Hidden Iran

by Ray Takeyh

  Iran’s innovative intellectual class is not without ideas about how to proceed and forge new constitutional arrangements designed to foster a more inclusive regime. After all, Iran’s constitution has been amended before, most notably in 1989 when the powers of the Supreme Leader were considerably augmented. The problem so far has been an absence of will, coupled with a refusal to engage in protest and confrontation to achieve political aims. There are signs that the most recent repudiation of the reformers and pragmatists by a sullen electorate has finally injected them with a measure of resolution. The so-called anti-fascist front that began to evolve during the presidential campaign uniting the pragmatists and the reformers is beginning to congeal. A younger generation of activists led by reformers such as Muhammad Reza Khatami, the brother of the former president, and Gholam-Hussein Karbaschi, a former mayor of Tehran and a Rafsanjani protégé, are openly discussing the prospects of a common front and examining ideas about how to alter the fundamental contours of the state. A more determined effort, coalescing Iran’s factions against the reactionary Right, may yet belie the notion that the conservative manipulations can perpetuate their political monopoly.

  As Iran’s liberals and pragmatists plot their future, it is important to stress that the only pathway out of the Islamic Republic’s current impasse is the restoration of the original draft of the Islamic Republic’s constitution, which pledged separation of powers, a strong presidency, and a clear demarcation of responsibilities for the elected institutions. This would be a viable return to the roots of the revolution, as the 1979 mass uprising was designed to forge a new republic, a political order based on pluralism and individual rights. It was a national effort for democratic empowerment of a citizenry long suppressed by an unelected few. In essence, for Iran to reclaim its democratic spirit it must deconstruct Khomeini’s political order and dismantle his innovative but ultimately pernicious legacy.

  Should Iran’s activists manage to construct a system that accommodates both religious convictions and democratic norms, then the Islamic Republic may still emerge as a model of political development for the region. A social revolution is engulfing the theocratic state with notions of representation and accountability, inspiring political action and defining ideological battles. The Iranian populace—the economically stressed middle class, the disenfranchised youth, the reformist clerics, and the persecuted intelligentsia—are rejecting their revolutionary patrimony and demanding a state whose legitimacy is predicated on popular sanction. The governing order that emerges from Iran’s tribulations and struggles may finally offer the region a model that draws on the democratic ideals of the West and the cultural traditions of the Middle East.

  3

  IRAN’S PLACE

  IN THE GREATER

  MIDDLE EAST

  A state’s international orientation is shaped by a variety of factors and historic interactions. Cultural traits, ideological aspirations, demographic pressures, and religious convictions are all critical in determining how a country views its environment and its place within its neighborhood. Iran is no exception, since its unique national narrative and Islamic pedigree define its approach to the Greater Middle East.

  As with most revolutionary states, Iran has journeyed from being a militant actor challenging regional norms to being a pragmatic state pursuing a policy based on national interest calculations. However, Iran’s journey has been halting, incomplete, and tentative. Through the 1980s, under the stern dictates of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran thrashed about the Middle East, seeking to undermine established authority in the name of Islamic redemption. Khomeini’s successors would wrestle with this legacy, as they sought to integrate the theocracy into the global society. From Rafsanjani to Khatami to Ahmadinejad, Iran’s presidents would seek the impossible, balancing Khomeini’s vision with the mandates of the international community.

  The best manner of understanding Iran’s regional policy is to envision three circles: the Persian Gulf, the Arab East, and Eurasia. The Persian Gulf would by far be the most significant, while the Arab East and Central Asian lands would assume less importance. The intriguing aspect of Tehran’s policy is that while ideology may define its approach toward one of these circles, in the other, careful national-interest determinations would prove its guide. Thus, while in the 1980s the Saudis would decry Iran as a grave fundamentalist threat, Russian diplomats would just as convincingly testify to Tehran’s pragmatism and moderation.

