by Mark Simmons
Kathleen Norman, a naval wife, recorded the scenes around and on board Illustrious.
Each day, as we came in at the gate, there was some fresh scene of devastation. Workshops lay piled in rubble and glass. Iron girders were twisted and torn … [The crew] had lost most of their gear. They were dressed in old boiler overalls, in grey flannel trousers and sweaters any old garment they had managed to rescue from the wrecks of their cabins. The surgeon of the ship had done wonderful work in the battle at sea. He was pale, and his face was very, very, sad.
Surgeon Commander Keevil was awarded the DSO for his work on Illustrious and ashore on Malta. Mrs Norman went on board the battered carrier.
It was the first time I had ever been on board a wounded ship. When I saw Illustrious’s great torn decks, the aching chasm that reached into her bowels, the little sickbay that had known such horror, I felt almost as near tears as when I talked with her tired seamen.9
Three days later the attack was renewed by swarms of Stukas and fighters. They concentrated on Malta’s airfields at Hal Far and Luqa; six aircraft were destroyed on the ground and many damaged. Illustrious it was hoped would sail on the 20th but heavy attacks on the 19th in the dockyard areas resulted in underwater damage to her keel plating, requiring further repairs. Finally the Vice-Admiral Malta, Sir Wilbraham Ford was able to report the carrier ready for sea on the evening of the 23rd.
At dusk that day Illustrious crept out of harbour unobserved by the enemy. At Suda Bay destroyers and cruisers had been assembled to cover her passage. Two merchant ships left just before her to take advantage of this cover as well. That night she ran up to 24 knots. The cruisers and destroyers missed her, not expecting such a turn of speed from the patched up vessel. They came under attack by enemy aircraft but suffered no heavy damage. Illustrious escaped unscathed, on this occasion, helped by poor visibility. At noon on the 25th Illustrious steamed into Alexandria harbour, to be cheered by every ship there. Admiral Cunningham noted:
That Illustrious episode stands out as a triumph for British shipbuilding and our naval constructors, as well as for those who repaired her at Malta. I sent a message to the Vice-Admiral at Malta expressing our warmest appreciation of the work done under conditions of great difficulty to get the ship away. The men of Malta dockyard deserved all the praise we could give them.10
Illustrious was soon on her way again on her journey to the US, where she would be extensively rebuilt at Norfolk in Virginia.Formidable would join the fleet in March.
The arrival of the Fliegerkorps in the central Mediterranean completely changed the military situation, making the use of shipping in daylight within the range of the dive bombers extremely expensive in terms of men and ships. Convoys for Alexandria were now routed around the Cape. To restore freedom of movement would require more fighters, both carrier-borne and shore-based, and more bombers, but aircraft of all types were in short supply.
Meanwhile the importance of Malta as a base had become greater than ever. Airfields in the bulge of Cyrenacia were being secured, which would bring a degree of air cover to the central Mediterranean and support for Malta. The island’s role as an offensive base was paramount. RAF Wellingtons kept up their attacks against Sicilian airfields when they could. While Navy Swordfish based on Malta continued to attack Axis shipping, five submarines of the small ‘U’ class were based on the island and, with other larger longer range boats, were also taking an increasing toll on enemy shipping.
Since the raid on Taranto and the redeployment of the Italian fleet to the west coast ports of Italy, Admiral Somerville had considered attacking these ports from the sea. Intelligence suggested that one of the Vittorio Veneto class battleships was under repair in Genoa. The port that could be bombarded from the sea, in waters that were too deep to be mined, but Genoa was 700 miles from the base of Force H, right in the backyard of the enemy. It was possible there might not even be any Italian heavy naval units there, but the effect on morale of striking the enemy so far north could be considerable. Cunningham agreed to Somerville’s plan. The Admiralty suggested a subsidiary operation to attack the Tirso dam in Sardinia with torpedo aircraft; the dam supplied much of the island’s power.11
On 23 January the information was that Littorio was in dry dock and Giulio Cesare was alongside at Genoa. A long range photographic Spitfire was sent to confirm this from Malta but was shot down.
