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It never was: ‘UN Keeps Damning Report of Afghan Massacre Secret’, Independent (31 July 2002); ‘UN Revises Afghan Wedding Attack Report’, CNN, 30 July 2002.
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The more it drags on: ‘Draft Report Indicates US Cover-up’ (op. cit.).
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I don’t think this was necessarily: Interview, Ambassador Dobbins, 3 March 2010.
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There was a moment: Interview, unnamed UK diplomat, 21 March 2010.
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mostly on editorial boards: Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 200.
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1.6 troops per thousand: Dobbins, Jones et al, Europe’s Role in Nation-Building, from the Balkans to the Congo (RAND, 2008), cited Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, p. 119.
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8,000 troops: Dobbins, p. 140; Bosnia had received 2,000 Dobbins, p. 127.
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None of the countries: Interview, Ambassador Robert Finn, 3 March 2010.
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The idea that we’d liberated a country: Interview, Ambassador James Dobbins, 3 March 2010.
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$577 per civilian: Jones, p.122.
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In Bosnia they had: Interview, Ambassador Robert Finn, March 2010.
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There was no planning: Interview, British diplomat, 21 March 2010. One reason for the lack of planning was the speed of the operation. ‘Everything happened so quickly’ he admitted. Only later did potential problems emerge: After the Afghan government was established, I was certainly then thinking to myself, “What we’ve got here is totally inadequate. It doesn’t look like a government at all. Now we’d better start doing something.” . . . I think there were things that we could have done – and quickly – which would have changed the scene. Now, whether that would ultimately have led to success or not, I don’t know. But we would have given ourselves a better chance.’
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We three brothers . . . The presence of Americans . . . When you see . . . I hate Americans: Interviews with Abdul Malik’s family, March 2010.
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We had very elaborate administrative structures: CIA source, 14 March 2010.
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At that time: Interview, General Dan McNeill, 24 February 2010.
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In March 2002: Interview with Michael Scheuer, 26 March 2010.
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But we haven’t caught Bin Laden yet! CIA source, 14 March 2010.
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Afghanistan was really: cited Jones.
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When we succeeded: Fox News, 9 July 2002.
4: Groupthink 7075-T6
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Simply stated, there is no doubt: 26 August 2002.
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Fuck Saddam: First reported by Daniel Eisenberg, ‘We’re Taking Him Out’, TIME (5 May 2002).
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ASSISTANCE REQUIRED: Interview, Sami Ibrahim, Baghdad, 30 February 2009.
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In 1984: Background on the Nasser 81 mm project comes from Sami Ibrahim, various IAEA sources and weapons technicians in Iraq. An excellent summary appears in the Iraq Survey Group’s final report (‘Duelfer Report’): Aluminium Tube Investigation’.
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They weren’t very successful: Interview with anonymous weapons inspector, 1 July 2009.
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It was severely corroded . . . Corrosion is a bit like a disease . . . We classified them . . . not usable at all: Interview, Ibrahim, 30 February 2009.
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We can extrude aluminium . . . That’s a hard alloy . . . He screwed me down: Interview with Garry Cordukes, Sydney, 29 October 2008.
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Kamel put in place: Original correspondence, contracts and paperwork provided by Cordukes.
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A signal had been picked up . . . There were a lot of meetings . . . All we were going off: Interview with Geoff Wainwright, 13 August 2010.
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It was a top secret signal: Details of meetings between Cordukes and Wainwright come from interviews with both men. Corduke’s collection of these meetings is somewhat differemt. According to the aluminium trader he was aware from the outset of what Wianwright was up to.
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President’s Daily Brief. . . Senior Executive Intelligence Brief: ‘Rockefeller Report’, p. 88.
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I happened to be in town . . . They just didn’t work: Interview with Houston Wood III, 2 July 2009.
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not consistent with a gas centrifuge: ‘Rockefeller Report’, p. 89.
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the key thing: Interview, Geoff Wainwright, 13 August 2010.
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Fuck. Are you serious? . . . Happy to . . . You’re from the Defence . . . I thought it was dodgy . . . For Christ’s sake! . . . We’ve got a big problem . . . You’ve obviously fed me bullshit: Interview, Garry Cordukes, 29 October 2008.
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‘Joe T’ has been publicly named as Joe Turner. He still works at the CIA. Through intermediaries he has refused to comment on this chapter.
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to manufacture chambers: Daily Intelligence Highlight, 9 May 2001, cited ‘Rockefeller Report’, p. 89.
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less likely: 14 June 2001, Senior Publish When Ready (SPWR), cited ‘Rockefeller Report’, p. 90.
