Hidden Iran

by Ray Takeyh

  In yet another departure from the norms of the ruling clerical elite, Khatami did not view the West as a pernicious agent seeking to undermine the cohesion of the Islamic civilization through its cultural intrusions. As with many Muslim reformers, Khatami had a more nuanced view of the West and stressed that its scientific achievements and democratic heritage were worthy models of emulation. “Our revolution can give rise to a new civilization if we have the ability to absorb the positive aspects of Western civilization,” he declared.46 For the first time since the revolution an Iranian politician acknowledged that pluralism, democracy, and other products of Western political heritage should be embraced by an Islamic government seeking the empowerment of its citizenry.

  The foundation of the hard-liners’ foreign policy had always been a relentless struggle on behalf of revolutionary ideals. But by the late 1990s, burdened by Iran’s costly isolation and challenged by Khatami’s popularity, the conservatives conceded the need for mending fences with key global actors. In his role as the Supreme Leader, Khamenei sanctioned such compromises as necessary for the vitality of the nation. Soon after his election, Khatami scored a series of impressive victories as he managed to reconcile with the Saudi regime, long the bête noire of the Islamic Republic, as well as the European Union, which had grown weary of Iranian terrorism on its territory. It was Khatami who transcended Iran’s factionalism and prodded the Supreme Leader into accepting the necessity of abandoning Iran’s hostility to states that Ayatollah Khomeini had routinely castigated as immoral. It was at this point that terrorism as an instrument of Iranian policy toward the Gulf sheikdoms and European states essentially ceased.

  It would be over the issue of the United States that Khatami’s policy of engagement experienced its most pronounced setback. In a bold move, Khatami reached out to the United States. In a famous January 1998 interview with CNN, he praised “the great American people” and the civilization that rested “upon the vision, thinking, and manner of puritans who desired a system which combined the worship of God with human dignity and freedom.” For an American audience accustomed to clerical fulminations and chants of “Death to America,” Khatami must have seemed like a remarkable change. The new Iranian president invited discussion between the two peoples, “especially scholars and thinkers.” Despite his unwillingness to call for an official dialogue, Khatami left the door ajar for a potential normalization of relations with the United States.47 However, Khatami’s enterprising diplomacy fell victim to the Iranian hard-liners’ hostility and to American indifference.

  The conservative counterattack was swift and decisive. Supreme Leader Khamenei set the tone by denouncing the West as “targeting our Islamic faith and character.”48 The influential hard-line cleric Ayatollah Muhammad Mesbah Yazdi followed suit by claiming, “It is natural that one cannot establish links with the likes of America, whose aim is merely to exert its hegemony and whose policies and actions we have witnessed in history.”49 A former foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, chimed in with his objections, stressing, “The issue of talks with America is a prelude to America reopening its ‘den of spies’ in Iran and carrying out its plans to overthrow the Islamic Republic.”50 Given the conservatives’ institutional power and suspicions, the only manner that Khatami could have pressed the hard-liners into acquiescing to his diplomacy was to garner significant American concessions. Alas, such an imaginative diplomacy would elude a Washington establishment mired in its anachronistic containment policy.

  During much of the 1990s, America’s foreign policy was guided by the Democratic administration of Bill Clinton. Although the Clinton team disparaged various aspects of its Republican predecessors’ international policies, it still continued to approach Iran with alarm and dismay. Secretary of State Warren Christopher—who had served in the Carter administration and was the chief negotiator in the final months of the hostage crisis—quickly denounced Iran as an “international outlaw” and a “dangerous country.”51 Anthony Lake, the national security adviser, was no less charitable, chastising Iran as one of the “reactionary backlash states” that “seek to advance their agenda through terror, intolerance and coercion.”52 Moreover, given the collapse of the Soviet Union and the military defeat of the radical Iraqi regime in the first Gulf war, the Clinton team perceived an ideal opportunity to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and usher in a “new Middle East” that would be politically stable and economically integrated. The resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute was seen as having an impact beyond the Levant, leading to the transformation of the entire region. Under the banner of “dual containment,” the United States sought to prevent the potential resurgence of Iraq and to prolong the policy of isolating and coercing Iran.53 Trade prohibitions, attempts to limit Iran’s access to international lending organizations, and even the imposition of secondary sanctions on European firms doing business with Iran became the order of the day.

