by Ray Takeyh
This process of consolidation of the revolution soon moved beyond the political elites as Khomeini proclaimed his own cultural revolution. The universities were closed for two years as their curriculum was altered, television and news media bombarded the populace with crass Islamic propaganda, and the women who had made up such a critical part of the revolutionary coalition were forced to wear strict religious dress. Every aspect of public life had to conform to Islamic strictures, with loyalty tests and ideological standards determining admission to universities, the civil service, and the armed forces. Children were encouraged to inform on their parents, students on teachers, employees on each other. The new stalwarts of the revolution who had survived assassination campaigns, American coercion, and Saddam’s invasion seemed confident that God was on their side and the perpetuation of their regime was a sign of divine approbation. Throughout the 1980s, war, martyrdom, sacrifice, and vengeance were the themes of Iranian politics and national discourse.
During his first two years in power, Khomeini’s achievements were considerable. He implemented the Islamic ideology that he had spent decades developing and refining, and he created a new constitutional system with clear redlines and an elite loyal to his vision, which ensured that the Islamic Republic would survive his passing. Iran would now be guided by activist clerics and a strict interpretation of Shiite Islam. Alternative ideologies such as liberalism or secularism and politicians and clerics challenging the prerogatives of the velayat-e faqih were simply excluded from the councils of power. To be part of the ruling echelon one had to be committed to the Islamic Republic and its mission of salvation.
Despite his imagination and innovative skills, Khomeini’s political acumen failed him in some important respects. The reality remains that the Islamic Republic never evolved into a pure totalitarian state such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. As the revolution settled into a more predictable pattern of governance and as the regime’s detractors were eliminated from the scene, the differences and divisions among Khomeini’s disciples began to surface. Pragmatists stressing the need for a greater focus on the economy, hard-liners insisting that their mandate from God empowered them to disregard popular aspirations, and reformers stressing the need for a more tolerant theocracy began to battle one another for influence and power. After all, not all revolutionaries are alike. President Ahmadinejad and his immediate predecessor, Muhammad Khatami, are both part of the same elite, yet on critical issues such as the importance of civil society and individual sovereignty they differ radically. To be sure, Iran’s factions may submerge their differences and defend the regime when it is challenged by student protests or American threats, but the core disagreements within the elite remain unabridged. The Islamic Republic may not be a big tent, but it is still a tent with diversity of views and opinions.
In a perverse sense, Khomeini’s determination to impose Shiite Islam as the dogma of the state was partly undermined by the traditions of that very same Shiite faith. Shiism—with its history of decentralized power, independent-minded clerics, and seminaries that vehemently disagree with one another—never evolved into a hierarchical priestly class similar to the Catholic Church. The spirit of boisterous debate soon infiltrated the Islamic Republic, as the system stubbornly featured diverse and contenting factions. The simmering tensions between clerical leaders and the popular base of the regime and its constitutional pledges and republican mandates ensured divisions and rivalries. Even within its restrictive confines, the Islamic Republic would always feature robust and lively debate. In the end, Khomeini did succeed in ensuring the perpetuation of an Islamic Republic, yet one that is hopelessly and irrevocably divided against itself.
2
CONSERVATIVES,
PRAGMATISTS, AND
REFORMERS
On June 6, 1989, the founder of the Islamic Republic finally died. On that tumultuous day when the guardians of the revolution gathered to bid farewell to their departed leader an uneasy future lay ahead. The simmering conflicts that had been held in check by Khomeini’s authority now became all too evident, and his disciples soon lapsed into an intense factional struggle as contending interpretations of Islam, differences over economic policy, and Iran’s role in the international community dissolved the unity of the clerical elite. In essence, the tensions between the regime’s revolutionary ideals and its practical requirements burst to the surface, bedeviling Iran’s new rulers. Without Khomeini available to resolve these disputes, stalemate and deadlock became the new currency of Iranian politics.
Three political tendencies now emerged in the struggle for the leadership of the Islamic Republic, all led by very different clerical politicians. The hard-liners, united by their contempt for democratic pluralism and their determination to sustain Khomeini’s divisive legacy, would ultimately settle on the stern and forbidding Ali Khamenei as their standard-bearer. The more moderate and pragmatic elements within the clerical hierarchy would coalesce around Iran’s ultimate political insider, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. These more tempered clerics believed that the perpetuation of Islamic rule mandated a greater attention to the economic deficiencies of the state and integration into the global economy. The pragmatists would press for a degree of cultural freedom and normalized relations with states that Khomeini had long castigated. Finally, the Islamic Republic featured a dynamic cadre of clerical and intellectual reformers who stressed that the legitimacy of the state was contingent on the vitality of its representative institutions. Also drawing on Khomeini’s legacy, they emphasized the elected branches of the state and the importance of popular will in charting the national course. Muhammad Khatami would emerge as the most important, but by no means the only, representative of this cohort. These factions would now battle one another for influence and power, as the Islamic Republic’s institutions were increasingly pitted against each other.