On the evening of 31 January Force H – Renown, Malaya, Ark Royal, Sheffield and ten destroyers – sailed from Gibraltar. The plan was to attack the Tirso dam on 2 February and bombard Genoa the next day, while Admiral Cunningham sailed westward from Alexandria with part of his fleet to create a diversion.
Eight aircraft of No 810 Squadron carrying torpedoes were flown from Ark Royal at 06:00 into deteriorating weather. They were met by heavy anti-aircraft fire over the targets; no hits were seen on the dam, and the Air Ministry had warned torpedoes would be unsuitable. One aircraft was lost.
The weather rapidly worsened, developing into a gale from the northeast slowing the speed of Force H. This would have meant an approach to Genoa in daylight so the operation was abandoned.
On 6 February Force H sailed again in two groups trying to confuse the enemy. The whole force concentrated early on the 8th north of Majorca. At 04:00 after a calm if moonlit passage, Ark Royal was detached with a destroyer escort to bomb the oil refinery at Leghorn and lay mines off Spezia. Two hours later catapult aircraft were launched from the bombardment group to spot the fall of shot. At 07:11 Renown’s aircraft reported that no battleships could be seen. This was an error as Duilio was in fact in dry dock.
The sea was calm; there was no sign of shipping and the sky was clear of enemy aircraft. The gulf of Genoa was covered in sea fog but the spotting aircraft had a bird’s eye view. At 07:15 the battleships opened fire. Force H fired some 300 tons of shells into Genoa, 273 rounds of 15-inch, 782 rounds of 6-inch and 400 rounds of 4.5-inch. Many merchant ships in the harbour were damaged, but Duilio escaped unscathed. CPO Charles Wright had mixed emotions about the bombardment;
What a delightful place this was in peacetime when I was in Resolution. How different in war. I remember being on Renown’s boat deck watching the destruction of the wharves and the Ansaldo works, when a voice behind me said, ‘What are you doing up here?’ My reply was to the effect, I was in Genoa in peacetime, sir, and made many friends. The Commander’s reply left me in no doubts. ‘Get below. This is war.’
Admiral Somerville himself had some pangs of conscience.
For half an hour we blazed away, and I had to think of Valletta, London, Bristol, etc, to harden my heart. But I was watching the map and the reports of the aircraft and I do believe practically all our shots fell on works, warehouses, shipping, docks etc. Still it’s no use pretending that some innocent people were not killed. War is lousy.12
Force H was spotted by the Italians early in the morning of the 8th. Supermarina ordered the battleships Vittorio Veneto, Cesare, and Doria to sail from Spezia and the heavy cruisers Trieste, Trento, and Bolzano from Messina to meet at dawn on 9 February 40 miles west of the Boniface strait, between Corsica and Sardinia. According to Commander Bragadin in the official history, this was ‘much further north than the standing orders for this type of situation which called for a rendezvous southwest of Sardinia.’13
This meant Admiral Iachino’s force was at sea before Ark Royal’s aircraft had mined the approaches to Spezia. His fleet was well placed to intercept Force H on the return to Gibraltar. However a familiar sequence of events began to unfold; Italian reconnaissance and interservice cooperation was poor. Iachino received conflicting reports and his own fleet’s catapult aircraft found nothing. Regia Aeronautica aircraft did find Force H more than once, some even attacked it but scored no hits, but this information was not integrated into the Italian air-sea communications system. Thus Supermarina only received the reports once the aircraft had returned to base. As Commander Bragadin summed up; ‘it must be said that the day, whic
h for a great many reasons had begun with such favourable prospects, ended in deep disappointment.’14
It was remarkable that a British fleet, that must have expected to be spotted, had attacked a port in the north of Italy inflicting damage and had escaped unscathed without even coming under serious attack, all this against the combined might of the Regia Marina, Regia Aeronautica and the Luftwaffe. It demonstrated the arrival of German air power had not secured control of the Mediterranean for the Axis, and all eyes now turned toward Greece.
