The European Dream

by Jeremy Rifkin

  Which course is likely to prevail? Right now both the xenophobic and pluralistic cultural schools are at play. The question of future outcomes depends largely on whether ethnic-based interests and rights-based interests can find common ground with one another and with the European Union over an extended geographic field, stretching from the local to the transnational arena. If the European Union can facilitate the coming together of these varied interests in Europe-wide governing networks, the stage will be set for a new kind of politics more suited for the challenges of a globalizing world. The success of the European Dream depends, in no small measure, on the ability to make cultural identity, universal human rights, and European governance a seamless rather than a contradictory relationship.

  The new partnership between the EU and civil society organizations is going to prove difficult to manage. We need to bear in mind that CSOs are often at odds with government over official policies. Governments, in turn, often perceive CSOs as threats to their authority and seek to undermine their credibility and discredit their legitimacy.

  It’s not surprising, then, that the EU has not always greeted the participation of the third sector with open arms. It has been the combination of relentless public pressure and mobilization of popular support behind their agendas that has forced government recognition and secured them a place in the formal public policy debate.

  Former United Nations secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali characterizes civil society organizations and movements as “a basic form of popular representation in the present-day world.” He says that “their participation in international relations is, in a way, a guarantee of the political legitimacy of those international organizations.”13

  Boutros-Ghali’s opinion, while widely shared, is still controversial in many quarters. Although the UN General Assembly allows for greater formal input by CSOs at international gatherings, the UN Security Council bars civil society participation, as does the WTO. Some global organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, give lip service to CSO representation but generally limit participation to an advisory role, often several steps removed from official proceedings. Nation-states and provincial and local governments are also ambivalent about how much formal participation by CSOs ought to be sanctioned. Most governments would probably prefer to limit CSO involvement to a monitoring and feedback function and to mobilizing support behind government initiatives, with formal partnerships limited to just the delivery of services. The CSOs, understandably, would like to be at the decision-making table, with an equal voice and vote in policy decisions. The tensions between the two sectors often flare up and spill out onto the streets. Civil society protests at global political forums and at the EU, as well as at national- and regional-level conferences and meetings, have increased dramatically in recent years.

  Much of the ambivalence on the part of government actors and the rising sense of frustration and anger by the activists have to do with conflicting political agendas. Transnational civil society movements use their clout to gain increasing recognition of the universal rights of individuals—as well as nature—under international laws and seek to hold governments accountable to said laws. Their ultimate aim is to create a new planetary political sphere connecting individuals and nature directly to global covenants and conventions. Civil society organizations that represent local subcultures eat away at national sovereignty from the other end. They are constantly in search of new ways to secure greater regional and local autonomy and a more independent voice in decisions that affect their communities. Nation-states sense that the goals of rights-oriented and subculture-oriented civil society organizations, at times, threaten their own sovereignty and hegemony and attempt to either absorb or ignore activist efforts to gain a foothold into the political process.

  The European Union, on the other hand, has shown itself to be somewhat more open on the matter of integrating the civil society into its political sphere, although even in Brussels, there are pockets of resistance to the idea of advancing greater CSO participation. The reason the EU is willing to share at least some governing power with civil society organizations is that they bring with them the kind of local, grassroots credibility that Brussels so desperately needs to effectively maintain its legitimacy in a world torn between local, national, regional, and global forces.

  A recent study conducted by Edelman PR, one of the world’s leading public relations firms, found that among public opinion leaders, especially in Europe, civil society organizations are more favorably regarded and enjoy higher levels of trust than either the commercial or government sectors. While 41 percent of European opinion leaders were favorably disposed toward CSOs in Europe, only 28 percent regarded businesses favorably, and a mere 17 percent were favorable to government.14 Opinion leaders in the U.S., however, were more favorably disposed to business and government, with 40 percent favorable to commerce and 46 percent favorable to political institutions. Only 34 percent were favorable to CSOs.15

  When it comes to trust, again European opinion leaders said they have greater trust in CSOs than either business or government. The figures are compelling. Fifty-one percent of opinion leaders say they trust CSOs, only 41 percent say they trust business, and a meager 26 percent say they have trust in government. Again, the United States’ opinion leaders express greater trust in government and business than CSOs, but the difference in trust levels between the three sectors is only slight.16 Other surveys confirm similar findings.

  It’s not hard, then, to understand why the European Union has embraced, at least tentatively, the idea of sharing governance with CSOs in European policy networks. CSOs enjoy widespread public support and bring a new sense of participatory democracy to the political process. The EU is often criticized for a failure to narrow what observers call the “democratic deficit.” With European public opinion polls showing lukewarm support of the European Union, the bureaucrats in Brussels have everything to gain and little to lose in embracing CSOs as partners in Europe-wide policy networks.