  The extraordinary aspect of America’s position was that even the election of the dynamic and forthcoming Khatami did not provoke a change in policy. The specter of the Iran-Contra Affair continued to haunt the Clinton White House, restraining its options and removing the prospect of a creative diplomacy. Moreover, an administration that had made the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the centerpiece of its regional policy was prone to look at Iran through the prism of the peace process, focusing on terrorism as the essential barometer of change in Iran. Although the administration did express a willingness to “test the possibilities for bridging the gap between the two nations,” Clinton maintained his commitment to the policy of “dual containment.”54 The U.S. position was encapsulated by UN ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who said, “If the Iranian government responds positively to the American position on issues of state sponsorship of terrorism and cooperating in solving regional problems and sources of instability in which Iran plays a big role, then the road will be open for a major development in the relationship.”55 In essence, instead of devising a negotiation process that could resolve such disputes, the onus was placed on Iran, with any improvement of relations contingent on Tehran embracing America’s priorities.

  Three years after Khatami’s election, Washington finally responded with an important speech delivered by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In a unique gesture of contrition, Albright apologized for America’s role in the overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953, acknowledging that “the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development.” In another magnanimous move, the secretary noted that “U.S. policy toward Iraq during its conflict with Iran now appeared to have been regrettably shortsighted.”56 The administration then moved beyond rhetoric and lifted sanctions on Iranian carpets, pistachios, and caviar, which along with oil are among Iran’s most lucrative exports. However, the intent of the speech was mired when Albright declared, “Despite the trend toward democracy, control over the military, judiciary, courts, police remain in unelected hands, and the elements of its foreign policy, about which we are most concerned, have not improved.”57 A speech that began by apologizing for intervention in Iran’s internal affairs ended up meddling in Iran’s domestic conflicts. It was inevitable that the conservatives would retaliate by obstructing a positive Iranian response.

  Tehran’s reaction was predictable, as the theocratic regime pushed aside Albright’s positive gestures and denounced the speech as a crass intervention in its internal politics. To be sure, the reformist government did appreciate the historic significance of the speech and was inclined to respond positively, but the dreadful phrase “unelected hands” offered the hard-liners sufficient ammunition to thwart any such efforts. Iran’s official response came when the Supreme Leader pointedly asked, “What good does this admission—that you acted in that way then—do us now? Admission years after the crime was committed, while they might be committing similar crimes now, will not do the Iranian nation any good.”58 Iran’s secretary to the National Security Council, Hassan Rowhani, also castigated the speech, em
phasizing, “From their point of view they are offering a piece of chocolate to what they see as developments inside Iran. This is a very ugly and unacceptable move.”59 Tehran’s reaction essentially ended a belated effort by Washington to forge a more rational relationship with the Islamic Republic.

  The Albright speech and the partial lifting of sanctions should not be dismissed as mere symbolic gestures, as these constituted an important change in America’s behavior and a significant revision of the dual containment policy. Nonetheless, America’s gesture was still too little and, more important, too late. The crucial time for embracing Khatami would have been immediately after his election, certainly by the time of his historic CNN interview. A more substantial offer of sanctions relief at that time, including allowing U.S. investments in Iran’s critical energy sector and an offer to discuss the return of Iran’s frozen assets, might have tipped the balance in favor of the reformers. Such relaxation of sanctions need not have been conditioned on Iran’s behavior, as its mere offering might have manipulated the internal balance of power in favor of those inclined to diminish the Islamic Republic’s militancy. At a time when the conservatives were still in shock, struggling to regain their footing, this offer might well have allowed Khatami to breach the “wall of mistrust” and assist the reformers in consolidating their power. But by 2000 the conservative counterattack was in full force, and the American concessions went largely unheeded. In a relationship that has witnessed so many missed opportunities, the inability of the Clinton administration to forge a timely and imaginative policy stands as one of its most tragic failures.

