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The Battle of Matapan 1941

Page 4

by Mark Simmons


  At 14:47 the enemy was sighted by Orion. The Italians opened fire about 30 minutes later. Admiral Tovey’s four ships were heavily outnumbered, out-gunned and out-ranged. However Warspite came into action at 15:26, the enemy cruisers turning away under a smoke screen. A lull followed in the action.

  At 15:50 Warspite sighted the two Cavour class battleships and both sides exchanged fire at 26,000 yards. Shooting was good, both sides obtaining straddles. A few minutes later a hit was observed at the base of the leading Italian battleship’s foremost funnel. This resulted in a fire below decks which extinguished some boilers. The vessel in question, Cesare the flagship, lost speed and dropped to 19 knots. The heavy cruiser Bolzano was also hit by three 6-inch shells with no effect to her speed or fighting efficiency.

  On the British side only the cruiser Neptune received some light damage from a near miss. The Italians thought they had hit Warspite; from the Cesare they could see flames around the rear turrets. However it was only one of her catapult aircraft that had caught fire from the flash of the ship’s own guns and her crew dumped the aircraft over the side.

  Under smokescreens Campioni withdrew his battleships, aware he faced three enemy battleships. Destroyers covered the withdrawal, the battleships moving southwest while the destroyers conducted an ineffective torpedo attack.

  Eagle also launched another air strike which was unsuccessful. British destroyers counterattacked with cruiser support but came under heavy fire from enemy ships covering the retiring battleships.

  At about 16:40 Cunningham broke off the action, concerned about submarine and or destroyer ambushes.

  I had no intention of plunging straight into the enemy smoke-screen. We decided to work around to the windward and to the northward of it. Some of our destroyers were clear of it by 5 o’clock, but the enemy were out of sight.10

  Indeed Campioni’s plan had been to try and lure the British across a line of submarines using his superior speed. However the submarines were too far south.

  By this time the British fleet was only 25 miles from the coast of Calabria. More high-level bombing attacks developed over the next four hours, during which the Regia Aeronautica even managed to bomb their own fleet – much to the fury of Campioni – although failing to hit any ships.

  Admiral Cunningham was not altogether happy with the outcome:

  The action was most unsatisfactory to us. I suppose it was too much to expect the Italians to stake everything on a stand-up fight. Yet if they had timed their attacks better with all types of arms they employed they might have given us much trouble. The one 15-inch hit they sustained from the Warspite had a morale effect quite out of proportion to the damage.11

  The Italians commander as you might expect, saw it rather differently:

  An objective analysis of the engagement must reach the conclusion that the results were about equal. No ship was sunk; the four hits suffered by the Italian ships had no serious consequences and the same was true of the damage suffered by the Neptune and Warspite. Both sides succeeded in the primary purpose for which they had taken to sea; that is, to get their respective through convoys to their destinations. Each failed to prevent the operations of the other because neither understood the other’s purposes soon enough.12

  It should be pointed out the Regia Marina at that time only had two operational battleships available. It would be another month before the new battleships Littorio and Vittorio Veneto entered service. Therefore their cautious approach in this action is perhaps understandable.

  So ended the action off Calabria; the Italians called it Punto Stilo. Undoubtedly Cunningham did establish a ‘moral ascendancy’ over the Italian fleet, and had proved his fleet could operate in the central basin even against the combined surface ships, air power and submarines of the enemy.

  As the Italian fleet moved toward the straits of Messina, Cunningham’s fleet turned toward Malta. That night an air strike launched from Eagle attacked shipping in Augusta harbour on Sicily where they hoped to find heavy units of the Regia Marina. However the harbour was largely empty but for a tanker and the destroyer Pancaldo, which were both sunk.

  For the next 24 hours Cunningham’s fleet cruised to the south and east of Malta, while the Royal Sovereign and destroyers entered harbour to fuel. The Vice-Admiral Malta, learning the fleets were engaged, had used the window of opportunity to sail the convoys to Alexandria. While they were attacked by Italian aircraft, no ships were hit. By 12 July they were under the air umbrella of the Desert Air Force, and Blenheim fighters of No 252 Squadron chased off the enemy bombers. The next morning the fast convoy arrived, followed two days later by the slow convoy.

