Hidden Iran

by Ray Takeyh

  Hovering over all this is the reality that the hard-liners today are one of the few segments of Iranian society that is actually benefiting from the current economic order. The mainstay of the right-wing power bloc remains the vast religious foundations, the bonyads, which have come to dominate the trade and manufacturing sectors. The bonyads began in the aftermath of the revolution as religious foundations that expropriated the assets of the defunct monarchy for philanthropic purposes. However, in the intervening quarter-century they have metamorphosed into huge holding companies that dominate key industries while evading competition and state regulation. These interests are inimical to a truly free market and dissuade their beneficiaries—mostly conservative clerics and other defenders of the current system—from implementing any serious structural reforms to Iran’s economy.

  Such corrupt practices are now being emulated by the Revolutionary Guards, who in recent years have steadily intruded into economic activities, establishing their own commercial firms with privileged access to contracts in key industries such as telecommunications and imported consumer goods. Through this network of companies, the Guards have enhanced their patronage power, allowing them to further cultivate their constituents. In an even more ominous manner, much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is being procured by firms owned by members of the Guards, making compromise on this issue even more difficult. At any rate, the fundamentals of economic reform, including decentralization, free competition, and the rule of law cannot be instituted without endangering the conservatives’ lucrative power base.

  In a sense, the hard-liners are offering the populace their own social compact, whereby in exchange for spiritual salvation, the public will relinquish the right to dissent. In such an order—where the task at hand is to construct a society seeking continuous conformity with God’s will as seen by an enlightened clerical corps—there is no room for disagreement. The populace should be grateful, the hard-liners assert, that it is provided with a leadership and a social arrangement leading to celestial rewards. To disagree with clerical fiats and the accumulation of power by a narrowly self-selected group of religious reactionaries is to engage in a provocative act of defiance that must necessarily be suppressed. Iran’s Right seems to perceive that it has reached “the end of history,” where an exalted order has been constructed that requires no further reform or alteration.

  The inflexibility of the hard-liners’ outlook stands in stark contrast to a dynamic and changing Iranian society. By the time of Khomeini’s death, the prolonged war with Iraq and the struggles on behalf of the revolution had convinced many social sectors that citizens have rights and are not mere actors obeying clerical dictates. Iran is also a young country, with an estimated 70 percent of the population under the age of thirty. A new demographic cohort has been evolving under the structure of the Islamic Republic, with its own demands and imperatives. Two other political tendencies have emerged seeking to accommodate such popular aspirations and balance the mandates of the revolution with the desires of its constituents.

  RAFSANJANI AND THE POLITICS OF PRAGMATISM

  The pragmatic wing of the clerical elite is led by a politician who defies easy characterization. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was a longtime disciple of Khomeini, one of the architects of the revolution, and a politician who has held nearly every important office in postrevolutionary Iran. Rafsanjani reached the apex of his career in 1989 when he assumed the office of the presidency for two successive terms. A mixture of realism and self-interest would perennially lead Rafsanjani to embrace economic and cultural policies that contravened established orthodoxies and even theological norms. For him, the legitimacy of the state and the prolongation of Islamic rule were contingent on its economic performance. As such, he would spend much of his presidency, indeed his entire career, seeking to build strong institutions, buttressed by a competent and expanding bureaucracy to realize his vision of change and reform.12

  Soon after Khomeini’s death, Rafsanjani and his technocratic protégés began to assert their identity and political platform. They had risen to critical positions in the professional associations, the modern business community, and state bureaucracies. By 1996, they went one step further and established their own political party, the Servants of Construction (Kargozaran-e Sazandegi), whose declared mission was “the use of experts and creation of a domestic environment where ideas flowed.”13 Using China as a model, they hoped to conceive a new order that would be economically efficient, culturally tolerant, and politically autocratic. It is important to note that the aim of the pragmatists was never the creation of a democratic polity, but rather a stable society that would meet the economic needs of its constituents.

  Given their preoccupation with economic rejuvenation, Rafsanjani and his allies pressed for tempering the Islamic revolution in terms of how Iran defined its priorities and formulated its policies. The conservatives’ opaque economic practices and their emphasis on social justice were seen as militating against judicious economic planning. A technocratic cadre would have to displace the revolutionary loyalists in key ministries and private economics would have to assume priority over the revolutionary pledge to lift up the dispossessed. For Rafsanjani, Iran could best preserve its revolution only “under the aegis of rational and logical policy.”14 The pragmatists would seek to transcend Khomeini’s populist policies by emphasizing private initiatives and attracting foreign investments. This would entail borrowing from the World Bank and agreeing to partial foreign ownership of domestic industries. The Islamic Republic would no longer seek to challenge the prevailing international norms but would participate in the global economy. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati noted these sentiments in 1991 by stressing that “economic considerations overshadow political priorities.”15 Once a modern industrial economy was created, then not only would the regime’s legitimacy be enhanced but problems of economic inequality would be similarly alleviated.

