The Day We Lost the H-Bomb

by Barbara Moran

  18. The concept of alert time: Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 97–110.

  19 LeMay had flown to Washington: Information on the 1956 “bomber gap” hearings comes from Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 156–160; Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, pp. 78–79; and The New York Times’ coverage of the hearings.

  19 Worrisome intelligence had trickled in: Information on the 1955 Soviet airshow comes from Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 156; Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, p. 78; and “Bison vs. B-52,” The New York Times, May 6, 1956, The Week in Review, p. 1.

  20 The Soviets had only ten Bisons: Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), p. 375.

  20 The budget already included $16.9 billion: “On Arms and Aid,” The New York Times, Week in Review, May 13, 1956, p. 1.

  21 “Curt LeMay thinks only of SAC”: “Defense under Fire,” Time, May 14, 1956.

  21 To counter the threat: Henry M. Narducci, Strategic Air Command and the Alert Program: A Brief History (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1988), pp. 1–4; Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, pp. 244–245; J. C. Hopkins and Sheldon A.

  Goldberg, The Development of the Strategic Air Command, 1946–1986 (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1986), p. 65. An earlier alert operation occurred in February 1955, but the first true proof-of-concept test for ground alert was Operation TRY OUT, from November 1956 to March 1957. A description of life on ground alert can be found in “On Continuous Alert,” The New York Times Magazine, December 8, 1957, pp. 10–11.

  21 the Soviets launched Sputnik: Paul Dickson, Sputnik: The Shock of the Century (New York: Berkley Books, 2001). The Johnson quote appears on p. 117. See also Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 135–136. An example of press reaction to ground alert in the wake of Sputnik is Richard Witkin, “S.A.C. Operating New Alert Program: Aims to Get Third of Bomber Force Airborne within 15 Minutes after Attack,” The New York Times, November 11, 1957, p. 12.

  22 SAC began testing another program: Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, 1946–1986, p. 74.

  22 “Any Soviet surprise attack”: Hanson W. Baldwin, “Ready or Not? President Upheld on Plan Not to Keep Bombers Constantly in Air on Alert,” The New York Times, March 8, 1959.

  22 Airborne alert was ready to go: John D. Morris, “Soviet ICBM Held Able to Pinpoint 5,000-Mile Target,” The New York Times, January 31, 1959, p. 1; Power, quoted in Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, p. 83.

  22 “futile and disastrous”: Jack Raymond, “President Sees Dangers in Full Mobilization Now,” The New York Times, March 5, 1959, p. 1.

  22 Eventually the two sides reached a compromise: “Some B-52’s in Air around the Clock: S.A.C. Begins Training for Possible Establishment of an Airborne Alert,” The New York Times, January 19, 1961, p. 12; Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, p. 101; Narducci, Strategic Air Command and the Alert Program, pp. 46; “SAC’s Deadly Daily Dozen,” Time, March 17, 1961, p. 19.

  22 the exact number remained classified: Airborne alert rates can now be found in Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, p. 681.

  22 SAC named the program “Chrome Dome”: A map of the Chrome Dome routes in 1966 appears in Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, 1993), p. 194. Despite many interviews with SAC airmen, the author never discovered a definitive genesis of the name.

  22 Power refused to confirm or deny: “Some B-52’s in Air around the Clock,” The New York Times, January 19, 1961, p. 12; The Strategic Air Command Alert Force: History and Philosophy (Briefing) (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1988), p. 10.

  23 LeMay had moved on: Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, pp. 666–667. Stats on SAC in 1957 come from ibid., pp. 676–677, 681.

  23 Power carried the torch: A good overview of Power’s views can be found in “Power Airs SAC Deterrent Capability,” Aviation Week, April 20, 1959, pp. 66 ff.

  23 But as missiles grew more sophisticated: Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, pp. 104–105. For further reading on McNamara’s relations with SAC, see Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), chaps. 6–9.

  23 “backbone of SAC’s deterrent strength”: The Mission of SAC: SAC Film Report no. 2 (U.S. Air Force, 1961).

  CHAPTER 2: THE ACCIDENT

  24 At midmorning on January 17, 1966: The account of the accident comes from two major sources: author’s interviews with Wendorf, Rooney, and Messinger; and Report of Major Aircraft Accident.