Notes
1 Bullock, Alan, Hitler a Study in Tyranny p.573
2 Playfair, Major-General I.S.O. The Mediterranean & Middle East Volume I p.315
3 Lamb, Charles, War in a Stringbag p.121–122
4 Ibid p.123
5 Cunningham A. B. A Sailor’s Odyssey p.302–303
6 Wragg, David, Swordfish p.152
7 Play fair, p.320
8 Elliot, Peter, The Cross and the Ensign. A Naval History of Malta 1798–1979 p.126
9 Perowne, Stewart, The Siege within the Walls: Malta 1940–1943 p.68
10 Cunningham, p.305
11 Playfair, p.329
12 Smith, Peter C. Hit First Hit Hard: HMS Renown 1916–1948 p.183
13 Bragadin, M.A. The Italian Navy in World War II p.65
14 Ibid p66
PART TWO
Matapan
Coming from the west one often makes a landfall at Cape Matapan, the low-lying point where the tall Taygetos range of the Mani peninsula falls insignificantly into the sea. The cape is so low that one can often see the lighthouse before the point of land.
H.M. Denham1
9
Reluctant Allies
In February 1941, at Merano in the foothills of the Dolomite Mountains, the Chief of Staff of the Regia Marina, Admiral Arturo Riccardi, and his German counterpart, Admiral Erich Raeder, along with their staffs, met for three days. This was ostensibly to exchange ideas and experiences, for up to that time the Axis partners had largely been fighting their own wars keeping their plans broadly hidden from each other.
However Italian war aims had largely failed. The short war theory lay in tatters. More and more Italy would have to rely on her northern ally for supplies and materials merely to keep her in the war. A war that was becoming increasingly unpopular with the Italian public.
The Germans were not merely going to supply their erratic ally; rather, fully equipped German units like Fliegerkorps X of the Luftwaffe, and the Africa Korps which began arriving in the early days of February, would take up the fight. The aim of this involvement in the Mediterranean would result in the war being directed from Berlin. The Italians could not continue without material aid so had to accept German domination.
This situation for the Italian armed forces fell hardest on the navy, who felt it bordered on the absurd, as Germany was not even an important naval power. But they did come to an understanding over German action in Greece, and the Italians hoped to resolve the growing problems of fuel supplies, which had become dire. The Regia Marina had begun the war with 1,800,000 tons of fuel but by the time of the Merano meeting 1,000,000 tons had been used. According to Commander Bragadin:
At this rate, the Italian fleet would have to cease all activity by the coming summer. This tremendously grave problem naturally had already been brought to the attention of the supreme command many times, but nothing of a reassuring nature had been agreed upon with Germany. For this reason it was hoped that direct conversations with German Navy chiefs, who were professional people more capable of understanding such problems, would bring about a satisfactory solution of the problem.2
The involvement of Admiral Raeder in the Italian naval fuel supplies did ease the situation. By the spring of 1941 more regular deliveries were arriving, however even then it was about 50,000 tons a month, only a quarter of what was required. Indeed by the summer of 1941 the navy ran out of fuel and was paralysed.
However the main German concern of the conference was the imminent German invasion of Greece which they felt would be heavily reinforced by the British. They felt the Italian fleet should be able to carry out offensive sweeps against the British line of supply from Egypt to Greece. Admiral Riccardi pointed out this would be difficult to achieve because of the proved effectiveness of British air reconnaissance, and the distance from the fleet’s bases would put any convoys quickly beyond their reach. ‘The Germans appeared to be convinced by the Admiral’s explanation, and the subject was dropped.’3
However at the beginning of March, Berlin informed Rome of the nearness of their intervention in Greece and the Balkans, and they expected the Italians to do their utmost to block British aid to Greece. German commanders had voiced cynical contempt of their ally’s navy; Field Marshal Kesselring was one.
