The Battle over Hetch Hetchy: America's Most Controversial Dam and the Birth of Modern Environmentalism
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Interior Department officials took the secretary's idea seriously, although surely some privately questioned the wisdom of opening such a Pandora's box. The Reno Gazette-Herald commented: "It sounds crazy, doesn't it? Drain Hetch Hetchy reservoir in Yosemite National Park to restore a valley for tourists-meantime wiping out the main water supply for San Francisco." Undeterred, Interior spokesman Tom Wilson affirmed that the department would "provide [Hodel] with what he wants as quickly as possible." He expected that within a couple of months the preliminary data could be in Hodel's hands, a report that would evaluate the possibilities of a much more detailed "feasibility study." 18
While both the California state legislature and the Department of the Interior took action, the Sierra Club struggled with a position. On August 28, 1987, Sierra Club chairman Michael McCloskey, accompanied by members Sally and Les Reid, Carl Pope, and Joanne Hurley, drove to O'Shaughnessy Dam. Dean Coffey, superintendent of the Hetch Hetchy system and surely the most informed person regarding the consequences of removing the dam, met them. Coffey believed that some replacement water might be secured through building "wing dams" at the Don Pedro Reservoir. Furthermore, increasing the city's water rights at Don Pedro might be possible but would surely involve lengthy, costly legal fights. Coffey asserted that the existing system would not provide sufficient water if San Francisco elected to remove the dam. Furthermore, the Western River Guides, who had established a lucrative rafting business on the lower river, would object to removal. McCloskey noted that there was virtually no silt in the reservoir. This fact would accelerate restoration efforts should the dam be removed, but a siltless reservoir also offered a potent argument for San Francisco to maintain the dam, which Coffey believed could last a thousand years.19
McCloskey also met with Secretary Hodel in Washington, D.C. At the Sierra Club leader's request, the secretary gathered together Peter Koppleman of the Wilderness Society, Paul Pritchard of the National Parks and Conservation Association, Kent Olsen of American Rivers, Ed Ossan of the National Wildlife Federation, and Scootch Panhanian of the Western River Guides. It was a cordial meeting and the group focused on replacement water possibilities, including the Don Pedro Dam and the New Melones Dam on the Stanislaus River. They discussed San Francisco's water and power rights should the darn be breached. Although Hodel believed that the city had amortized its investment and benefited handsomely over the last So years, he still held that the city must be given some sort of settlement sum and, of course, replacement water. Probably most important, the group discussed political realities. Since Reagan would finish out his second term in January 1989, McCloskey urged the secretary to seize the opportunity while he was still in office to wrap up a study that could serve as the basis for a recommendation to Congress. He and the others agreed that this work should not be vested in any sort of commis Sion, but should be done in-house. Hodel had some discretionary funds for preliminary work, although a full-fledged engineering feasibility study would require an appropriation from Congress.20
Evident at this meeting were the different agendas of the various environmental groups. The Western River Guides opposed raising the Don Pedro Dam since they would lose two miles of prime white water. Furthermore, breaching the O'Shaughnessy Dam would lead to an unregulated river, shortening the rafting season. The National Parks and Conservation Association worried that Hodel might use Hetch Hetchy restoration as a rationale for unwise development elsewhere. The National Wildlife Federation hoped to use this effort to force the secretary into improving the wildlife habitat in the CentralValley Project. In essence, all of these environmental groups supported the idea of restoration of Hetch Hetchy, but with their own conditions. All agreed, however, that the secretary should pursue a study immediately and that the National Park Service should play a key role. Furthermore, the study should not be publicized, and Congress should not be involved prematurely.21
Differences of opinion surfaced within the Sierra Club itself. Secretary Hodel counted on full support from the club, but it was not automatic. Harkening back to 8o years earlier, the Sierra Club Board of Directors hesitated to embrace a position that was unproven and unpopular in San Francisco. For David Brower, however, the darn should come down, and city politics, dollars, and budgets should not prevail over the rightness of an action. He was not above creating a clever message to enhance his position. On September 24, 1987, he wrote Sierra Club president Larry Downing and the Board of Directors, that he had received-on his computer screen-a letter from John Muir! Muir related to Brower that "the loss of the Hetch Hetchy Valley to the money-changers of San Francisco was one of the greatest disappointments of my life, and I saw little point in remaining on Earth after theValley was lost." Now, with restoration possible, "it will be a glorious day when the recovery begins, and each succeeding day will be more glorious as each of the outcast [denizens] of the Valley, flower and trees and birds and other wildlife, return."
