Rage Company

by Daly, Thomas P.

  Hydraulic fluid from the aircraft dripped onto my groin pad and body armor. In the night’s darkness, the fluid was jet-black. It pooled in two distinct spots, and I immediately recognized the symbolism. The color and texture of the fluid were, in the dark, the same as the blood of my fallen comrades. I looked up to find the source of the leak, waiting for the third and even more symbolic drop. It never came.

  It didn’t have to. I knew what had to happen. If the world was going to know of Melia’s, Ahlquist’s, and Chavez’s sacrifice and the victory that forfeiture of life had achieved in Ramadi, someone had to tell them.

  15

  OPERATION SQUEEZE PLAY: A SUMMARY

  Part 1: The Situation

  A. Purpose

  On September 13, 2006, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) sailed out of San Diego, California. Embarked on three naval warships were the members of Rage Company and their parent unit: 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines (2/4). The standard purpose of an MEU is to serve as America’s rapid response force. At least two such units are continually deployed around the globe to protect American interests abroad. Our original orders were not to enter Iraq but to offload into Kuwait and stand by for any emergency that might arise in the Middle East.

  On November 9, 2006, the 15th MEU was ordered into Al Anbar Province. General John Abizaid, the CINC U.S. Central Command, was transferring us to the operational control of Multi-National Corps-Iraq’s commander, General George Casey. The use of the MEU was the result of a decision by Iraq’s number two in command, General Raymond Odierno, and also received the blessing of Iraq’s future commander General David Petraeus. Together, these two men had a plan to stabilize Baghdad, and it began by putting the pressure on al Qaeda’s Sunni base of operations: Al Anbar Province.

  B. Strategy for Anbar

  Once the decision to deploy the MEU in Iraq was announced, the junior officers of the battalion were immediately privy to a cascade of information, the most important of which was the plan for Operation Squeeze Play, what ended up being the shaping phase of the greater surge strategy. At the same time that Squeeze Play was being planned, Sheikh Sattar and his secular insurgents declared an “Awakening” against al Qaeda. It wasn’t until Operation Squeeze Play was in full swing that they would overtly join America against al Qaeda.

  Squeeze Play’s planners chopped the MEU into three separate units. They sent the majority of the MEU—the command element, the artillery battery, the reconnaissance platoon, and the combat logistics battalion—to the western city of Rutbah. On arrival, the command element formed its own brigade/regimental area of operations: AO Bull-Rush. Before the creation of AO Bull-Rush, the entire region surrounding Rutbah fell to the responsibility of a single light-armored reconnaissance battalion. This battalion was spread out over hundreds of miles and exerted minimal control over Rutbah.

  The second largest unit, the headquarters element of 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines and two subordinate infantry companies (Company G and Weapons), was sent to the Haditha Triad. The battalion’s two remaining company-size units were sent to Ramadi.

  If you were to plot these three cities (Rutbah, Haditha, and Ramadi) on a map, you would see their strategic importance. Only one highway runs west to Iraq’s border with Jordan and southern Syria. It passes through Rutbah. The route to Anbar’s other gateway, where the Euphrates River Valley flows into Syria, passes through the Haditha Triad. Heading east toward Baghdad, both of these routes intersect on the outskirts of Ramadi. Al Qaeda understood the three locations’ strategic importance; large swaths of each city were under their control. Squeeze Play sought to contest these militant-controlled areas and hopefully divert the enemy’s attention away from Baghdad. At a minimum, the insurgents would be forced to fight on multiple fronts.

  C. Executing Operation Squeeze Play

  In the grand scheme, Rage Company was written from a narrow perspective. While it does capture the birth of the Awakening movement from a first-person point of view, it does not provide a larger context toward explaining how operational and strategic-level events shaped the Awakening. The following will help you grasp the root causes of the dramatic success that appeared seemingly overnight in Al Anbar Province during spring 2007.

  Phase I: November 9, 2006-January 10, 2007

  Rutbah: The 15th MEU Command Element and its subordinate units became operational in AO Bull-Rush at the end of November 2006. The initial focus was placed on securing the two major points of entry (POEs) on Iraq’s western border with Syria and Jordan. Then they sought to bolster the regional Iraqi Highway Patrol. The center of Rutbah itself remained largely under al Qaeda’s control.