The Italian Navy was regarded as a piece de resistance and was therefore used sparingly-an attitude which caused special internal difficulties. Yet three times we managed to overcome these and get it to put to sea. A further trouble lay in its being stationed in different harbours; to assemble it cost time and wasted fuel. Finally, one or other battleship was either not ready to put to sea, or was not fuelled, or was in dock. Exercises in large formations could not be carried out mainly because of this same shortage of fuel. Gunnery practice was a rarity. On top of this there were extraordinary technical deficiencies which deservedly earned the Italian navy the nickname ‘Fair–weather Fleet.’ Its doubtful seaworthiness called for increased air protection and that, with the limited strength of the Axis air forces in the Mediterranean, imposed ridiculous demands on the German Luftwaffe, whose hands were already full protecting convoys. If the Italian fleet by any chance ever came within extreme range of the British fleets and a few shots were actually exchanged, it had to break off the engagement at the approach of dusk because of its inability to fire in the dark, and run for the nearest port Taranto or Messina.4
Kesselring had a point, but his views are pretty typical of land-based commanders with little naval experience.
Having been ordered by the Italian High Command to intervene in the British build up, Supermarina ordered more submarines into Cretan waters, a special assault team was ordered to strike against ships in Suda Bay, and heavy surface units were ordered to carry out offensive sweeps. ‘Supermarina undertook this reluctantly feeling that the risks that they entailed were far greater than the very unlikely probability of surprising an enemy convoy in Cretan Waters.’5
The Germans promised closer cooperation with Fliegerkorps X, the latter having claimed they had hit two of the three British battleships from the Mediterranean Fleet west of Crete on 16 March. Supermarina was also assured they would have greater air reconnaissance by the Luftwaffe over Alexandria and the central Mediterranean. They would increase bombing raids on Malta, and fighter sweeps to intercept British spotter aircraft from the island. When the fleet was at sea aircraft from the Regia Aeronautica would bomb British airfields on Crete and carry out reconnaissance of the British supply routes north from Alexandria. Also fighter aircraft from Rhodes would cover the ships in the Crete area. A great many promises were made by the airmen.
On 19 March the German Naval Liaison Officer in Rome handed the following communication to the Italian Naval Staff.
Subject: Naval Strategic situation in the Mediterranean.
The German Naval Staff has instructed me to communicate to you the following views of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy.
The German Naval Staff considers that at the moment there is only one British Battleship [Valiant] fully ready for action in the east Mediterranean. It is not anticipated that the British will withdraw heavy units from the Atlantic in the near future. Force H is also considered unlikely to appear in the eastern Mediterranean. Thus, the situation in the East Mediterranean is more favourable for the Italian fleet at this moment than ever before. The intensive traffic from Alexandria to the Greek ports, by which the Greek forces are receiving constant reinforcements both in men and equipment,
presents a particularly worthwhile target for the Italian naval forces.
The German Naval Staff considers that the appearance of Italian units in the area south of Crete will seriously interfere with British shipping, and may even lead to the complete interruption of the transport of troops, especially as these transports are at the moment inadequately protected.6
This communication was based on Fliegerkorps X’s claim to have damaged two British battleships on 16 March.
Of course this could have been fairly easily checked out on the ground. They had time a week before the fleet sailed and there were many Axis agents in Alexandria. John Eppler – known as ‘Rommel’s Spy’ – whenever he was in the port, always viewed the harbour, later sketching what he saw and reporting to his masters.7
The Germans also seemed unaware that on 10 March the armoured aircraft carrier Formidable had reached Alexandria via the Suez Canal. It was as if the Germans and Italians were guilty of listening to only the intelligence they wanted to hear.
Admiral Angelo Iachino was 52 in 1941. He had joined the navy in 1904 at the academy at Livorno, graduating in 1907. He commanded a torpedo boat during the First World War, and was naval attaché to the Italian embassy in China 1923–1928. He had been promoted Admiral a few months before Italy entered the Second World War.
Iachino had an upright bearing, with a trim figure of middle height; his steely blue eyes gazed out beneath a high forehead giving him a brooding appearance, which was not his nature. A man of few words who was known for his affable temperament, he had the ability, envied by many officers, to make commands clear to his subordinates. He was held in high regard by all those who ever served with him.