  In essence, geography and competing interests would do much to moderate Iran’s ideological tendencies. Given the fact that Iran’s oil is largely exported through the Persian Gulf, the theocracy eventually appreciated the need for stability in this critical region. As such, ideological crusades and terrorist attacks against the Gulf sheikdoms came to an end, and Iran accepted the prevailing status quo. In a similar vein, the theocratic regime recognized the futility of antagonizing its powerful Russian neighbor, and did not inflame the Islamic sentiments in the former Soviet bloc. As the two powers cultivated favorable economic and strategic relations, Iran was provided further incentives for a policy of moderation. However, in the more distant Arab East that neither bordered Iran nor offered it lucrative commercial opportunities, Tehran behaved in a zealous manner and allowed its animosity toward Israel to condition its strategy. The fact remains that Iran’s excessive ideological posture toward this region did not infringe on its tangible interests, limiting the need for caution and pragmatism.

  Such a bewildering array of policies and priorities has often confounded the international community, making Iran’s foreign policy difficult to comprehend. Through a more detailed assessment of the evolution of Iran’s regional policy, one can better appreciate why the clerical state has made the decisions that it has and where it is likely to go from here.

  THE SOURCES OF IRANIAN CONDUCT

  More than any other nation, Iran has always perceived itself as the natural hegemon of its neighborhood. Iranians across generations are infused with a unique sense of their history, the splendor of their civilization, and the power of their celebrated empires. The Achaemenid Empire of the sixth century B.C.E. was, after all, the first global power, reigning over lands that stretched from Greece to India. Subsequent Persian dynasties of Sassanians and Safavids displayed similar imperial reach as they intricately managed vast domains. A sense of superiority over one’s neighbors, the benighted Arabs, and the unsophisticated Turks, would define the core of the Persian cosmology. The empire shrank over the centuries, and the embrace of Persian culture faded with the arrival of more alluring Western mores, but a sense of self-perception and an exaggerated view of Iran have remained largely intact. By dint of its history and the power of its civilization, Iranians believe that their nation should establish its regional preeminence.

  Yet Iran’s nationalistic hubris is married to a sense of insecurity derived from persistent invasion by hostile forces. The humiliating conquests by the Mongol hordes and Arabs have left Iran profoundly suspicious of its neighbors’ intentions and motives. Few nations have managed to sustain their cultural distinction and even absorb their conquerors as effectively as the Persians. In due course, Persian scholars, scribes, and bureaucrats would dominate the courts of Arab empires and define their cultural landscape. Nonetheless, such unrelenting incursions with their prolonged periods of occupation have had a traumatic impact, leading Iranians to simultaneously feel superior to and suspicious of their neighbors.

  By far, the one set of imperial conquerors that proved the most formidable challenge to Iran were the Western powers. These states could neither be absorbed as the Arabs were, nor did they necessarily defer to Persians for the management of their realm. In a sense, Iran became another victim of the “Great Game,” played by the British and the Russians for the domination of Central Asia, and later the intense Cold War rivalry between America and the Soviet Union. While it is true that Iran was never formally colonized as was India, nor did it undergo a traumatic national liberation struggl
e as did Algeria, it was still dominated and its sovereignty was still usurped by imperial intrigue. Behind every Shah lay a foreign hand that could empower or humble the Peacock Throne with ease. The Shahs and the parliaments debated and deliberated, but all Iranian politicians had to be mindful of the preferences of the imperial game masters. At times a degree of autonomy would be secured by manipulating great-power rivalries, but this was a precarious exercise, since accommodation usually proved a better path toward self-preservation. The Islamic Republic’s stridency and suspicions of the international community can better be understood in the context of Iran’s historic subjection and manipulation by outside powers.

