Demokrasi

by Hamish McDonald

  Disputes have been running since the 1950s over the ownership of islands and seabed resources in the sea adjacent to the Malaysia-Indonesia border on the eastern side of Kalimantan. In 2002 the International Court of Justice upheld Malaysia’s claims to two small islands, Sipadan and Ligitan. The two governments now wrangle over the seabed boundary, which straddles a potentially huge oil and gas field known as the Ambalat block on the Indonesian side. Incursions by navy patrol boats and the construction of lighthouses have led to tense confrontations and at least one ramming incident.

  Being able to match Malaysia in the air and on the sea became one of the unvoiced reasons for Indonesia to acquire advanced weaponry; in 2013 some of its newly acquired Sukhoi-30 fighters were stationed in Makassar in order to be close to the disputed area. If ASEAN deliberations often seemed to be more aimed at building personal relationships than achieving any immediate outcomes, keeping disputes like this under control was partly the reason.

  In an echo of its Cold War position, Indonesia tried to avoid lining up on either side in the new strategic rivalry that was building between China and the United States. As much as it wanted to welcome back the American president Barack Obama, who spent part of his childhood in Jakarta, Indonesia’s government was sniffy about Obama’s announcement in November 2011 of a strategic “pivot” into Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, particularly his plan to rotate a US Marine Corps strike force through Australian bases in Darwin each year, close to Indonesia’s restive eastern provinces. But it could not help tilting one way.

  Suharto had resumed relations with Beijing in 1990. In the new century, Chinese banks and enterprises began investing heavily in Indonesia’s infrastructure and resources sector, and Sino-Indonesian businesses invested deeply in their ancestral homeland. Yet China’s abrasive grab for resources, such as coal and timber, often ignoring customs procedures, gave it a predatory character. Its official uptake of Indonesian exports was 11.4 percent of the total in 2012, lagging behind that of the largest market, Japan, at 16 percent. With imports, the China-Japan balance was roughly reversed. In 2013 the Chinese ambassador in Jakarta was complaining privately to diplomatic colleagues about perceived snubs from Indonesian leaders and officials. China’s assertion of territorial and resource rights in the South China Sea also touched on Indonesia’s claims. It had no islands or reefs in dispute, unlike Vietnam and the Philippines. But Beijing’s famous “nine-dash line” on its map of the sea, denoting its claim to maritime resources down to its southern and western areas, cut into Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone.

  In November 2013 the Indonesian air force held a large-scale exercise around the Natuna Islands, Indonesia’s territorial outpost in the South China Sea. In March 2014 its navy was due to hold a similar defense exercise, which was clearly aimed at sending a message to China. The Chinese navy preceded this with an unusual exercise in which a flotilla of warships returning from the Middle East diverted south through the Sunda Strait, cruised eastward off the south coasts of Java and Bali, and then headed north through the Lombok and Makassar Straits—all a perfectly legal maneuver under the law of the sea and duly notified to Indonesia, but a show of naval reach nonetheless.

  Under the “free and active” rubric, Indonesia’s diplomats pursue an active role in multilateral forums. Indonesia keeps nearly 2,000 military personnel attached to UN peacekeeping missions in Darfur and South Sudan, Lebanon, the Congo, Haiti, Liberia, and the Philippines and has declared its willingness to join any mission set up in Syria. Frowning on interventions outside a direct UN mandate, it opposed the American-led campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.

  Although Indonesia is an assiduous member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, its position as the largest Muslim nation by population is not matched by its authority on religious or Middle East political questions. It remains a receiver of wisdom from the Arab world, rather than a messenger of multireligious tolerance. Its lack of formal diplomatic relations with Israel limits its influence on the Palestinian question; its offer of help in mediating the tension over Iran’s nuclear program was not taken up by either Tehran or Israel and the West. Its pressure on Myanmar’s junta amounted to quiet jawboning and waiting for a change of mind, rather than applying sanctions or exclusions with ASEAN. In short, Indonesia’s diplomacy is long on so-called soft power and short on application of “hard power” sanctions or force.

