Hidden Iran

by Ray Takeyh

  In the Persian Gulf, the Islamic Republic finally appreciated after years of revolutionary radicalism that it could not have suitable relations with the Gulf sheikdoms unless it first came to terms with Saudi Arabia. Such lessons have yet to be fully absorbed by the Iranian elite when it comes to the Arab East. The reality is that Iran cannot be part of the larger Middle Eastern landscape until it rationalizes its relations with Egypt. Tactical alliances with a beleaguered Syrian regime and patronage of terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah will not ease Iran’s path to the heart of the Arab world. Tehran can be mischievous and use terrorism and violence as a means of attracting attention to its claims and obstructing peace initiatives between Israel and the Arab bloc. But for Iran to assert its influence in the region it has to have a more constructive agenda than prefabricated Islamist slogans and hostility to the Jewish state. Hovering over all this is the gradual fracturing of the Middle East along sectarian lines, with Shiite Iran increasingly pitted against the alarmed Sunni powers. The Islamic Republic may emerge as a critical player in its immediate neighborhood, but as a non-Arab, Shiite state it is unlikely ever to become a significant actor in the Arab East.

  THIRD CIRCLE: EURASIA

  In contrast to its policy toward the Persian Gulf and the Arab East, Iran’s approach toward its northern and eastern neighbors has been one of sustained realism. The proximity to a strong Russian state and the prospect of commercial contracts and important arms deals has always injected a measure of pragmatism in Iran’s policy. In a curious manner, despite its declared mission of exporting the revolution, the Islamic Republic has seemed perennially indifferent to the plight of the struggling Muslims in Central Asia. A beleaguered Iranian state requiring arms and trade and an aggrieved former superpower seeking profits and relevance have forged an opportunistic relationship that eschews ideology for the sake of tangible interests. Nor is such pragmatism unique to Russia; as when the theocracy looked to Afghanistan, its priority was always stability, not Islamic salvation. In essence, the fears of being isolated in the international arena and having Afghan troubles seep over its borders have compelled Iran’s theocratic oligarchs to transcend their ideological exhortations and focus on achieving their practical objectives in the vast Eurasian landmass.

  On the eve of the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s prevailing foreign policy slogan was “Neither East nor West.” Khomeini was as contemptuous of Soviet Communism as he was of Western liberalism, and he often denounced the Soviet Union in harsh and unyielding terms. Iran vocally condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and materially assisted the mujahedin’s resistance to the occupation. On the domestic front, the mullahs relentlessly persecuted the Communist Tudeh Party and other leftist forces attracted to the Soviet model. For its part, Moscow proved a generous supplier of arms to Saddam Hussein, as he waged his war of aggression against Iran, and often supported Iraq against Iran in various international forums.

  Yet even as tensions were simmering, both sides seemed to veer away from active confrontation as trade between the two powers continued to increase, and the Soviet Union was never without an extensive diplomatic representation in Tehran. In a manner radically different from its approach to the United States, the theocratic regime seemed to appreciate that its geographic proximity to the Soviet Union and its estrangement from the West required a more realistic relationship with Moscow. The two sides would often differ, as they did on critical issues of Afghanistan and Iraq, yet somehow Khomeini managed to suppress his ideological animosities and pursue ties with the Soviet state that seemed beneficial to Iran’s overall interests.19

  The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the rise of the Russian Federation ushered in a new regional policy in Moscow. The Soviet state had been inordinately invested in the fortunes of radical Arab regimes and shared their concerns regarding developments in the Arab-Israeli arena. For the new masters of the Kremlin, the direction of the newly independent Central Asian republics and the nature of Islamic awakenings in that region were far more relevant than the plight of the Soviet Union’s Arab clients. The stability of the Russian frontier was now partly contingent on Tehran resisting the impulse to inflame Islamic sentiments in Central Asia. Moreover, with its imperial reach dramatically contracted and the country in dire need of hard currency, Russia began to auction off its military hardware to the highest bidder. Iran proved a tempting market for Russian arms merchants, since it possessed both cash and a seemingly insatiable appetite for military equipment.20