The intriguing aspect of Iran that tends to persistently puzzle Western observers is that these political factions never completely lose their influence despite their electoral performance. The fact remains that they all represent important constituencies and have a presence in the complicated web of informal and formal institutions that govern the Islamic Republic. For example, Rafsanjani’s failed bid to capture the presidency in 2005 has not necessarily lessened his influence, as he is still in command of the powerful Expediency Council, which is responsible for mediating disputes between Iran’s institutions. It is now fashionable to suggest that the reform movement is all but dead, given its recent string of electoral failures. But in the early 1990s the reformers were similarly excised from the ruling establishment, only to come back in force a few years later. Through the adroit use of their newspapers, intellectual circles, and supporters within the bureaucracy, the reformers managed to make an astonishing return to prominence under Khatami in 1997. The point remains that these three broad factions are likely to challenge one another for control of the Islamic Republic, and despite the ebbs and flows of their political fortunes they will determine Iran’s future. Thus, it is important to have a better understanding of their ideological precepts, sources of support, successes, and failures if we are to better appreciate Iran’s internal political dynamics.
KHAMENEI AND THE MILITANT RIGHT
The figure that has come to dominate the conservative bloc since the death of Khomeini is the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In many ways, the uncharismatic and uninspiring Khamenei was an unusual choice to succeed the founder of the Islamic Republic.1 A loyal aide to Khomeini, Khamenei was not one of his favorite disciples. After the removal of Bani-Sadr from the presidency in 1981 and a wave of terrorism that decimated the top echelon of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei was elevated to the presidency, an office whose powers at that point were largely symbolic. After Khomeini’s death, and once the more esteemed and learned Ayatollah Ali Hussein Montazeri proved politically unacceptable, Khamenei emerged as the consensus choice within the clerical estate to be the new Supreme Leader. Khamenei would spend much of hi
s early tenure compensating for his lack of erudition by seeking the approbation of the reactionary clerics who invested such august powers in him.2 The relationship between Khamenei and the clerical oligarchs would evolve into one of mutual dependence: they needed him to assert their influence and he relied on them to buttress his lackluster theological credentials.
Despite the skepticism, if not derision, that greeted Khamenei’s appointment among the more traditional senior clergy, he would prove an adept political survivor. By temperament, Khamenei was cautious and conservative, uneasy about radical solutions and self-defeating crusades. Over the years, the new Leader would become more conservative, even reactionary, undergoing a subtle transformation into a harsh, uncompromising ideologue. At its core, Khamenei believes that the mission of the Islamic Republic is to uphold religious norms and resist popular attempts to alter the regime along democratic lines.
Over the past few decades, Khamenei and the militant conservatives essentially ensured their political hegemony by dominating Iran’s powerful nonelected institutions. Through their control of the Supreme Leader’s office, the Guardian Council, and the judiciary, they sought to ensure that the prerogatives of the elected institutions and the demands of the public could be effectively negated. Clerical stalwarts such as Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati and Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi headed these organizations and openly acclaimed the virtues of despotic rule. The hard-liners took full advantage of Khomeini’s constitutional manipulations, which granted clerical watchdog organizations ample power to thwart popular aspirations. In the name of Islamic salvation, the reactionary elements of the state obstructed a range of initiatives that would have made the Islamic Republic a more tolerant and inclusive polity.
Beyond the formal institutions of the state, the hard-liners also came to dominate the coercive instruments of power, particularly the Revolutionary Guards. The 125,000-strong Revolutionary Guard force is commanded by reactionary ideologues who are committed to the values and philosophical outlook of the clerical militants. Throughout the 1990s, they called for suppression of the reform movement and denounced its attempts to expand the political rights of the citizenry. The Guards were unleashed to deal with student protests and often pressed the leadership to violently dispense with pro-democratic forces. As they gained stature and wealth, the Guards have increasingly emerged as an independent pillar of the state whose predilections and demands cannot be ignored by the ruling authorities. Today the Guards are not just enforcers of the regime’s determinations but active participants on issues ranging from internal security to the nuclear program.3
In recent years, the demographic complexion of the militant Right is beginning to change, with a younger generation coming to assume important leadership positions. President Ahmadinejad and the parliamentarians organized in the new political party Abadgaran are the future of the conservative movement.4 The younger rightists have been molded not by the revolution but by the prolonged war with Iraq in the 1980s, leading them to be suspicious of the international community and treaties as a means of preserving Iran’s interests.5 Although committed to the religious pedigree of the state, the callow reactionaries have at times been critical of their elders for their passivity in the imposition of Islamic cultural restrictions and the rampant corruption that has engulfed the state. As Iran’s revolution matures and the politicians that were present at the creation of the Islamic Republic gradually recede from the scene, a more dogmatic generation is beginning to take hold of the reins of power.