  Haditha Triad: When 2/4 arrived in the region, also at the end of November, there was a single Marine infantry battalion already on the ground and responsible for the entire triad. So, the adjoining units decided to use the Euphrates River as their boundary, with 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines (2/3) occupying the towns on the western side (Haditha and Haqlaniyah), while 2/4 formed AO Bastard to the east in the town of Barwana.

  The deployment for 2/4 began by taking control of Barwana. They did this by conducting a battalion-size assault and following it up with the construction of an earthen wall around the entire town. The populace of twenty thousand was essentially locked inside the wall, with all civilian traffic coming in and out subject to a search by the Marines. The constant barrage of insurgent attacks ceased almost immediately.

  Ramadi: In Anbar’s capital, the brigade received Company F (call sign Rage) and Company E, 2/4. Company E was immediately assigned to 1/9 Infantry, in order to help the undermanned army battalion occupy all of its required positions. Company F, or Rage Company as it is called in the book, was used as a brigade-level maneuver asset, a tactic I had never seen before. Instead of being assigned to a piece of land, we were moved from battalion to battalion, pushing the insurgents out of their safe havens and isolating them in the Mila’ab.

  Phase II: January 11-April 1, 2007

  At the end of Phase I, the Haditha Triad was under total coalition control. Ramadi was still contested, but the insurgents were being isolated in the Mila’ab and slowly pushed out of the city. The 1st Marine Division, in command of Anbar, shifted its focus to Rutbah, removing Company E from Ramadi and attaching them to AO Bull-Rush.

  Rutbah: In early January, a message between insurgent leaders was captured by coalition troops. Al Qaeda had declared Ramadi too dangerous and was seeking ways to relocate its base of operations. The message stated that the insurgents were going to move their weapons in a tractor trailer, through the desert, and attempt to reestablish themselves in Rutbah. At the time, the 15th MEU had not entered the city center itself, making Rutbah the last potential safe haven along al Qaeda’s Syrian and Jordanian infiltration routes.

  Whether the insurgents actually shifted the bulk of their weaponry to Rutbah, I do not know. Either way, at the end of January, the 15th MEU assaulted Rutbah’s city center and seized control of the city. Resistance to the coalition quickly dissipated.

  Haditha Triad: The arrival of 2/4 greatly reduced violence within the region. As a response, local sheikhs began to sign their men up for Iraqi police positions. Although sporadic attacks did occur, the repeated violence that had taken place before 2/4 arrived was effectively over. The Haditha Triad was pacified.

  Ramadi: In January, the city’s insurgents were off balance. Isolated in the Mila’ab and unable to mount sustained resistance to the increased coalition presence, al Qaeda attempted to regroup. At some point, the terrorist group’s regional commander, Mullah Qahttan, returned to the city, forsaking his mission of reigniting the insurgency in Fallujah.

  The decisive moment for the city of Ramadi was when Rage Company shifted out east to Julayba. When this took place, at the end of January 2007, the Sunni insurgency’s two distinct factions (secular-nationalists and AQI Islamists) were placed in two very different positions. The secular groups were given an opportunity; al Qaeda was threatened. The evidence for this is
clear on the secular side: Thawar Al Anbar moved openly to assist Rage Company. But al Qaeda also subtly identified Julayba as its base of operations. In the first week after Rage Company arrived, IED attacks in Ramadi proper plummeted. In Julayba, they skyrocketed. For insurgents to shift their focus of effort and resources from the urban streets of Ramadi to a cluster of agricultural villages meant one thing: to them, Julayba was more important.

  By our challenging al Qaeda in Julayba, the militant group’s operations were severely disrupted. The leadership could no longer comfortably coordinate attacks; there was no rest-and-refit location for AQI foot soldiers. In less than two months, their regional commander was detained, along with more than one hundred followers, and a few dozen more were killed. The conditions for an uprising were set. The scouts, Abu Ali in particular, seized the moment in dramatic fashion.