  The Islamic Republic had to make its own set of adjustments to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Central Asia. During the Soviet era, Iran propagated its Islamic message over the airways in a variety of local languages without evident anticipation that it would have any impact. Such limited propaganda effort satiated its ideological imperatives without unduly straining its relations with its powerful neighbor. But the collapse of the Soviet empire and the independence of the Central Asian republics presented Iran with the need for circumspection. The Islamic Republic had to balance its strategic ties with Russia with its declared mission of exporting its revolutionary template to new, fertile grounds. In a unique display of judiciousness, Iran largely tempered its ideology, essentially denoting the importance of trade and stability over propagation of its Islamic message.21

  The full scope of Iran’s pragmatism became evident during the Chechnya conflict. At a time when the Russian soldiers were indiscriminately massacring Muslim rebels and aggressively suppressing an Islamic insurgency, Iran’s response was a mere statement declaring the issue to be an internal Russian affair. At times, when Russia’s behavior was particularly egregious, Iran’s statements would be harsher. However, Tehran never undertook practical measures such as dispatching aid to the rebels or organizing the Islamic bloc against Moscow’s policy. Given that Iran had calculated that its national interests lay in not excessively antagonizing the Russian Federation, it largely ignored the plight of the Chechens despite the Islamic appeal of their cause.22

  The Chechnya issue reveals that during the past decade, a tacit yet important bargain has evolved between Russia and Iran. The Islamic Republic has emerged as Russia’s most important partner in the Middle East and as a valuable market for its cash-starved defense industries. Although in recent years the nuclear cooperation between the two states has garnered much attention, the more significant fact is that Russia has also been willing to sell Iran a vast quantity of conventional arms, including sophisticated aircraft and submarines. Iran, on the other hand, has kept a low profile in Central Asia and has refrained from destabilizing a region critical to Russia’s security. This important relationship has led Moscow to provide Iran indispensable diplomatic support, particularly at a time when its nuclear portfolio is being addressed in a variety of international organizations. The United States, hoping to garner Russian support for its policy of sanctioning and ostracizing Iran, would be wise to consider the overall nature of relations between Moscow and Tehran. Given that reality, the notion that Russia would assist in applying significant economic pressure on Iran for its nuclear infractions is far-fetched and fanciful.

  A similar penchant toward national interest calculations has defined Iran’s policy toward Afghanistan, its neighbor to the east. Despite Iran’s close linguistic and cultural ties to Afghanistan, relations between the two countries have not always been simple. The fiercely independent Afghan tribes have historically resisted Persian encroachment and have jealously guarded their rights. Tehran’s most natural allies are found in the province of Herat, where proximity to Iran and a large Shiite population have encouraged the establishment of close relations. But for Tehran the issue in Afghanistan has not been ideological conformity but stability. Since assuming power, the theocracy has looked warily upon its neighbor with its war against the Red Army, the rise of Taliban fundamentalism, and, finally, the American invasion. Afghanistan’s tribal identity, ethnic diversity, and largely Sunni population have made it an unea
sy place for implanting the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary message. And, to its credit, Iran has not been active in seeking to export its governing template to its troubled neighbor.

  During much of the 1980s, Iran’s policy toward Afghanistan was opposition to the Communist regime and assisting forces battling the Soviet occupation. In yet another uneasy paradox, this decade saw a rough coincidence of objectives between Iran and the United States as both parties had an interest in holding back Soviet power in Southwest Asia. Although Khomeini attempted to justify this policy on Islamic grounds, the instability of the war and the extension of Soviet influence southward offered sufficient strategic justification for Iran’s conduct. At a time when Iran was housing nearly two million Afghan refugees, the clerical state understood that it could not afford a failed state next door.23