  Equally important, CSOs are the social engine for preserving cultural diversity throughout the European Union and for mobilizing public support behind universal rights agendas. They are both embedded in geographic communities and, at the same time, connected in their activities beyond regional and even EU boundaries. They are local, transnational, and global players and the essential political partner for an EU regulatory state dedicated to advancing both cultural diversity and universal human rights.

  What’s becoming clear is that in a world increasingly dominated by global corporate interests, governments at every level—municipal, regional, national, and transnational—will have to establish deep interlinking policy networks with civil society organizations if either are to amass enough political power to provide an effective counterbalance to the commercial arena.

  12

  The Immigrant Dilemma

  EUROPE IS A KALEIDOSCOPE of cultural diversity. The Union’s inhabitants break down into a hundred different nationalities who speak eighty-seven different languages and dialects, making the region one of the most culturally diverse areas of the world.1

  For a long time, the business community and Europe’s political elite viewed these cultural enclaves as impediments to progress, historical backwaters that resisted change and fostered traditional prejudices against other groups, especially immigrants and foreigners. Nation-states tried to assimilate them into the dominant national cultures but had only mixed success. Local cultures proved quite resilient.

  The early EU visionaries, like their nation-state political counterparts, were uneasy with the idea of accommodating distinct cultures. They worried that local cultures would be unfriendly to Europeanization and, therefore, made little room for them at the table. By the 1970s, however, multiculturalism was experiencing a makeover of sorts. A new generation of post-modern scholars took up their cause, arguing that the Enlightenment project, with its emphasis on grand meta-narratives, nation-state hegemony, and monolithic ideolog
ies, was the real impediment to change. The post-modernists contend that the emphasis on single-perspective and unified visions only supports a colonial agenda that breeds intolerance of other views and spawns repression and violence against minorities at home and subject peoples abroad. In a world increasingly dominated by global commercial forces and remote and impersonal political bureaucracies, the post-modernists champion an antidote in the form of multicultural perspectives and the reification of local cultures.

  If, in the nation-state era, the struggle was a class one and centered on the question of possession and distribution of capital and the protection of private property rights, in a global era the struggle is over diversity and centers more on preserving one’s cultural identity and enjoying access rights in a densely connected, interdependent world.

  What most people fear in a globalizing age, where all the old boundaries are being torn down, is both getting lost and being left out. One’s cultural affiliation provides a larger group identity and is a way of being heard, of securing a safe haven in the new multilayered world. Having access is a way of being included in the larger flow of activities that is inexorably moving the human race into a shared commercial arena and global public square. The resurgence of cultural identity, then, serves a dual function. It both establishes a boundary to differentiate oneself from the outside world and provides a strong social vehicle that can be used to assert one’s right to access to the global flows that surround.

  From Class Politics to Cultural Politics

  Managing cultural diversity would be tough enough, if it were only a matter of accommodating the often competing agendas of existing European subcultures. The situation is exacerbated by the dramatic increase in immigrant cultures from outside the European Union.

  The globalization of capital flows creates new divides. The world’s poor are forced to migrate to wherever capital takes up residence. It’s a matter of finding work. In Europe, companies are anxious to recruit cheaper immigrant workers in order to cut their labor costs and remain competitive in world markets. Immigrant groups will often take menial jobs that the native population refuses to do. Cheap immigrant labor also has the effect of dampening wages for everyone else. And, in a depressed labor market with high structural unemployment, Europeans worry that immigrant groups will grab the few available manufacturing and service jobs, at the expense of the native-born.

  There is also the concern that immigrant cultures will strain an already overburdened welfare system by taking up precious social services. In an era characterized by heavy taxes and diminishing welfare benefits, native populations, and especially less endowed local cultural communities, are loath to have their taxes spent on educating “foreigners” and providing welfare benefits to support their families.

  Lastly, native cultural communities claim that poor immigrants pose a real threat to public safety. It is true that a disproportionate number of immigrants commit crimes and end up in prison. In Germany, for example, foreigners make up a startling 33 percent of the prison population, even though they comprise less than 9 percent of the country’s population. In France, 26 percent of the prisoners are immigrants, while foreigners make up only 8 percent of the population.2

  The main reason for the high crime rate is the high unemployment rate among foreigners living in the EU countries. In Germany, 15 percent of the immigrant work population is unemployed, compared to 7 percent of the native-born population. In France, the unemployment rate among male immigrants is 20 percent, compared to 9 percent of the native-born population. Europeans are growing increasingly apprehensive. In a recent poll conducted by the European Commission, 39 percent of EU residents said that legal immigrants should be sent home if they’re unemployed. The immigrants counter that they would like to work but are systematically excluded from employment in many industries. In France, there are more than fifty professions that exclude non-EU nationals from employment, including airline pilots, pharmacists, funeral-home directors, midwives, and architects. Foreigners are even denied the right to obtain licenses to sell alcohol and tobacco. Other countries sport similar employment restrictions.3

  Immigrants are frequently discriminated against by their adopted country. The discrimination, in turn, perpetuates the cycle of dire poverty and alienation and fans the flames of social unrest among immigrants, creating a kind of vicious cycle that’s difficult to break. Then, too, immigrant parents often are unable to exert the same kind of parental control over children that they were able to command in their native land. The breakdown of family authority combined with abject poverty and a sense of rootlessness make for a powerful mix of escalating antisocial behavior and crime.

