Three Roads to the Alamo

by William C. Davis

  In response to these grievances, the committee resolved that they should reaffirm their support for Smith as governor, that all of the usurpatory acts of the council were null, “anarchical assumptions of power to which we will not submit,” that they should call on Houston's army to adopt similar resolutions, that the council had been “in the highest degree criminal and unjust” in misappropriating money intended for Béxar, that they repudiated Grant and all the officers of his illegal expedition, and that Smith himself accept their thanks. In so doing, said the resolutions, “yet under treatment however illiberal and ungrateful, we cannot be driven from the post of Honor and the sacred cause of freedom.” Certainly Bowie's influence was apparent in the forceful, even intemperate language used against the council and Grant. And in that last sentiment about the “post of Honor” could be read his own position on the most important issue of all. These were more than resolutions. They were Béxar's declaration of independence from the false authorities that ignored and abused the garrison. They were also the irrevocable announcement of Bowie and the rest that so long as this internal discord plagued the provisional government and the rest of its forces, they intended to stay there, come what may.93

  So Bowie decided to stand. He quartered in his old home at the Veramendi house, where Ursula's adopted sister, Juana, lived with her new husband, Horace Alsbury, and her sister Gertrudis. Bowie, though quite literate, was not facile with a pen, and Alsbury acted as secretary, writing his letters and passing the idle hours with him in conversation.94 Bowie stored his few belongings there for the time being. He also had four mules to stable in town, and at least one and maybe two slaves with him who had probably been in Béxar all along, including a cook.95 As soon as he arrived he began cultivating the tejano community again. Some suspected him, the old braggart they remembered from earlier days, and one or two at least believed that he really came only to prepare for another try at the San Saba treasure.96 In fact, however, most readily welcomed him back. Garza quickly became a main support in the town, and Bowie began politicking with other leading bexareños to bring them over to the revolutionary side, including Alcalde Francisco Ruiz.97 Within two weeks of his arrival, Bowie had cajoled the citizens and their leaders sufficiently that he commented on their cooperative attitude to Smith. In fact, there was no one else in Texas better qualified to get cooperation from them than Bowie.98 By January 30 Houston still had no answer to his suggestion of destroying the Alamo and evacuating San Antonio, and now spoke of the possibility instead of its being maintained.99 In any event the volunteers at Béxar had all but taken the matter out of his hands so long as he could not enforce his orders. By February 1 they had held their election, choosing Samuel Maverick and Jesse Badgett to represent them in the coming consultation.100 Now they were a political entity, one more encouragement to remain. Neill and Bowie pushed the work of the fortifications rapidly, and Bowie paid tribute to Neill's energy, saying that no other man in the army could have kept the command together as long as he had under the hardships it faced. The two of them used their imaginations in trying to raise funds to pay “the small but necessary expenses of our men,” with no success. They pleaded with Smith to send some money if he could. Bowie assumed from the outset that if the enemy did approach, then they would be besieged, and so they all worked long hours laying in as much of corn and beans and other foodstuffs as possible.

  To that end Bowie wrote to Smith on February 2 to implore that “relief at this post in men, money and provision is of vital importance.” He could not stress the point enough. “The salvation of Texas depends on keeping Béxar out of the hands of the enemy,” he said. He had good reports that the foe was marshaling in strength on the Rio Grande, and now his latest intelligence suggested that more than just a few hundred might move on San Antonio. He kept small parties of mounted volunteers out as far as the Rio Frio, fifty miles southwest, to keep watch. They brought no word of an advance as yet, but it might only be a matter of days before his scouts spotted the van of an advancing army.