To board members suspicious of Hodel's motives, "Muir" had a message. "Would they rather curse a man for his demonic sins than reward him and all people who revere nature for his demonstrated virtue?" Muir (and Brower) clearly believed that the club should embrace the message and not be dissuaded by the messenger. In closing, Muir hoped that the present board would "renew the commitment to the ideal for which I founded the Club. It will hurt me greatly to be required to resign as Founder."22
The mystical Muir message forced the board to think in terms of history and commitment to an idea. However, it was ineffective. The board members refused to take a strong stand. The Hetch Hetchy Resolution, adopted on September 27, 1987, reaffirmed the club's opposition to the damming of the Tuolumne River. It also welcomed the initiative by Secretary Hodel and urged the secretary to "demonstrate the seriousness of his public proposal by assuring a feasibility study." In the endorsement, the board emphasized its "many and serious disagreements with Secretary Hodel and with the Administration," calling into question the sincerity of the proposal. It was a carefully worded, lukewarm endorsement of the secretary's initiative.23 Brower was displeased. Here, finally, was the chance to right a wrong, and there should be no hesitancy. The club should act on principle and not be subject to monetary considerations, practicality, or the pulse of the public. This was not a matter for a Gallup poll to decide.
While the Sierra Club was unable to take a strong stand, no such problem plagued San Francisco. Removal of the darn would cost the city at least 50 percent of the output of the Moccasin and Kirkwood power houses which, in 1987, combined with the Holm unit to bring in approximately $25 million to the city's treasury. Such an amount of money paid for many services that the city could ill afford to lose. Mayor Feinstein and other city officials simply shook their heads in disbelief when confronted with the loss of income from the "vast hydroelectric power" system of Hetch Hetchy.24 It was practically inconceivable that after so many years of trying to comply with section 6 of the Raker Act, the city had finally done so by the 195os, only to have a significant portion of the power system dismantled by the interior secretary and his environmentalist supporters.
In the end, the mayor counted on the high cost of dam dismantling as the key to killing the idea. No reliable cost of the project existed, but Feinstein estimated $6 billion to $8 billion as not an unreasonable guess. All that money to resurrect 1.25 square miles of valley floor! She maintained that restoration "at the expense of the only water supply for two million people, 28 communities, thousands of businesses and two agricultural districts, and vast hydroelectric power-is not a good tradeoff" Mayor Feinstein implied, but never stated, that Congress would never authorize such a project. Legislators would be reluctant to vote such a sum to build a dam, let alone tear one down. Hodel, meanwhile, was well aware of the cost factor and had informed supporters that an $8o million appropriation might be possible, but not an $8 billion one.25
IN NOVEMBER 1987 the Department of the Interior issued its report, entitled Hetch Hetchy: A Survey of Water & Power Replacement Conc
epts. It was a joint undertaking, with the Bureau of Reclamation examining the idea of restoring Hetch Hetchy Valley as a unit of the National Park Service. As the report subtitle indicated, the bureau focused on ii potential replacement concepts should the dam be removed. The most practical matrices employed the idea of"reoperation" of the Tuolumne River system, acknowledging that the wild-and-scenic-river status of the lower Tuolumne would be impacted. Rerouting water through the city's tunnels and increasing storage at Don Pedro Reservoir could resolve the loss of water storage. The report noted that while the Hetch Hetchy reservoir could store 360,360 acre-feet, the Don Pedro's capacity was 2,030,000, nearly six times as much. The Bureau of Reclamation suggested that if the city made significant alterations, replacement water could be found:
Based on dry-year hydrology, it appears that operation of the Hetch Hetchy system without Hetch Hetchy Reservoir could provide a minimum of 336,000 acre-feet of Tuolumne River water annually to San Francisco through the City's existing system. (At the present time, 336,000 acre-feet per year is the maximum amount that can be conveyed through existing conduits.) Over 100,000 acre-feet of replacement supply could be provided from river level diversion from below O'Shaughnessy damsite and another 250,000 acre-feet from changes in operation in Lakes Eleanor and Lloyd. In total, enough water could be captured to operate the City's existing conveyance system at full capacity and deliver almost 100,000 acre-feet more than is currently being used.26