  At first Mussolini was delighted with the results of the clash at Punto Stilo, no doubt influenced by the exaggerated claims of the Regia Aeronautica, which stated on Rome Radio that they had ‘annihilated 50 per cent of the British naval power in the Mediterranean.’ Ciano thought differently and wrote in his diary on 13 July that ‘The real controversy in the naval conflicts is not between us and the British, but between our air force and our navy.’ The claimed numbers of British losses he judged to be ‘somewhat exaggerated’.13

  Cunningham was delighted that his wife and two nieces had got out of Malta on the fast convoy. On the island they had been

  Bombed practically every night and often by day, they had not enjoyed it. My wife had chalked up seventy-two raids from the day Italy entered the war until the time she left, a period of twenty-nine days … [I found them] a flat about six miles out from Alexandria where they could hear and see the bombs and gunfire when the raids took place.14

  Alexandria (Aleck), air raids and all, became the home port of thousands of matelots over the war years. Charles Causley, poet and writer, a PO coder at the time wrote:

  Aleck. Ah, I can remember thinking; here it is at last, the real thing; Anthony and Cleopatra, guidebook by E.M. Forster, brilliant blue sea. Pharaohs, Alexander the Great, Stewart Grainger!

  Of course, the locals soon put a stop to all that: but I still think it was an exciting prospect. And, meanwhile, Tug and I prepared for our run ashore, changing English money into ackers and putting on our number sixes – those flashing white sailor-suits that made us look as if we only needed a balloon or a toy windmill in hand to complete the picture.

  The run ashore did not live up to expectations.

  We did the usual round; tombola at the Fleet Club, the pictures sending home boxes of horrible-looking marshmallows, buying cameras that wouldn’t photograph, pens that wouldn’t write and watches that fell to pieces as soon as you wound them up. I liked the rows of clean white books in the French bookshops, the elegant faces of the Greek women, and the iced coffee we got at the Rio bar. And, like all matelots, we ended up in the bar of the Blue Anchor Club, where we’d booked beds for the night, drinking John Collinses, eating peanuts and listening to an Egyptian band tearing the life out of a selection from Follow the Fleet. 15

  Cunningham rightly could claim victory in the action off Calabria but it had revealed limitations in his fleet:

  Several serious implications had arisen, and perhaps the most important was that the 25-year old Warspite, which had been reconstructed and modernised, was the only ship in the fleet which could shoot at the ranges at which Italian battleships and 8-inch gun cruisers were straddling us comfortably. In writing privately to the First Sea Lord on the day of our arrival I pointed out this fact, and that during the first clash with the Italians neither the Malaya nor Royal Sovereign crossed the target. I must have at least one more ship that can shoot at a good range.16

  Admiral Pound was quick to respond to the problem. The Mediterranean Fleet was sent the 8-inch gun cruiser Kent, but lost the Royal Sovereign which went to Durban, South Africa for badly needed repairs. Other substantial reinforcements were on the way; Warspite’s sister ship the modernised Valiant, together with the new fleet aircraft carrier Illustrious and the anti-aircraft cruisers Calcutta and Coventry came from Britain. Assembling at Gibralta
r they left there on 30 August in company with Force H consisting of the battlecruiser Renown, aircraft carrier Ark Royal, cruiser Sheffield and seven destroyers for the central Mediterranean.

  The Eastern Fleet also left Alexandria on 30 August consisting of Warspite, Malaya, Eagle, two cruisers and nine destroyers to receive the additional ships. A convoy of an oil tanker and two merchant ships left Alexandria at the same time for Malta with an escort of four destroyers.

  On 31 August air reconnaissance spotted vessels of the Regia Marina at sea, reporting 2 battleships, 7 cruisers and 8 destroyers steering south toward Cunningham’s fleet 130 miles away. However the force was in fact more substantial than reported. The modernised Duilio had entered service and Cesare’s damage from Calabria had been repaired. Also at sea were Cavour and the new battleships Littorio and Vittorio Veneto; the latter ships had a similar profile to some heavy cruisers in the Italian fleet.

  Cunningham’s first priority was the convoy so he remained to the south. Late on 31 August the Italian fleet reversed its course, with orders to resume the southerly course in the morning. During the night a severe storm boiled up from the north preventing air reconnaissance in the morning.