  Bowie and Neill decided by now what they must do. “We will rather die in these ditches, than give it up to the enemy,” Bowie told Smith. “Public safety demands our lives rather than evacuate this post to the enemy.” He expected a few volunteers to be coming in within a few days, but he needed a large reinforcement with ample provisions. The muster that day showed only 120 men and officers. “It would be a waste of men to put our brave little band against thousands,” he pleaded. “Again we call loud for relief.” Until such reinforcements arrived, he and Neill would continue encouraging the men, scavenging for supplies, and watching for the enemy. Just before Bowie closed the letter a scout brought him fresh news that the enemy at the Presidio de Río Grande now numbered 2,000, with up to 5,000 more marching north through Mexico to join them. “There is no doubt,” he added, that their objective was Béxar.

  For a man who never before showed a sense either of understatement or irony, Bowie revealed a sudden inspiration of both when he closed his letter to Smith. “We have no interesting news to communicate,” he said. But then maybe it was not so ironic after all. For James Bowie, the man who single-handedly fought several at the Sandbar, who drove away perhaps 100 on the San Saba, who led 92 against 200 or more at Concepción and faced even greater odds in the Grass Fight—for Bowie, the man who tried to steal a kingdom in Louisiana and Arkansas, then tried to buy an empire in Texas—for Big Jim, who dreamed of a seat in Congress and who thought nothing of confronting the mighty in Washington when they stood in his way—for a man like James Bowie—the prospect of 120 ragged volunteers and twenty cannon facing 2,000 or more well-fed and -equipped Mexican soldiers, many of them seasoned professionals, simply may not have been enough to make what he called “interesting news.”101

  20

  TRAVIS

  1835—February 23, 1836

  I am determined to defend it to the last, and should Bejar fall, your friend will be buried beneath its ruins.

  WILLIAM BARRET TRAVIS, FEBRUARY 12, 1836

  Travis had no sooner unpacked his saddle bags in San Felipe than Texas claimed him again. On December 1 or 2 a member of the permanent council approached him with a question. The military committee needed advice on the organization of a proper army for the defense of Texas. Austin was gone, most of the other experienced company commanders were either resigned and gone home, or still with the army in Béxar, and Travis may have been the only experienced officer from the army readily at hand, or the only one trusted. Nevertheless, with the caveat that “my military experience is so limited,” he drafted on December 3 a comprehensive organizational plan to go before the council.

  Travis knew that Fannin had already sent in a proposal for a “regular,” or professional force, and thus since he wholeheartedly endorsed Fannin's outline, Travis confined himself to the volunteer forces, those to be raised during the time of emergency, and then released. Texas must have a dependable volunteer army ready and equipped to take the filed at a moment's notice. He suggested enlisting 1,000 to 1,600 men for a brigade, and one battalion of cavalry numbering 160 to 180, plus officers. The cavalry should be armed with broadswords, pistols, and double-barreled shotguns. A lieutenant colonel ought to command them, and he should report directly to Houston rather than through any intermediary officer. “I consider that such a Battalion as I have indicated, is indispensible to the service of Texas during the present struggle,” he said. “Do you wish to get information of the movements of a distant enemy? Cut of[f] supplies of the enemy? Harrass an invading army by hanging upon his rear, or forming ambushcades in his front? Do you wish to carry the war into the enemie's country as has been indicated?” If so, they needed calvary. “In an word, all the brilliant military exploits which have ever been performed in time & which we read of in the history of nations, have been accomplished by celerity of movement, promptness of action.”

  Travis made little attempt to conceal his own enthusiasm for the cavalry, and the unexpressed message in hi
s report fairly screamed that he wished to be its commander. “A storm is impending over us,” he warned. “The time that is ‘to try men's souls’ is yet to come.”1 The council shared his sense of urgency, and within two weeks deliberated on a bill incorporating substantially his recommendations for the “permanent” volunteer army, men to be enlisted and serve not for a specified time, but for the duration of the war. Even before that, however, the council revealed its other plans for Travis. It had been some time since he had seen Rebecca Cummings, and shortly after sending his ideas to the council, he rode out to cummings Mill to stay several days. He was with her on December 17 when news of several events reached him at the same time. Along with seemingly everyone else, he favored the idea of an expedition to take Matamoros, and now news of impending plans—Houston assigned Bowie to the operation that very day—persuaded him to reiterate to Lieutenant governor Robinson his support. “I intend to join the expedition of one is gotten up,” he said, “and I will execute to the best of my ability any command which the council may see proper to confer on me.”

