Stumbling on Happiness
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Chapter 7: Time Bombs
1. M. Hegarty, “Mechanical Reasoning by Mental Simulation,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8: 280–85 (2004).
2. G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
3. D. Gentner, M. Imai, and L. Boroditsky, “As Time Goes By: Evidence for Two Systems in Processing Space Time Metaphors,” Language and Cognitive Processes 17: 537–65 (2002); and L. Boroditsky, “Metaphoric Structuring: Understanding Time Through Spatial Metaphors,” Cognition 75: 1–28 (2000).
4. B. Tversky, S. Kugelmass, and A. Winter, “Cross-Cultural and Developmental Trends in Graphic Productions,” Cognitive Psychology 23: 515–57 (1991).
5. L. Boroditsky, “Does Language Shape Thought? Mandarin and English Speakers’ Conceptions of Time,” Cognitive Psychology 43: 1–22 (2001).
6. R. K. Ratner, B. E. Kahn, and D. Kahneman, “Choosing Less-Preferred Experiences for the Sake of Variety,” Journal of Consumer Research 26: 1–15 (1999).
7. D. Read and G. F. Loewenstein, “Diversification Bias: Explaining the Discrepancy in Variety Seeking Between Combined and Separated Choices,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 1: 34–49 (1995). See also I. Simonson, “The Effect of Purchase Quantity and Timing on Variety-Seeking Behavior,” Journal of Marketing Research 27: 150–62(1990).
8. T. D. Wilson and D. T. Gilbert, “Making Sense: A Model of Affective Adaptation” (unpublished manuscript, University of Virginia, 2005).
9. Human beings are not the only animals that appreciate variety. The Coolidge effect ostensibly got its name when President Calvin Coolidge and his wife were touring a farm. The foreman noted the sexual prowess of his prize rooster: “This rooster can have sex all day without stopping,” he said. “Really?” said Mrs. Coolidge. “Please tell that to my husband.” The president turned to the foreman and asked, “Does the rooster mate with the same chicken each time?” “No,” said the foreman, “always with a different chicken.” To which the president replied, “Really? Please tell that to my wife.” The story is probably apocryphal, but the phenomenon is not: Male mammals who have mated to exhaustion can usually be induced to mate again with a novel female; see J. Wilson, R. Kuehn, and F. Beach, “Modifications in the Sexual Behavior of Male Rats Produced by Changing the Stimulus Female,” Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 56: 636–44 (1963). In fact, even breeding bulls whose sperm is collected by a machine show a greatly reduced time to ejaculation when the machine to which they’ve become habituated is moved to a novel location. E. B. Hale and J. O. Almquist, “Relation of Sexual Behavior to Germ Cell Output in Farm Animals,” Journal of Dairy Science 43: Supp., 145–67 (1960).
10. It is worth noting that if we change our assumptions (particularly the habituation assumption), then switching plates exactly at the point at which our favorite meal has lost its edge can be a poor strategy for maximizing pleasure in the long term; R. J. Hernstein, The Matching Law: Papers in Psychology and Economics, ed. H. Rachlin and D. I. Laibson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
11. I would like to take this opportunity to note that while my apparent fixation on adulterous mailmen betrays my juvenile sense of humor, the example is entirely fictitious and is not meant to reflect poorly on the many fine mailmen and spouses I have had.
12. D. T. Gilbert, “Inferential Correction,” in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, ed. T. Gilovich, D. W. Griffin, and D. Kahneman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 167–84.
13. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science 185: 1124–31 (1974).
14. N. Epley and T. Gilovich, “Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic: Differential Processing of Self-Generated and Experimenter-Provided Anchors,” Psychological Science 12: 391–96 (2001).
15. D. T. Gilbert, M. J. Gill, and T. D. Wilson, “The Future Is Now: Temporal Correction in Affective Forecasting,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 88: 430–44 (2002).
16. See also J. E. J. Ebert, “The Role of Cognitive Resources in the Valuation of Near and Far Future Events,” Acta Psychologica 108: 155–71 (2001).
17. G. F. Loewenstein and D. Prelec, “Preferences for Sequences of Outcomes,” Psychological Review 100: 91–108 (1993).
18. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” Econometrica 47: 263–91 (1979).
