loaded rifles in defiance of park rules, the relationship between the city and the military had remained strained. Superintendents colonels Harry Benson and James W. Forsyth had kept in close contact with John Muir and the defenders. Muir acknowledged the army's diligence in protecting Yosemite, declaring "blessings on Uncle Sam's soldiers! They have done their job well, and every pine tree is waving its arms for joy."55

  Significant for the outcome was the board members' calling as professional engineers. They belonged to a fraternity that commanded great respect and authority. Engineers were the technical experts who supposedly knew best how to deal with questions of natural resources. They made decisions by the force of their calculation and their facts, which few could dispute. Colby and the valley's defenders were quite willing to defer to their expertise.59 No professional group paraded a longer list of qualifications. When the San Francisco Examiner printed the resume for John Freeman, it exceeded the column inches allotted to many of the paper's other stories.60

  Questioning the objectivity of an engineering board was rare indeed. However, when, in 1909, the Senate Committee on the Public Lands proposed an impartial board of engineers to investigate the Hetch Hetchy situation, both sides embraced the idea. The only dissenting voice came from Robert Underwood Johnson. To Senator Newlands's question about whether a report by the Army Corps of Engineers would be a good thing, Johnson responded: "I should think that would be very admirable, if in addition to that there were included lay members who were impartial, not living in California, but men of such high standing as to render their appointment a guaranty of impartiality."61 Newlands took note of the suggestion, but the idea went nowhere. Johnson, of course, understood that the army engineers excelled at solving technical problems, but their orientation limited them. A board of engineers was unprepared to answer the concerns of the nature lovers, such as: What of the growing importance of national parks? What of the future use of the Hetch Hetchy Valley as a tourist attraction? What was the direction ofAmerican culture regarding leisure time, outdoor recreation, and a need to escape the burgeoning cities? Army engineers were illequipped to address these social and cultural questions.

  One other factor mitigated in favor of the city. Money was not a problem for San Francisco, but it was for the Interior Department. When Secretary Richard Ballinger originally ordered the report by the Special Board of Army Engineers, he allocated no funds for such a purpose. Instead, he quietly requested that the city pay for the study and furnish information to the board on demand. This financial arrangement could give the appearance of guaranteeing a result in San Francisco's favor.62 Neither Ballinger nor Secretary Fisher, however, seemed concerned with such a potential conflict of interest.

  On February 13, 1913, officials released the long-awaited report. The conclusions represented a victory for San Francisco, although the Hetch Hetchy Valley defenders did note that the engineers provided other water options. The board accepted Freeman's conclusion that in the year 2000 the population of the Bay Area communities would be 3,632,000 people, requiring 540 million gallons per day (MGD). Given that the present Spring Valley water facilities provided 133 MGD, the new source should provide about 400 MGD. The Hetch Hetchy system would be adequate and would be approximately $20 million cheaper than any other feasible project that could furnish the 400 MGD. Most of the other rivers and sources failed the test to deliver the needed water. Furthermore, the report suggested that "the necessity of preserving all available water in the Valley of California [Central Valley] will sooner or later make the demand for the use of Hetch Hetchy as a reservoir practically irresistible." Given this conclusion, there seemed no reason to delay construction. However, the report also concluded that other options existed. The engineers noted that "the best available sources, outside of the Tuolumne River, appear to be the filtered Sacramento [River], the McCloud [River], a combination of the Lake Eleanor-Cherry [Creek]-Stanis- laus [River] and Mokelumne [River], and a combination of the American- Consumnes-Stanislaus, and Mokelumne [Rivers]."63

  The engineers ignored the national park status of Hetch Hetchy and gave no real weight to scenic value. Given the criteria they established, their conclusion to allow construction was self-evident. Colby, Muir, and other defenders had an unwarranted confidence that the engineers could give a balanced opinion. However, when the board treated Hetch Hetchy Valley land as just another site rather than one located in a national park, its conclusion surprised no one. Perhaps the defenders realized their error when, in later years, both Colonel John Biddle and Lieutenant Colonel Harry Taylor kept in close contact with Michael O'Shaughnessy, each visiting the dam site on more than one occasion to heap praise on the city engineer and the work crews.64 A major reason why the Sierra Club and its allies ultimately lost the fight was that they failed to influence the selection of the board and to shape the questions that the "impartial" board asked. The board, consequently, discounted cultural and environmental issues. Scenic value, tourist use, and national park invasion-the issues on which the Sierra Club based its case-all fell outside the Board ofArmy Engineers' purview And, it goes without saying, neither the Sierra Club nor the Society for the Protection of National Parks could afford to produce its own report.65

  In spite of the advantage of San Francisco, Secretary Fisher hesitated to move forward with a darn decision. Finally, three days before leaving office, he sent Mayor Rolfe a letter that surely disappointed him. Fisher determined that he lacked the statutory authority to grant a permit to San Francisco. He decided, in other w
ords, that he could not make a decision. Therefore, the order to the city to "show cause" would remain in effect. He and his predecessor interior secretaries had overstepped their authority in the matter. Recourse for San Francisco to change the order must come from the Congress of the United States.66

  The chilled champagne of celebration would have to wait for another day.