  On 2 September the reinforcements joined the Eastern Fleet. The adverse weather still prevented flying. When Supermarina in Rome learned of the presence of the additional ships in Alexandria harbour, they assumed they must have arrived via the Red Sea.17

  Late in September 1940 Cunningham’s reinforced fleet escorted some convoys and transported troops to Malta. Two thousand soldiers were embarked on the cruisers Liverpool and Gloucester, while Warspite, Valiant, and Illustrious supplied the heavy escort. They were heavily bombed but Fulmer fighters from Illustrious took a toll on the raiders. To the north the Italian fleet was spotted at sea with four battleships, but they did not try to interfere with the movement.

  Early in October a convoy of supplies from Alexandria was run through to the beleaguered island. This time it was covered by the entire fleet, reaching Malta without incident; fortunately the weather was bad so they did not suffer the usual attentions of the Regia Aeronautica.

  On the night of 11/12 October the fleet escorted a small convoy away from Malta. The cruiser Ajax, patrolling to the north, ran into an Italian destroyer flotilla. Supermarina was operating blind as usual, but after a report from a civilian aircraft en route to Libya that the British fleet was at sea, they sent out a night patrol of six destroyers and four motor torpedo boats to the northeast of Malta. Another patrol was sent out to the west of the island in case it was Force H.

  On the eastern patrol at 01:35 the destroyer Alciane spotted an enemy cruiser which at first began to flash recognition signals, while the destroyer attacked with torpedoes. Cunningham described the action involving Ajax.

  After a most spirited action at ranges of 4,000 yards and less in the moonlight she sank two destroyers and damaged a third, setting her on fire. She then engaged two other ships, which disappeared behind a smoke screen with some celerity when fire was opened. The Ajax did not come off unscathed. Hit seven times in all she sustained considerable damage to her bridge and radar equipment, largely caused by a fire in a storeroom. There was some difficulty in the Ajax because of the blinding effect of the flash of her own guns, whereas the enemy was using flashless ammunition with good tracers.18

  The destroyer Artigliere was sunk later that day by the cruiser York, after she was found dead in the water. Floats were dropped in the water for her crew before she was finished off with torpedoes.

  Radar came as a surprise to Commander Bragadin:

  it had to be admitted that the Italians were technically inferior to the British, at least as far as carrying out night encounters at sea was concerned. In reality this inferiority was probably to be explained solely by the fact that the Ajax was equipped with radar, while the Italians did not yet know the British had succeeded in perfecting that device to the point where it could be used in operations. This existence of combat worthy enemy radar was not known to the Italians until after the battle of Cape Matapan in March 1941.19

  Notes

  1 Cunningham, A. B. A Sailor’s Odyssey p.238

  2 Van Der Vat, Dan, Standard of Power. The Royal Navy in the Twentieth Century p.199

  3 Arthur, Max, Lost Voices of the Royal Navy p.256

  4 Playfair, Major-General I.S.O. The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume 1 p.136

  5 Ibid p.151

  6 Cunningham, p.258

  7 Bragadin, M.A. The Italian Navy in World War II p.28

  8 Playfair, p.153

  9 Cunningham, p.259

  10 Ibid p.262

  11 Ibid p.263

  12 Bragadin, p.29

  13 Ciano, G. Ciano’s Diary 1937–1943 p.370

  14 Cunningham, p.264–265

  15 Causley, Charles, Hands to Dance and Skylark p.29–30

  16 Cunningham, p.26

  17 Bragadin, p.33

  18 Cunningham, p.278

  19 Bragadin, p.39–40

  6

  Operation Judgement

  HMS Illustrious was laid down in April 1937, launched in April 1939 and completed fitting out a year later. After trials at Bermuda and a minor refit where some problems were ironed out, she sailed for the Mediterranean and joined Admiral Cunningham’s fleet.

  Illustrious was the class leader of six aircraft carriers and was markedly different to the carriers that had gone before. She was heavily armoured on her flight deck and on the hanger deck, displacing 23,000 tons, 28,000 tons under full load, with a speed of 30 knots. Later ships in the class would be even larger. However she carried fewer aircraft than Ark Royal which had double hangers; this was mainly due to the armour and a shorter flight deck. Anti-aircraft defence was much improved having sixteen 4.5inch anti-aircraft guns in eight turrets. She could accommodate 36 aircraft.