19. J. W. Pratt, D. A. Wise, and R. Zeckhauser, “Price Differences in Almost Competitive Markets,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 93: 189–211 (1979); A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science 211: 453–58 (1981); R. H. Thaler, “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1: 39–60 (1980).
20. R. H. Thaler, “Mental Accounting Matters,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12: 183–206 (1999).
21. R. B. Cialdini et al., “Reciprocal Concessions Procedure for Inducing Compliance: The Door-in-the-Face Technique,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 31: 206–15 (1975). There is some controversy about whether this effect is, in fact, due to the contrast between the large and small requests. See J. P. Dillard, “The Current Status of Research on Sequential-Request Compliance Techniques,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 17: 283–88 (1991).
22. D. Kahneman and D. T. Miller, “Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives,” Psychological Review 93: 136–53 (1986).
23. O. E. Tykocinski and T. S. Pittman, “The Consequences of Doing Nothing: Inaction Inertia as Avoidance of Anticipated Counterfactual Regret,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 607–16 (1998); and O. E. Tykocinski, T. S. Pittman, and E. E. Tuttle, “Inaction Inertia: Forgoing Future Benefits as a Result of an Initial Failure to Act,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68: 793–803 (1995).
24. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Choices, Values, and Frames,” American Psychologist 39: 341–50 (1984).
25. I. Simonson and A. Tversky, “Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion,” Journal of Marketing Research 29: 281–95 (1992).
26. R. B. Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1985).
27. D. A. Redelmeier and E. Shafir, “Medical Decision Making in Situations That Offer Multiple Alternatives,” JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association 273: 302–5 (1995).
28. S. S. Iyengar and M. R. Lepper, “When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79: 995–1006 (2000); and B. Schwartz, “Self-Determination: The Tyranny of Freedom,” American Psychologist 55: 79–88 (2000).
29. A. Tversky, S. Sattath, and P. Slovic, “Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice,” Psychological Review 95: 371–84 (1988).
30. C. K. Hsee et al., “Preference Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Options: A Review and Theoretical Analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 125: 576–90 (1999).
31. C. Hsee, “The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 67: 247–57 (1996).
32. J. R. Priester, U. M. Dholakia, and M. A. Fleming, “When and Why the Background Contrast Effect Emerges: Thought Engenders Meaning by Influencing the Perception of Applicability,” Journal of Consumer Research 31: 491–501 (2004).
33. K. Myrseth, C. K. Morewedge, and D. T. Gilbert, unpublished raw data, Harvard University, 2004.
34. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” Econometrica 47: 263–91 (1979); A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science 211: 453–58 (1981); and A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106: 1039–61 (1991).
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35. D. Kahneman, J. L. Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler, “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” Journal of Political Economy 98: 1325–48 (1990); and D. Kahneman, J. Kentsch, and D. Thaler, “The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 193–206 (1991).
36. L. van Boven, D. Dunning, and G. F. Loewenstein, “Egocentric Empathy Gaps Between Owners and Buyers: Misperceptions of the Endowment Effect,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79: 66–76 (2000); and Z. Carmon and D. Ariely, “Focusing on the Foregone: How Value Can Appear So Different to Buyers and Sellers,” Journal of Consumer Research 27: 360–70 (2000).
37. L. Hunt, “Against Presentism,” Perspectives 40 (2002).
Chapter 8: Paradise Glossed
1. C. B. Wortman and R. C. Silver, “The Myths of Coping with Loss,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 57: 349–57 (1989); G. A. Bonanno, “Loss, Trauma, and Human Resilience: Have We Underestimated the Human Capacity to Thrive After Extremely Aversive Events?” American Psychologist 59: 20–28 (2004); and C. S. Carver, “Resilience and Thriving: Issues, Models, and Linkages,” Journal of Social Issues 54: 245–66 (1998).
2. G. A. Bonanno and S. Kaltman, “Toward an Integrative Perspective on Bereavement,” Psychological Bulletin 125: 760–76 (1999); and G. A. Bonnano et al., “Resilience to Loss and Chronic Grief: A Prospective Study from Preloss to 18-Months Postloss,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83: 1150–64 (2002).
