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the greatest explosives bonanza: The memo was actually written by George Healey.
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Buildings just disappeared before our eyes: Interview, Rod Barton, 7 November 2008.
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You’d end up with just granules: Interview with unnamed British intelligence official, 27 January 2009.
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Write this down: Bush at the White House, 20 September 2002, cited McClellan, What Happened. Six months later, Paul Wolfowitz drew a direct analogy to the liberation of Paris: ‘Like the people of France in the 1940s,’ he told Veterans of Foreign Wars on 11 March 2003, ‘[the Iraqis] view us as their hoped-for liberators.’
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[This war] could last: Address to US troops in Aviano, Italy, 7 February 2003. Cheney agreed: ‘weeks, rather than months’ he told NBC’s Meet the Press on 16 March 2003.
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It’s hard to conceive: US Congress Committee on the Budget, Department of Defense Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2004, 1st Session, 27 February 2003.
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I remember a representative: Interview, unnamed CIA officer, 14 March 2010.
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Chief of the Agency’s Bin Laden Unit: Interview, Michael Scheuer, 26 March 2010: ‘The Chief of the whole Bin Laden Unit at the time directly told Tenet that, whatever the threat is from Saddam, if we invade Iraq we will give the entire Muslim world the perfect Koranic predicate for a defensive jihad.’
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No progress is possible: Iraq: What’s Going Wrong? Cable sent 11 May 2003, cited Gordon and Trainor, COBRA II, p. 471.
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At the Tuwaitha nuclear plant: Actually, the looters weren’t interested in yellow cake at all. They wanted the yellow plastic drums the uranium was stored in for use as water butts. See Security Council Report, S/2003/711, 14 July 2003. On yellow cake discoveries abroad, see, for example ‘IAEA Confirms Yellowcake Found in Rotterdam Likely from Iraq’, USA Today (16 January 2004).
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black fever, cholera, HIV: Galbraith, The End of Iraq, p. 102.
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My cousins came to me . . . We allowed the Arabs in to our homes . . . They told us they had come: Interview with Yusuf (name changed), Baghdad, March 2009.
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After the invasion we started seeing: Interview, Haki Mohammed, 27 February 2009.
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I saw loads of munitions: Interview with Abdul (name changed), Baghdad, March 2009.
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There was a rush . . . There were bunkers . . . We found something: Interview, Yusuf, March 2009.
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The biggest trade I ever did?: Interview with Abu Sultan, Iraq, March 2010.
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People from Yusifiyah: Interview, Haki Mohammed, 27 February 2009.
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a classified Defense Intelligence Agency report: 9 November 2003, cited US News and World Report, 31 October 2004. The ‘Joint Department of Defense/Intelligence task force’ special analysis is cited in the same piece.
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We had a map . . . I had a couple of Marine buddies: Interview, Lawrence Wilkerson, 3 September 2009.
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All these things were there: Interview, Ali, 4 April 2009.
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There was a bridge: Interview, Haki Mohammed, 27 February 2009.
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UN Building in Baghdad: Al-Kurdi’s questioning at the hands of the United Nations is cited in Power, Chasing the Flame, p. 513. Apparently, Power’s revelation caused problems. Asked about the interview, and given the code of the cable in which it is apparently transcribed (CZX-251), staff refused to be drawn. ‘No one is prepared to discuss this sensitive matter,’ I was informed on 22 September 2008. ‘Especially after the reference to that cable in Ms Power‘s book.’ A more concrete link between Kurdi, the UN bomb and Yusifiyah can be found in ‘Abu Ghraib Attack Planner Caught’ (American Forces’ Information Service, 8 May 2005). According to this article, Kurdi’s associate Abu al Abbas stole his explosives from ‘a weapons facility in Yusifiyah’, then stored them on his farm, also in Yusifiyah. At least ten car bombs were made there. Al Kurdi was estimated to have been responsible for 75 per cent of the car bombs in Baghdad until his capture. Yusifiyah is fifteen kilometres from Al Qa’qaa.
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We told him we had lost 40,000 tonnes: Interview, Ali, 4 April 2009. ‘[The Americans] only had to do simple things: imposing a curfew and not let people move from their houses to protect both the people and the country. But they did nothing. They are responsible for the chaos that ensued,’ he recalled. ‘They didn’t care.’
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suicide-bomb belts: Interview, Ali, 4 April: ‘We got the order to make the explosive belts in February 2003, a month before the war. It was not my job, but I heard from the other engineers that they managed after a month or so to manufacture them. But I don’t think they made more than a thousand.’
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Virtually every single report was the same: Interview, Wayne White, 10 July 2009.
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It was being dismissed: Interview, Lawrence Wilkerson, 3 September 2009.