  In many ways, Iran and the United States appear as two ships that always seem to pass in the night. At the rare moment when Iran was ready to improve relations, America was unresponsive. When the Americans were prepared to move beyond their hostility, Iranians were quick to demur. The emotional legacy of the Mossadeq coup and the hostage crisis, and the bureaucratic paralysis in both countries, have led to a relationship that seems immured in its pattern of antagonism and suspicion. The timing of positive gestures is usually bad, the contemplated offers always too little, and the domestic political scene in both countries often unprepared for the end of conflict. It is rare in international diplomacy to be given a second chance. Yet, in the aftermath of the September 11 tragedies, Washington was once again offered an opportunity to rationalize its relationship with the Islamic Republic. And, not unsurprisingly, the United States failed to take advantage of that opportunity.

  5

  UNDER THE SHADOW

  OF SEPTEMBER 11

  It is often stated that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, forever changed America. In an even more dramatic fashion, al-Qaeda’s nefarious plot also changed the Middle East. The region’s pathologies, its ideology of wrath, and a political culture that too often condoned suicide bombing could no longer be concealed by its oil wealth. Perhaps more than any other regional actor, the Iranian mullahs appreciated that a certain epoch had ended and that previous arrangements were no longer tenable. As we have seen, President Muhammad Khatami had gradually pressed the clerical oligarchs toward a substantial revision of Iran’s foreign policy along pragmatic lines. The issue of normalization of relations with the United States, though, had persistently eluded him. With the arrival of the American imperium in the Middle East, the recalcitrant hard-liners became convinced that it was time to set aside their long-standing antagonisms toward the United States. For a brief, fleeting moment, a consensus evolved among the clerics on the need to have a more rational relationship with America. However, in a pattern that has so often bedeviled U.S.–Iranian relations, just when one party was ready for accommodation, the other was moving in the opposite direction. The Bush administration had arrived in the Middle East not to reconcile with old foes but to foster a new order.

  The tragedies of September 11 led the Washington establishment to reevaluate the traditional concepts of statecraft. Containment and deterrence were now viewed as dangerously naive in the era of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. America no longer sought merely to contain rogue regimes and to press for their disarmament through negotiations, but to actively alter the political culture of the region by ushering in a democratic dawn. Regime change, preemptive war, and coerced democratization were the new currencies of American policy. As the administration of President George W. Bush gazed across the Middle East, it perceived a unique opportunity to reformulate the dysfunctional political topography of the region and finally ensure the stability that all empires crave. In this context, Iran was no longer a problem to manage, but a radical, unsavory regime to topple.

  As the fractious theocracy came close to accepting the need for a changed approach to America, Washington proved not only indifferent but hostile. The brief interlude between the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and President Bush’s State of the Union address in January 2002 represented a unique opportunity to fundamentally alter relations between the two states. And once more that opportunity was squandered. A year later, as America became entangled in the Iraq quagmire, a more consolidated conservative government in Iran was no longer eager to normalize relations with the United States. The power of ideologues in both Washington and Tehran essentially precluded an imaginative revision of U.S.–Iranian relations.

  NEW THINKING

  As the American empire arrived in the Middle East brandishing its new doctrine of preemption, the most critical debate within the Islamic Republic was how to approach its new neighbor. As we have seen, the reactionary elements within the Iranian state had long objected to any normalization of ties with the “Great Satan,” reasoning that the benefits garnered by such militancy outweighed its costs. The American colossus was too distant, its leaders too fickle, and its struggles against terrorism more symbolic than real. However, the Bush administration’s expansive vision for the Middle East confronted the Iranian Right with realities that it could no longer ignore and responsibilities that it could no longer evade.