3. E. J. Ozer et al., “Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Symptoms in Adults: A Meta-analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 129: 52–73 (2003).
4. G. A. Bonanno, C. Rennicke, and S. Dekel, “Self-Enhancement Among High-Exposure Survivors of the September 11th Terrorist Attack: Resilience or Social Maladjustment?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88: 984–98 (2005).
5. R. G. Tedeschi and L. G. Calhoun, “Posttraumatic Growth: Conceptual Foundations and Empirical Evidence,” Psychological Inquiry 15: 1–18 (2004); P. A. Linley and S. Joseph, “Positive Change Following Trauma and Adversity: A Review,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 17: 11–21 (2004); and C. S. Carver, “Resilience and Thriving: Issues, Models, and Linkages,” Journal of Social Issues 54: 245–66 (1998).
6. K. Sack, “After 37 Years in Prison, Inmate Tastes Freedom,” New York Times, 11 January 1996, 18.
7. C. Reeve, Ohio State University commencement speech, 13 June 2003.
8. D. Becker, “Cycling Through Adversity: Ex-World Champ Stays on Cancer Comeback Course,” USA Today, 22 May 1998, 3C.
9. R. G. Tedeschi and L. G. Calhoun, Trauma and Transformation: Growing in the Aftermath of Suffering (Sherman Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1995), 1.
10. R. Schulz and S. Decker, “Long-Term Adjustment to Physical Disability: The Role of Social Support, Perceived Control, and Self-Blame,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48: 1162–72 (1985); C. B. Wortman and R. C. Silver, “Coping with Irrevocable Loss,” in Cataclysms, Crises, and Catastrophes: Psychology in Action, ed. G. R. VandenBos and B. K. Bryant (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1987), 185–235; and P. Brickman, D. Coates, and R. J. Janoff-Bulman, “Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36: 917–27 (1978).
11. S. E. Taylor, “Adjustment to Threatening Events: A Theory of Cognitive Adaptation,” American Psychologist 38: 1161–73 (1983).
12. D. T. Gilbert, E. Driver-Linn, and T. D. Wilson, “The Trouble with Vronsky: Impact Bias in the Forecasting of Future Affective States,” in The Wisdom in Feeling: Psychological Processes in Emotional Intelligence, ed. L. F. Barrett and P. Salovey (New York: Guilford Press, 2002), 114–43; and T. D. Wilson and D. T. Gilbert, “Affective Forecasting,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. M. Zanna, vol. 35 (New York: Elsevier, 2003).
13. D. L. Sackett and G. W. Torrance, “The Utility of Different Health States as Perceived by the General Public,” Journal of Chronic Disease 31: 697–704 (1978); P. Dolan and D. Kahneman, “Interpretations of Utility and Their Implications for the Valuation of Health” (unpublished manuscript, Princeton University, 2005); and J. Riis et al., “Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemo-Dialysis: A Study Using Ecological Momentary Assessment,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 134: 3–9 (2005).
14. P. Menzela et al., “The Role of Adaptation to Disability and Disease in Health State Valuation: A Preliminary Normative Analysis,” Social Science & Medicine 55: 2149–58 (2002).
15. P. Dolan, “Modelling Valuations for EuroQol Health States,” Medical Care 11: 1095–1108 (1997).
16. J. Jonides and H. Gleitman, “A Conceptual Category Effect in Visual Search: O as Letter or as Digit,” Perception and Psychophysics 12: 457–60 (1972).
17. C. M. Solley and J. F. Santos, “Perceptual Learning with Partial Verbal Reinforcement,” Perceptual and Motor Skills 8: 183–93 (1958); and E. D. Turner and W. Bevan, “Patterns of Experience and the Perceived Orientation of the Necker Cube,” Journal of General Psychology 70: 345–52 (1964).
18. D. Dunning, J. A. Meyerowitz, and A. D. Holzberg, “Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57: 1–9 (1989).
19. C. K. Morewedge and D. T. Gilbert, unpublished raw data, Harvard University, 2004.
20. J. W. Brehm, “Post-decision Changes in Desirability of Alternatives,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 52: 384–89 (1956).