  24 The lower compartment, where Rooney sat: The author toured a B-52 at Minot Air Force Base on August 23, 2005, and interviewed six airmen with B-52 experience: Mo Wiley, “Monty” Moncrief, Eric DePriest, Stephen Miracle, Harry Bender, and Glynn Breuer. Bender also demonstrated a midair refueling in a B-52 simulator. Additional details of B-52 culture came from retired airmen Max Kennedy and Donald Chase, interviewed by the author on August 25, 2005.

  25 Messinger was about to attempt: Background on midair refueling comes from Mike May, “Gas Stations in the Sky,” Invention &Technology 19, no. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 10–19, and Dennis Casey and Bud Baker, Fuel Aloft: A Brief History of Aerial Refueling, undated (AFHRA). For additional information on the importance of midair refueling to SAC, see Kohn and Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare, pp. 104–108.

  26 and they remain so today: In 2008, the Air Force awarded a contract for the next generation of aerial refueling tankers to the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) and the U.S.-based Northrop Grumman. Boeing and the U.S. Government Accountability Office challenged the decision, and the Pentagon decided to recompete the $35 billion contract. As of this writing, the KC-135 and its flying boom remain the state of the art, though some planes use a probe-and-drogue system.

  26 The boom is an aluminum tube: The description of a KC-135 refueling a B-52 comes from two sources: author’s visit to Minot Air Force Base on August 23, 2005, and author’s flight on a KC-135 refueling mission on July 29, 2005. During the refueling flight, boom operator Glen Starkweather answered many questions about the process; the boomer jokes come from him.

  28 “It was a dog”: Larry Messinger interview, October 19, 2004.

  28. “First you tell the plane to turn”: Harry Bender interview, August 23, 2005.

  29 Pilots usually refer to the B-52: The background on the B-52 comes from the author’s visit to Minot Air Force Base on August 23, 2005; author’s visit to the Strategic Air and Space Museum on August 25, 2005; and interviews with airmen with B-52 experience. Statistics on the number of B-52s in SAC’s inventory can be found in Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, p. 677.

  29 The G model: Information on the B-52G can be found at www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b-52g.

  29 B-52 pilots injected 10,000 pounds of water: The background on water augmentation comes from the author’s visit to Minot Air Force Base on August 23, 2005.

  30 Rooney and Wendorf suspect that fatigue failure: In one famous example, the horizontal stabilizer snapped off a B-52 during severe turbulence. The plane landed successfully. See “Something Missing,” Aerospace Safety, April 1964, pp. 4–7. The fatigue failure problem is also discussed at www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b-52g.

  31 The one surviving member: To the best of the author’s knowledge, Ross C. Cox is the only living member of the accident investigation board. He refused several requests for an interview.

  31 Buchanan, in the lower compartment: Buchanan’s story comes from author’s interviews with Mike Rooney and SAC Historical Study #109: Sixteenth Air Force Operation Recovery, 17 January–7 April, 1966 (History and Research Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1968), vol. 1, pp.
13–14.

  34 about eight miles from land: Different accounts place Messinger between five and fifteen miles from shore. “Eight miles” comes from SAC Historical Study #109, p. 15.

  35 The survivors stayed: The chronology of the survivors’ movements is from SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 14–16.

  35 At 7:05 a.m. Washington time: Letter, Bill Moyers to Flora Lewis, August 11, 1966 (LBJ).

  CHAPTER 3: THE FIRST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS

  37 Manolo González Navarro believed in fate: Manolo González’s story comes from author’s interview with Manolo and Dolores González, February 24, 2007, and “Operación Flecha Rota: Accidente nuclear de Palomares (Almería),” directed by José Herrera Plaza, 2007. Some additional information about Manolo and Dolores is in Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 26–29.

  38 Fiery debris rained onto Palomares: Additional information about the debris shower can be found in Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 41–42, and Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 22–28.

  38 Palomares sat on the southeastern coast: The description of Palomares in 1966 comes from author’s interview with Manolo and Dolores González, February 24, 2007; Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 14–22; author’s visit to the area, February 24–27, 2007.

  40 Wendorf’s bomber had not been alone: SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 5–10.

  40 The two planes had planned to switch: Report of Major Aircraft Accident, Wendorf’s statement, p. 2.

  41 the Morón Command Post radioed: SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 8–10.