  In a similar manner, Iran had to endure the prolonged years of Taliban rule. The radical Sunni regime that waged a merciless war against Afghanistan’s intricate tribal system and routinely massacred Shiites provided a formidable challenge for the Islamic Republic. In the summer of 1998, the killing of ten Iranian diplomats by Taliban forces in Mazar-i-Sharif nearly led the two states to go to war. Beyond active confrontation, Iran was extraordinarily alarmed by the puritanical Taliban regime’s reliance on the drug trade and on Sunni terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda to sustain its power. Today a large portion of Afghan drugs end up in Iran, creating its own addiction crisis; it is estimated that the Islamic Republic may have as many as two million drug addicts. Given these realities, Iran soon emerged as the most durable foe of the Taliban. Indeed, despite the presence of American forces in Afghanistan since 2001, the theocratic regime finds the existing configuration of power whereby Sunni militancy is largely tempered and a benign government reigns in Kabul an acceptable outcome.24

  While Iran’s relations with Afghanistan have improved over the years, its ties to Pakistan have at times been problematic. The Pakistani policy of using Afghanistan as a conduit for assertion of influence over Central Asia has greatly troubled Iran.25 At a time when the Bush administration loudly proclaims Pakistan a valuable ally in its “war against terror,” it conveniently neglects the fact that it was Islamabad that sustained the Taliban and tolerated its al-Qaeda ally. The cynical Pakistani policy of unleashing the Taliban upon the hapless Afghan nation as a means of securing a bridge to Central Asia confronted Iran with a pronounced strategic threat. Since the demise of the Taliban, the relations between the two powers have markedly improved, since the issue of Afghanistan no longer divides them. However, Iran remains concerned about the internal stability of the Pakistani state, with its ample nuclear depositories. From Tehran’s perspective, the prospect of a radical Sunni regime coming to power in Pakistan with its finger on the nuclear button is nearly an existential threat. As such, once more stability is the guide of Iran’s policy toward yet another unpredictable neighbor.

  It may come as a shock to the casual observer accustomed to American officials’ incendiary denunciations of Iran as a revisionist ideological power to learn that, in various important regions, the Islamic Republic’s policy has historically been conditioned by pragmatism. Iran’s approach to the Persian Gulf sheikdoms and its Eurasian neighbors today is predicated on national interest designs that are largely devoid of Islamic content. The need for stability on its frontiers and the recognition of the importance of its strategic relationship with Russia have pressed Tehran toward behaving with moderation in its immediate environment. The same cannot be asserted in the case of the Arab East; the theocratic state’s dogmatic opposition to the state of Israel has deprived its policy of the nuance and flexibility that has characterized its approach to many of its neighboring states. It is likely that this central contradiction in Iran’s regional policy will persist, as Tehran may continue with its perplexing mixture of radicalism and moderation, pragmatism and defiance.

  In formulating its regional vision, the Islamic Republic has tried to marry two disparate strands of Iran’s identity: Persian nationalism and Shiite Islam. As a great civilization with a keen sense of history, Iran has always perceived itself as the rightful leader of the Middle East. For centuries, Persian empires dominated the political and cultural landscape of the region, inspiring a national narrative that views Iran’s hegemony as both beneficial and benign. At the same time, as a persecuted religious minority, Shiites in Iran have always been suspicious and wary of their neighbors. The reality of rising Arab states, domineering Western empires, and Iran’s religious exceptionalism has not ended Tehran’s perception of itself as the “center of the universe,” a society that should be emulated by the Arab masses. Successive Persian monarchs and reigning mullahs would subscribe to this national self-perception, giving Tehran an inflated view of its historic importance.