  CHAPTER 6

  Congress Decides

  "The Destruction of the charming groves and gardens, the finest in all California, goes to my heart"

  JOHN MUIR

  THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS can be a fickle one. Elections bring changessome unplanned-that determine outcomes, including the fate of a relatively obscure valley. The interplay between the executive and legislative branches is cumbersome, seemingly dedicated to slowing down the process of decision making. At tunes both sides in the Hetch Hetchy controversy might have wished for a benevolent dictator to decide in their favor. Interior Secretary Walter Fisher could have acted in that capacity, but instead he deferred to Congress, perhaps knowing that the whole issue would end up there anyway. It did.

  By 1913 the time had come for a decision. Both sides had perfected and presented their arguments. San Francisco based its hopes for water and power needs on John Freeman's idea that the city's victory could provide water and power, while giving the American people a scenic lake set deep in the granite frames of the Hetch HetchyValley. The city believed that through good planning and design the practical needs of a growing city could be linked to the aesthetic standards of a national park. The Sierra Club and the Society for the Preservation of National Parks did not deny the city's right to a bountiful water supply. However, they vigorously argued that there were other viable options. The Hetch Hetchy Valley should remain undefiledrevered as scenery, protected by the mantle of the national parks, and maintained as a place where thousands of Americans could refresh themselves while spending their dollars.

  Of course, as 1913 unfolded, there was much speculation about who President-elect Woodrow Wilson would select as his secretary of the interior. Defenders of the valley preferred Secretary Walter Fisher, but they knew that "the new President will want to make a clean sweep."1 He did indeed. Wilson choose Franklin K. Lane for the Interior post, a San Franciscan well acquainted with Hetch Hetchy. He had served as city attorney between 1900 and 1903, and during his tenure he worked closely with Mayor Phelan to obtain water rights in the valley. It was Lane who appealed to Secretary of the Interior Ethan Hitchcock to reverse the secretary's decision to deny the city a permit. If there was any doubt of Lane's position, he resolved it within a week of taking office. The new secretary called in San Francisco city attorney Percy Long and an attorney representing the Modesto and Turlock irrigation districts, with the intention of hammering out their differences regarding Tuolumne River irrigation waters. Richard Watrous, McFarland's assistant at the American Civic Association, heard of the meeting and asked that he be included. Lane extended an invitation, although he would have preferred otherwise. At the meeting, Watrous recalled, the new secretary stated flatly that as city attorney he had favored the Hetch Hetchy scheme, he had favored it in the intervening years, and now that Wilson had elevated him to secretary of the interior, he would continue the battle in and out of Congress. Watrous could only compliment the secretary for his honesty, knowing that Lane's zeal would be very hard to overcome.2

  The Lane appointment came as a surprise to all parties. The preservationists knew little about President-elect Wilson. In their view this Easternborn, Princeton University president had come to power when both Taft and Roosevelt floundered. Woodrow Wilson had no record on conservation matters, and presumably little interest. If he had an opinion regarding the philosophical split between Gifford Pinchot and John Muir, it was to favor the utilitarian camp. Presumably Wilson appointed Franklin Lane as interior secretary because the San Franciscan worked hard on his campaign and delivered both the city and state to the Democrats. Much later Horace Albright, second director of the National Park Service, would dispute that interpretation, convinced that "Franklin Lane's appointment to the cabinet was made specifically for the purpose of pushing this [Hetch Hetchy project], the so-called Raker-Pittman Bill."3

  Albright's recollection is questionable, for there is no evidence thatWilson had ever met Franklin Lane or had even heard of the Hetch Hetchy controversy. Colonel Edward House, a wealthy Texas cotton farmer, had become the close confidant of Wilson. Known for his political acumen, House would be the one to search for a new secretary of the interior. His diary gives us his thoughts and some clues regarding the appointment. On November 21, 1912, House spent most of the day with Lane. They discussed the position, but Lane indicated that he was happy with his present situation and would not change it. Their conversations turned to James Phelan, whom Colonel House described as "a man worth from four to ten million dollars, a bachelor, a fine after-dinner speaker, able but cold blooded." Evidently the perceived latter trait and the fact that he "has some enemies" were enough to eliminate Phelan. House did note that although the West wanted Phelan, the East would not. Although House never mentioned Hetch Hetchy, he did indicate in a memo to Wilson that "the East is all for conservation and the far West is for it in a limited way-that is where it does not conflict with their material interests."4