  41 The tanker, after finishing the refueling: Ibid., p. 20.

  41. Morón reported the incident to SAC: Ibid., p. 9.

  42 the phone rang on the desk: Joe Ramirez’s recollections of the first twenty-four hours and his personal background are from author’s interviews with Ramirez, January 27, 2007, and April 27, 2007.

  44 About twenty minutes before 2 p.m.: SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 67–69. The times noted in the SAC Historical Study are “Zulu” time, or Greenwich Mean Time. The local time in Palomares was Zulu plus 1 hour.

  44 He was a steady, capable leader: The characterization of Wilson comes from author’s interviews with several men who served under him, including Walter Vornbrock on April 23, 2007, and Ralph Jenkins on March 14, 2007.

  44 Wilson also had a unique link: Coffey, Iron Eagle, pp. 148–149.

  45 he learned that three: Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 71; Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 79–81.

  46 “This miracle is too big”: Quoted in “An H-bomb Is Missing and the Hunt Goes On,” Newsweek, March 7, 1966, p. 57.

  46 Night had fallen by then: Additional details on the first night’s fruitless search can be found in Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 75–76.

  46 A sergeant named Raymond Howe: The story of finding bomb number one comes from Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 78–79, and Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 74–75.

  47 The bomb was torpedo-shaped: The description of the Mark 28 comes from Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New York: Crown Publishers, 1988), pp. 149–154, and James A. Gibson, Nuclear Weapons of the United States: An Illustrated History (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Publishing, 1996), pp. 99–100. Additional information can be found in Chuck Hansen, Swords of Armageddon, vol. 6: Gravity Bomb Histories (Sunnyvale, Calif.: Chukelea Publications).

  The Palomares weapons were Mark 28RI (Retarded Internal). There is disagreement as to whether the bomb was eleven or twelve feet long, perhaps because the bomb could be configured in different ways.

  47 It had a nine-inch gash: The condition of bomb number one is from SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 32–33, and Cable, DASA to RUECW/CNO, January 21, 1966, #51711 (LBJ).

  47 The “H” in “H-bomb”: The background on nuclear bombs comes from Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun, pp. 116–117 and pp. 247–248; Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, pp. 11–25; Jack Dennis, ed., The Nuclear Almanac: Confronting the Atom in War and Peace (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1984), chap. 10. The author has converted metric weights and measures to English units.

  49 “without splattering the beer”: Quoted in Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 117.

  50 “Fission bombs”: Ibid., p. 511.

  50 The exact inner workings: The explanation of a fusion bomb comes from Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, pp. 21–25, and Howard Morland, “The H-Bomb Secret,” The Progressive, November 1979, pp. 3–12. Andy Karam provided additional comments in his e-mail to the author, September 9, 2007.

  51 The charred remains: SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 18–19; Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 81–82; Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 76.

  52 General Wilson and his entourage: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 82; author’s interview with Joe Ramirez, January 27, 2007.

  52 thirty-eight guardias civiles: SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 18, 71.

  52 Wilson had sent a message: Ibid., pp. 76, 81; Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 75; Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 82.

  53 When Wilson’s message arrived in Torrejón: SAC Historical Study #109, p. 81; author’s interviews with Robert Finkel, April 4, 2007, and Phil Durbin, March 15, 2007.

  53 Ramirez and a handful of others: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 83; Joe Ramirez interview, January 27, 2007.

  53 By 7:30 a.m.: SAC Historical Study #109, p. 75.

  53 The small teams moved out: Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 82.

  54 helicopters arrived from Morón: Ibid., pp. 82, 84; SAC Historical Study #109, p. 22.

  54 Ramirez and others went to look: Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 84; Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 85–86; author’s interview with Joe Ramirez, January 27, 2007.

  54 Bomb number two was in bad shape: The condition of bomb number two is from SAC

  Historical Study #109, pp. 33–34; Cable, DASA to RUECW/CNO, January 21, 1966, #51711; and a photograph of the bomb obtained from NNSA through FOIA.

  55 If he had looked up: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 89.

  55. Bomb number three lay in a plowed field: The story of the discovery of bomb number three is in Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 88–89; Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 50–51, 84–85;

  “Special Report: Lost and Found, One H-Bomb,” CBS News, March 22, 1966.