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One of the operations we did: Interview with Abu Shujaa, Baghdad, July 2008. Shujaa named three specific attacks in which munitions looted from Al Qa’qaa were used: October 2003 (Al Amyria Police Station), February 2004 (al Jihad Bridge) and May 2004 (roadside bombs on Route Irish, the main road to Baghdad Airport). Although he gave details of the bombings, he was unable to recall their exact dates – making it difficult to pinpoint the specific attacks, or the exact number of casualties in each one. The clearest of the three is the Amyria blast: there was a blast at the police station in the month he indicated and casualties concur approximately with his recollections of the incident. For details of the Amyria bomb, see The Times (28 October 2003).
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The IAEA officially informed: Security Council letter, 21/10/S/2004/831.
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Then, suddenly, the story leaked: Interview with Chris Nelson, 16 February 2009.
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Rove came and screamed at me: Interview with David Sanger, 10 February 2009.
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Al Qa’qaa was an Iraqi problem: CNN, ‘Tons of Iraq Explosives Missing’, 26 October 2004.
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There weren’t, for instance, 141 tons: The quantity of explosives of a particular type, this so-called RDX material, was actually much different than what was initially reported . . . on the order of more than 100 tons of difference. We’ve learned that since these initial reports.’ Special DoD Briefing on Al Qa’qaa Munitions Facility in Iraq, 29 October 2004.
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Saddam had moved them: Photographs of trucks were released on 28 October 2004. They had been taken on 17 March 2003. See www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/images.
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highly improbable: Interview with Reporters, US Department of Defense news transcript, 27 October 2004.
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Picture all of the tractor trailers: WHPT Radio, Philadelphia, 29 October 2004.
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which we may provide later: Special Department of Defense briefing on Al Qa’qaa Munitions Facility, 29 October 2004.
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John A. Shaw: ‘Russia Tied to Iraq’s Missing Arms’, Washington Times (28 October 2004). According to Shaw, Russian Special Forces descended on the plant in January 2003 to shred all evidence of complicity with Iraqi weapons programmes. Arms were shipped to Syria and Lebanon.
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cast his vote: This story apparently emerged in the Wall Street Journal. Mohammed ElBaradei called it ‘total junk’. See ‘ElBaradei Dismisses Revenge Claim’, BBC News, 30 October 2004.
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The stories have pretty much been discr
edited: Fox, The O’Reilly Factor, 28 October 2004.
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bogus: ‘Munitions Issue Dwarfs the Big Picture’, Washington Post (29 October 2004).
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an embarrassment: Tony Snow made this suggestion on Fox News. For a full examination of the ins and outs of media presentation of the Al Qa’qaa allegations, see Eric Boehlert, ‘Iraq Explosive’s Story Detonates under Bush Campaign’, Salon.com, 30 October 2004.
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0.06 per cent: First to cite this figure appears to have been Anthony H. Cordesman, Al Qa’qaa and the Military Realities in Iraq’, Centre for Strategic International Studies, 28 October 2004. 198-9 Bush and Cheney’s speeches in Sioux City, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Ohio can be accessed at www.georgewbushlibrary.gov/white-house.
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Accusing the IAEA: The original holding of RDX was 141.23 tonnes. In 2003 IAEA inspectors verified the existence of 128 (the Iraqis said 10 tonnes had been used for non-military purposes from 1998-2002); 3 tonnes were never accounted for. Vice President Cheney’s 3 ton figure was wildly off the mark.
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[The Pentagon] was trying to compare: Interview with unnamed weapons inspector, 18 February 2009.
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Joe, I think we’ve been to the place . . . It was clear: Interview, Dean Staley, 21 February 2009.
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I think it’s game, set and match: CNN, Newsnight with Aaron Brown, 28 October 2004.
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Osama bin Laden succeeded: That the al-Qaeda leader’s message might prove politically useful to the Republican Party was not lost on the CIA. ‘Bin Laden certainly did a nice favour today for the President,’ commented the former acting Director of Central Intelligence, John McLaughlin. ‘Certainly’ replied Deputy Director for Intelligence, Jami Miscik. ‘He would want Bush to keep doing what he’s doing for a few more years.’ The reporter of this exchange noted the irony of the moment: ‘What did it say about US policies that Bin Laden would want Bush re-elected?’ Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine, p. 336.
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The second operation: It is entirely possible that this attack was less successful than Shujaa portrays it. Al Jihad Bridge spans Route Irish, the main highway leading to Baghdad Airport – possibly the most common target of the insurgency. Whether or not the attack inflicted the damage he claims is a matter for debate; the fact that he failed to name a specific date (other than a month and a year) makes it almost impossible to pin down with any certainty which American troops, if any, were injured or killed.
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I met him: Interview, Yusuf March 2009.
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Those guys started ruling: Interview, Haki Mohammed, 27 February 2009.
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We had a firing range: Interview, Ali, 4 April 2009.
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We were making up rumours . . . We realized that al-Qaeda didn’t come: Interview, Yusuf, March 2009.
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We hadn’t seen anything like this: Interview, Haki Mohammed, 27 February 2009.