  Charles Lamb joined the new Illustrious with the rest of 815 Squadron as a Swordfish pilot.

  I had never been on board a purpose built aircraft carrier before and was most impressed I could only make comparisons with the old Courageous, but everything in Illustrious was so much bigger and better that the comparison was absurd.

  Courageous had been converted into a carrier from the hull of an old cruiser but this ship had sprung into life from the combined skills of many marine architects. The result was not just a masterpiece of planning and design, but a mighty ship of great beauty. Comparing her with Courageous was tantamount to comparing her with Noah’s Ark.1

  The Royal Navy at that time had the best design of aircraft carriers available. With their armoured flight decks they were able to withstand far more punishment than vessels in service with the US Navy or the Imperial Japanese Navy, although they carried fewer aircraft and those aircraft were outdated.

  The mainstay of the Fleet Air Arm was the Swordfish aircraft, first flown in 1934 and entering service in 1936, it was a jack of all trades with six roles: reconnaissance, spotting for the guns of the fleet, convoy escort-anti submarine, torpedo strike aircraft, dive bombing and mine laying. A Swordfish was powered by a single Bristol Pegasus engine providing 690hp. It carried a crew of three men, each in his own open cockpit, a pilot, observer and telegraphist air gunner in the rear. Range was 450nm but this could be increased with additional fuel tanks to about 900nm at the cost of one crew member. Armament consisted of two Vickers machine guns, one fired by the pilot through the propeller in First World War style, the other used by the rear gunner. A variety of ordnance could be carried, something for every occasion, a single 18inch MK XIIB 1,620lb torpedo, four 250lb depth charges, 500lb or 250lb bombs up to 1,500lbs, or six rockets. The maximum speed was 125 knots although few pilots managed this; in normal level flight around 90 was normal.

  It was from the variety of ordnance the Swordfish could carry that it got its affectionate nickname, when some test pilot observed: ‘No housewife on a shopping spree could cram a wider variety of articles into her string bag.’ However the String Bag was stu
rdy and robust and able to fly with a high degree of damage.

  Nevertheless there was never any doubt that the String Bag was a very slow machine, and a vulnerable target for all, especially in daylight … the lumbering old ladies were an easy prey for a capable fighter pilot, providing he appreciated the remarkable manoeuvrability of the old biplane he was attacking.2

  The Fairy Fulmar carried by Illustrious was a big advance on earlier Fleet Air Arm fighter aircraft, even monoplanes like the Blackburn Skua. However it was far from ideal, its two-man crew affected performance even though it used the same engine as the Spitfire and Hurricane, the Rolls-Royce Merlin. It first flew in January 1937, entering service in 1940. It had a speed of 230 knots, about 100 knots less than a Spitfire. It carried eight 0.303 Browning machine guns, and in a fighter bomber role could carry two 250lb bombs. Its rate of climb was slow because it was heavy but it was the best fighter the Royal Navy had, and against Italian aircraft it was to prove adequate.

  Illustrious brought another advantage to Cunningham’s force: she had the best radar of any ship in that fleet. Fighters could be directed onto enemy aircraft; thus 806 Squadron – even though they only had Fulmars – would make a significant difference.

  Captain Denis Boyd, commanding officer of Illustrious, told his men:

  Mussolini has become boastful; he has got into the habit of referring to the Mediterranean as ‘Mare Nostrum’ which means ‘our sea’. We are going to change it to ‘Cunningham’s Pond’.3

  On 28 October 1940 Italy invaded Greece unprovoked. The next day Ciano wrote in his diary ‘Diplomatic reactions in the Balkans are quite limited for the time being. No one makes a move to defend the Greeks.’4

  On 5 November Winston Churchill told the House of Commons: ‘We have most carefully abstained from any action likely to draw upon the Greeks the enmity of the criminal dictators. For their part the Greeks have maintained so strict a neutrality that we were unacquainted with their dispositions or their intentions.’ Britain deployed forces to Crete to establish naval fuelling facilities and a cruiser took a battalion of infantry there to help establish a forward base.

 

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