State Violence

by Raymond Murray

  On the night of 14 August 1969 John Gallagher was shot dead by ‘B’ Specials in Armagh. The Scarman Tribunal was able to unravel the facts relating to this fatal shooting. Justice was not done. Twenty-two years later no one has been charged with this unjust killing. The rot set in then and the government has followed a policy of lies and cover-up in similar shootings. It is my belief that there is a government policy not to injure the morale of their security forces and so the crimes of army and police are covered up and they receive protection. The only time they weaken in their resolution is when the media shames them into cosmetic action by the sheer weight of facts. Would six members of the Parachute Regiment have been charged with the killing of two teenagers and the wounding of a third a year after the incident if a BBC Panorama programme had not highlighted the facts to the public? Seventeen people including eight children have been killed by rubber and plastic bullets fired by lethal weapons and over 100 have been seriously injured. Any other government would hang its head in shame at these unnecessary and tragic criminal acts and would withdraw the use of these death-dealing missiles. The plastic bullet gun has never been used in riots in Britain. This underlines the contempt the British government has for the Irish people.

  The Irish people should strongly urge that front-line regiments like the marines and paratroopers should not be sent in the rota of British forces service in Ireland. The build-up to the shooting of Fergal Caragher was a litany of harassment, verbal abuse, beatings and threats to the lives of citizens. This was tolerated by RUC authorities. Inevitably it ended in tragedy. The same scenario of pre-killing harassment was evident in the run-up to the shooting by the paratroopers of unarmed people like Brian Smith in Belfast and the teenage joyriders in 1990.

  British forces have shot armed people when arrests could have made due to control of a situation. This happened for example at Coagh, Loughgall, and Drumnakilly.

  There is a long list of men, women and children, unarmed persons who have been unjustly killed and some murdered.

  Most sinister are the shootings of Catholics by loyalists acting in collusion with security forces like Loughlin Maginn and Pat Finucane. In the past two years 14 people have been murdered in the south Derry/ east Tyrone region by loyalists. Collusion is suspected. The success rate of the RUC in charging people for these murders is nil. That must be the worst statistic for vigorous investigation of any police force in the world. The murders of Catholics by loyalists in the Craigavon region and the absence of prosecutions there tells a similar story.

  Add to these deaths the killings by the SAS, an assassination squad acting outside the law and the vulgarity of praise bestowed on them by government ministers for their bloody deeds.

  Public opinion should call on the British government as a democratic right to have the law changed so that the Deputy for Public Prosecutions should give his reasons for his decisions not to prosecute in cases of disputed killings. We must be able to see behind the scenes what is going on. This is a matter of charity, truth and justice so that we can bring peace to our country.

  The serious problem that the police force in Northern Ireland is drawn from only one section of the community must be faced. London and Dublin should set about setting up a second level police force which will also draw from the nationalist community; it is up to them to work out a solution to the complexities involved.

  In the absence of fair play at home we must seek international help on the occasion of every fatal shooting carried out by the security forces. In that line the Cullyhanna community has to be commended for bringing Fergal Caraher’s death to the attention of the world. Their new-found expertise will be welcomed in other areas of the north. Furthermore we must encourage the non-governmental human rights’ bodies to set up teams of experts – legal, medical and forensic who will fly quickly to emergency situations here and give immediate help to local communities in their investigations, since they have no trust that the RUC vigorously and urgently carry out investigations into the shootings of people by the security forces.

  The system of coroners’ inquests must be urgently reformed. They are unfair. Bereaved relatives are denied elementary standards of justice. The families should have access to legal aid to secure proper legal representation. They are unable to penetrate the veil of secrecy surrounding information on how their loved ones came to die. Because the outcome can influence subsequent civil or criminal proceedings the government authorities make sure they have a strong legal team. The dice is loaded against the relatives. A campaign to reform the system of inquests is necessary in the name of justice so that the public can have an idea for themselves that proper investigations are taking place and chances of a cover-up can be avoided. For bereaved families inquests in the north of Ireland lead to distrust and give minimum satisfaction.

  Shoot-to-Kill and Collusion, 1990–94

  This is an extract from the pamphlet Collusion 1990–1994: Loyalist Paramilitary Murders in North of Ireland published by Relatives for Justice, 1995. It lists murders committed by loyalist paramilitaries 1990–1994 and specifies those caused by South African weaponry.

  For twenty-five years the counter-insurgency methods of the British government in Northern Ireland has involved a Shoot-to-Kill policy, in direct ambushes when both innocent victims and suspects have been shot dead without warning, and in a sinister indirect campaign of murder which involves manipulation of loyalist paramilitaries who are provided with security information and who then kill with the knowledge that they are free from prosecution. This policy is pursued by small groups of RUC personnel and British army and the secret intelligence network of MI5 and MI6. A section of the Northern Ireland administration is aware of this policy, protects it by withholding information, insincere cosmetic investigation, non-prosecution and curbing of inquests. The families and friends of the victims not only suffer the insult of cover-up and lies but they often become targets for harassment and abuse from the British army and the RUC. They seek redress in publicising the truth to the world and will not cease to bring their grievances before governments and international human rights’ bodies.