  Travis knew he could expect a command because of the other news that came that day. Even while deliberating on the volunteer forces, the council organized the regular army of Texas, and that included a regiment of artillery. It chose Fannin as colonel, James Neill for lieutenant colonel, and Travis learned that he had been commissioned its major. Flattered though he was, he did not welcome the news. “I could not be so useful in the artillery as elsewhere,” he explained.2 Indeed, appointing Travis to the artillery did seem an ill-conceived idea, since his sole experience with cannon was loading one aboard the Ohio for the Anahuac raid. Moreover, he certainly had more practical field experience—limited though it was—than Fannin, while Neill out-stripped both of them in artillery expertise.

  More than anything else, these appointments represented compromises in the council. There were better commissions to be had, but some members felt that if they gave out all the best ranks in the regular services now, it might discourage experienced officers from he U.S. Army from resigning and coming to Texas to take commands, and they counted heavily on attracting such men of proven military education and talent. At the same time, the council was bitterly divided between Austin and Houston adherents. Fannin, at the moment, was a Houston man, also heavily identified with Frank Johnson and James Grant and the speculating faction that seemed to command a slight majority in the council. Neill, the most qualified, had no such base of support on the council, and Travis must in part have owed his appointment to the need of the majority on the council to appease in some measure the Henry Smith—Austin faction.3

  But it did not matter in any case, for Travis immediately wrote to Robinson with a polite but firm refusal of the post. Beyond question, he was holding out for a cavalry command, and since the regular army did not include a mounted arm, he wanted the company of volunteers that he had suggested to the military affairs committee. In the end he got it. On December 19 the council created the Legion of Cavalry, and the next day unanimously selected Travis to hold commission as lieutenant colonel in command. The act mandated a force of 384 men and officers, divided into six companies, and the council also appointed the captains, including Robert Wilson and Juan Seguín, though Seguín never accepted his appointment. An appointment as first lieutenant went to James Butler Bonham, the South Carolinian born near travis's boyhood home, who may possibly have known him, or at least who he was, during their childhood.4

  This appointment Travis accepted as quickly as offered. The act even specified the uniform of his legion, suits of cadet gray, cowhide boots, black cloth neck stocks, and fur caps, though uniforms were a long way in the future just then. The only adjustment the council made in Travis's recommendation was to call for six rather than four companies, with nearly double the number of men, and only half of them armed with shotguns, while the rest were to carry rifles. The result was the creation of a much larger unit, combining the mobility of cavalry, with the firepower of infantry. If Travis ever raised the full complement of his command, he would lead a force nearly as large as Austin's army when it first approached the Cibolo.

  Travis's commission was confirmed on December 24, and on that day he took his oath, and at a time when so much was being done in a communications vacuum, that some seemed uncertain of just what travis's command involved.5 Houston called the new unit the “First Regiment of Cavalry,” and thought it was in the regular army rather than the volunteers. At the same time, he seemed to be under the impression that Travis's new commission was as a colonel, and in the infantry.6 Meanwhile, down in Matagorda, on the coast one Texian official thought Travis might be available as a lawyer to settle a shipping dispute.7 The confusion for many only disappeared early in January when the Telegraph and Texas Register actually published the roll of officers of the legion.8

  There was little time to lose on confusion and cross-purposes. On Christmas Day San Felipe got information from San Antonio, dated December 18, of an advance toward Texas by a large contingent of Mexican soldados, on its way both to relieve and avenge Cós's loss of Béxar. At once the military committee ordered Fannin to go to the west and take command of the volunteers until recently commanded by Burleson, and at the same time gave Travis instructions to go immediately to the frontier with all the volunteers he could gather.9 The Weeks of confusion over the ill-fated Matamoros expedition ensued, but happily Travis stayed out of that, for he had more pressing matters.