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The specifications for the tubes far exceed: 2 July intelligence assessment, cited ‘Rockefeller Report’, p. 90.
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At the Nassr facility . . . The assessment was made: Interview with Bob Kelley, 18 February 2009.
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We were aware of all these tubes: Interview with George Healey, 1 July 2009.
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‘The [tubes’] walls were way too thick . . . It wasn’t hard . . . about half an hour . . . You would talk to him: Interview with unnamed IAEA officer, 18 February 2009.
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A so-called expert. . . practically a layman: Interview with unnamed IAEA officer, 17 February 2009.
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If we wait for threats: Remarks by the President at the Graduation Exercise of the US Military, West Point, 1 June 2002.
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This is not the time to err: Blair in Sedgefield, 5 March 2005.
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It’s hard to overstate: Interview with unnamed senior US intelligence official, 30 June 2009.
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That sense – worldwide – of vulnerability: Interview with unnamed CPD officer, 3 July 2009.
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People were working . . . It was unlike anything: Interview with unnamed CTC officer, 14 March 2010.
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I thought we had put the issue to rest. . . The tubes were purported by the CIA . . . That’s when I began to get angry: Interview, Houston Wood III, 2 July 2009.
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compelling: Spinning the Tubes, ABC Four Corners, 27 October 2003.
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little gem: Lateline, ABC, 18 July 2003.
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I wasn’t aware: Interview, Geoff Wainwright, 13 August 2010.
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a mood of great accomplishment. . . They were very proud: Interview with unnamed Australian intelligence officer, 3 July 2009.
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There were all kinds of reasons: Interview with Carl Ford, 30 June 2009.
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Oh Wayne! . . . Maddening! This was the kind of logic: Interview with Wayne White, 10 July 2009.
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I blame that on 9/11 . . . Carl, what are you guys: Interview, Carl Ford, 30 June 2009.
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Basically, they had all disappeared: Interview with unnamed British intelligence official, 27 January 2009.
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Having leaked the information: Cheney, Meet the Press; Rice, CNN, Late Edition with WolfBlitzer; Rumsfeld, CBS Face the Nation; Powell, Fox News Sunday. All broadcast 8 September 2002.
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Is this something new?: Interview, Houston Wood III, 2 July 2009.
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There’s Dick Cheney on Meet the Press: Interview with CPD officer, 3 July 2009.
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It was very skilfully done: Interview with Greg Thielmann, 21 September 2009.
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Now there’s new evidence: BBC Panorama, The Case Against Saddam, 23 September 2002.
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There’s nothing that frightens: Interview, Wayne White, 10 July 2009.
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The way the information was presented: Interview, Greg Thielmann, 21 September 2009.
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highly unlikely to be intended: cited ‘Robb-Silberman’, p. 73.
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Only if you believed it before: Interview, Carl Ford, 30 June 2009.
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will be forced either to demonstrate: cited Cook, Point of Departure, p. 246.
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[T]his resolution contains no hidden triggers: UN Security Council, Meeting 4644, 8 November 2002. There is no ‘automaticity’: Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Meeting 4644, also 8 November 2002. There is nothing in the resolution: ‘UK Expects Iraq to Fail Arms Tests’, Guardian (11 November 2002).
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OK, what was it you were doing . . . They literally stood on their heads . . . Bent over backwards . . . Tubes guys had . . . We went through the manufacturing process: Interview, George Healey, 1 July 2009.
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Stop burying them!: Interview with two Iraqi scientists from Al Qa’qaa, Baghdad, 4 April 2009.
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Look, you know our [old] centrifuge programme: Obeidi and Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden, p. 193. Interview, George Healey, 1 July 2009.
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He was absolutely right. . . There was no question: Interview, George Healey, 1 July 2009.
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When we got done: Interview, Bob Kelley, 18 February 2009.
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With the Iraqi record: cited Blair’s Wars, p. 256.
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From March 2002: Interview, Michael Scheuer, 26 March 2010.
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When intelligence does not: Interview with Larry Johnson, 29 March 2010.
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There was another staple in it: Interview with Rod Barton, Canberra, 7 November 2008.
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You couldn’t be sure: Interview with unnamed British intelligence official, 27 January 2009.
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Bugging was also rife: See Short, An Honourable Deception, as well as numerous press reports at the time. Chile was a particular target. See Muñoz, A Solitary War.
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We knew absolutely: Interview with unnamed British intelligence official, 27 January 2009.
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I think Mr ElBaradei, frankly, is wrong: NBC Meet the Press, 16 March 2003.
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The not-so-good intelligence: Interview with unnamed IAEA officer, 17 February 2009.