While the discussion of water replacement was hopeful, the figures regarding electrical power were not. The city would lose capacity. Loss of the Hetch Hetchy Reservoir would leave only enough power to meet the city's uses. The Holm powerhouse (average annual generation 81o million kilowatt-hours [kWh]) would be unaffected, the Kirkwood powerhouse (615 million kWh annually) would lose much of its capacity, and the Moccasin Creek powerhouse (540 million kWh annually) would also lose some capacity. The surplus power sold to the Modesto and Turlock irrigation districts, of course, had become a "cash cow," significantly supplementing the city of San Francisco's budget. Removing the dam would result in a loss of millions of dollars in revenue, while the irrigation districts would also suffer a percentage loss of electricity deliveries from the Hetch Hetchy system.The Bureau of Reclamation projected that the cost of replacement power in the year 2000, at 8.47 cents per kWh, would be $109 million.27
Overall, the report was more upbeat regarding possibilities of replacement water and power than could have been expected. Perhaps it was the fact that the bureau's boss favored the idea. But more likely it reflected the slow evolution of the Bureau of Reclamation's mission in the West. Established in 1902 to build dams for irrigation and power purposes, that objective had been significantly diluted by the 196os and 1970s. In the very year of Hodel's Hetch Hetchy idea, the bureau officially announced that its mission "must change from one based on federally supported construction to one based on effective and environmentally sensitive resource management.."28 The Bureau of Reclamation's assessment should be understood from this standpoint.
Written comments to the bureau's report were generally negative. The tally showed six agencies supported restoration, five had no position, and nine opposed it. Most of those supporting restoration were quite ambivalent and simply encouraged the consideration process to continue, specifically with a feasibility study rather than restoration itself. Those against tended to be much more detailed in their rejection of the study, and certainly more emotional. Letters addressed not only financial cost but also the projected loss of life involved in dismantling the huge dam. Perhaps the most determined opposition came from the San Francisco Bay Area Water Users Association, which considered itself a "co-grantee" with San Francisco under the Raker Act. The association membership included 30 cities and water districts in three Bay Area counties and consumed almost two-thirds of the Hetch Hetchy water delivered to the Bay Area. (In 1985-1986 the total delivery was 306,371 acre-feet, of which the users association consumed 195,457). In a 15page single-spaced statement, President Warren Mitchell contested most of the bureau's findings, concluding, "We hope that, upon reflection, the Department will see no need to pursue the idea further." Mayor Dianne Feinstein agreed. "We cannot help but conclude," argued the mayor, "that the idea to remove Hetch Hetchy must rank at the bottom of the list of priorities for the federal government, the state and certainly the Bay Area." Those who opposed the restoration idea hoped that the report would put an end to what they considered a foolish scheme, perpetuated by radical environmentalists who had somehow hoodwinked the secretary of the interior.29 With lukewarm backing at best, Hodel shelved the bureau's report, and like so many others, it faded from view
The California state report, authorized by the state legislature, took an altogether different tack. Restoring Hetch Hetchy gave little emphasis to replacement of water and power, and more discussion and speculation on what might occur if the valley was restored to a natural state. The authors believed that with little human assistance, grasses would appear in a year or two. In regard to trees, "if Mother Nature does all the planting, then it would take much longer for a natural appearance." Trees would have to start as seeds, and not all the species originally in the valley would reestablish themselves. On the other hand, if humans assisted, moderately sized trees would be planted to replicate those growing in 1915, and within 1o years Hetch Hetchy would be quite presentable. Within 50 years the valley would appear natural to everyone except the experts. The report emphasized that restoration would be a "national experiment" that would draw attention across the country. Within 1o years the valley would be "fully usable" by recreationists.311