  Although their economic focus precluded tackling issues of representation and pluralism, the pragmatists did stand against the totalitarian Islam of the Right. In the interest of stability they thought it necessary to accommodate at least some of the populace’s political aspirations and thereby strengthen the republican pillar of the state. It was important, they believed, to grant the public a stake in the political process and national planning through competitive politics with elections among diverse choices of candidates and platforms. In their conception, the Supreme Leader was not just the guardian of a restrictive view of Islam, but an important politician with the responsibility to tackle thorny issues such as population growth and institutional decay that had obstructed Iran’s development. All this is not to suggest an emerging appreciation for the collective will—Rafsanjani and his allies were not beyond manipulating the electoral process to achieve their desired results. Nonetheless, unlike the reactionary Right the pragmatists saw a rigid political order as detracting from the essential task of rehabilitating the economy.

  On cultural issues, the pragmatists sought to avoid the coercive imposition of Islamic ordinances on the country’s restive youth. Their focus was not on creating a more liberal society but a stable one that would lessen tensions. Such stability was unlikely to be fostered with a sullen, alienated generation resentful of the persistent and onerous state intrusions into their lives. Given their devotion to the essential institutions of the Islamic Republic, such enterprising moves would have distinct limits, as notions of equality of the sexes and gender emancipation were still dismissed on religious grounds. Despite such inhibitions, the pragmatists acknowledged that the relaxation of cultural restrictions and a degree of social freedom could provide a useful safety valve for Iran’s youthful populace.

  Despite their lofty pledges of creating an industrial economy, the ambitions of the pragmatists soon fell victim to the vicissitudes of Iranian politics. During Rafsanjani’s presidency from 1989 to 1997 his initiatives inevitably began to encroach on the ideological imperatives and the power base of
the conservatives. As we have seen, for Iran’s hard-liners privatization meant a merchant class free of state regulation and intervention. The task of creating a coherent economy with a modern infrastructure, rule of law, and uniform tax policy manned by a technocratic bureaucracy was abhorrent to the conservative bloc. Given the right wing’s paranoia about Western cultural influences, they were averse to opening the system to foreign investments, much less implementing the structural measures mandated by the World Bank. For them, the sanctity of private property implied empowering the bazaar and its opaque economic arrangements and not creating a modern economy integrated in global markets.

  Beyond his economic measures, Rafsanjani faced an open rebellion on his attempt to loosen the suffocating cultural impositions. Supreme Leader Khamenei led the chorus by claiming, “Some mock religious virtues, but if we spend billions on development projects and ignore moral issues, all achievements amount to nothing.” The head of the Guardian Council, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, similarly admonished Rafsanjani, stressing that the role of the state is to support “true Islamic culture by reinforcing religious bedrock of the people and fighting all those who are anti-Islamic and Western-stricken.”16 For the Right, the mission of the revolution remained the rigorous enforcement of Islamic tenets. Despite Rafsanjani’s professions, moral police and law enforcement officials continued to harass and arrest those seeking a degree of personal and intellectual freedom.

  In a pattern that would prove all too familiar, the hard-liners employed their institutional power to thwart reform measures. Under the auspices of Ayatollah Khamenei, the hard-liners systematically undermined Rafsanjani’s initiatives. Not for the first time Iran was paralyzed by the core contradiction between factions professing ideology and those pressing the cause of national interest.

  In the end, Rafsanjani’s presidency failed to achieve its main objectives. Despite some success in denationalization measures, the so-called Era of Reconstruction did not liberalize the economy or resolve its inherent distortions. Borrowing from the international markets placed Iran in the unenviable position of having a huge debt burden. The resulting inflationary pressures eroded the standard of living of the poor and the middle class. The inability of the state to reduce its heavy subsidies, the periodic declines of the petroleum market, and an inability to attract foreign investment curbed the potential of Iran’s growth. On the cultural front, Iran remained a largely repressive society, struggling under the burdens of religious impositions that many found objectionable, given the rampant corruption of the clerical class.

  The triumph of the Right had much to do with Rafsanjani being unwilling to challenge the fundamental power of the hard-liners. Every time he met resistance, he quickly retreated, shielding himself in a barrage of religious rhetoric. Despite his advocacy of reform and moderation, Rafsanjani reigned over a state that was economically stagnant and socially repressed. And his quest for power led him to abandon his own convictions and betray the nation that had invested so much hope in his presidency.

  At first glance it is easy to dismiss Rafsanjani and his pragmatic allies as a fading and unsuccessful phenomenon. However, in a perverse manner, the pragmatists contributed to the long-term transformation of Iran by altering the legitimacy of the republic. During Khomeini’s reign, the basis of the regime’s authority was its Islamic ideology and the Supreme Leader’s overpowering charisma. More than any of his clerical counterparts, Rafsanjani appreciated that the populace that had suffered so much hardship and loss of life during the prolonged war with Iraq would no longer be satisfied with the rhetoric of martyrdom and sacrifice. Rafsanjani’s emphasis on economic performance and cultural freedom altered the nature of the relationship between state and society. The declared mission of the government was no longer provision of salvation but delivering on its practical pledges. Thus, Rafsanjani’s tenure served as the midwife of the reform movement, which sought to fundamentally alter the political topography of Iran.