  However, to ascribe Iran’s foreign policy strictly to its sense of nationalism and historical grievances is to ignore the doctrinal foundations of the theocratic regime. Khomeini bequeathed to his successors an ideology whose most salient division was between the oppressors and the oppressed. Such a view stemmed from the Shiite political traditions as a minority sect struggling under Sunni Arab rulers who were often repressive and harsh. Thus the notion of tyranny and suffering has a powerful symbolic aspect as well as practical importance. Iran was not merely a nation seeking independence and autonomy within the existing international system. The Islamic revolution was a struggle between good and evil, a battle waged for moral redemption and genuine emancipation from the cultural and political tentacles of the profane and iniquitous West. Khomeini’s ideology and Iran’s nationalist aspirations proved reinforcing, creating a revolutionary, populist approach to the regional realities.1

  The Islamic Republic’s inflammatory rhetoric and regional aspirations conceal the reality of Iran’s strategic loneliness. Iran is, after all, a Persian state surrounded by non-Persian powers, depriving it of the ethnic and communal ties so prevalent in the Arab world. If durable alliances are predicated on a common vision and shared values, then Iran is destined to remain somewhat insulated from the rest of its region. Nor, until the emergence of the Shiite bloc in Iraq, has religion necessarily mitigated Iran’s isolation. Historically, the persecuted Shiites have been held at arm’s length by the Sunni Arabs, who harbor their own suspicions of their coreligionists. In a standard Persian self-justification, Iran has tried to turn its isolation into an advantage, since notions of self-sufficiency and self-reliance have had an emotive appeal to a beleaguered populace. Nonetheless, as Iran’s rulers look over the horizon, they seldom see a placid landscape or ready-made allies.

  Iran is a country of contradictions and paradoxes. It is both grandiose in its self-perception yet intensely insecure. It seeks to lead the region while remaining largely suspicious and disdainful of its neighbors. Its rhetoric is infused with revolutionary dogma, yet its actual conduct is practical, if not realistic. A perennial struggle between aspirations and capabilities, hegemony and pragmatism has characterized Iran’s uneasy approach to the Greater Middle East.

  FIRST CIRCLE: THE PERSIAN GULF

  Despite the mullahs’ often-declared pan-Islamic pretensions, the Persian Gulf has always been Iran’s foremost strategic priority. The critical waterway constitutes Iran’s most direct link to the international petroleum market, the life blood of its economy. Although the issue of Iraq will be addressed later, it is important to note here that Tehran’s concerns and aspirations in the Gulf transcend Iraq. The Islamic Republic, as with all its monarchical predecessors, perceived that Iran by the virtue of its size and historical achievements has the right to emerge as the local hegemon. The changing dimensions of Iran’s foreign policy are most evident in this area, as revolutionary radicalism has gradually yielded to pragmatic power politics.

  Soon after achieving power, Khomeini called on the Gulf states to emulate Iran’s revolutionary model and sever relations with the “Great Satan,” the United States. The profligate princely class, the hard-pressed Shiite populations, and these states’ dependence on America were all affronts to Iran’s revolutionaries. The theocratic state unambiguously declared the monarchical order a source of oppression and tyranny. “Monarchy is one of the most shameful and disgraceful reactionary manifestations,” Khomeini declared.2 An authentic Islamic society could not prevail under the banner of monarchy, because the proper ruling elite were the righteous men of God. Thus, beyond their foreign policy alignments, the character of the Gulf regimes proved a source of objection to Iran’s new rulers.3

  As Iran settled on its course of enmity and radicalism, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia emerged as the subject of particularly venomous attacks. In a sense, the two states had much in common, as they both predicated their legitimacy on a transnational mission of exporting religion and safeguarding Islam. The natural competition between their contending interpretations of Islam was sufficient to ensure a tense relationship. To this pressure was added Saudi Arabia’s close ties to the United States, further fueling Khomeini’s already intense antagonism toward the House of Saud. “In this age, which is the age of oppression of the Muslim world at the hands of the U.S. and Russia and their puppets such as al-Sauds, those traitors to the great divine sanctuary must be forcefully cursed,” he said.4 The Iranian revolutionaries saw the Saudis as not just sustaining America’s imperial encroachment of the Middle East, but also employing a reactionary interpretation of Islam to sanction their hold on power.5

  Tehran’s mischievous efforts were not without success; in the early 1980s, demonstrations rocked Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. In the end, however, Iran’s revolutionary message proved attractive only to a narrow segment of the minority Shiite population. Even the sporadic Shiite demonstrations were not designed to emulate Iran’s revolution, but rather were an expression of the Shiites’ economic and political disenfranchisement. The protesters used the specter of Iranian subversion to press their claims and extract needed concessions from the ruling elite. The prevailing regimes, for their part, seemed to appreciate this reality and, after putting down the demonstrations by force, opted for economic rewards as a means of restoring quiescence. This strategy essentially ended Iran’s attempt to exploit Shiite grievances to launch a new order. Tehran would subsequently rely on violence and terrorism, practices that were bound to alienate the local populace.