The cost of removal of the O'Shaughnessy Dam posed a problem. In the interest of economy the report suggested that workers might breach the darn, but not remove it. Jackhammers would reverberate throughout the valley as workers cut a tunnel through the base to allow drainage. Once accomplished, the tunnel could become the roadway into the valley. Planners, however, should not include intensive development as in Yosemite Valley, but rather place housing and tourist facilities downstream in the PoopenautVal- ley. Shuttle buses might provide access, accommodating by 2000 one million visitors per year, or 2,700 per day on average, a far cry from the minuscule iio visitors per day in 1987. Such a leap in visitation would equal about 15 percent of the 1987 visitors per day inYosernite National Park.31
Eventually the state report had to abandon possibilities and address realities. The city's current diversion of 214,000 acre-feet of water from Hetch Hetchy Reservoir would drop to about 100,000, a serious loss. Regarding electricity, the report estimated that San Francisco would lose about $35 million per year if sold at 4.0 cents per kWh. These serious "takings" from the city could be ameliorated, but the six options suggested were complex, involving new construction of dams and tunnels, new irrigation agreements, and new power purchase contracts. None seemed satisfactory, although the most sensible was "to use the existing darns on the Tuolumne River and to construct a new dam that would flood the PoopenautValley, which is immediately downstream from Hetch Hetchy." Of course this smaller, less spectacular valley was within the boundaries of Yosemite National Park, too, but congressional legislation could transfer Poopenaut Valley to Stanislaus National Forest jurisdiction. The report concluded that both sides were right, but one side was just a little more right than the other:
John Muir was right: the Hetch HetchyValley was gorgeous and would have provided incredible recreational opportunities. San Francisco was also right: the Hetch Hetchy Valley would make an exceptional municipal reservoir site. In 1913, Congress decided that San Francisco was "more" right and the Hetch Hetchy Dam was allowed. For the people of the r98os, the issue of restoring Hetch Hetchy involves trade-offs between several very important public needs: recreation, aesthetics, high quality drinking water supplies, hydroelectric energy, and cost. We conclude that the existing Hetch Hetchy system is more valuable to society than a restored Hetch Hetchy.32
Earlier Secretary Hodel
had written a supporter that the scenic wonders of Hetch Hetchy "need not be lost to the people forever. Maybe, with imagination, good will, and perseverance," mused Hodel, "we will be able to reclaim the national park land under the water of Hetch Hetchy Reservoir. Only [a] fair-minded study will tell whether this is an idea whose time yet may come." Now the interior secretary had not one, but two studies. Both were "fair-minded," objective efforts, and both indicated directly or indirectly that the time had not yet come for the great valley to be set free of the burden of almost 300 feet of water. Interior Secretary Hodel lit the fire in 1987; it blazed briefly, but then smoldered and died out. The Sierra Club moved onto other issues. The new George Bush presidency, with Manuel Luhan presiding as interior secretary, had no interest in pursuing Hodel's pet project.
Hodel had planted a seed, but maturation was not yet possible. However, the idea of renovation of landscapes has caught on, and local groups and national agencies have restored abandoned mining sites, toxic waste dumps, polluted wetlands, and other examples of our improvident use of the land. The idea of restoration of nature, of course, is not new In his classic 1864 book, Man and Nature, George Perkins Marsh spoke of "restoration of disturbed harmonies." Marsh believed that worn-out lands could be restored. Human beings could become "co-worker[s] with nature in the reconstruction of the damaged fabric which the negligence or the wantonness of former lodgers has rendered untenantable."33 One immediately thinks of American efforts to replant millions of acres of harvested timberland. Perhaps a more pertinent example was the attempt to restore topsoil in the Great Plains, so unwisely tilled by farmers in the 192os and 1930s, the loosened soil lifted in great clouds by the winds of the West. No one would wish to indict the city of San Francisco with Marsh's idea of negligence or wantonness, but still the city had inundated a magnificent valley-many believed needlessly-and it would be intriguing to restore the "damaged fabric." It would be an experiment into the unknown, a challenge certainly not on the scale of the 196os American decision to go to the moon, but path breaking in the sense that no humans have attempted the resurrection of nature on such a scale.