  TEHRAN SPRING

  The Iranian regime in the post-Khomeini years was nothing if not fractious, as a third group, the reformers, also emerged, pressing their own claims and ideological template.17 The politician who would capture the imagination of the reformers and indeed the larger Iranian society was a midlevel cleric, Hojjat-ol-Islam Seyyed Muhammad Khatami. Despite his position in the clerical establishment, Khatami had long distinguished himself from it, both in his politics and in his intellectual enterprises. In 1992, the future president, who was then the minister of culture, broke with the Rafsanjani administration over his liberal tendencies and his willingness to grant licenses for publications and plays that defied the strictures of the regime. After he was ousted, he immersed himself in Western philosophy as a complement to his Islamic training. In his subsequent writings, Khatami dared to contravene the ruling consensus, declaring that “state authority cannot be attained through coercion and dictatorship. Rather it is to be realized through governing according to law, respecting the rights and empowering people to participate and ensuring their involvement in decision making.”18 Themes of civil society, rule of law, and individual sovereignty permeated his speeches and writings.

  Although Khatami was versed in Western political thought, it would be wrong to characterize him as a Western-style democrat in clerical garb. To be sure, he often acknowledged the West’s economic progress and pluralistic achievements, but he was also quick to criticize the West for its excessive materialism and insensitivity to man’s spiritual needs. In a sense, Khatami can best be seen as following the long line of Islamic reformers, seeking to revitalize their societies by relying on Islam’s own traditions and injunctions. Khatami remained a man of the system, however, and once his reforms threatened to undermine the edifice of the Islamic Republic, he quickly retreated and opted for conformity instead of confrontation. As he was preparing to leave office in 2005, Khatami defended his reticence, stressing, “We believed that internal clashes and chaotic conditions were a fatal poison for the country’s existence and the Islamic Republic’s sovereignty.”19

  The other misconception about Khatami is that he was the sum total of the reform movement, and that his failings foreclosed the possibility of expanding Iran’s political parameters. The reform movement was a vast coalition of dissident intellectuals, liberal clerics, middle-class professionals, and hard-pressed students. As with most coalitions, there were always tensions between those pressing for dramatic change and more establishment figures calling for caution and restraint. Given Khatami’s impeccable revolutionary credentials and liberal tendencies, he was initially seen by a cross-section of the reform movement as an ideal vehicle for its aspirations. However, there were always many rank-and-file reformers who were uneasy about Khatami’s strategy of gradualism. To properly understand the reform movement, with all its complexities and contradictions, it is important to look beyond Khatami and examine the diverse forces that shaped this important faction in Iranian politics.

  By the early 1990s, an eclectic group of politicians, seminary leaders, religious scholars, and intellectuals undertook an imaginative reexamination of the role of public participation in an Islamic government.20 An impressive array of the regime’s own loyal soldiers—men who had fought for the clerical state and served in some of its highest posts—found themselves increasingly marginalized by the defenders of strict Islamic orthodoxy and began subtly defecting from the official line. Recognizing that the rigid definition of religious governance was threatening the entire structure of the Islamic Republic, veteran politicians such as Abdollah Nuri, Sa’eed Hajarian, and Abdulvand Musavi-Lari mobilized a counterassault. The academic and journalistic circles they established then served as the precursors for their subsequent campaigns to capture the elections and political institutions.21

  The challenge for the reformers was to reconcile two competing demands. On one side stood Islam with its holistic pretensions, maintaining how society and individual lives should be governed. On the other side was the movement
for political modernity with its democratic claims. The reformers, in essence, claimed that these two realms were not incompatible in principle or in practice. This was a remarkable rebuke to totalitarian Islam, which was increasingly serving as the regime’s ideology, providing the ruling clergy with a divine justification for its privileges and power.

  The essential basis of the reformers’ ideology was that the interpretation of the scriptures cannot remain immutable and must adjust to the changing human condition. For religion to remain vital, they said, it had to address the demands of modern society. Islam was not lacking in traditions that can address this challenge, as the well-established practice of ijtihad (interpretation) offered the reformers a path toward an evolved understanding of the sacred texts. In the hands of the reformers, Islam was not merely a system for connecting man to his divine creator, but a force for progressive change. The scriptures call for freedom from tyranny and for human equality, and Islamic civilization’s historical legacy of intellectual inquiry was seen as the basis for reconstructing the society along pluralistic lines. Moreover, the Koran’s mandate that the community be consulted and rulers be accountable established the platform for collective action and democratic participation.

  This reconceptualization of Islam was most effectively articulated by a courageous intellectual who would challenge the foundations of theocratic rule. Abdol Karim Soroush was a professor at Tehran University whose personal journey mirrored the evolution and contradictions of the Islamic Republic. During the initial decade of the revolution, Soroush was an ardent proponent of imposing the regime’s cultural restrictions on the universities and dismantling objectionable student organizations. He was active in revising the universities’ academic curriculum, establishing new criteria for admission that took into consideration religious commitment, and essentially reducing the university into an ideologically reliable pillar of the state. Soroush was just another functionary of the regime, using a reactionary and exclusivist definition of Islam to combat political diversity and democratic pluralism.