  The Lasting Success of Squeeze Play

  The uprising that occurred in Julayba, a piece of what is commonly referred to as the Awakening, did not end in Ramadi. Instead, it spread like wildfire, scorching the al Qaeda network both east and west along the Euphrates River Valley. When it reached Baghdad, many critics thought it would falter, but it only grew more intense. Moving south to the Sunni Triangle and north into Diyala Province, countless Sunni sheikhs forcibly removed or killed al Qaeda’s foreign leadership and reconciled their young men back into society.

  Part of the reason for this momentum was the surge. All across Iraq, U.S. troops were entering cities, villages, and neighborhoods that historically had never had an American presence. By sending these additional troops into the same regions where the populace was dissatisfied with the brutal local al Qaeda government, America placed itself, for the first time, in a position to succeed in Iraq. We now had an opportunity to implement the key factor in defeating a guerrilla movement: finding common ground with the people of Iraq.

  Part 2: Changing the Tide of the War

  The following is a time line that I believe will help the reader understand where Operation Squeeze Play fits into a broader context of the Iraq War’s history. The time line begins when violence was at its peak, the summer of 2006.

  Summer 2006: The U.S. president officially orders a review of military strategy in Iraq. In the city of Ramadi, soldiers of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armor Division begin to seize “combat outposts,” turning Iraqi homes into American fortresses in the city’s urban sprawl. The methods are what General David Petraeus refers to as “clear, hold, build.”

  September 2006: Sheikh Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi declares an Awakening of Anbar’s tribes against al Qaeda from his home in Ramadi. His fighters begin a guerrilla campaign against the extremist movement.

  October 18, 2006: Al Qaeda declares Ramadi the capital of the Islamic State of Iraq. Its fighters hold a parade 800 meters from Anbar’s capital building and claim to have crushed Sattar’s Awakening.

  November 9, 2006: The 15th MEU is ordered into Al Anbar Province to execute Operation Squeeze Play. Almost 2,500 Marines are sent to the cities of Rutbah, Haditha, and Ramadi. The goal of the mission is to prepare the battlefield for the surge by denying al Qaeda its traditional stronghold.

  December 2006-late January 2007: A series of coalition operations within Ramadi corners al Qaeda fighters in the city’s Mila’ab neighborhood. The district is subsequently barricaded with massive concrete barriers.

  January 10, 2007: President Bush announces the surge to America.

  January 25, 2007: Awakening fighters approach U.S. Marines from the 15th MEU on the eastern outskirts of Ramadi, offering assistance against al Qaeda. The two units begin a campaign to rid the local area of al Qaeda’s command-and-control network for Al Anbar Province.

  January 2007: The 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division deploys to Baghdad. They are the first of the five surge brigades sent to stabilize the capital. The other brigades follow monthly throughout the spring.

  February 2007: Operation Imposing Law begins in Baghdad; it is the first mission to use surge forces in Iraq’s capital. In Ramadi, elements of 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry and the Iraqi army begin to assault the Mila’ab sector. After suffering five KIAs and fifty-two WIAs in five days, they halt the offensive and regroup. They eventually clear the entire sector with the assistance of 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines.

  February 16, 2007: The House of Representatives passes a concurrent resolution stating, “Congress disapproves of the decision of President George W. Bush announced on January 10, 2007, to deploy more than 20,000 additional United States combat troops to Iraq.”

  March 11, 2007: After a series of joint raids between Awakening fighters and Marines east of Ramadi, who arrested 150 al Qaeda fighters, the extremist network begins a brutal campaign against local civilians. The violence backfires, sparking an open revolt against al Qaeda’s terror that begins on this date.

  April 2007: Violence in Ramadi abates, and the Awakening spreads.

  June 16, 2007: Operation Phantom Thunder begins in and around Baghdad. Surge forces begin to enter former al Qaeda strongholds throughout the capital. Within months, the Anbar Awakening and surge forces in Baghdad drive al Qaeda from the Sunni villages south of Baghdad and Al Anbar Province. The terror group is eventually isolated in Diyala, north of Baghdad and Mosul.

  Summer 2007: General Petraeus turns the Awakening into a permanent force, paying the fighters for their service with U.S. currency and calling them the “Sons of Iraq.”