  More than any other international event, America’s response to the September 11 attacks exposed the fault lines among Iranian conservatives. As with most political movements in contemporary Iran, the conservative bloc is riddled with its own factions and contradictions, chiefly over foreign policy. For the ideologues among Iran’s hard-liners, the Islamic template remains a model worthy of export, and the necessity of resisting America and its regional surrogates has never been greater. Moreover, a confrontational foreign policy has the advantage of reinvigorating a revolution whose popularity has long waned. By contrast, Iran’s pragmatic conservatives stress that given the proximity of the American presence, Iran has to tread carefully and cultivate cooperative relations with its neighbors. They also argue that given Iran’s economic pressures, dogmatism does not serve the cause of attracting foreign investment. Such debates were once more polarizing Iran’s clerical rulers as competing factions of ideologues and realists battled each other over national security issues.

  Iran’s hard-line ideologues view themselves as the most ardent disciples of Ayatollah Khomeini and his revolutionary mission. These stalwarts of the revolution, such as Ayatollah Jannati and Ayatollah Shahroudi, control powerful institutions such as the Guardian Council and the judiciary, and they command key coercive instruments such as the Revolutionary Guards and Ansar-e Hezbollah. Their world-view is framed by a vision of the Islamic Republic as more than a rebellion against an iniquitous monarch but rather an uprising against a host of forces—the imperial West, Zionist encroachment, and Arab despots, to name a few—that have sustained America’s presence. As such, their hostility to the United States is immutable and a function of their “revolution without borders.” As Ayatollah Shahroudi, the judiciary chief, exclaimed in 2001, “Our national interests lie with antagonizing the Great Satan.”1 For the ideologues, international isolation, ostracism, and sanctions are necessary sacrifices on the path of revolutionary affirmation.

  Khomeini’s more pragmatic partis
ans may share the ideologues’ disdain for popular sovereignty, but they recognize that the survival of the regime is contingent on a more judicious international course. Even at the height of its revolutionary fervor, the Islamic Republic never renounced the imperatives of the international economy and has always remained a participant in the global financial order. For the first time, the conservative wall of solidarity against America was fractured. In an important move, former president Rafsanjani, in his new role as the head of the powerful Expediency Council responsible for resolving disputes within the state, led the chorus by stressing, “We have lost opportunities in the past. We have made inappropriate measures or never made any measures. Our ideology is flexible and we can choose expediency on the basis of Islam.”2 Another stalwart of the revolution, Bahzad Nabavi, a prominent member of the parliament, similarly noted, “Normalizing ties with the U.S. does not contradict our values—the conditions today require different policies.”3 The realities of the post–September 11 international system were also starkly noted by Ayatollah Muhammad Emami-Kashani, a Friday prayer leader when he stressed, “In the absence of a rival superpower, America is relying on guns and its economic power to play with the fate of the world. Unfortunately, some European countries are going along with it.”4 Iran’s conservative clerics did not suddenly alter their perception of America as an iniquitous state, but given the changing realities, they perceived a limited utility in continuing the conflict.

  It is important to stress that it was not just the projection of American power that was pressing Iran’s pragmatists toward a readjustment of their policy toward the United States. The persistent domestic deadlock and the inability of the state to formulate a cohesive economic plan had effectively obstructed much-needed reforms. This paralysis was coming at a time when the regime was failing to meet half the unemployment needs of 700,000 new job seekers every year or to generate $70 billion needed over the next decade to refurbish the country’s dilapidated oil industry. Double-digit unemployment and inflation rates, falling standards of living and a bloated bureaucracy were eroding the prospects of a massive younger generation demanding material wealth. Daunting economic challenges and the demographic bulge were finally leading some within the clerical class to focus on the best means of alleviating a potentially explosive political problem. Given their reluctance to enact structural economic reforms, which at least in the initial stages would lead to a degree of dislocation and thus popular anger, the theocracy opted for foreign investment to rescue it from its predicament. Khatami captured Iran’s dilemma by noting, “The government cannot come up with the money needed to create a million jobs a year. We need private and foreign investments.”5 It would be difficult for Iran to generate the necessary level of external investments while still embracing a militant defiance of the international community.