  This was realistic enough in ambition. Indonesia’s 6 percent average growth during much of Yudhoyono’s presidency took its economy past $1 trillion in size. If this growth is sustained, Indonesia will enter the list of the world’s ten biggest economies in a decade or so. Several studies by banks and rating agencies suggested a $9 trillion economy by 2030, which would make it the sixth-largest economy after China, the United States, India, Brazil, and Japan. The fashionable concept of the “BRIC” emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China) expanded to include Indonesia, before growth faltered and deficits blew out in several of these countries. If many Indonesians came to assume that finally their nation was about to come into its destiny as a great power, wiser heads among them were pointing out that much better performance in economic policy and delivery would be required.

  The identity of the Indonesian republic wrapped around this economy also still seems to be in formation. Will the educated strata left by the European Enlightenment continue to grow and prevail over the authoritarian mentality bequeathed by the harder side of colonial power and the Japanese occupation? Will diversity flourish, or will the “unitary state” draw power back to the center? Will the competition of market-based capitalism eventually overwhelm the cooperative impulse that is still so embedded in Indonesian thinking on the right pathways of commerce? Will the syncretic cultures of Java, Bali, and other proud ethnicities resist the “Arabization” that is infiltrating the nation through heightened religious devotion?

  As the republic moves through its second half century, these questions remain. Perhaps, in the “staging place for all races” between two great oceans that Hatta wrote about in 1953, it is characteristic of the nation to leave them open.

  Acknowledgments

  To list the fellow journalists, the academics, the politicians, the officials, the diplomats, and others who have helped me over the course of my working life to understand Indonesia—or at least to think I understand it—would require a book in itself. Many contributed unknowingly in encounters and gatherings over recent years to the background of this book. But as I put together this snapshot of Indonesia as it moves through the second decade of this century, the following individuals responded promptly and helpfully.

  Peter McCawley, Christopher Manning, Asep Suryahadi, Satrio Budihardjo Joedono, and Bambang Ismawan were my guides through economic issues. James Castle, Gene Galbraith, Shoeb Zainuddin, Patrick Alexander, Henry Heinz, Donald Greenlees, Geoffrey Gold, Christopher Flanagan, and Daniel Horan were informed and wise advisers in the labyrinth of commerce and resource extraction. In Australia, Marcus Meitzner, David Reeve, Tim Lindsey, Adrian Vickers, and Vanessa Stearman were ready reference points on political and social trends, as were, in Jakarta, the old hands Tim Scott and Dennis Heffernan, while Agus Widjojo spoke frankly about military reform.

  In Surabaya, Leak Kustiya, the editor in chief of Jawa Pos, took a day to show me around this vibrant city, while Rohman Budijanto and his team at the media group’s Institut Pro-Otomi briefed me on regional government. As always, my journalist friends in Jakarta were superbly informed and lucid. Among them, Sabam Siagian, Ati Nurbaiti, Warief Djajanto Basorie, John McBeth, Yuli Ismartono, Lin Neumann, Michael Bachelard, Karuni Rompies, and Otje Soedioto gave me their insights and opened their contact books. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Adi Sasono, and Ilham Habibie gave me their time to discuss the role of Muslim intellectuals. Andreas Harsono, of Human Rights Watch, and Sidney Jones, of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, briefed me on human rights issues, as di
d Sayid Iqbal and Simon Field on the role of organized labor. On environmental questions, particular help came from Muslim Rasyid, of Jikalahari, and Susanto Kurniawan, of the Elang Foundation, both in Pekanbaru, and from Chandra Kirana, of Daemeter in Bogor. Damien Kingsbury gave me introductions to Mohammed Nur Djuli and Shadia Mahaban, who told me their gripping stories of the Aceh conflict and peace process. In Jayapura, the governor of Papua, Lukas Anambe, gave me a long midnight interview at the end of a busy day. The Papua region police chief, Tito Karnavian, gave me a long and frank briefing on security issues, while valuable insights on Papuan sentiment came from Neles Tebay, Paul Mambrasar, Manfred Naa, and Frits Ramandey. In Sydney, Peter King and Jim Elmslie helped with the latest scholarship on this troubled region.

  Rizal Sukma organized a room and a visiting fellowship for me at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, which became my base for research. Three of the founders of the CSIS—Harry Tjan Silalahi, Jusuf Wanandi, and Klara Juwono—were as informed, incisive, and outspoken as they were during my first years in Indonesia. Lina Alexandra deftly organized the logistics of my CSIS stay between her own research. I thank them all.