Iran’s conservatives, both young and old, are imbued with an ideology that views the essential purpose of the state as the realization of God’s will on earth. Such an exalted task mandates the assumption of power by clerics or by laymen who are religiously devoted. They see themselves as a vanguard class that retains loyalty to Khomeini’s revolutionary vision and best understands the intricacies of religious jurisprudence, and for that reason they hold that their authority should neither be infringed upon by representative bodies nor challenged by popular will. In a defiant tone, one of the champions of the Right, Hojjat-ol-Islam Moslemin Ghavarian, declared, “In my view a despotism which is rational must be accepted. Genuine despotism means obeying the divine decree.”6 True to Khomeini’s example, his disciples reject the Shiite traditions, pressing the clergy to remain aloof from politics and preoccupy themselves with theological disquisitions.
Given such ideological inclinations, the hard-liners are utterly contemptuous of democratic accountability and pluralistic precepts. Khamenei has led the chorus in condemning liberal rule by insisting that the Islamic Republic is not “prepared to allow flawed and non-divine perspectives and ideas that are aimed at enhancing the power of the individual to dictate its social and political lives.”7 Ayatollah Muhammad Mesbah Yazdi, the spiritual adviser to Ahmadinejad and many within the Revolutionary Guards, captures this totalitarian sentiment by claiming, “The Prophets of God did not believe in pluralism. They believed that only one idea was right.”8 Assured of their ideological verities and still in command of powerful institutions, the hard-liners are unconcerned about loss of popularity and widespread dissatisfaction with theocratic rule. After all, as Hamid Reza Tariqi of the Islamic Coalition Society noted, “The legitimacy of our Islamic establishment is derived from God. This legitimacy will not wash away even if people stop supporting it.”9
The reactionary politics of the conservatives is complemented by a stringent view of cultural rights and the necessity of the imposing Islamic strictures on a reluctant populace. The conservatives spend much time anguishing about Western cultural influences and are puzzled why younger Iranians do not want to spend their time reading their ponderous theological tracts. The segregation of the sexes, the enforcement of female dress codes, and the control of the media and the film industry are still the preferred methods for preventing cultural decadence. After twenty-seven years of struggle, the attempt to control Iran’s youth is a losing battle that the conservatives nonetheless insist on waging.
Following Khomeini, a degree of contempt characterizes the clerical militants’ approach to their constituents. They believe that the nation’s citizenry has to change, purify itself, adhere uncritically to their ideological exhortations, and obey their commands. Only then will Iranians be worthy subjects of the divine republic. Ayatollah Ahmad Azari-Qomi reflected this sentiment, stressing, “The Leader was analogous to the head of the family and has the right to interfere in the house where he has delegated the housework.”10 Similarly, the hard-liners dismiss the notions of individual sovereignty and an empowered citizenry as a means of forging a new political community.
The economic perspective of the Right is as flawed and retrogressive as its political platform. The conservatives’ economic policies stem from competing demands of their constituents in the bazaar and their revolutionary pledge to uplift the downtrodden. The clerical hard-liners have acclaimed the sanctity of private property and routinely assert Islamic injunctions endorsing commerce and free enterprise. After all, they say, the Prophet of Islam was a trader and the mullahs themselves have proved shrewd businessmen. However, in practice the hard-liners’ economic conception does not entail the creation of a modern economy with its calls for transparency, the rule of law, and accountability. To such traditionalists, private economy has implied allowing their merchant allies to operate with limited state scrutiny.
In a paradoxical sense, the hard-liners’ celebration of commerce militates against fostering a modern industrial economy. Indeed, the creation of such an infrastructure is at times explicitly rejected in favor of the merchant class with its trade monopolies and unregulated practices. Muhammad Reza Bahonar, the deputy speaker of parliament, noted, “In the commercial sector, our country has a great potential for becoming an international merchant. I don’t have high hopes that our industry or agriculture can meet the country’s expenditures.”11 A modern economy with its rational bureaucracy, cohesive administrative institutions, and a viable banking sy
stem are dismissed in favor of the existing opaque arrangements with their traditional means of exchange.
However, the conservatives face a contradiction in their attempt to reconcile the mandates of the private economy and the inequalities it produces with their revolutionary pledge to lift up the dispossessed. The notion of economic justice and egalitarianism still has a powerful resonance for a segment of the Right that is offended by the persistence of class cleavages and the inequality in the distribution of wealth. These themes mobilized the lower classes on behalf of President Ahmadinejad in the 2005 election as his message of equality of sacrifice proved alluring to the foot soldiers of the revolution. The conservative response to this conundrum has been massive subsidies on critical commodities such as bread, fuel, and sugar. The results have been predictably disastrous, and subsidies today consume approximately 20 percent of the country’s GDP. A viable structural reform package would entail dispensing with these onerous subsidies and reducing the size and scope of the bloated bureaucracy. However, such reforms may cause short-term disruptions that a regime with a limited popular base is unwilling to countenance. Given its ideological commitments and its fear of antagonizing its lower-class constituents, the Right has jealously guarded the existing stagnant state with all its pathologies and deficiencies.