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wants to get to the bottom of this: David Sanger, ‘Iraq Explosives Become Issue Campaign’, New York Times, 26 October 2004.
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detailed investigation: Interview with Bill Cunningham, 700 WLW-AM, Cincinnati, Ohio, 26 October 2004.
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important and ongoing: President’s remarks in Vienna, Ohio, 27 October 2004.
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Impossible: Interview, Ali, 4 April 2009.
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The explosives were available everywhere . . . I would say 98 per cent: Interviews with bomb disposal experts who declined to be named, 4 April 2009.
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You want to do Iran for the next one?: cited The Assassins’ Gate, p. 145.
6: The Egyptian
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The war against terrorism: Memorandum from George W. Bush on ‘Humane Treatment of Taliban and Al-Qaeda Detainees’, 7 February 2002.
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They caught the Egyptian: Since Khaled el Masri is currently incarcerated and refusing to communicate even with his lawyer, this account of his arrest, detention, rendition, incarceration and release is taken almost entirely from:
Declaration of Khaled el-Masri in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to the United States’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgement, 6 April 2006.
www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/elmasri_decl_exh.pdf.
Complaint, for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division. Khaled el Masri v George J. Tenet; Premier Executive Transport Services, Inc; Keeler and Tate Management LLC, Aero Contractors Ltd, Does 1–20. 6 December 2005.
Declaration, Exhibit F, English Translation www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/elmasri_decl_exh.pdf.
James Meek, ‘They Beat Me from All Sides’, Guardian (14 January 2005).
Don Van Natta Jr and Souad Mekhennet, ‘German’s Claim of Kidnap Brings Investigation of US Link’, New York Times (9 January 2005).
Dana Priest and Julie Tate, ‘Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake’, Washington Post (4 December 2005).
Stephen Grey, Ghost Plane.
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I don’t know. A hotel?: Declaration of Khaled el-Masri, p. 3.
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In the winter of 1998: 9/11 Commission Report, 5.3: The Hamburg Contingent. The Khaled el Masri encounter appears on pp. 165-6.
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We’re staying here . . . Am I under arrest?: Declaration of Khaled el-Masri, p. 6. Declaration, Exhibit F, p. 3.
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We got him! . . . She briefed all of us: Interview with unnamed CTC officer, 14 March 2010.
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You know, it would scare the shit. . . : 9/11 Commission Report, p. 189.
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Afghan Eyes: Details of the project, including early Predator deployments, are also in the 9/11 Commission Report, starting at p. 189. See also Grey, Ghost Plane, Clarke, Against All Enemies and Coll, Ghost Wars.
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National Security Directive 207: Margaret Satterthwaite, The Story of el Masri versus Tenet: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the ‘War on Terror, New York University School of Law, Public Research Paper 08-64 (December 2008).
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George Bush Snr had reauthorized . . . So had Clinton . . . Directive 62: The Story of El Masri versus Tenet.
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The rendition operations they did: Interview, Michael Scheuer, 26 March 2010.
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These renditions have shattered: Statement of DCI George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: The Worldwide Threat in 2000 Global Realities of Our National Security (2 February 2000).
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‘exceptional’ authority . . . Great job!: Bush at War, pp. 76-8, 97, 101.
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There can be no bureaucratic impediments: Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. 179.
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Call the German embassy!: Declaration of Khaled el-Masri, p. 6. Don van Natta, ‘Germany Weighs if it Played Role in Seizure by US’, New York Times (21 February 2006).
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They don’t want to talk to you: Declaration of Khaled el-Masri, p. 8; Declaration, Exhibit F, p. 4. Don van Natta, ‘Germany Weighs if it Played Role in Seizure by US’.
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What kind of a deal?: Declaration, Exhibit F, p. 4.
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I then felt a stick: Declaration of Khaled el-Masri, p. 9.
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We can see British Airways . . . You want to get: Interview with Josep Manchado, 23 October 2010.
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It was quite a boring day . . . It’s not a good time . . . It was a very new: Interview, Josep Manchado, 23 October 2010.
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That’s the question I wanted to ask you: Declaration, Ex
hibit F, p. 7. You attended terrorist. . . You’re in a country where . . . If the charges here weren’t correct. . . Everyone claims that when we start interrogating: Declaration, Exhibit F, pp. 7-8.
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The snatch is something that: Interview with Professor John Radsan, 22 March 2010.
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We said very clearly . . . We had no permission: Interview, Michael Scheuer, 26 March 2010.
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That’s something from the dark side: Interview, Professor John Radsan, 22 March 2010.
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For some reason: Interview, Michael Scheuer, 26 March 2010.
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I am a German: Declaration, Exhibit F, p. 10.
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The passport was genuine: Lisa Myers, ‘CIA Accused of Detaining Innocent Man’, MSNBC, 21 April 2005; Dana Priest and Julie Tate, ‘Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake’, Washington Post (4 December 2005). James Meek, ‘They Beat Me from All Sides’, Guardian (14 January 2005).
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