  At the Australian National University, Andrew MacIntyre and Andrew Walker at the College of Asia and the Pacific allowed me the flexibility to mix my book research with writing and editing, and I was supported by James Giggacher and Belinda Cranston of the college’s media unit. Nadjib Riphat Kesoema, Indonesia’s ambassador in Canberra, Gary R. M. Jusuf, consul general in Sydney, and their staff were helpful in making arrangements, as were Siti Sofia Sudarma and her team at the Information and Media Directorate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jakarta. Ambassador Greg Moriarty and his staff at the Australian embassy were also most supportive. Julian Welch, my editor at Black Inc., worked with great skill while the rest of Australia was enjoying the summer break; his editing and suggestions resulted in a much improved book. My wife, Penny, held the fort at home in Sydney during my long absences on research trips, and I thank her too.

  The accuracy of all the content of this book and responsibility for any errors remain at the feet of the author, however, and it is always wise to recall the old Jakarta saying: “Anyone who thinks he understands the situation is sadly mistaken.”

  Notes on Sources

  Please note that some of the links referenced in this work are no longer active.

  Chapter 1: Nusantara

  Onghokham ideas on “Mooi Indie” (Beautiful Indies) are discussed in David Reeve et al. (eds.) Onze Ong: Onghokham Dalam Kenangan, Komunitas Bambu, 2007. The references to the writings of M. C. Ricklefs come from his panoramic A History of Modern Indonesia, ca. 1300 to the present, 4th edition, Palgrave and Stanford University Press, 2008; Benedict Anderson’s comment from his essay, “The idea of power in Javanese Culture,” in Claire Holt (ed.) Culture and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell U.P., 1972; Herbert Feith’s observations from The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Cornell U.P., 1962.

  Chapter 2: The Crocodile Hole

  Clifford Geertz put his theory about the cultivation of Java in Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia, University of California Press, 1963. The cited comment by Harry J. Benda comes from his 1964 essay “Democracy in Indonesia,” that by David Levine from his 1969 essay “History and Social Structure in the Study of Contemporary Indonesia,” and that by Herbert Feith from his “History, Theory and Indonesian Politics: A Reply to Harry J. Benda,” published in 1965. These three articles are included in Benedict Anderson & Audrey Kahin (eds.) Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1982, republished by Equinox (Singapore) 2010. The account of the September 30 Movement and its immediate effects draws from Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell, 1978; John Roose, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’Etat in Indonesia, University of Wisconsin Press, 2006; Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968, Stanford U.P. 2008; Jusuf Wanandi, Shades of Grey: A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia 1965-1998, Equinox, 2012; Kurniawan et al., Pengakuan Algojo 1965 [Admitting the 1965 Slaughter], Tempo Publishing, 2013.

  Chapter 3: The New Order

  Ruth T. McVey made the cited comparison in her 1977 essay “The Beamtenstaat in Indonesia,” also in Benedict Anderson & Audrey Kahin (eds.) Interpreting Indonesian Politics cited above. The Sawito affair (including Ali Murtopo’s remark) was examined by the magazine Tempo in its issues of October 16, 1976, August 13, 1977, and November 19, 1977. Radius Prawiro made the remark about B. J. Habibie’s aircraft project to Raphael Pura, correspondent of The Asian Wall Street Journal; the late president Suharto wrote Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX out of the Yogyakarta clash of March 1, 1949, and also admitted approval of the “mysterious killings” of alleged criminals in his autobiography Soeharto: Pikiran, Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya, Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989. The chapter draws on the author’s Suharto’s Indonesia, CollinsFontana, 1980, and University of Hawaii Press, 1981, for the early New Order years, and Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, Westview Press, 1994, and updated editions in 1999 and 2004 which carried the story through to Suharto’s fall and just beyond. Angus McIntyre’s The Indonesian Presidency, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, provided many insights into the cultural and psychological factors behind the careers of Sukarno, Suharto and Megawati Sukarnoputri.