  He may have been lieutenant colonel of the mounted legion, but it was a unit in name only until he could recruit the men to fill its ranks. There was no recruiting service. Each commander had to raise his own volunteers, and the council made no appropriation for recruiting expenses until December 21, when it voted for forty thousand dollars, which mostly it did not have.10 Houston gave travis orders on December 23 to make his headquarters in San Felipe and immediately start recruiting, direction further that Travis send his captains off into the countryside to recruit, and even that he send one or more of them to Louisiana and Mississippi to raise their companies, all to return and rendezvous by March 1, 1836.11 Travis quickly sent Bonham to San Antonio to try to recruit among the informal volunteers there, and then to proceed to Goliad.12 Travis himself would stay in San Felipe.

  The work of raising his men tasked Travis more stressfully than anything he had done since moving to Texas. The council did at least allow him some enlistment inducements, including a 640-acre land bounty, plus a bonus of an additional 160 acres and twenty-four dollars, though only half of the money was to be paid in hand on signing up, and the land itself would not be forthcoming until—and unless—Texas won its independence.13 Feeding and clothing the men once they did take their twelve dollars and give their oath presented an equal challenge. In January he personally initiated ordering the uniforms and equipment for his men through Thomas McKinney, and met with McKinney personally to place an order for his own military clothing, which he apparently designed himself in the absence of any legislation covering officers' uniforms.14 As the number of his volunteers slowly grew, he had to purchase food and gear for them personally, furnishing merchants an order against the provisional government, and sometimes the necessary articles proved hard to find, as everyone was scouring the shops and countryside.15 When forced to, he used his own credit to buy what he needed.16 Travis himself arrived back from the Béxar siege to find that one of his own horses had been impressed by the military in his absence, and now he resorted once more to impressment himself to get at least one of his men mounted.17

  The worst challenge of the was finding the men. They simply did not come forward. “Volunteers can no longer be had or relied upon,” he complained to Smith, and by late in January he began to believe that only an enforced conscription could raise the men needed to defend Texas. “In consequence of dissentions between contending and rival chieftains, they have lost all confidence in their own govt. & officer,” he lamented, thinking in part of the controversy over the Matamoros expediti
on, but also of the battle within the provisional government.18 The situation had become bad enough that Travis actually resorted to deception to persuade enlistees. He told Edward Wood that “the surest chance, for a commission in the army was to enlist in the Calvary Corps,” and promised that if Wood signed up with him he would have a priority claim on promotion, actually promising him elevation within a few days. Wood gullibly enlisted under those terms, but two days later when Travis roused him from slumber to drill under what Wood called “some Corporal Sergeant or other inferior officer,” the recruit rebelled. He reminded Travis of his promise of speedy promotion, and insisted on being released from service if Travis could not keep the bargain. Travis simply refused. He needed every man, and apparently did not scruple at how he got them.19

  All the while, with the prospect of a long campaign ahead of him, Travis also had to pay some attention to his personal affairs. The partnership with Willis Nibbs had not worked out, and it expired on January 20.20 Unattended business accumulated. He had an inventory of notes he had been engaged to collect, and not yet seen to. Suits needed investigation. There were wills and estates to look after. Travis certainly knew even before the partnership expired that he could not handle this himself while absent with his command. 21 He needed another partner, and happily found one just in time. Franklin J. Starr had come from Georgia in 1834, looked around Texas, then returned home again, only to leave in November 1835 for the Brazos area once more, arriving in January 1836. He had been unable to resist the lure of the new country, though he wavered for a time until his friends told him to go. “Your ruling passion is avarice,” one told Starr playfully, borrowing Crockett's idiom. “Well, go ahead! for that is the only true philosophy which teaches that to be continually active in endeavoring to acquire that which we do not possess is the road to happiness.” Even as Starr and Travis formed their partnership, his brother in Georgia wrote to remind him that “Crocket's motto is the best that can be devised.”22