  A campaign of bombings, targeting embassies, industrial plants, and even oil installations, was soon attributed to Iranian-sponsored opposition groups. The states that were particularly targeted by Iran’s new tactics were those with substantial Shiite populations, namely, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. In many cases, the instrument of Iranian terrorism was the al-Dawa Party, which has since become part of the ruling coalition in the post-Saddam Iraq. All this is not to point out the irony of the United States empowering an Iranian-terrorist client, but to suggest that Iran’s revolutionary élan faded rapidly, forcing it to rely on terrorist tactics that would succeed in neither overthrowing the incumbent regimes nor enhancing its standing in the international community.6

  By the time of Khomeini’s death in 1989, Iran’s revolutionary foreign policy had not achieved any of its objectives. Tehran’s attempt to export its revolution had not merely failed, it had led the Gulf states to solidify against Iran. Leading regional actors such as Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic, while the sheikdoms put aside their historic enmities and came together in the Gulf Cooperation Council, an organization largely devoted to containing Iranian influence. Along these lines, the Arab princes and monarchs further solidified their security ties to the United States and generously subsidized Saddam Hussein’s military in his war with Iran. The revolution without borders seemed uneasily confined within Iran’s boundaries.

  The 1990s will stand as one of the most important periods of transition for the Islamic Republic. The end of the prolonged war with Iraq and Khomeini’s death suddenly shifted focus away from external perils to Iran’s domestic quandaries. The specter of invading Iraqi armies had ensured a remarkable degree of political conformity and allowed the regime to mobilize the masses behind its exhortations of national
resistance. Khomeini’s undisputed authority and his hold on the imagination of the public allowed the state to deflect attention from its domestic deficiencies and feel safe from popular recrimination. The basis of the regime’s legitimacy and authority would now have to change; the Islamic Republic had to offer a reason for its rule beyond the catastrophic invasion of its territory and the moral claims of its clerical founder.

  Along these lines, Iran’s new pragmatic rulers, led by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, began discussing a regional security arrangement whereby the stability of the Gulf would be ensured by the local regimes as opposed to external powers. After Saddam’s eviction from Kuwait in 1991 and the deflation of his power, the mullahs perceived a unique opportunity to establish their hegemony in the region. Instead of instigating Shiite uprisings and exhorting the masses to emulate Iran’s revolutionary model, Tehran now called for greater economic and security cooperation. However, the success of this ambition was predicated on the withdrawal of American forces. This was to be hegemony on the cheap, with Iran’s preeminence recognized, the U.S. presence lessened, and a permanent wedge drawn between Iraq and the Arab Gulf states. The only problem with this proposal was that it remained fundamentally unacceptable to the sheikdoms for whom Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait had conveyed the danger of relying on imperious local regimes for their security.7

  In essence, Iran’s new stratagem conflicted with the Gulf states’ survival tactics. The sheikdoms, with their perennial concern about the designs of their more powerful and populous neighbors, viewed Tehran’s penchant toward collective security with apprehension. Although relations between Iran and the Gulf states did improve in terms of establishment of formal diplomatic ties and volume of trade, the local princes were not about to sever ties with the United States in order to appease Iran. In line with their long-standing historic practice, they sought the protection of external empires against neighboring states that have often coveted their wealth and resources. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, the level of defense cooperation between the United States and the Gulf regimes significantly increased, with America enforcing the containment of Iraq and the no-fly zones from military bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Whereas in the 1980s Iran’s revolutionary radicalism had polarized the Gulf, in the 1990s its insistence that these states share its opposition to the American presence proved a source of division and tension.