  Europeans, by and large, feel inundated and overwhelmed by the immigrant crush. The resentment has been building up slowly over the course of the past half century and now threatens to undo the process of Europeanization. Only 21 percent of Europeans polled in 2000 considered themselves to be “actively tolerant” of immigrants. More than half of the EU population surveyed said that the quality of education suffers if the immigrant percentage of the school population “is too high.”4 Moreover, one half of the EU population agreed that “people from minority groups abuse the social welfare system.”5

  Even in the United Kingdom, which has long been known for being somewhat more tolerant of immigrants, two-thirds of those surveyed said that there were just too many foreigners in their country.6 Similarly, according to a German poll, two-thirds of the population favor stronger immigration controls.7 The growing resentment toward immigrants has encouraged the birth of anti-immigration parties on the extreme right, many of whom enjoy widespread popular support. The Italian Northern League, the Swiss People’s Party, the Austrian Freedom Party, and the French National Front have all met with success at the polls with their populist appeals attacking immigrants.8

  The EU as a Land of Immigrants

  Although European countries have experienced migratory waves in the past, the numbers, until late, have been relatively small compared to those of the United States. America is a nation of immigrants. Everyone—with the exception of Native Americans—came from somewhere else, and most immigrants, at least for the first three centuries, arrived from Europe. European cultures, by contrast, have existed often in the same region for millennia of history. Welcoming newcomers has proved to be challenging.

  The modern wave of immigrants began arriving in Europe after World War II. Labor shortages brought on by the losses of so many young men and women in the war led Germany, France, Belgium, and Switzerland to recruit cheap labor from Southern Europe in the late 1950s and 1960s, and Turkey and North Africa in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.9 Most of the foreign workers were characterized as guest workers and deemed to be temporary rather than permanent residents. The U.K., France, and the Netherlands drew immigrant labor from their foreign colonies. Italy and Spain soon followed suit, by bringing in guest workers to fill menial jobs within the agricultural sector.10 Labor shortages throughout Europe were so acute at the time that immigrants were welcomed with open arms. They were regarded as essential to the effort to rebuild the war-torn economies of the continent. In the 1970s, the dramatic post-World War II economic growth began to cool down. The OPEC oil embargo in 1973 led to a worldwide recession and growing unemployment lines across Europe. Fear over job loss ignited native political resentment and spawned anti-immigrant movements in virtually every European country.

  Immigration picked up again in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the tearing down of the Berlin Wall. The economic boom in Western Europe in the 1990s brought in more immigrants. Many were asylum-seekers and illegal aliens from Central and Eastern Europe and especially war-ridden Yugoslavia.

  The successive waves of immigrants into Western Europe over the past five decades has nearly equaled the intensity of the great migrations to America at the turn of the last century. Germany took in 24.5 million immigrants between 1950 and 1988, while France opened its doors to 21.9 million imm
igrants. The U.K., Switzerland, and Scandinavia, as well as the low countries of Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium, accounted for an additional 25 million immigrants.11

  The European Commission reports that in 1999, nineteen million people, or 5.1 percent of the total population of the fifteen member states, were non-nationals. Thirty percent of the migrants, or six million people, were from other EU member states. The remaining thirteen million immigrants, totally 3.4 percent of the total population of Europe, were from outside the EU. By way of contrast, in 1985 there were only 8.4 million third-party immigrants (non-EU nationals) living in Europe, or 2.3 percent of the total population. In Austria, non-nationals make up 9 percent of the population, and in Germany they make up nearly 7 percent of the population. In France and Sweden, non-nationals comprise 6 percent of the population.12

  The sociological effects of this kind of rapid immigration can be boggling. For example, in Germany in 1960, nearly everyone who married was German. In only one marriage out of every twenty-five was a foreign national one of the partners. By 1994, in one out of every seven marriages, one or both of the spouses were foreign born. Births are even more illuminating. In 1960, only 1.3 percent of births had a foreign father or mother. By 1994, 18.8 percent of newborns had a foreign father, mother, or both.13 Mixed cultural marriages seem to have two contradictory effects. They often deepen the sense of diminution of German culture and lead to a more bitter cultural retrenchment and reprisals against foreigners. At the same time, the fusing of cultural traditions opens up new channels of communications between the cultures and lessens some of the cultural barriers, at least among the grown children of mixed marriages.