  This Shoot-to-Kill policy has already been outlined in The SAS in Ireland 1969–1989 (Raymond Murray) and in a pamphlet entitled State Killings (Raymond Murray) published by Relatives for Justice. The policy became a virtual campaign in the 1980s.

  From the time of Sam Marshall’s death in Lurgan on 7 March 1990 until John O’Hanlon’s death on 1 September 1994, loyalist paramilitaries have killed 185 people (3 others not in these figures were killed by an RUC member in a Sinn Féin office in Belfast in 1992). Of the 185 killings 168 of them were sectarian or political in motive. The remaining 17 deaths were internal and non-sectarian. There were also over 300 attempted killings and other attacks during the same period. In 103 of the sectarian/political type killings there is evidence of some form of collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and the security forces.

  The RUC informed some of the victims that their personal details, contained in official British Intelligence files, were in the hands of loyalist paramilitaries. Some victims were killed by loyalist gangs with members of the security forces in their ranks. Some were killed by weapons reportedly stolen from members of the security forces before their deaths. Some were killed by weaponry acquired by loyalist paramilitaries with the assistance of a number of British Intelligence agents, Brian Nelson being the best known of these. Nelson, when he appeared in court in January 1992, was suspected to have played a vital role in 10 murders and the targeting of a further 16 people who were later murdered or wounded. An apparent deal was made and he was convicted of less serious offences.

  Brian Nelson received a 10-year sentence in February 1992 for his role in loyalist violence. He was a British military agent. He was also the UDA’s intelligence officer, responsible for setting up people to be killed. He had unlimited access to security forces intelligence documents on nationalists and republicans. Such information was supplied to the UDA by himself or
by security forces sympathetic to loyalist paramilitaries. The effects of Nelson’s work in refining the UDA’s intelligence department is still being felt.

  ‘The legacy is that since Nelson’s arrest another 6 people have been killed and 3 injured. These people’s names were among the 369 found in Nelson’s possession at the time of his arrest’. (BBC Panorama Programme The Dirty War 1992.)

  The role of Nelson and other British agents in assisting loyalist paramilitaries to acquire an arms shipment from South Africa has had a great impact on loyalist violence. The significance of the South African weaponry to loyalist death squads, and how they acquired it, was exposed in a report on BBC’s Insight Ulster on 28 January 1993. British intelligence services alleged a breakdown of their own intelligence and surveillance. The shipment, it was reported, had been monitored by British Intelligence from South Africa to the north of Ireland, but a breakdown occurred when it arrived and they lost trace of it. The report pointed out how the South African weapons have enhanced the killing capacity of loyalist paramilitaries, revealing that before the arrival of such sophisticated weapons loyalist killers were more likely to have used home-made machine-guns, sawn-off shotguns and old revolvers.

  The murders in Cappagh, at the mobile shop in Craigavon, the Hyster factory in Lurgan, the Ormeau Road and Oldpark ‘bookies’, and Castlerock, the pub massacres at Greysteel and Loughinisland, were all carried out by loyalists using weaponry imported from South Africa. They also used them in many individual killings. In fact from the Milltown killings in March 1988 to the slaughter of six men watching a football match on television in a public house at Loughinisland, County Down, in June 1994, all loyalist multiple killings have been carried out with South African weaponry.

  Note the following comparison. In the six years before the arrival of these weapons, from January 1982 to December 1987, loyalist paramilitaries murdered 71 people of whom 49 were sectarian/political. In the six years following, from January 1988 to 1 September 1994, loyalists murdered 229 people, of whom 207 were sectarian/political.

  Brian Nelson was arrested in January 1990, following the investigation of Cambridgeshire Chief Constable John Stevens into the leaking of security forces’ intelligence files. The UFF had boasted that they used security forces’ intelligence files in the murder of Loughlin Maginn in August 1989. Stevens ended his inquiry in May 1990. In his report he was able to conclude ‘that members of the security forces have passed on information to paramilitaries’ and that ‘there was no organised campaign of leaks’.

  But, if his recommendations were introduced, he said, ‘then there is every hope that future collusion between the security forces and paramilitary groups will be eradicated’.

  Among the 83 recommendations of John Stevens were the blurring of copies of files when files were photocopied and a system to identify user access to computer records on suspects. Amnesty International in a statement following the release of people charged with possession of leaked files in October 1990 said, ‘It is obvious from all the evidence that collusion remains a fact of life and that the government is not prepared to confront it’.

  The belief of Amnesty International that the Stevens inquiry was a failure can be seen in the continuing evidence of security forces’ intelligence files going missing and ending up in the hands of loyalist paramilitaries.

  The continuing flow of security forces’ intelligence files to loyalist paramilitaries led to the return of (now Northumbria) Chief Constable John Stevens to Northern Ireland in August 1993. As in September 1989, the content of his investigation was not disclosed. A report on the second investigation was sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in February 1994. In July 1994 the DPP asked Mr Stevens to make further inquiries. The DPP’s request, it was reported, was made following an examination of the findings of Mr Stevens’ recent inquiry. To date there has been no indication of charges being brought.