  56 “I knew it was a bomb”: “Special Report: Lost and Found, One H-Bomb.” 56 According to some accounts: “An H-Bomb Is Missing and the Hunt Goes On,” p. 57.

  56 The bomb lay in its crater: The condition of bomb number three is from SAC Historical Study

  #109, pp. 34–35; Cable, DASA to RUECW/CNO, January 21, 1966, #51711; and a photograph of the bomb obtained from NNSA through FOIA.

  56 A situation report was sent: Memo, ATSD (AE) to Secretary of Defense et al. “Situation Report, B-52/KC-135 Accident, 17 January 1966,” January 18, 1966.

  CHAPTER 4: THE AMBASSADOR

  58 On the morning of the accident: Duke’s actions on the morning of the accident come from author’s interview with Joseph Smith, January 23, 2007, and Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 60–63. See also Angier Biddle Duke, “Address to American Management Association,” January 17, 1966, and Angier Biddle Duke, “Remarks of Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke on ‘CBS Special Report,’” March 16, 1966 (both in Angier Biddle Duke Papers, Box 18, Duke).

  59 If America had to choose: The background on Duke comes from author’s interviews with Robin Duke, June 7, 2007; George Landau, January 22, 2007; and Joseph Smith, January 23, 2007. Print sources include Current Biography 23, no. 2 (February 1962), p. 7; Marguerite Higgins, “He Takes the Starch Out of Protocol,” The Saturday Evening Post, September 29, 1962, pp. 24–25; E. J. Kahn, “Good Manners and Common Sense,” The New Yorker, August 15, 1964, pp. 34 ff; “New Diplomatic Hand,” Newsweek, January 11, 1965, pp. 27–28. Also see Angier Biddle Duke, Living History interview, conducted by James David Barber, John TePaske, and Taylor Cole, October 24, 1990 (Duke Living History Program, Box 1, Duke). A Duke family genealogy can be found at http://library.duke.edu/uarchives/his
tory/duke_familyndx.html.

  62 “tobacco-rich playboy”: “New Diplomatic Hand,” Newsweek, January 11, 1965, p. 27.

  62 “He has dedicated more sewers”: Quoted in Current Biography 23, no. 2 (February 1962), p. 8.

  62 “I’m lost”: E. J. Kahn, “Good Manners and Common Sense,” The New Yorker, August 15, 1964, p. 35.

  63 “When I got there”: Angier Biddle Duke, Living History interview, October 24, 1990, part II, p. 7.

  63 There was only one reason: The background on the importance of the Spanish bases comes from author’s interviews with George Landau, January 22, 2007, and Joseph Smith, January 23, 2007. Cable #1552 from the Embassy in Madrid, February 14, 1964 (LBJ), notes, “GOS attributes great importance to military relationship with US and would be most reluctant to liquidate present arrangements. However… It is psychologically very important to Spain that they stand up against us on some issue.”

  63 The Air Force operated three bases: Information on the U.S. military presence in Spain comes from Harry R. Fletcher, Air Force Bases, vol. 2: Air Bases outside the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force, Center for Air Force History, 1993), pp. 187 ff; and Arthur P. Whitaker, Spain and the Defense of the West: Ally and Liability (New York: Harper &Brothers, 1961), pp. 56–64.

  63 Zaragosa in northeastern Spain: Zaragosa was reduced to “modified caretaker status” on January 1, 1966, and reassigned to USAFE on April 15, 1966. It returned to active status on February 19, 1970, when Wheelus Air Base in Libya closed. Fletcher, Air Force Bases, p. 201.

  64 Generalissimo Francisco Franco: The description of Franco comes from Michael Streeter, Franco (London: Haus Publishing, 2005), and Jean Grugel and Tim Rees, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold Publishers, 1997). For further reading on the Spanish Civil War, see Hugh Thomas’s classic text The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper &Row, 1961).

  64 “the most uncharismatic dictator”: Angier Biddle Duke, Living History interview, October 24, 1990, part II, p. 10.

  65 The Allies worked hard: Spain’s relations with the West during World War II and in the postwar years is described in detail in Whitaker, Spain and the Defense of the West, chaps. 1 and 2. See also R. Richard Rubottom and J. Carter Murphy, Spain and the United States since World War II (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984).