  Colonel House continued his search. He considered Walter Page,Wilson's lifelong friend, the editor of World's Work, and the man soon to be appointed ambassador to Great Britain. But Page was a Southerner being considered for a position traditionally occupied by a Westerner. In the meantime, Lane had second thoughts. He asked House if he would have a free hand in running the department. Colonel House assured him that if Lane proved capable, Wilson would have no cause to interfere. In the middle of February, House recommended Lane for either "War or Interior." Wilson quizzed his adviser on Lane's views on conservation. House didn't know but said he would invite Lane to Washington, and during the meeting Norman Hapgood, the muckraking editor of Collier's Weekly, could "drop in and let them meet as if by accident." House incorrectly believed that the outspoken editor was a conservationist who represented "the extreme Eastern view" Lane, presumably, passed the Hapgood test. Wilson and House continued to jockey their cabinet posts, but finally on February 2¢, just a little over a week before the inaugural, House offered Franklin Lane the Interior post, and he accepted it.5

  From Colonel House's diary we may surmise that the ongoing Hetch Hetchy fight had little to do with Lane's appointment. It is possible that Colonel House and/or Norman Hapgood may have mentioned the conflict, but it would have made little difference, since Hapgood supported the city's position. Whatever the exact nature of the San Franciscan's appointment, he was the antithesis of an impartial interior secretary. Lane had an agenda of water development in and out of the national parks, and he would follow it. One cannot help but note the serendipitous nature of his ascendancy, seemingly so unimportant to the new Democratic administration but so crucial to a small glacial valley tucked away in the Sierra Nevada mountains.

  For San Francisco Lane could not have been a more perfect choice.Yet, in a sense, the city forces were frustrated by Secretary Fisher's "midnight decision" that he did not have the authority to rule on a permit and that San Francisco must go before Congress. The Fisher decision angered Michael O'Shaughnessy, who, after reading a copy, marched into the outgoing secretary's office and harangued him, saying all the copies of his decision belonged in his waste basket.6 If Fisher had not tossed the ball to Congress, Secretary Lane could have quickly reversed Ballinger's "show cause" decision, restoring the Garfield grant. By the summer of 1913 O'Shaughnessy could have been busy clearing the valley, beginning construction, and enjoying a cool river swim in the evening. But because of Walter Fisher's resolution to throw the whole issue to Congress, O'Shaughnessy remained in Washington.

  Thus, to the city engineer's displeasure, the "nature lovers" would be given one more chance. But they would be on the defensive. San Francisco ci
ty attorney Long and city clerk John S. Dunnigan soon drafted a bill authorizing San Francisco's use of the Hetch HetchyValley. They prevailed on Congressman John E. Raker of California to introduce it and enlisted the influential support of Congressman William Kent. Fortunately for San Francisco, Wilson felt it necessary to call Congress to a special summer session to consider tariff reform. Under the spurious argument that the city suffered from a water shortage, Raker managed to get the Hetch Hetchy bill on the calendar. Muir sent a telegram to Henry Fairfield Osborn that the "San Francisco Schemers Making Desperate Efforts to Rush Bill Through Congress. . . . You Know the President and Am Sure You Will Strike Hard." Letters resulted from Muir's appeal, but the bill appeared quickly before the House Committee on Public Lands, and for weeks San Francisco's lobbyists had been preparing the committee.?

  O'Shaughnessy, Long, and Dunnigan were only part of a phalanx of San Franciscans who descended on Washington and took up residence at the Willard Hotel. James Phelan, Rudolph Spreckels, andAlexanderVogelsang- the last soon to be appointed by Lane as assistant secretary of the interiorwere often seen at the capitol. John Dunnigan led the effort to draft what would become the Raker bill. They all stayed at the Willard Hotel, suffering through the humid heat. In the evening, to escape his stuffy room, O'Shaughnessy frequently walked, ending his stroll at the ice cream parlor. Often he was accompanied by Congressman James M. Graham from Illinois, who happened to be on the House Public Lands Committee, a person whom he "became sincerely attached to." Presumably O'Shaughnessy used the word "sincerely" to avoid the reader's suspicion that he was lobbying, but friend or not, Congressman Graham would play a significant pro-San Francisco role in the hearings.8