  Chapter 4: Reformasi

  The account of B. J. Habibie’s presidency draws on his autobiography Detik-detik Yang Menentukan [Decisive Moments], Ilthabi Rekatama, 2006; R. E. Elson’s paper “Engineering from within: Habibie the man and Indonesia’s reformasi,” for the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies conference on “Indonesia’s reformasi: reflections on the Habibie era,” March 26-27, 2007; Endy M. Bayuni, “How Soeharto schemed and Habibie botched it,” The Jakarta Post, October 9, 2006; Wimar Witoelar, “The Lady or the Tiger, or Habibie guesses wrong,” www.perspektif.net, October 9, 2006; “Wiranto’s Game Plan,” cover story Tempo [English edition] No. 06/VII/Oct 10–16, 2006; “Coup D’etat!,” cover story Tempo [English edition] No. 05/VII/Oct 03–09, 2006; author’s interview with Adi Sasono, August 29, 2013. Tempo, September 18-24, 2000, reported the remark of Ali Alatas on the Santa Cruz massacre. The Wikileaks cache of State Department cables includes former US ambassador Cameron Hume report of Habibie’s account of his last words with Suharto. Angus McIntyre’s insightful The Indonesian Presidency greatly helped the passages on the Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri presidencies.

  Chapter 5: Tsunami

  This story of the Aceh conflict and the peace settlement quotes extensively from the author’s interviews in Banda Aceh with Shadia Mahaban and Mohammed Nur Djuli in May 2013. Anthony Reid (ed.), Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem, National University of Singapore Press, 2006, was an immensely useful source on the history of the region and origins of the revolt. The cited comment by Reid comes from his fascinating introduction and chapter on the Dutch colonial impact. The Indonesian side of the Helsinki peace negotiations is recounted in Hamid Awaluddin (Tim Scott trans.), Peace in Aceh, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 2009.

  Chapter 6: Beyond Dwifungsi

  The remarks by retired army general Agus Widjojo come from an interview by the author in August 2013. The State Department cables published by Wikileaks were an invaluable source on developments in Indonesian military affairs and the thinking of military leaders up until 2010; all references to US Embassy reports come from this material. Otherwise, quoted comments come from contemporary reports in The Jakarta Post, The Jakarta Globe, or Tempo magazine. The remark by Prabowo Subianto about the lack of written orders in the Indonesian military was quoted by Ken Conboy in Kopassus: Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces, Equinox, 2003. The pass
age on the separation of the military from business activity was helped by the Human Rights Watch report “Unkept Promise; Failure to End Military Business Activity in Indonesia,” January 12, 2010 and Lex Reiffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, Out of Business and on Budget: the challenge of military financing in Indonesia, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2007. Background on the military and its doctrines comes in Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: from turbulent transition to democratic consolidation, ISEAS (Singapore), 2009, and Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, Routledge, 2003. The comments by the 1970 military academy class came in Sudrajat et al, Mengawali Integrasi Mengusung Reformasi: Pengabdian Alumni Akabri Pertama 1970, Kata Hasta Pusaka, Jakarta 2012.

  Chapter 7: Supreme Commodity

  Anecdotal material on the coal-mining boom in Kalimantan came from interviews during 2013 with industry figures who asked to be kept anonymous. Wahyu Dhyatmika, Khaidir Rahman, SG Wibisono, Firman Hidayat, “The Coal Capitalists,” Tempo Interaktif, August 16, 2012, gave further biographical material on the new coal barons. The portrait of the impoverished past of Srihardjo came from David Penny & Masri Singarimbun, Population and Poverty in Indonesia: Some Economic Arithmetic from Srihardjo, Cornell University, Department of Agricultural Economics, 1973. The picture of the more comfortable present came from a visit with Christopher Manning in September 2013. Asep Suryahadi of the SMERU Research Institute, and Satrio Budihardjo Joedono, emeritus professor of economics at the University of Indonesia, gave interviews from which the quoted remarks are taken. J. K. Galbraith’s paradigm came of course from The Affluent Society, Houghton Mifflin, 1958. Manning’s conclusions about the effect of minimum wage rises came in “A Robust Wage Campaign in 2013,” The Jakarta Post, June 4, 2013. Vikram Nehru wrote about the conflict between the macro-economic managers and the departmental nationalists in “Manufacturing in India and Indonesia: performance and policies,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (BIES), Vol. 49, Issue No.1 2013. Hadi Soesastro’s remark is recalled in Hal Hill & Mari Elka Pangestu, “M. Hadi Soesastro: Indonesian Public Intellectual, Asia Pacific Visionary,” BIES Vol. 46, Issue No. 2, 2010.