  A final important factor that has intruded itself uneasily in Iran’s international orientation is pragmatism. Iran may perceive itself as uniquely aggrieved by the great powers’ machinations and it may nurse aspirations to emerge as the regional leader. However, the limitations of its resources and the reality of its actual power have sporadically led to reappraisal and retrenchment. The intriguing aspect of Iran’s policy is that it can be both dogmatic and flexible at the same time. The Islamic Republic may take an ideologically uncompromising position toward Israel, yet pragmatically deal with its historic Russian nemesis. The tensions between Iran’s ideals and interests, between its aspirations and limits, will continue to produce a foreign policy that is often inconsistent and contradictory.

  4

  TURNING POINTS

  IN U.S.–IRANIAN

  RELATIONS

  At the height of the hostage crisis, President Jimmy Carter’s chief of staff, Hamilton Jordan, was having another secret meeting with Iran’s foreign minister, Sadeqh Ghotbzadeh, in the suburbs of Paris. After a series of talks, both men instinctively knew that their delicate diplomatic dance was coming to an end. As the two jaded officials departed for the last time, Ghotbzadeh turned to Jordan and breezily declared, “You know, we came close.” Indeed, relations between the United States and Iran have often come close, but somehow never managed to transcend the enduring animosities and suspicions.

  A look back at the entangled ties between Iran and the United States reveals a series of critical turning points, watershed events whose impact would persist. The relationship between America and Iran has witnessed its fair share of tension, drama, and missed diplomatic opportunities. However, in selecting events that have fundamentally transformed this relationship, one must choose more carefully and focus on incidents that have left a permanent imprint. I have identified four such episodes, leaving behind many others that, although crucial, were not of enduring significance.

  One of America’s first acts as a great power in the Middle East was the overthrow in August 1953 of the nationalist Iranian prime minster Muhammad Mossadeq in the name of Communist containment. Over the decades, as history faded into mythology, Mossadeq would assume a commanding presence in the Iranian imagination. To this day, many Iranians believe that an opportunity to forge a new independent and nonaligned foreign policy, employ natural resources for national development, and build a democracy were all lost due to the machinations of a rapacious superpower. The charge, however exaggerated, is not without merit, as American intervention did obstruct the progressive trajectory of Iranian politics. The events of 1953 have created an emotional barrier for Iran’s masses and have made them inherently suspicious of American motives and conduct. The United States was once genuinely seen as a depository of idealism, a great power that resisted temptations of imperial aggrandizement. After August 1953, few Iranians would hold such a pristine image of America.

  A quarter-century later, Iran’s populist revolution ushered in a theocracy determined to confront and defy the “Great Satan.” Such defiance soon manifested itself through the hostage crisis, as the revolutionary regime held captive fifty-two American diplomats for fourteen months. The fero
city and ambition of Iran’s revolutionaries was a new phenomenon for the American people. To be sure, the United States had grown used to being demonized in Third World capitals, but the mullahs fundamentally challenged the paradigm of interstate relations. During 1979, Americans seemed transfixed by daily images of clerics denouncing their country as sacrilegious, while frenzied crowds routinely commemorated their national events with chants of “Death to America.” The American public could not comprehend the turbaned Old Testament–like figures who repudiated their country, its values, and its traditions. A certain perception of the Islamic Republic soon congealed in the popular imagination, transforming Iran from a strategic quandary to a hated country that had managed to emasculate the American colossus with impunity.

  The one sustained attempt by the United States to reach out to Iran, the infamous Iran-Contra affair of the mid-1980s, was simplistic in its assumptions and undermined by the connection to the Nicaraguan rebels. The scandal of arms for hostages tainted the reputation of one of the most popular presidents in the postwar period, destroyed the careers of many officials, and greatly embarrassed the United States. The Iran-Contra affair is no passing episode, as subsequent administrations have been particularly gun-shy about approaching Iran, a nation generally regarded by the American people as poisonous. Any notion of engagement with Iran was sacrificed on the altar of bureaucratic expediency and self-preservation. It was simply convenient to sustain a policy of containment, however flawed and ineffective that approach may have been. It was such politically sensitive caution that caused the Clinton administration to miss one of the rare opportunities to fundamentally alter the parameters between the two countries.