  August 29, 2007: Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr calls for his fighters to observe a six-month truce with U.S. and Iraqi forces. This call for a truce comes after the success of the Anbar Awakening and is a politically calculated move. This is not the first time Sadr declares a cease-fire to regroup (June 2004). The cleric understands that with cooperation between the Iraqi government and Sunni tribes, the focus of U.S. and Iraqi forces will shift to his militia. He is right.

  Fall-Winter 2007: Violence in Baghdad drops dramatically. Surge and Iraqi forces, supported by secular Sunni militias, now occupy every major neighborhood and district except for Sadr City. In Ramadi, Iraqi forces begin to take over the combat outposts established by 1/1 AD. The Awakening begins to transition from a militia force to one that is capable of providing security to its citizens.

  February 22, 2008: With Sadr’s network of corrupt officials within Iraq’s Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Health crumbling, he declares an extension to the cease-fire. The Iraqi government, empowered by the fact that Sunnis are no longer fighting them in large numbers, attempts to exploit the situation.

  March 25, 2008: Iraqi forces launch an offensive against Sadr’s militia in the country’s third largest city, Basra. The fighting quickly spreads throughout southern Iraq, and the Iraqi army is initially repulsed by Sadr’s fighters. A scene of Sadr’s men celebrating over burning Iraqi vehicles, however, causes the militia’s popularity with citizens to plummet. Iraq’s prime minister, in a display of his determination, personally directs the operation in Basra. He also brings in thousands of reinforcements from an interesting place, Al Anbar Province. This would not have been possible without the cooperation of the Sunni tribes.

  March 30, 2008: Sadr brokers a cease-fire from his hideout in Iran. The Iraqi government asserts military control over Basra the next day.

  April 6, 2008: A joint U.S. and Iraqi offensive begins in Baghdad’s Sadr City, a Mahdi Army stronghold. Heavy fighting rages in the Shia slum for weeks. The district is barricaded in the same manner as Ramadi’s Mila’ab.

  May 11, 2008: The Mahdi Army crumbles, unable to sustain prolonged fighting. Sadr declares a cease-fire yet again.

  May 20, 2008: Coalition forces control all of Sadr City. For the first time, coalition-supported troops maintain a presence in all of Baghdad’s nine districts.

  The fall of Sadr City marked the end of the Mahdi Army. It was also the peak of the surge. Clearly, the additional combat power provided to General Petraeus by the surge shifted the tide in the Iraq conflict. Without the surge’s additional troops, t
he United States would not have been in a position to exploit the opportunity given by the rise of the Awakening. Yet without Operation Squeeze Play, the shaping operation for the surge, the Awakening would not have happened in the manner it did. Success in Ramadi would not have been guaranteed, and the ability of the Awakening to spread beyond Anbar would have been jeopardized. Clearly, these events are not mutually exclusive.

  In a greater context, we must ensure that the lessons of this reduction in violence are truly captured. The greatest obstacle to this is inaccurate information. After I left Iraq and was sailing toward Australia, I listened to CNN’s Michael Ware (one of the best newsmen covering the Iraq conflict) explain the changing of the tide in Anbar as the United States paying thugs to secure the streets. This belief has led to an assumption that the United States can simply hire militias to do its fighting. Mr. Ware’s statement is not completely correct, however. The streets of Julayba, Ramadi, and other villages across Anbar were secured before the fighters of the Awakening were ever paid. They fought first out of a determination to destroy al Qaeda. Our payments to them were to sustain our gains once they transitioned into a peacekeeping role. If the United States attempts to hire militia/guerrilla-style forces before it wins over the population, it will be repeating the mistakes of Afghanistan in the 1980s, an era when the country funded the efforts of Osama bin Laden.

  This is only one of numerous lessons from Ramadi. Dozens more are threaded throughout Rage Company. Rather than continuing to list them in the style of a tactical manual, I have chosen to let the reader learn them in the same fashion I did: via experience. Challenge our decision making, our actions, and ultimately our results. In order to defeat the guerrilla threat of the future, we must understand how we won against Al Qaeda in Iraq in early 2007. Only then will we realize what the end-state in the “war on terror” looks like.