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We found nothing: Interview, Rod Barton, Canberra, 7 November 2008.
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slam dunk: The most famous comment of all, first reported in Woodward, Plan of Attack.
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Five tests were performed: For spin tests and their results, see ‘Rockefeller Report’, pp. 105-8.
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[My analysts] went directly: Interview, Carl Ford, 30 June 2009.
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According to WINPAC: Tables displaying rotor specifications can be found in ‘Rockefeller Report’, pp. 109-12.
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considerably more expensive: ‘Rockefeller Report’, p. 98.
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Cheap as chips: Interview, Garry Cordukes, Sydney, 29 October 2008.
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This fact was not presented: ‘Rockefeller Report’, p. 110.
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When it came to rocket production . . . twenty-five pages . . . bicycle-seat posts: ‘Rockefeller Report’, p. 102.
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[We] explained to him . . . After he returned from his visit to Vienna: Interview, IAEA official, 18 February 2009.
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That speech! Interview, Houston Wood III, 2 July 2009.
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If anyone had tested [the tubes]: Interview, Garry Cordukes, 29 October 2008.
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I thought that they had the goods: Interview, Rod Barton, 7 November 2008.
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What he was saying was not matching: Interview, unnamed CPD officer, 3 July 2009.
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I had a serious problem: Interview, Wayne White, 10 July 2010.
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The biggest load of crap: Interview, Geoff Wainwright, 13 August 2010.
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I just couldn’t believe it: Interview, George Healey, 1 July 2009.
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Somebody mis-briefed Powell: Interview, Bob Kelley, 18 February 2009.
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It was all very convincing . . . A counterpart in an allied country . . . Powell had heard . . . The damage was done . . . he was lied to: Interview with Lawrence Wilkerson, 3 September 2009.
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France: Wilkerson was reluctant to name the nation responsible, but in a speech before the New American Foundation American Strategy Program Policy Forum on 19 October 2005 he named France. An article in the Financial Times (4 July 2003) reported the spin test allegation before Colonel Wilkerson’s speech.
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The issue of having the tubes spun: Baute, correspondence, 2 October 2009.
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The secretary got led . . . I could not believe: Interview, Carl Ford, 30 June 2009.
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It’s hard to think of a more odious: Interview, Greg Thielmann, 21 September 2009.
5: Stuff Happens
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Freedom’s untidy: US Department of Defense news briefing, 11 April 2003.
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I really do believe: NBC Meet the Press, 16 March 2003.
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Are you true Arabs? . . . Take it: Interview, Haki Mohammed (name changed), Baghdad, 27 February 2009.
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Huge: Interview with unnamed British weapons intelligence expert, February 2009.
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Just enormous: Interview with unnamed weapons inspector, 18 February 2009.
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On a whim, one enterprising inspector: It was Bob Kelley of the IAEA.
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We thought it might be: Interview, Haki Mohammed, 27 February 2009.
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The Americans came in: Interview with Ali (name changed), Baghdad, 4 April 2009.
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Lots of people went in: Interview, Haki Mohammed, 27 February 2009.
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In the images of falling statues: Televised address, USS Abraham Lincoln, 1 May 2003.
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traffic jams of looters: Robert Fisk, ‘Baghdad, the Day After’, Independent (11 April 2003).
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Imagine the frustration: CNN, ‘Rampant Looting Across Iraq’, 9 April 2003.
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The images you are seeing . . . Stuff happens: US Department of Defense news briefing, 11 April 2003.
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Lathes, machine tools: Interview, Haki Mohammed, 27 February 2009.
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It was astonishing: Interview, Ali, 4 April 2009.
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In the mosques: Interview with Ahmed (name changed), Baghdad, April 2009.
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It was a sightsee: Interview with Joe Caffrey, 20 February 2009.
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There was just row after row . . . The 101st Airborne . . . These guys were like kids: Interview with Dean Staley, 21 February 2009.
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There were these round cardboard cylinders . . . It was very flour-like: Interview, Joe Caffrey, 20 February 2009.
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Prior to the invasion: In January 2003, ElBaradei personally reported on Al Qa’qaa to the United Nations Security Council.
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Two weeks after the start: According to the IAEA, Jacques Baute regularly expressed his concerns about the security of materials stored at Al Qa’qaa – specifically the high explosives – in the months following the war. IAEA had been in and out of Qa’qaa prior to the invasion – partly to try to sort out the issue of the aluminium tubes (the propellant for the Nasser 81 mm rockets was made there). IAEA inspectors checked the explosives on 14 and 15 January and 8 and 15 March 2003.
A History of the World Since 9/11 Page 39