  Amnesty International in reports published in 1993 and 1994 again criticised the British government and the RUC for their handling of the collusion issue and for their failure to establish an independent inquiry.

  The Nelson case focused on another suspicion of the nationalist community, namely, that British troops patrolling nationalist areas have had on occasions a role in loyalist attacks. In the murders of Gerard Slane and Terence McDaid in 1988, both of whom were set up by Nelson, relatives claimed there was suspicious activity by the security forces near their homes prior to the loyalist attacks. Gerard Slane’s home was raided by the security forces two weeks before his death. Both families believed the activity of the security forces was a reconnaissance in preparation for the loyalist killings.

  The most common accusations of collusion concern the removal of checkpoints, some of which were in place before loyalist attacks. Some areas where loyalist attacks have taken place have witnessed saturation levels of security forces patrolling and searching prior to attacks. The suspicion of collusion was supported in January 1993 by remarks made by their commanding officer in the north, Sir John Wilsey. When asked what was his attitude to employing agents like Nelson and the morality thereof, he replied that he was ‘certainly not ashamed of Nelson’s role’.

  Information and weaponry are not the only forms of collusion between the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries. During the period covered by this article, 51 serving and former security forces’ members were charged or convicted of terrorist-related offences ranging from illegal possession of arms to murder.

  Political and clerical leaders in the Catholic community and their local press have criticised the security forces’ lack of response to appeals for adequate protection. Loyalist death squads have used the same routes again and again to enter nationalist areas and to flee after murders. Lanark Way off the Springfield Road in west Belfast was opened in the summer of 1986 and, despite it being used as an escape route by loyalists in eight murders and numerous attempted killings, it was not closed until the murder of Philomena Hanna in April 1992. She was the ninth victim of loyalist violence. North Howard Street, Rosapenna Street and the Donegall Road are other examples where persistent pleas for closure of thoroughfares used by loyalist death squads have been ignored.

  A recent example of security forces ignoring requests by Catholics for protection occurred on the night of 27 April 1994 in west Belfast. Paul Thompson and a friend were in a car and were making a U-turn at the bottom of Springfield Park, which is a cul de sac. Unknown to both men, loyalist gunmen had gained access to the street through a hole in the pallisade fencing which was part of the ‘peace line’. The gunmen opened fire on the vehicle killing Paul Thompson and wounding his friend who saved his life by driving away. One of the first on the scene was a woman resident of Springfield Park. She had noticed the hole in the fencing earlier that day and, realising the danger (there had been at least 16 murder attempts in the Upper Springfield Road area in the previous three and a half years), telephoned the RUC and the Northern Ireland Office immediately. She was told by those who received the calls that the matter would be looked into and resolved as soon as possible. But the fence was neither repaired nor security in the area increased. Several hours after her plea, as she stood at the front door, she witnessed what she feared might happen, the murder of an innocent person.

  This inadequacy of the security forces in protecting nationalists was revealed again in the failure of British army and RUC bases, despite sophisticated surveillance equipment, to detect, deter or arrest loyalist murder gangs. The murders of Sam Marshall in Lurgan and Thomas Hughes, Martin O’Prey, James Carson, Kieran Abrams, Joseph McCloskey and Seán Monaghan in Belfast, are examples where the gangs responsible could have been observed by security forces in their bases. There are other examples of this situation in a number of attempted killings.

  Another persistent complaint of nationalists concerns the failure of the security forces to respond promptly to some killings and attempted killings by loyalists. When they arrive on the scene their reaction has been
misdirected. It is often nationalist areas which feel the brunt of follow-up operations rather than the areas to which the killers escaped. There have been murders and attempted murders where there have been no follow-up operations. Relatives and friends of the victims of loyalist violence have complained about the bad behaviour of security forces arriving in the aftermath of a murder or attempted murder. Their conduct at the scene of the Sinn Féin office killings, the Peter McTasney killing in Bawnmore estate, the Seán Anderson murder near Pomeroy, and the murder of Theresa Clinton in Belfast was insulting and oppressive. Funerals of some of the victims of loyalist violence have been disrupted by an undue heavy force of RUC and British army presence either around the family home while the body was waked or at church and graveyard. Mourners have been stopped, searched and on occasions abused. Mourners at the funerals of Thomas Donaghy, Kilrea, Kevin McKearney, Moy, and Conor Maguire and Mark Rodgers in Belfast were severely harassed.

  RUC forensic teams investigating killings and attempted killings have sometimes failed to remove all relevant material from the scene of the incident. The bag, with spent shells inside, used by the RUC member who murdered three people in the Sinn Féin office on the Falls Road, was found in the office after the forensic team left the scene. Similarly, after the forensic team left the home of teenager Gerard O’Hara, having spent a number of hours in the house, bullets fired by the gunmen were found in the living-room where the young man was killed. One of the bullets had blood on it.