21. E. E. Lawler et al., “Job Choice and Post Decision Dissonance,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 13: 133–45 (1975).
22. S. Lyubomirsky and L. Ross, “Changes in Attractiveness of Elected, Rejected, and Precluded Alternatives: A Comparison of Happy and Unhappy Individuals,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76: 988–1007 (1999).
23. R. E. Knox and J. A. Inkster, “Postdecision Dissonance at Post Time,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8: 319–23 (1968).
24. O. J. Frenkel and A. N. Doob, “Post-decision Dissonance at the Polling Booth,” Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 8: 347–50 (1976).
25. F. M. Voltaire, Candide (1759), chap. 1. I’ve never found an English translation that I like, so I’ve cobbled together my own. Pardon my French.
26. R. F. Baumeister, “The Optimal Margin of Illusion,” Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 8: 176–89 (1989); S. E. Taylor, Positive Illusions (New York: Basic Books, 1989); S. E. Taylor and J. D. Brown, “Illusion and Well-Being: A Social-Psychological Perspective on Mental Health,” Psychological Bulletin 103: 193–210 (1988); Z. Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning,” Psychological Bulletin 108: 480–98 (1990); and T. Pyszczynski and J. Greenberg, “Toward an Integration of Cognitive and Motivational Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased Hypothesis-Testing Model,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. L. E. Berkowitz, vol. 20 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1987), 297–340.
27. Both Sigmund and Anna Freud called this a system of “defense mechanisms,” and just about every psychologist since has remarked on that system and given it a different name. A recent summary of the literature on psychological defense can be found in D. L. Paulhus, B. Fridhandler, and S. Hayes, “Psychological Defense: Contemporary Theory and Research,” in Handbook of Personality Psychology, ed. R. Hogan, J. Johnson, and S. Briggs (San Diego: Academic Press, 1997), 543–79.
28. W. B. Swann, B. W. Pelham, and D. S. Krull, “Agreeable Fancy or Disagreeable Truth? Reconciling Self-Enhancement and Self-Verification,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57: 782–91 (1989); W. B. Swann, P. J. Rentfrow, and J. Guinn, “Self-Verification: The Search for Coherence,” in Handbook of Self and Identity, ed. M. Leary and J. Tagney (New York: Guilford Press, 2002), 367–83; and W. B. Swann, Self-Traps: The Elusive Quest for Higher Self-Esteem (New York: Freeman, 1996).
29. W. B. Swann and B.
W. Pelham, “Who Wants Out When the Going Gets Good? Psychological Investment and Preference for Self-Verifying College Roommates,” Journal of Self and Identity 1: 219–33 (2002).
30. J. L. Freedman and D. O. Sears, “Selective Exposure,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. L. Berkowitz, vol. 2 (New York: Academic Press, 1965), 57–97; and D. Frey, “Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. L. Berkowitz, vol. 19 (New York: Academic Press, 1986), 41–80.
31. D. Frey and D. Stahlberg, “Selection of Information After Receiving More or Less Reliable Self-Threatening Information,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 12: 434–41 (1986).
32. B. Holton and T. Pyszczynski, “Biased Information Search in the Interpersonal Domain,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 15: 42–51 (1989).
33. D. Ehrlich et al., “Postdecision Exposure to Relevant Information,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 54: 98–102 (1957).
34. R. Sanitioso, Z. Kunda, and G. T. Fong, “Motivated Recruitment of Autobiographical Memories,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59: 229–41 (1990).
35. A. Tesser and S. Rosen, “Similarity of Objective Fate as a Determinant of the Reluctance to Transmit Unpleasant Information: The MUM Effect,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 23: 46–53 (1972).
36. M. Snyder and W. B. Swann, Jr., “Hypothesis Testing Processes in Social Interaction,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36: 1202–12 (1978); and W. B. J. Swann, T. Giuliano, and D. M. Wegner, “Where Leading Questions Can Lead: The Power of Conjecture in Social Interaction,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42: 1025–35 (1982).
37. D. T. Gilbert and E. E. Jones, “Perceiver-Induced Constraint: Interpretations of Self-Generated Reality,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50: 269–80 (1986).